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Abstract 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the effects of the use of derivatives on financial 
risk measures of UK non-financial firms for the period 1999-2010. This question is 
important in the light of attempts by regulators to curb the use of over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives as a response to the 2008 financial crisis, the introduction of European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation and more recently the prospect of the introduction of the 
financial transactions tax. Despite the significant use of derivatives by UK non-financial 
firms, there is a gap in literature for a study that shows the effect of derivatives use on the 
financial risk for UK firms. This examination is important in the UK setting as financial 
distress is more costly for the UK firms due to higher creditors’ right in the UK, all else 
being equal. In this thesis, the effects of foreign currency (FC) and interest rate (IR) 
derivatives are examined on the 1-year probability of default, 5-year probability of default, 
total risk, idiosyncratic risk, market risk and foreign exchange (FX) exposure. This thesis 
contributes to the corporate hedging literature by presenting, to the best of our knowledge, 
new evidence on the impact of derivatives on firm financial risk.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis examines the effects of derivatives use on the total risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and market risk. The results suggest that a 1% increase in the extent of 
all derivatives use is associated with a reduction of 2.52% in total risk, 2.22% in 
idiosyncratic risk and 0.0651 basis points in market risk. A 1% increase in the extent of FC 
derivatives use is associated with a reduction of 0.0945 basis points in market risk. We also 
examine the nonlinear effect of derivatives use on financial risk and find inverted U-
shaped relationship with reduction in total risk and idiosyncratic risk is associated with low 
and high derivatives use. We also control for the problem of endogeneity by matching 
derivative users with non-users using a propensity score matching method. Our results 
suggest that derivative users have a statistically lower 5.50% to 6.80% total risk and 4.08% 
and 5.17% idiosyncratic risk. We provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the 
notion that firms use derivatives for hedging and not for speculation. 
In Chapter 5, we examine the effects of derivative use on expected default frequency 
(EDF). The results show that IR derivatives use has a greater impact on the probability of 
default than FC derivatives use. Furthermore, we find that hedging with derivatives has a 
significantly greater impact on near term default (1-year) than long-term (5-year) default 
probabilities. The interaction of derivatives variable with time dummies reveals that the 
Abstract 
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derivatives use is associated with a large reduction in the probability of default during the 
period of 2000-2001 and 2007-2009. We also interact our derivatives variable with proxies 
for credit risk conditions and find that derivatives use has largest negative effect on the 
probability of default during the period of heightened credit risk conditions. In this chapter 
endogeneity between the probability of default, derivatives and leverage is addressed using 
instrumental variable analysis. The results suggest that derivatives use is associated with a 
reduction in the probability of default. We also use propensity score matching method to 
match derivative users and non-users and then examine the mean differences on the 
probability of default for matched firms. The results show that the mean 1-year (5-year) 
probability of default of derivative users is 1.60% to 2.09% (1.11% to 1.24%) lower across 
different matching methods than matched non-users. The findings of this chapter will be of 
interest to public policy makers, financial regulators and corporate as they suggest that 
firms are using derivatives for hedging purposes rather than speculative ones. 
In Chapter 6, we examine the effects of FC derivatives and FC debt on FX exposure. The 
results show that firms use FC derivatives and FC debt to hedge unexpected changes in FX 
rates as the use of FC derivatives and FC debt is associated with a significant reduction in 
FX exposure. The results also indicate that UK non-financial firms’ stock returns are 
sensitive to not only the current but also the time delayed exchange rate changes and that 
the use of FC derivatives also significantly reduce the sensitivity of stock return to the time 
delayed exchange rate changes. In respect of FC debt, the evidence suggests that the use of 
FC debt leads to a significant reduction in FX exposure and supports the view that FC debt 
works as a natural hedge. We also examined the effect of FC debt on the probability of 
default and Z-score after showing that FC debt works as a natural hedge.  
The empirical examination in this thesis provides an important understanding of the role 
played by derivatives in UK non-financial firms’ risk management policies. This thesis 
contributes to the existing body of knowledge on risk management by providing a 
comprehensive examination of the effect of derivatives on UK firms’ risk.   
Keywords: Bankruptcy, Default Probabilities, Derivatives, Total risk, Foreign Debt, 
Foreign Exchange Exposure, Hedging, Idiosyncratic Risk, Market Risk, Risk Management, 
Speculation and Z-score. 
JEL CODES: G3, G32.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
In the current financial climate risk management has become one of the key financial 
decisions faced by finance directors and corporate treasurers. There has been extensive 
growth in the use of derivatives by corporations around the world but various stakeholders 
such as employees, investors, creditors and regulators have become increasingly concerned 
about how firms use these instruments, particularly in light of the recent financial crisis.1 
These stakeholders are concerned about the stability of their employment, the value of 
their investments, the ability of the firm to payback its lenders and whether firms are 
taking excessive financial risks, which could affect the economy as a whole. It follows 
then that an understanding of the effects of derivatives use on the firm’s level of risk is an 
important area of research. 
In today’s economic environment firms are serving new markets, which brings new 
challenges and less explored areas of risk. FX risk, IR risk and CP risk are examples of 
fresh challenges these new markets offer to corporations that are ready to explore the new 
avenues and accept the challenges they offer. Encountered with the financial risk of 
functioning in world markets, many firms choose risk management activities, such as 
financial derivatives, in order to reduce the unfavourable and unexpected effects of 
exchange rate, IR and CP volatility. However, the recent financial crisis has shown that 
there are many instances where firm’s senior managers have been encouraged to take on 
additional financial risks rather than dampen the effects of financial price volatility. In the 
wake of recent financial crisis of 2007, derivative markets have come under greater 
scrutiny. The financial crisis points out the important role played by financial derivatives 
market in recent failures of Lehman Brothers and American Insurance Group in 2008 and 
brought these financial markets to the attention of regulatory authorities. This brings 
                                                 
1“According to the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), at the end of December 2009 the notional value of 
outstanding interest rate (IR) and foreign exchange (FX) derivatives held by non-financial customers was 
$35.6 trillion and $8.8 trillion, respectively. By comparison, at the end of 2000 those numbers were only $6.1 
trillion and $3.3 trillion. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) reports that virtually 
all of the world’s largest companies use derivatives to hedge their business and financial risks.”Campello, 
Lin, Ma and Zou (2011, p. 1615) 
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criticism for the complex and less transparent nature of financial derivatives market that 
limits the ability of regulators to identify the level of financial risk. 
Financial derivative instruments are widely used risk management instruments. Derivatives 
can allow businesses to effectively manage exposures to external influences on their 
business over which they have no control. Derivatives can also be used to speculate on 
market prices. Derivatives is “a means of either gaining exposure to or gaining an offset to 
an underlying asset without either buying or selling the underlying asset” (LCH.Clearnet, 
stated by House of Lords, 2010, p. 8). A derivatives contract involves one party reducing 
its risk, “When a derivative contract is entered, one party to the deal typically wants to 
free itself of a specific risk, linked to its commercial activities, such as currency or interest 
rate risk, over a given time period. It is ‘hedging’; and the more exact that hedge, the 
better for the hedging party”(The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, stated 
by House of Lords, 2010, p. 8), and other taking on risk associated with an underlying 
asset, “The other party to the deal assumes the risk, though it may then ‘lay it off’ 
elsewhere, in a process akin to reinsurance. Thus risk passes to those most willing to take 
it on (including investors, who are used to taking similar risks through other financial 
instruments)” (The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, stated by House of 
Lords, 2010, p. 8). This allows parties to speculate on the values of underlying assets 
without having any actual interest in the asset itself. This use of derivatives for speculating 
on financial prices, coupled with the lack of transparency in the derivatives market as a 
whole, could lead to increased firm risk. Financial market regulators like European 
commission are concerned about the potential risk arising from the use of derivative 
instruments for speculation. 
In a seminal work, Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that hedging does not add value to 
the firm in a perfect capital market. However, in the absence of perfect capital market 
hedging can increase firm value by reducing expected cost of financial distress, better 
coordinating financing and investment decisions, reducing corporate tax liability, 
improving conflict of interest between bondholder and shareholders and maximising the 
value of manager’s wealth portfolio.2 Corporate hedging theory argues that firms faced 
                                                 
2 See for more details Smith and Stulz (1985), Bessembinder (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), 
Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Graham and Smith (1999)  
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with large exposures to interest rates, exchange rates or commodity prices can increase 
firm value by reducing or eliminating these exposures. Firms can achieve this by using 
financial and operational hedging strategies. Financial hedging strategies involve use of 
derivative instruments such as FC derivatives, IR derivatives, commodity price (CP) 
derivatives and FC debt3; whereas operational hedging strategies require physical change 
of production or change of supplier among others. Operational hedging strategies are 
normally for a longer period and require huge financial commitments whereas financial 
hedging strategies do not require huge financial commitments and can be available for both 
short-term and long-term periods.4 
Some US studies have examined the question of whether derivatives are being used for 
hedging or speculation. These studies reported mixed results. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
using a data of US firms for the year 2001 find that use of derivatives significantly reduces 
the foreign exchange exposure firms face. Guay (1999) also studies US non-financial firms 
and finds evidence that firms use derivatives to hedge, and not to increase firm financial 
risk. Guay (1999) finds that in the year following the start of derivatives use firms 
experience a decline in market risk, idiosyncratic risk and IR risk exposures. In contrast, 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find very little differences in the measures of risk between 
users and non-users of derivative instruments. They point out that they do not find 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms use derivatives to speculate on a large 
scale. However, they do not detect any significant reduction in firms’ risks from the use of 
derivatives either. Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) find significantly lower total risk, 
market risk and cash flow volatility for derivative users compared to matched non-user 
firms. Recently, Boyer and Marin (2013) and Magee (2013) examine the effect of 
derivatives use on the market-based measure of default using US data. Both of the studies 
find negative effect of FC derivatives use on the measure of default. However, both the 
studies only examine the effect of FC derivatives and do not examine the effects of IR 
derivatives despite the fact that IR derivatives should have a greater effect on the 
likelihood of default. 
                                                 
3 To use FC debt as a hedging tool a firms needs to have foreign income. 
4 There is no cost to enter into a forwards derivative contract where as there is a premium to buy an options 
contract in OTC market.  
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The discussion above suggests that there is, to the best of our knowledge, very little 
research on the impact of derivatives on firm financial risk.  It also shows that not all 
categories of derivatives are employed to investigate their effect on firm financial risk. In 
this thesis, we examine the impact of derivatives use on measures of firm financial risk for 
a large sample of UK non-financial firms during the period 1999 to 2010. In particular, we 
examine the effects of any derivative and then separately FC and IR derivatives use on 
firm risk. This examination is presented in three empirical chapters. All these chapters 
examine the effect of derivatives on a distinct type of firm risk. The first empirical chapter 
(Chapter 4) examines the effects of derivatives on firm equity price risks. In particular, the 
chapter examines whether the use of derivatives lowers firm total risk, market risk and 
idiosyncratic risk. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) examines the effects of 
derivatives on a market-based measure of the likelihood of default. In this chapter, we use 
the 1-year and 5-year expected default frequency (EDF) as a measure of the probability of 
default. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) examines the effects of FC derivatives and 
FC debt use on firm exchange rate exposure and the probability of default.  Firm exchange 
rate exposure is measured by exchange rate betas estimated using the market model.  
1.2. Research Rationale 
The main reason for conducting this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
effects of derivatives use on the firm risk in the context of UK. This is particularly useful 
to regulators, investors, creditors and employees. We conduct this analysis by examining 
the effects of derivatives use on the total risk, market risk, idiosyncratic risk, 1-year 
probability of default, 5-year probability of default and FX exposures. Previous researchers 
examined the determinants of derivatives use5 using data for UK firms; however, not much 
is known about the effects of derivatives on the firm financial risk measures. This gap in 
the existing literature motivated this study to conduct this research. 
This research is very important given the recent financial crisis and the role-played by 
derivative instruments during this period. Financial regulators have blamed OTC derivative 
instruments for the systemic failures in global financial markets. In view of this, public 
policy makers and regulators are planning to curb the use of OTC derivative instruments. 
The European Market Infrastructure Regulation introduced new regulations governing the 
                                                 
5 Judge (2006a), Judge (2006b) and Clark and Judge (2008) 
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use of derivative instruments and started a move towards exchange–traded instruments and 
centralised clearing and therefore daily marking-to-market of firms’ derivative positions. 
Non-financial firms are opposing these new regulations, as the new regulations will 
increase the cost of firms for using financial derivatives. Non-financial firms argue that 
they use derivative instruments for reducing their exposure to unanticipated changes in the 
future prices of currency, interest rates and commodity and hence they should be excluded 
from the new regulations governing the derivatives use. In a memorandum to House of 
Lords, British Airways argued that “The economic effect of the requirement to provide 
cash collateral/margining is to convert the primary risk for companies from that 
associated with counterparty exposure into liquidity risk. The adverse effect of the creation 
of liquidity risk is a reduction in the amount of funds allocated to productive investment in 
the Company, and curtailment or even elimination of the ability of BA to manage its 
financial risks (ie hedge) because the liquidity risk generated jeopardises our financial 
stability”House of Lords (2010).  
Furthermore, this research is very vital due to the prospect of the introduction of the 
financial transactions tax (FTT). Though FTT will be introduced for financial firms, non-
financial firms could be considered financial firms and will be liable to pay the FTT; if 
non-financial firms carry out activities such as deposit taking, lending, financial leasing or 
guarantees and commitments and also if the average annual value of their financial 
transactions is more than 50% of their overall average net turnover (Martin, Tim and 
Kamal, 2013). Despite the proposal by European Committee to protect non-financial 
business from the FTT, it has been argued that the introduction of the FTT would 
unfavourably affect the risk management activities of non-financial firms (PwC, 2013). 
This indicates that introduction of FTT would lead to reduction in the use of derivatives 
due to increased costs and will result in unhedged risk for non-financial firms. Given this, 
the findings of this study are potentially quite significant, because if non-financial firms 
are actually using derivative instruments for risk management purposes, it could be argued 
that non-financial firms should be exempted from the new regulations and permitted to use 
OTC derivatives without any impediments. 
The research question of this thesis is very important in a UK context for several reasons. 
First, the bankruptcy code in UK is creditor friendly which implies, all else being same, 
that the rules of bankruptcy in the UK make bankruptcy more likely for firms in financial 
distress. Both UK and US are English-origin countries, however, they have substantially 
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different protection for creditors.   In the UK senior creditors are secured by floating 
charge that gives senior creditors full control of the firm via receivership in the event of 
bankruptcy (Senbet and Wang, 2012). The UK is also given the highest creditor rights 
score of 4 by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) whereas US is given 
a creditor rights score of only 16. Hence, all else being equal it is more important for UK 
firms to manage their firm financial risk than US firms. Second, the UK is a relatively 
open economy in which its firms trade actively with customers in the EU and further 
afield. For example, in 2012 UK exports as a percentage of GDP equated to 32% whereas 
the corresponding figure for the US was only 14%.7  Third reason for conducting this 
analysis is that there are no studies that use UK data to explicitly examine whether 
derivatives are used for hedging or speculative motives. This study is intended to fill this 
gap.  
1.3. Research Questions 
This section presents the research questions that are examined in each of the empirical 
chapters. The main aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
effects of derivative instruments on the firm financial risks. We organise our aim into three 
empirical chapters in this thesis and try to answer the research question. 
1.3.1. Objective for Chapter 4 
The objective for Chapter 4 is to examine the effect of use of derivatives on equity price 
risk. A few studies examine this question using data for US firms (Guay, 1999; Hentschel 
and Kothari, 2001), Australian firms (Nguyen and Faff, 2010) and a world-wide sample 
(Bartram, 2006; Bartram et al., 2011).8 The results of these studies are rather mixed.  
Guay (1999) finds an average reduction of 5% in the stock return volatility of all derivative 
user firms for a sample of US firms. However, Hentschel and Kothari (2001) fail to find 
any significant reduction in the total risk for a sample of US derivative users. Bartram 
(2006) examines the effects of derivatives use on financial risks for a sample of firms 
across 46 countries and finds significant negative effect of derivatives on the financial 
                                                 
6 See La Porta et al. (1998) for more details. 
7 Sourced from www.data.worldbank.org. 
8The sample of Bartram (2006) and Bartram et al. (2011) inlcudes UK firms. Bartram et al. (2011) did not 
examine the research question separately for UK firms and hence it is not clear how derivatives use effect 
firm finacnial risk measures of UK firms. 
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risks. However, the author fails to find any significant negative effect of derivatives on 
firm risks when a separate examination is performed for UK firms. For a sample of 
Australian firms Nguyen and Faff (2010) find a nonlinear effect of derivatives use on total 
risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk. Bartram et al. (2011) examine the average mean 
difference between matched derivative users and non-users and find significantly lower 
standardised total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk. In this thesis, a negative sign is 
expected on the derivatives coefficient if firms are using derivatives for hedging and 
positive sign if firms use derivatives for speculation. 
1.3.2. Objective for Chapter 5 
The objective for Chapter 5 is to examine the effect of derivatives on firms’ probability of 
default. We used expected default frequencies as a proxy for the probability of default.9 A 
firm might default on its liabilities if it is not in a position to service those liabilities due to 
IR or cash flow volatility. Hedging theories argue that a firm can reduce its probability of 
default by hedging its interest rate, foreign exchange or commodity price risk. Therefore, 
firms that use derivatives for hedging should benefit from a lower probability of default. 
Boyer and Marin (2013) and Magee (2013) examine the effects of FC derivatives use on 
the measure of default calculated using an option-based model. Boyer and Marin (2013) 
use distance to default, equity-implied volatility of assets and moneyness of debt as 
measures of firm risk. They use a dummy measure for FC derivatives use. Magee (2013) 
also uses distance to default as a measure for a firm’s probability of default and uses a 
continuous measure of foreign FC derivatives use. Both of the studies find that the use of 
FC derivatives is associated with a reduction in the probability default. However, neither of 
the studies examines the effects of IR derivatives use on the probability of default, 
although it is expected that IR derivatives should have a larger negative effect on the 
probability of default. In Chapter 5, we examine the effects of derivatives use on the 
probability of default and extend previous research by examining not only the effects of 
FC derivatives but also the effects of IR derivatives use on the probability of default. This 
chapter also examines the importance of derivatives during the period of financial crisis 
and heightened credit risk conditions and for firms with different levels of pre-derivatives 
use credit risk. 
                                                 
9 This data is sourced from Moody’s. See section 3.3.1.2 for more details. 
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1.3.3. Objective for Chapter 6 
The objective of Chapter 6 is to investigate the impact of the use of FC derivatives and FC 
debt on firm exchange rate exposure.  FC derivatives are one of the most used financial 
instruments by firms (Bank for International Settlements, 2007; Bartram, Brown and 
Fehle, 2009; Bank for International Settlements, 2012).  An examination of UK annual 
reports shows that many firms use FC debt as a means to manage their FX exposure. In 
Chapter 5 we find that UK firms have higher levels of foreign currency exposure, 
measured by foreign sales, foreign assets and foreign income, compared to US firms.10 
This suggests that all else being equal UK firms have greater incentives to use FC 
derivatives and FC debt to manage their foreign exchange exposure.  
If FC derivatives are effective in reducing FX exposure, then firms that use FC derivatives 
should end up with lower FX exposure than what they have started with. We also find 
anecdotal evidence showing that UK firms use FC debt as a tool for natural hedging 
against FX exposure. Hence, we expect that the use of FC debt should also reduce FX 
exposure. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) examine the effects of FC derivatives on FX 
exposure of US firms. They find significant negative effect of FC derivatives use on FX 
exposure. They confirm the role of FC debt as a tool for hedging, however, they did not 
further investigate the role of FC debt in reducing the FX exposure. A recent study by 
Zhou and Wang (2013) examines the effects of FC derivatives on FX exposure for a 
sample of UK firms for the year 1999. They find only a weak negative effect of FC 
derivatives use on FX exposure when they use raw values of FX exposure with p-value of 
0.1235.  
1.4. Structure of Thesis 
The remaining chapters of the thesis are organised as follows: 
1.4.1. Chapter 2: Literature Review  
provides review of the existing theoretical and empirical research related to the firms’ use 
of derivatives and the effects of derivatives use on the firm financial risks. This chapter is 
organised around the aim of this thesis that whether the use of derivatives lowers the firm 
                                                 
10 We compared our sample mean for foreign sales, foreign income, foreign assets with studies that used US 
data (Such as Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Bartram et al., 2011) 
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financial risk. This chapter highlights the gaps in the research and provides a motivation 
for this thesis. 
1.4.2. Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
In Chapter 3, we discuss the sample selection and sample period, the data sources for the 
variables used in the analysis, measurement of the dependent; independent and control 
variables, justification for the control variables and comprehensively the methods of 
estimation used in the empirical chapters. In this chapter we discuss the characteristics of 
our sample period and explain the importance of this study in the UK setting. 
1.4.3. Chapter 4: The Effects of Derivatives Use on Equity Implied Risk 
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter and examines the effects of derivatives use on the 
equity-implied risk. In particular, this chapter examines the effects of all, FC and IR 
derivatives use on the total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk. We use both continuous 
and dummy measures for derivatives use. Different estimation methods are used to 
examine the research objective. We also use propensity score matching method to match 
derivative user and non-user firms in order to control the problem of self-selection and 
endogeneity.  
1.4.4. Chapter 5: The Effect of Derivatives Use on The Probability of Default 
We examine the effects of derivatives use on the probability of default in Chapter 5. In this 
chapter, we use 1-year and 5-year expected default frequency as a measure of probability 
of default. We examine the effects of all, FC and IR derivatives use on the probability of 
default. We also control for “other” users in the sample of non-user firms. We also create 
several categories of derivatives use based on the number of derivatives and combinations 
of derivatives and examine the effects of these new categories on the probability of default. 
We control for endogeneity between the probability of default, derivatives use and 
leverage using instrumental variable approach. In particular, we use two stage least square 
model (2SLS) and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methods. To control for the 
problem of firms self-selection we use treatment effects model, propensity score method 
and coarsened exact matching method.  
1.4.5. Chapter 6: The Effects of FC Derivatives and FC Debt on FX Exposure 
In Chapter 6 we examine the effects of FC derivatives and FC debt use on the FX 
exposure. We calculate weekly and monthly FX exposure following Allayannis and Ofek 
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(2001). We also calculate lagged FX exposure, FX exposure arising from Sterling/Euro 
and Sterling/USD exchange rate changes. We create several dummy variables based on 
firm’s use of FC derivatives and FC debt and examine the effects of them on the FX 
exposure. After establishing that firms use FC debt as a hedging tool, we examine the 
effects of FC debt on the probability of the default and Z-score.  
1.4.6. Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis and summarise the research findings. This chapter provides 
the contribution of this study to the existing literature. This chapter also provides 
limitations of this thesis and implication of this study for further research. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
This chapter provides the critical review of literature associated with the motives of firms 
behind the use of derivatives and the effects of derivatives on firm risk. This section shows 
the extent to which the research on corporate derivatives is explored over the last many 
years and the questions researchers tried to answer. The research on financial derivatives 
has grown from earlier studies examining the determinants of derivatives use to recent 
studies examining the role of derivative instruments in reducing risk faced by firms. This 
section also helps us in identifying the gap in literature for a study investigating the effects 
of derivatives use on the firm financial risk for UK non-financial firms. There is a lack of 
study showing clear and consistent effect of derivatives use on firm risk. Majority of the 
literature that we investigate here either use a general derivatives category or use FC 
derivatives and examine the effect of derivatives on firm financial risk. 
2.1. Introduction 
Corporate financial theories suggest that firms that have significant exposure to FX, IR and 
CP can use derivatives to reduce their exposure and in doing so they can reduce the costs 
associated with financial distress. Derivatives work as a tool to reduce risk for firms that 
want to reduce their risk, as the risk is born by the counter party who is in best position to 
bear the risk. This risk reduction benefits firms in many ways such as firms may use more 
risky but profitable projects by managing the risk that can be hedged with derivatives that 
could not have been chosen in the absence of hedging with derivatives. Corporate financial 
theories have portrayed derivatives as a tool to reduce the cost of financial distress by 
reducing the variability of firm’s future cash flows. However, in reality the use of 
derivatives dose not closely follow the theory. Firms’ use derivative to manage their cash 
flow volatility and small firms have more cash flow volatility than large firms and hence 
higher probability of default. Furthermore, smaller firms have restricted access to capital 
and hence they need more protection than larger firms do. However, larger firms use more 
derivatives than smaller firms do. Bartram et al. (2009) find that derivative user firms are 
larger and more profitable. This little discussion about the use of derivatives shows 
difference between theory and practical use of derivatives. By relaxing the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) assumptions and allowing for capital market imperfections, Smith and Stulz 
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(1985) provide rationales for why firms may decide to hedge and therefore use derivatives 
as a means for hedging.11 Some of the researchers have explained the benefits of risk 
management.12 These theories suggest that firms that have huge exposures to IR, FX rates 
and CP should use derivatives to reduce their exposure and in doing so increase the market 
value of the firm. Following are few fundamental goals of using derivative instruments. 
2.1.1. Minimize Corporate Tax Liability. 
Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that by reducing the variability of taxable income, hedging 
can reduce a firm’s expected tax liabilities given that it has a convex tax function. Since 
tax rates are progressive, smoothing cash flows across tax years reduces the tax 
percentages and hence minimizes corporate tax liability (Copeland and Joshi, 1996). Stulz 
(1996) argues that due to the convexity of tax code, a firm has benefit to manage its 
taxable income so that the taxable income falls within an optimal range. Stulz (1996) also 
suggests that risk management allows firms to reduce fluctuations in taxable income, 
which results in lower taxable income in a complete business cycle, by allowing income to 
fall in optimal range of tax rates. Stulz (1996) and Leland (1998) argue that by reducing 
the cash-flow volatility, derivatives may increase a firm’s debt capacity and provides more 
tax benefits. 
2.1.2. Reduce the Expected Cost of Financial Distress 
Finance theories argue that firms should not hedge if shareholders can hedge their risk 
away by diversifying their portfolio. However, this is true only when shareholders are 
concerned about the future cash-flow variability caused by changes in FX, IR or CP but if 
the exposure arising from FX, IR or CP can materially change the probability of 
bankruptcy for the firms, then it creates big financial implications for shareholders (Stulz, 
1996). In this case if a firm has unhedged position then it may see decline in its assets 
relative to debt and be required to file for bankruptcy. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that 
hedging can reduce the expected cost of financial distress. Firm’s market value will 
decrease if cash flow volatility decreases firm’s capacity to payback its debt and increases 
financial distress. Increased financial distress will increase financial distress cost and it will 
be reflected in the market prices of the firm. However, for a given level of debt, derivatives 
                                                 
11 Smith and Stulz (1985) show that a firm should hedge for three reasons 1) taxes 2) cost of financial 
distress and 3) managerial risk aversion. 
12 Smith and Stulz (1985); Froot et al. (1993); Géczy et al. (1997); Guay (1999) 
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can reduce the volatility of cash flow and hence reduces the cost of financial distress. Stulz 
(1996) argues that a costless risk management programme that has potential to eliminate 
the increase in bankruptcy cost can increase the firm value. Ross (1997) and Leland (1998) 
show that by reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy derivatives may increase a firm’s debt 
capacity, which in turn will increase firm value through debt interest tax shields. Lenders 
are more likely to lend money to firm that manages its cash flow volatility by hedging 
(Copeland and Joshi, 1996).  
2.1.3. Improve the Co-ordination Between Financing and Investment Policy 
Bessembinder (1991) shows that conflicts between shareholder and bondholders can lead 
to the problem of underinvestment in future positive net present value projects and that 
derivatives can help the firm reduce this conflict. Derivative can increase the shareholder 
value by improving the co-ordination between financing and investment policies (Froot et 
al., 1993). Froot et al. (1993) argue that firms facing costly external finance may use 
derivatives to reduce the probability that internally generated cash flows are insufficient to 
cover the cost of planned investments. They argue that if external capital is costly because 
of capital market imperfection than the internal capital, then there is an advantage in using 
derivatives. Managing cash flow volatility by hedging, firms control funds available for 
new projects (Copeland and Joshi, 1996). Stulz (1996) argues that if a firm becomes 
financial weaker then it would create problem for the firm to raise the finance from the 
capital market. The cost of borrowing would also go up, if any available, which may result 
in firm not to continue with a profitable project; hence, creates problem of 
underinvestment for a firm.   
2.1.4. Maximise the Value of Managers Wealth Portfolio 
Stulz (1984) states that there are greater benefits for managers to hedge when managerial 
compensation leaves the managers holding a large portfolio of idiosyncratic firm risk. 
Managers may not use derivatives to hedge when the equity value of a firm is positively 
associated with asset volatility. However, when managers hold undiversified financial 
stock portfolio of the firm, they may hedge non-diversifiable risk, which may not be in the 
best interest of the shareholders. This shows that the managers’ compensation plan can 
lower managers risk aversion and hence affect hedging decision. Stulz (1996) argues that it 
is not only the managers who need protection but employees, customers and suppliers with 
large stakes in the firms need protection from undiversifiable risk that a firm can hedge. If 
a firm decides to hedge the undiversifiable risk then employees, customers and suppliers 
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would feel confident about the firm which would result in smooth functioning of the firm; 
otherwise employees would demand more salary to work or reduce their loyalty toward the 
firm, customers will be reluctant to buy the products due to issue with a firm’s ability to 
fulfil warranty obligations and suppliers would not enter into long-term contracts and will 
charge more trade-credits (Stulz, 1996). 
Over the last two decades several studies have examined the aforementioned theories of 
corporate hedging (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Mian, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; 
Gay and Nam, 1998; Guay, 1999; Spanò, 2004; Judge, 2006a, 2006b; Purnanandam, 2008; 
Bartram et al., 2011; Magee, 2013). All of these studies incorporate the use of financial 
derivatives into their hedging definitions. One problem with this approach is that they have 
classified derivative users as hedgers; however, firms could potentially be using 
derivatives for speculation in financial markets and not for hedging. It follows from this 
that one of the critical basic assumptions of these studies is that risk management activities 
(such as the use of derivatives) are employed for hedging (that is, risk reduction) rather 
than speculative purposes. The relationship between derivatives use and firm risk is very 
complicated. Firms’ use of derivatives may be motivated by reasons other than those 
related to hedging, such as increasing the value of the managers wealth portfolio13, firms 
attempting to profit from taking speculative positions14 and firms matching the risk 
management strategies of competitors. All these expose firms to the new risks as these 
types of trade are not linked to any underlying exposure, they have the effect of increasing 
exposure and in doing so increases the firm risk. 
2.2. Why Firms Use Derivatives? 
A wider empirical examination is conducted on the use of derivatives by non-financial 
firms. While some of the studies find that derivatives are used for speculative purposes15, 
other studies find that derivatives are used for hedging underlying exposure16. These 
suggest that firms use derivatives for both hedging and speculative motives. Géczy et al. 
                                                 
13 See for details Jensen and Meckling (1976); Smith and Stulz (1985); Tufano (1996) 
14 See for details Faulkender (2005); Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) 
15 Stulz (1996) ; Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998); Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999); Faulkender (2005); Adam 
and Fernando (2006); Aabo (2007); Geczy, Minton and Schrand (2007); Adam (2009); Chernenko and 
Faulkender (2011); Aabo, Hansen and Pantzalis (2012); Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2012); Beber and 
Fabbri (2012); Lel (2012); Júnior (2013) to name a few. 
16 Guay (1999); Allayannis and Weston (2001); Hagelin and Pramborg (2004); Purnanandam (2008); 
Nguyen and Faff (2010); Allayannis et al. (2012); Magee (2013) to name a few 
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(1997) show that firms are more likely to use FC derivatives when they have high cost of 
financial distress and high volatility of cash flow, which suggests that their sample firms 
are using derivatives to protect themselves from unanticipated changes in foreign exchange 
rates that are capable of moving firms into financial distress zone. However, they find no 
direct evidence that the use of FC derivatives reduces the exposure to foreign exchange 
risk and hence it may be possible that the use is related to expected gain from speculative 
use of derivatives. Grant and Marshall (1997) find that their sample firms rarely use 
derivatives to speculate on market movements. They show that their sample firms use 
derivatives to reduce the cash flow volatility. Smith, Smithson and Wilford (1989) argue 
that firms hedge in response to volatile financial markets, reduce taxes, reduce the cost of 
financial distress, reduce the cost of borrowing and to increase the debt capacity.17 
However, Zhao (2004) finds that firms with high variance cash flow are discouraged to use 
derivatives even when they face high cost of financial distress. 
Hedging is defined as “the acquisition of financial assets that reduce the variance of a 
firm’s payoffs” (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Hentschel and Kothari (2001) define hedging as 
risk management activity that uses financial derivatives and other instruments in order to 
mitigate the adverse effects of exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price volatility. 
Geczy et al. (2007) define hedging with derivatives as “a position in derivatives market 
with the intention of reducing firm risk”. These suggest that firms are using derivatives for 
hedging when a firm’s use of derivatives lowers the firm risk. 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) define speculation as risk management activity that uses 
financial derivatives and other instruments and increases risk instead of decreasing.  
O'conner, Wackett and Zammit (2011) define speculation as the strategy to earn additional 
profits based on a view that the market is mispriced and hence there are gains to be made 
by trading. Speculation involves using the financial derivatives instruments to gain profit 
from anticipated changes in the prices of underlying securities. Harrington and Niehaus 
(2004) argue that firms find derivatives more attractive for speculation as derivatives are 
extremely liquid and offer the potential for massive leverage. Firms with a very little 
capital can enter into the derivatives contract to speculate without committing a huge cash 
as many derivatives contract do not need any upfront fees to enter where as those contract 
                                                 
17 cited by Grant and Marshall (1997) 
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that require fees need small fraction compared to the underlying value of the derivative 
instrument. These speculative positions in derivatives market can generate huge profits for 
firms with very little investment but they also create a potential for huge losses. Geczy et 
al. (2007) define speculation with derivatives as “a position in derivatives market with the 
primary intention of making a profit or increasing risk”. 
As discussed above derivative instruments may be used either to increase or decrease the 
firm financial risk and hence raises the question that whether managers of non-financial 
firms use derivative instruments to hedge firm financial risk or whether they use these 
instruments for speculative motives. If a firm uses derivatives for hedging then it should 
end up with lower firm financial risks than what it has started with and if it uses derivatives 
for speculation then it should end up with higher firm financial risks than what it has 
started with. 
Compared to a wider empirical work on the determinants of corporate derivative usage, 
there are few studies that examined the relationship between the use of derivatives and 
their impact on the firm risk. These studies are, but not limited to, Guay (1999), Allayannis 
and Ofek (2001), Hentschel and Kothari (2001), Nguyen and Faff (2010), Bartram et al. 
(2011), Boyer and Marin (2013), Marin (2013) and Magee (2013). Among these studies, 
studies prior to year 2013 used equity-based measure of firm financial risk such as total 
risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk; whereas the recent studies used both equity-based 
and market-based measures of firm financial risk such as distance to default. Market-based 
measure of firm financial risks is calculated using market model such as Black-Scholes 
option pricing model. The existing studies have tried to examine the motives behind the 
use of derivatives mainly using US data despite the fact that UK firms are more exposed to 
pre-derivatives use firm risk18 and that UK firms use more derivatives19. This shows an 
important gap in the existing literature.  
2.3. Managers View and Selective Hedging with Derivatives 
Firms would not state that they use derivatives for speculation, if they are, after the 
increased concern with the losses incurred on the derivatives market and hence it would be 
                                                 
18 In our univariate results we show that UK firms have higher levels of pre-derivatives use measures of 
exposures and firm financial risk measures.  
19 See Bank for International Settlements (2007) report for more details. 
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difficult to identify if a firm uses derivatives for reasons other than hedging from annual 
reports. Geczy et al. (2007) examine the information disclosed in the annual reports of the 
firms and compare it with the same firms that responded to a survey saying they use 
derivative for speculation and find that the information disclosed in the annual reports, 
which also meets the minimum disclosure requirements, is not sufficient to determine 
whether firms use derivatives for speculation. Geczy et al. (2007) report that 40% of the 
respondent to the survey indicate that they actively trade in derivatives market based on 
their market views at least some times; where as 7% of the respondent firms frequently 
speculate. However, when they examine the annual reports they do not find any 
information suggesting that firms are speculating with derivatives.   
Several studies have presented evidence that suggests that non-financial firms engage in 
selective hedging activities where they incorporate their views of future market price 
movements in deciding their hedging positions. (Dolde, 1993; Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 
1996; Stulz, 1996; Bodnar et al., 1998; Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1999; Glaum, 2002; Guay 
and Kothari, 2003; Adam and Fernando, 2006; Brown, Crabb and Haushalter, 2006; 
Adam, Fernando and Salas, 2008).  
Stulz (1996) argue that this practice of selective hedging is inconsistent with the modern 
risk management theory. Outright speculation may be a rare activity for non-financial 
firms but there is evidence that managers’ future market views affect firms’ financial 
policy decisions. Stulz (1996) calls the practice of managers’ attempt to time the financial 
markets with their risk management policy decisions as “selective hedging”. The author 
says that selective hedging will increase shareholders wealth if managers have private 
information about the market than other market participants. However, if financial 
managers do not have this advantage then this type of financial strategy of hedging will 
merely result in an increase in the variability of cash flow (relative to a fully hedged 
position) and will potentially reduce shareholders value. The author argues that “selective 
hedging” firms are those firms whose managers take their market views into consideration 
while deciding the hedging strategy for the firm. A firm is referred as “selective hedging” 
firm when it changes 1) time of hedging and/or 2) volume of hedging. Geczy et al. (2007) 
use a more controlled term for speculation. They argue that a firm is defined as a 
speculator in derivatives market if a firm “actively take positions” in the derivatives 
market based on their “market views”. They argue that there are two important aspects of 
their definition: 1) “the word “active” is important, as it does not allow for confusion 
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about whether or not hedging is a form of speculation” and 2) “the question specifically 
indicates that the cause for taking positions is a market view.” 20 
Stulz (1996) provides few reasons for selective hedging. First, he notes that it is a rationale 
approach for managers of firms that are likely to go bankrupt to take speculative positions 
as they have very little to lose; also the benefits of such actions will go to shareholders 
while the losses will go to bondholders. Since the firm is in financial distress it is likely to 
fail anyway and the additional downside risk due to speculation will be negligible, 
however, the firm’s upside potential will be enhanced leading to an increase in the 
probability of survival. Second, firms that are less likely for financial distress can engage 
in more risk taking activities such as using excessive amounts of derivatives, as they are 
less susceptible to the negative outcomes of such use. Third, risk managers could engage in 
selective hedging when their compensation is structured in a way that encourages risk 
taking. Finally, some managers may engage in selective hedging because they erroneously 
believe that they have a comparative advantage in hedging selectively, which in turn might 
lead them to overestimate their ability to beat the market. Stulz (1996) suggests that firms 
that can afford to be wrong are more likely to selectively hedge. Stulz (1996) also argues 
that only firms with an informational advantage should selectively hedge. However, Stulz 
(1996) links the widely-reported problems with derivatives use with selective hedging.21 
Several previous studies relied on survey analysis to identify the motives behind the use of 
derivatives by firms, as it is difficult to identify motives behind derivative use from annual 
reports. Below we discuss few of the studies that investigate motives behind derivatives 
use using survey analysis. Using a survey data of 244 firms, Dolde (1993) reports that 
almost 90% of the responded firms said that at least some times they changed the size of 
their derivatives contract based on the future market views. This shows that a large number 
of firms use derivatives in a way that is not consistent with modern risk management 
theories. When companies have taken their market views to hedge their FX and IR 
exposures, smaller companies have significantly overtaken larger firms. Stulz (1996) argue 
that shareholders of a firm whose managers have private information benefits from the 
selective hedging. However, managers of small firms may not have this information 
                                                 
20 Geczy et al. (2007, p. 2410) 
21 See Stulz (1996) for more details. 
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advantage which seems to suggest that the responded small firms in Dolde (1993) sample 
may be using derivatives for speculative purpose. These survey findings show that 
majority of firms take their market view into account while dealing with derivatives. These 
survey results also suggest that firms do not thoroughly hedge their exposures but instead 
hedges exposure based on their own market view of the future prices. 
In a survey of 530 US firms Bodnar, Hayt, Marston and Smithson (1995) find heaviest 
usage of derivatives for 65% of large firms whereas 30% of medium sized firms reported 
use of derivatives and only 12% of small firms reported use of derivatives. 80% of 
respondent firms use derivatives for contractual commitments. They report that 43% of 
firms use derivatives with a view on the direction of the financial prices but only 9% do so 
frequently while 57% never use derivatives with a market view. This indicates that larger 
number of firms follow a strategy which leaves some exposure unhedged or increases 
exposure. Bodnar et al. (1995) also asked respondents to rank the importance of three 
different risk management goals: minimise fluctuations in accounting earnings, minimise 
fluctuations in cash flows and protecting the appearance in the balance sheet. 67% of firms 
responded that they use derivatives to minimise fluctuations in cash flow while 28% of 
firms responded that they use derivatives to minimise fluctuations in accounting earning 
and the rest 5% of firms responded that they use derivatives to protect the appearance in 
the balance sheet. This indicates that large numbers of firms use derivatives for hedging 
the firm against the volatility in cash flow. 
In the updated survey of 399 firms, Bodnar et al. (1998) find that 49% of firms sometimes 
alter the timings of their foreign exchange hedges to incorporate their market views while 
51% of firms sometimes alter the size of their foreign exchange hedges. 26% of firms also 
said that they take active positions in foreign exchange market-based on their market view. 
This seems to suggest speculative use of derivatives based on the definition of speculation 
by Geczy et al. (2007). The numbers are larger for the same type of situation for IR 
derivatives. In case of IR derivatives 60% of firms sometimes alter the timings of their IR 
hedges to incorporate their market view, while 54% of firms sometimes alter the size of 
their IR hedges. 37% of firms also said that they take active positions in IR market-based 
on their market view. These show that large number of firms uses derivatives in a way that 
is not consistent with modern risk-management theories. Bodnar et al. (1998) ask non-
financial firms if their market views of future interest rates and exchange rates cause them 
to actively take positions. 13 firms indicated that they frequently take positions, 66 firms 
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mentioned that they time to time take active positions and for 290 firms the response was 
they never speculated.  
In a comparative study of the responses to the 1995 Wharton school survey of derivative 
usage among US non-financial firms and 1997 companion survey on German non-financial 
firms, Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) find firms in US and Germany are different 
particularity on issues such as derivatives use, the selection of derivative instruments and 
the influence of their market views when taking derivative positions. German firms’ show 
considerably less concern regarding issues related to financial derivatives use than the US 
firms. This could be due to the fact that financial accounting standards in Germany have 
greater importance than the US and German firms have strict corporate policies of control 
over risk management activities than US firms. However, Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) 
report that compare to US firms, German firms are more likely to allow their own market 
views on future price movements when taking positions with financial derivatives. Almost 
25% of German firms responded that they often change the maturity or the amount of their 
derivative positions based upon their future market views. In addition to this 50.6% of 
German firms mentioned that considering their future market views they at least 
sometimes take active positions on their underlying derivatives contracts compared to 
41.2% of US firms. These indicate that large numbers of firms in both countries take 
positions on derivatives market based on their market views and not necessarily based on 
their underlying exposure and also suggest that German firms make more speculative use 
of derivatives than US firms.    
Using a survey data of 74 non-financial German firms on financial risk management 
practices Glaum (2002) finds similar results to those of Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999). The 
author finds that the most of the sample German firms pursue forecast based, profit 
oriented financial derivative strategies. This indicates that the German firms’ use of 
derivatives is associated with speculation rather than hedging. However, Glaum (2002) 
suggests that the benefits arising to shareholders from managers allowing their future 
market views into firm’s financial instruments strategy decision is not clear. Therefore, 
according to Glaum (2002), the question then arises as to why there is a widespread use of 
risk management strategies based on future market views of managers. Glaum (2002) 
provides three potential explanations for this. Firstly, managers think that their forecast of 
future exchange rates is of a value and based on it firms are able to outperform the 
financial markets, which helps them to make profit on their gambles. Secondly, managers 
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think that their forecast of future exchange rates is of a value but they are unaware that the 
firms are not able to outperform the financial market. The author argues that firms 
managers themselves think that they can successfully forecast future market prices and 
able to outperform the financial market with the information. Lastly, managers are not 
aware that they are not able to outperform the financial market but they nonetheless take 
the bets in the market. 
Using a data of 234 large non-financial firms Guay and Kothari (2003) show that firms 
hedge only a small fraction of their exposure with the help of financial derivatives. They 
argue that corporate derivatives use is a small part of non-financial firms’ risk profile. 
They provide 3 reasons for an economically small derivatives programme that firms have; 
one of these reasons is that firms may be using derivatives for purposes other than those 
expected by modern hedging theories such as speculation.22 We argue that this indicates 
that firms might be leaving some of their exposures unhedged and therefore selectively 
hedging their financial price exposure. Their data also suggest that US firms are less 
exposed to interest rates, exchange rates and CP changes. 
In a study of 133 chemical industry firms, Faulkender (2005) shows that speculation or 
market timing drives IR risk profile and not the hedging considerations. The author does 
not find evidence that firms are hedging with derivatives, as when firms’ issue of debt is 
investigated, the author find no link between IR exposure and the choice of debt 
instrument. However, the author finds that firms use IR derivatives to speculate. The 
author suggests that firms are trying to lower their short-term cost of capital. These 
findings are consistent with both short-term earnings management and speculation. In 
order to reduce their short-term debt service payments, which generates higher quarterly 
earnings, firms might swap the IR profile of their debt into floating when there is a large 
difference between fixed and floating rates. On the other hand, firms may be speculating 
by incorporating their views of anticipated IR movements into their IR exposure decision, 
resulting in a significant sensitivity to the yield spread, if such views are on average 
correlated with the shape of the yield curve. 
                                                 
22 See for more details Guay and Kothari (2003, p. 425) 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Vikram Finavker 22 M00281338 
Geczy et al. (2007) study corporations’ use of derivatives to “take a view” on interest rate 
and currency movements using response to 1998 Wharton School/CIBC Wood Gundy 
survey. They show that firms start using derivatives for hedging and once the fixed costs of 
derivatives use are reached, firms start active trading with derivatives using their market 
views. “Firms are motivated to use derivative instruments to hedge. Once the fixed costs of 
derivatives operation in place, however, some firms extend these operations to include 
active trading based on market view” (Geczy et al. (2007, p. 2)).  They find that firms that 
actively take positions in derivatives market do so based on perceived information and cost 
advantage. They find that firms that take a view in FC derivatives market do not always 
suggest that firms are also more likely to speculate in IR derivatives market. Their results 
seem to suggest that firms possess expertise in FC or IR speculation and not in both of 
them. They argue that firms speculate because firms believe that speculation is a profitable 
activity and provides upside potential without downside fall. This indicates that 
speculation is not a random activity but instead an expertise in an underlying derivatives 
product.  
There seems to be strong evidence of selective hedging in the gold mining industry (Adam 
and Fernando, 2006; Brown et al., 2006; Adam et al., 2008; Adam, 2009). In a survey of 
111 gold mining firms, Adam (2009) notes that 62% of surveyed firms mentioned their 
expectations about movements in future metal prices are very important or fairly important 
when taking decisions on how much exposure to hedge. For 3 firms out of 13 surveyed 
firms the primary risk management objective was to increase sales revenue. This may 
suggest that the motive behind the use of derivatives is speculation and not hedging.  Using 
a sample of 92 North American gold mining firms from 1989 to 1999, Adam and Fernando 
(2006) find evidence of selective hedging but find no economically significant cash flow 
gains on average from selective hedging. In an attempt to time the market their sample 
firms do not yield any positive cash flows gains on average and suggest that this kind of 
speculation creates no value for shareholders. Furthermore, Adam and Fernando (2006) 
find that gold mining firms consistently achieve economically significant cash-flow 
benefits from derivatives use. This may suggest that their sample firms are using 
derivatives for hedging. They also find that this benefits of derivatives on cash flow 
increase shareholders value, as they do not observe any pass-through effect on systematic 
risk. 
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Brown et al. (2006) examine corporate risk management strategy of 44 companies in the 
gold mining industry using quarterly data and find that risk management strategies in gold 
mining industry is affected by the risk managers’ view of future movement of gold prices. 
They find that firms decrease their hedging activities as prices move against them. In line 
with Adam and Fernando (2006), they report that the potential economic benefit arising 
because of selective hedging in their sample is fairly small even before allowing for the 
marginal transaction costs of such hedging. They find no evidence of superior operating or 
financial performance based on selective hedging activities of the managers. 
A study by Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) further investigate the reasons for the IR 
timing behaviour noted by Faulkender (2005) and find that, to meet consensus earnings 
estimate and to increase managerial compensation firms primarily use IR swap to 
determine the choice of IR exposure. This is consistent with speculative motives of 
derivatives use. Consistent with Froot et al. (1993), their results indicate support for 
economies of scale hypothesis as they find that large investment firms are the ones that use 
derivatives to hedge IR exposure that is they match their IR liabilities to the cash flow. 
This also means that small firms use IR derivatives for speculative motives. In support for 
speculative motives behind the use of derivatives they find that when managerial 
compensation contracts are dependent on firms’ performance and earnings, firms use IR 
derivatives to speculate. They argue that if firms IR exposure from their operations is not 
changing over-time then there should not be any significant variation in the use of IR 
derivatives over-time and if there is a significant variation then the driver of this change is 
speculative motive. They find evidence that derivative usage is significantly varying over-
time and is consistent with firms using IR derivatives for speculation. Overall, their results 
suggest that non-financial firms use IR derivatives for both hedging and speculative 
motives. Interestingly, in a study of selective hedging in the airline industry, Sturm (2009) 
find that the crude oil futures markets may be vehicles by which the domestic airline 
industry can create value via selectively cross hedging their exposure to jet fuel price. 
In a study of Brazilian firms during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, Júnior (2013) finds 
that a significant number of Brazilian companies speculated in the derivatives market. The 
author identified two types of speculators: 1) firms that significantly increased their 
derivatives use in line with their underlying exposure, positive exchange rate exposure, 
during these period and 2) firms that have taken positions in derivatives contracts in which 
they do not have any underlying exposure, negative exchange rate exposure, and hence 
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unadvisable, with a common objective of making a gain through a continuous process of 
home currency appreciation as evident from their short-term position in the foreign 
exchange market. They show that firms that have information advantage in FC markets, 
exporters and firms with foreign debt, are more likely to speculate. Júnior (2013) reports 
that a substantial number of companies in the sample speculated during the period of study. 
The author reports 37.8% of firms speculated in the exchange rate market in year 2008 
while in year 2009, 21% of sample firms were classified as speculators. 
Using a panel of non-financial firms from North America during 1996-2001, Beber and 
Fabbri (2012) find evidence of selective hedging. They find that managers of their sample 
firms adjusted their positions in derivatives contracts based on the previous year’s 
exchange rate movements and hence suggest that firms take positions in derivative 
contracts based on their perspective on the exchange rate trajectory. They analyse the time-
series variation of FC derivatives and find selective hedging is a reason for considerable 
time-series variation they observe in currency derivatives holdings in excess of what can 
be explained by changes in currency exposure. 
2.4. Firm Characteristics that Might Influence Corporate Speculation or Hedging 
The literature provides various explanations for firms’ use of derivatives for speculation. 
Several empirical studies below suggest that firm size, corporate governance, firm distress 
level, manager’s skills and private information are related to speculation. 
Ljungqvist (1994) argues that firms whose managers have private information about firm’s 
exposure to risk may have an incentive to speculate on future financial price movements. If 
private information suggested by Ljungqvist (1994) motivates the decision to speculate, 
then there are chances that financial derivative users could be using them for speculation, if 
they are presented with these incentives. Therefore, it would seem that the only way to 
differentiate between hedging and speculating firm is to compare the financial risk 
characteristics of derivative users and non-users. If derivative using firms display lower 
levels of financial risk then it could be argued that firms are using financial derivatives for 
hedging purposes and not to speculate. 
Tufano (1996), using a sample of 48 North American gold mining firms for the period 
1990 to 1994, finds that as US gold producers increase their use of derivatives to the 
sensitivity of equity value to gold price falls, which is consistent with the theories of 
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hedging that derivatives are used for hedging purposes. Furthermore, the author also shows 
that firms with less liquidity manage more gold price exposure. Géczy et al. (1997) 
mention that they are observing derivatives use by sample firms and not the motive of 
using derivatives; considering this they mention that derivatives might be used for 
speculation rather than hedging. They mention that some of the firm characteristic 
variables, such as firm size, are significant determinants of both optimal speculation and 
optimal hedging, while other proxy variables such as those related with underinvestment 
costs are unrelated to optimal speculative motives. However, they find no support for the 
speculative uses of derivatives. They point out that although a currency derivative is not 
direct measure of hedging, their results suggest that on an average, their sample firms are 
not speculating with currency derivatives instruments. 
Geczy et al. (2007) show three features of survey respondents to 1998 Wharton 
School/CIBC Wood Gundy survey. First, they find firms that frequently speculate on FX 
rates have majority of their revenue coming from foreign operations and majority of costs 
in foreign currency compared to firms that do not speculate. Second, they show that the 
firms that speculate have different compensation arrangements. They show that firms 
where derivatives use is benchmarked against profit instead of risk-management are more 
likely to speculate. Geczy et al. (2007) also provide evidence of a relationship between 
corporate governance and use of derivatives for speculation. They witness that firms that 
have lower levels of corporate governance are more likely to speculate with derivatives. 
However, the internal control system for use of derivatives can limit the unadvised usage 
of derivatives. Geczy et al. (2007) also show that frequent speculating firms are larger than 
sometimes speculating firms and significantly larger than the firms that never speculated. 
They report that speculating firms have significantly lower long-term debt ratios. They 
argue that non-speculator firms at a greater extent employ risk-taking activities than 
speculators do.  
Adam, Fernando and Salas (2007) use a sample of 97 North American gold mining firms’ 
data that enables them to identify speculating firms and their extent of speculation. They 
find that compare to larger firms smaller firms speculate more. This result is surprising, as 
it is normally believed that small firms are less likely than larger firms to possess the 
information and financial advantages necessary to beat the market through speculation. 
Similar to Stulz (1996), the authors also show that firms with the more likelihood of 
bankruptcy speculate more. This show that at the cost of bondholders, firms close to 
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bankruptcy may have incentives to speculate for the benefit of shareholders. However, 
Adam et al. (2007) also provides evidence that firms that have the lowest possible chances 
of bankruptcy also speculate more. This can be justified as financially stronger firms can 
take on additional risk exposure associated with speculation. This would seem to suggest 
that there is a U-shaped relationship between extent of speculation and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. However, more importantly, their results indicate that speculative activities of 
a firm reduce firm value. 
A study by Lel (2012) also finds similar results. The author examines the effect of internal 
and external corporate governance on the use of derivatives using a sample of firms that 
are exposed to foreign exchange risk from 30 countries across world during the period 
1990-1999. The results of the study suggest that firms with lower levels of corporate 
governments inclined to use derivatives in a way that increases firm risk while firms with 
high levels of corporate governments are observed to use derivatives to minimize their 
exposure to foreign exchange and to overcome costly external financing. The author also 
reports that the use of currency derivatives is higher when the extent of currency exposure 
and the need for external financing is higher. The author also controls for the endogeneity 
between a firm’s inside ownership, government structure and hedging using an 
instrumental variable approach. In a similar type of analysis, Allayannis et al. (2012) 
examine a broad sample of firms from 39 countries with substantial exchange rate 
exposure. They argue that managers can use derivatives for their self-interest and 
derivatives can be used for either hedging or speculation. They hypotheses that investors 
can control the use of derivatives by managers by appealing to the firm-level and country-
level corporate governance, to draw conclusions on a firm’s motives behind the use of 
derivatives, as firms with good corporate governance are more likely to use derivatives for 
hedging than speculation. Consistent with their hypothesis the authors find that use of 
derivatives adds value to the firms that have strong firm-level and country-level corporate 
governance. The authors also find more noticeable relationship between the use of FC 
derivatives and firm value when the firm-level and country-level corporate governance is 
strong. They use instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity and use 
treatment effects model to control for the self-selection bias. 
Oliveira and Novaes (2007) examine a database of 25,457 contracts of foreign exchange 
swaps between Brazilian firms and financial institutions at the end of year 2002. They find 
that the existence of external debt and firm size affects positively the probability of 
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hedging while the income from exports affects the probability of speculation. The authors 
also report that during the period of increased volatility in exchange rates, such as in year 
2002, the firms demand for FC derivatives is linked to the speculative motives. 
Using a survey data of Danish firms, Aabo et al. (2012) find that firms where non-finance 
departments play role in risk management activities are more likely to use derivative 
instruments for speculation. The authors argue that the larger the involvement of non-
finance department in risk management department, the more the firm speculates in terms 
of selective hedging and in terms of active speculation. They also suggest that international 
presence and firm size also increase the probability of speculation. This is in contrast to the 
findings of Oliveira and Novaes (2007). Beber and Fabbri (2012) find that firms that have 
inexperienced young CEOs with MBA degree are more likely to speculate. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that an overconfident manager takes more risk. They also 
show that managers of large corporations time the foreign exchange market by adjusting 
currency hedging using past information. 
2.5. Derivatives and Asymmetric Information 
Private information in foreign exchange market can motivate firms to engage in 
speculative activities. Theoretical studies on speculation usually look at the role of 
asymmetric information as a factor that might motivate such activity. Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein (1992) study speculators trading horizon and show that speculators can reap 
profit by focusing on information that bears no relation at all to fundamental information 
of long-term firm values. Madrigal (1996) illustrates that speculators trade profitably by 
obtaining superior knowledge about market environment or exploiting the need of other 
investors. The author also argues that speculators chase trends and lose money after market 
overreaction. 
Standard models of informed speculation suggest that traders in the financial markets try to 
learn information that others do not have. Similarly, corporate speculation can be done 
using derivatives if managers hold private information that other market participants do not 
have. Demarzo and Duffie (1995) examine the relationship between proprietary 
information and hedge accounting in the decision to use derivatives and show that when 
managers hold private information on the firms expected payoff, then corporate hedging is 
optimal despite shareholders’ ability to hedge their own exposures. Their results suggest 
that firms with greater information asymmetry between managers and shareholders can 
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generate larger profit by using derivatives. They also argue that derivatives use reduces the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders by reducing the cash flow 
volatility. These suggest that firms with higher information asymmetry are more likely to 
use derivatives for hedging. Stulz (1996) argues that when a firm believes that they have 
private information than rest of the firms in the market, and hence are in better position to 
gain from the market, they are more likely to enter into derivatives market for speculation. 
This indicates that firms speculate with information that is not available to other market 
participants and hedge when the information asymmetry is higher between managers and 
shareholders.  
Dadalt, Gay and Nam (2002) examine the effect of information asymmetry on the 
derivatives use and find evidence that both the use of derivatives and extent of derivatives 
use are associated with lower information asymmetry. This is consistent with finding of 
Demarzo and Duffie (1995) who argue that derivatives use reduces information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders. 
Guay and Kothari (2003) find that although derivative users have private information 
about the direction of future movements in IR, FX and CP, majority of the derivative 
positions appear much too small to increase firm value. We can interpret this in one of the 
two ways, either this implies that corporate speculation with derivatives is not likely to be 
widespread or that firms are leaving much of their financial price exposures unhedged. 
Geczy et al. (2007) find that speculators perceived private information and cost advantages 
lead them to take active positions. They say “Several individual pieces of evidence taken 
together suggest that speculators are more likely to believe they have comparative 
information advantage relative to the market, and hence to view speculation as a positive 
net present value (NPV), that is, profitable, activity.” (Geczy et al., 2007, p. 2). Adam et 
al. (2007) state that when a firm has private information, which is not available to other 
participants of the market, selective hedging increases firm value. They find that smaller 
firms speculate more than larger firms do, although they are less likely to possess the 
information and financial advantages necessary to outperform the market through 
speculation compared to larger firms. Stulz (1996) concludes that firms should also possess 
financial strength besides having a genuine information advantage, to support the extra risk 
that selective hedging involves, to increase shareholders value using selective hedging. 
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Lin and Lin (2012) examine the effect of information asymmetry on firms incentive to 
hedge versus speculate or take a view by using FC derivatives. They find nonlinear 
relationship between information asymmetry and motives behind derivatives use. In 
particular, the authors find that firms that hedge have medium level of information 
asymmetry and firms that speculate have high and low levels of information asymmetry. 
This is in contrast to finding of Demarzo and Duffie (1995). 
2.6. Derivatives and Managerial Compensation 
The relation between managerial risk taking and compensation is complicated. The 
decision to use derivatives is made by managers and hence their rational drives the motive 
behind the use of derivatives. Previous studies in the field consider managers portfolio 
structure as a determinant of the corporate risk management choice. Smith and Stulz 
(1985) state usually the holder of the executive stock options has disadvantage to hedge 
firm risk. There is a positive relationship between manager option-based compensation and 
incentives for managers to take on risks as it will increase the stock option values (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). Tufano (1996) suggests that corporate risk management policy is mainly 
determined by managerial risk aversion. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when risk-averse managers hold an undiversified 
portfolio of equity and human capital invested in a single firm, then managers are 
motivated to use derivatives to reduce the risk for personal benefit and at the cost of 
shareholders. The authors argue that managers may use derivatives to increase the value of 
their compensation packages, to protect personal wealth invested in equity capital of firm 
and when managers receive a post-retirement compensation package. 
Using a sample of North America gold mining industry, Tufano (1996) finds that firms 
whose managers hold more options manage less gold price risk, and firms whose managers 
hold more stock manages more gold price risk which suggest that managerial risk aversion 
may affect corporate risk management policy. The author finds no evidence of use of 
derivatives for speculation among these firms. However, it is important to note that this 
study is carried out on firms in gold mining industry only. 
There is a positive relationship among option based compensation policy and incentives 
for managers to take risk because stock price volatility increases call option value (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). Firms are also more likely to use derivatives for speculative purposes 
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when the stock price sensitivity of the CFO’s firm related compensation is higher but the 
convexity of his options is not associated with speculation. Managers might have an 
incentive to engage in speculation if their remuneration is linked to the profits such 
strategies produce. Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate that when a risk-averse manager 
owns a large number of firm’s shares, his expected utility of wealth is significantly 
affected by the variance of the firm’s expected profits. The manager will direct the firm to 
hedge when he believes that it is less costly for the firm to hedge the share price risk than it 
is for him to hedge the risk on his own account. Consequently, Smith and Stulz (1985) 
predict a positive relation between managerial wealth invested in the firm and the use of 
derivatives. A study by Beber and Fabbri (2012) using a sample of large US non-financial 
firms with currency exposure find no significant link between CEO stock price sensitivity 
(delta) and selective hedging. However, they find a decrease in hedging activity when the 
sensitivity CEO Vega increases. They also find that CEO education, age, gender and 
experience can explain speculative behaviour. 
Wysocki (1996) examines the relationship between a firm’s use of derivatives and its 
compensation policy, ownership structure and organisational culture using a sample of US 
firms for the period 1993-1994. The author finds positive relationship between use of 
derivatives, number of business line and the number of overseas operations. Negative 
relationship is observed between derivatives use and inside ownership but it is unaffected 
by the riskiness of CEO compensation, the level of insider wealth invested in to equity or 
CEO retirement. These results are consistent with the notion that derivatives are used for 
hedging and not for the opportunistic use of derivatives. Rogers (2002) examines the risk 
taking incentives of CEOs from stock and option holding compared to derivatives use. The 
author finds strong negative association between CEO risk taking and derivatives use. This 
suggests that derivatives are used for hedging: however, it may also suggest that firms are 
leaving their exposure unhedged. The author measures CEO risk taking as the ratio of 
Vega-to-delta and uses a sample of 524 US firms. 
Using response to a well-known survey Geczy et al. (2007) find that CFO’s delta is 
positively associated with the probability of actively taking positions. However, the equity-
based compensation of the CEOs has the negative association with speculation. These 
results also suggest that the speculating firms have compensation related incentives that 
encourage speculation, but only if it is expected to be profitable. Geczy et al. (2007) also 
suggest that managers of derivative using firms are more likely to speculate when 
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derivatives function is benchmarked against profits rather than the effect of derivatives on 
the firm and when managers have high-powered incentives.  
2.7. Effects of Derivatives Use on The Firm Financial Risk 
Above, we discussed several of the factors that influence firm’s use of derivatives for 
hedging or speculation. In this section, we discuss the effects of derivatives use on the 
firms’ financial risk. From the above discussion it follows that if firms are using derivative 
for hedging then it would reduces the firm risk and if firms were using derivatives for 
speculation then it would increase the firm risk. Copeland and Joshi (1996), Guay (1999), 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001), Bartram (2006), Nguyen and Faff (2010), Bartram et al. 
(2011), Boyer and Marin (2013), Magee (2013) and Marin (2013) have investigated the 
relationship between derivatives use and firm financial risk. These studies examine the 
effects of derivatives directly on firm financial risk measures. Besides these studies, there 
are some other studies that indirectly investigated the effects of derivatives on firm risk. 
Using a sample of 254 non-financial US firms that started using derivatives, Guay (1999) 
provides evidence that firm risks (total risk, market risk, idiosyncratic risk, IR exposure 
and exchange rate exposure) decline in the period following the initiation of a derivatives 
program. These results are consistent with the theories that firms are using derivatives to 
hedge and not to increase firm risk. The author compares sample of derivative user firms 
that started using derivatives with a controlled sample of non-derivative user firms and 
finds 5% reduction in stock volatility, 22% reduction in IR exposure and 11% reduction in 
exchange rate exposure for firms that have started using IR and FC derivatives. These 
show that firms are using derivatives for hedging and are receiving significant benefits of 
derivatives in terms of lower firm risks. On the contrary, a study by Hentschel and Kothari 
(2001) fail to find any significant effect of derivatives use on the firm financial risk. The 
authors also look at firm risk characteristics by investigating whether firms’ use of 
derivatives is significantly related to their overall stock return risk and fail to find any 
significant effect of derivatives use. Using data from annual reports of 425 large US firms, 
they focus on firms with an average level of derivative usage and also intensive users of 
derivatives, they do not detect any economical or statistically significant relationship 
between firms’ risk characteristics and the extent of their participation in derivatives 
market. They also do not find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that firms use 
derivatives to speculate on a large scale. However, their results do not provide any 
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evidence suggesting that firms’ use of financial derivatives helps in reducing firm risk. 
They report that compare to non-user firms, derivative users firms display few, if any, 
measurable differences in risk that are associated with the use of derivatives. They find 
similar result when they control for endogeneity using an instrumental variable 
methodology.  
Marshall (2000) in a survey of 179 MNCs from US, UK and Asia in year 1998 find that 
majority of the respondents state that foreign exchange risk management is equally or 
significantly important in relation to business risk management. With regards to UK 
MNCs, 45% and 21% of respondent firms, respectively, stated that foreign exchange risk 
management is equally or significantly important in relation to business risk management. 
This result is not surprising as given UK geographic location, majority of UK MNCs are 
highly dependent on business from overseas. The author also finds statistically significant 
regional differences in the importance and objectives of risk management particularly for 
translation and economic exposures, internal/external techniques used in managing foreign 
exchange risk and the policies in dealing with economic exposure. The author also shows 
that derivative usage does not decrease the variation in the firm value but they show that 
the usage of certain techniques is related with an increase in the variability of certain 
financial measures. In a survey of 173 UK firms in year 2001, El-Masry (2006) finds that 
37% of respondent firms use derivatives to manage the volatility of cash flow. 29% of 
respondent firms use derivatives to manage their market value while 25% and 19% of 
respondent firms use derivatives for managing volatility in accounting earnings and 
managing balance sheet accounts respectively. In a study of hedging activities of 119 US 
oil and gas producers for the period 1998 to 2001, Jin and Jorion (2006) find that risk 
management activities of oil and gas producers decrease with sensitivity of equity returns 
to oil and gas prices. These results suggest that there is a negative relation between 
financial derivative instruments and the level of firm risk, which is consistent with firms 
using derivatives to hedge rather than speculate. 
Using a data from 47 countries Bartram (2006) examines whether firms use derivatives for 
hedging or speculation and finds strong results showing that firms use derivatives for 
hedging. The author shows that derivative users are exposed to exchange rate risk (higher 
foreign sales, foreign income, foreign assets, foreign debt) and interest risk (higher 
leverage and lower quick ratio). Moreover, the author finds that derivative users have 
lower levels of post-hedging measures of risk such as stock return volatility and market 
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betas than non-users. In terms of economic significance, the results suggest that derivative 
users have 20-30% lower stock return volatility than non-users. In multivariate analysis, 
the author finds that both stock return volatility and market betas have significant negative 
association with derivatives for the whole sample. The author finds qualitatively similar 
results for IR and CP derivatives use. However, when the author examines the effects of 
FC derivatives, the author find significant negative effect of FC derivatives on market risk 
but fail to find any effect of FC derivatives on the stock return volatility. The author also 
repeats the analysis for UK firms separately. The results of this analysis show that the 
author fails to find any significant effect of derivatives use on the stock return volatility 
and market betas.     
Purnanandam (2008) examines the effect of risk management in the presence of financial 
distress costs for a sample of US firms. The author finds nonlinear relationship between 
leverage and derivatives. In particular, the author finds that derivatives is positively related 
to leverage for moderate level of leverage and negatively related to leverage for highly 
leveraged firms. This is consistent with hedging theory that firms with more debt (risky 
firms) have more incentive to use derivatives. The author reports that hedging incentives 
disappear with a very high leverage. The author also finds that firms with higher financial 
distress in concentrated industries hedge more.  
Using a large sample of Australian firms for two years period Nguyen and Faff (2010) find 
that the use of derivatives does not lead to an absolute reduction in the firm risk for their 
whole sample but they find that the effect of derivatives use on firm risk is nonlinear as 
they find that the extent of derivatives use of less that 40% is associated with a reduction in 
firm risk. With regards to extensive derivative users they find that such firms seemed to be 
associated with an increase in firm risk and suggest that extensive usage of derivatives us 
associated with speculative use. This finding highlights that not all the levels of derivatives 
use are associated with a reduction in firm risk. They report that 56.9% of their sample 
firms experienced a reduction in risk as result of derivative use (198 firms out of 348 
derivative user firms). For the remaining firms though they find no evidence of risk 
reduction. Nguyen and Faff (2010) find that FC derivatives are used for hedging but it has 
little impact on the overall risk portfolio of the firm. This finding is in line with the Stulz 
(1996) argument that the use of FC derivatives is primarily to hedge short-term exposure 
that arises as a result of short-term currency contracts. In respect to IR derivatives, 
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consistent with theories, Nguyen and Faff (2010) find that firm use IR derivatives to hedge 
long-term exposure. For FC derivative users they find significant reduction in idiosyncratic 
risk and for IR derivative users they find significant reduction in total risk. They argue that 
the relationship between derivatives use and firm risk is nonlinear. Guay (1999) also 
notices nonlinearity in his work. They find that the nature of relationship between firm risk 
and derivative usage is conditional on the extent of derivative usage. 
A recent study conducted by Bartram et al. (2011) using a large dataset of non-financial 
firms from 47 countries with a sample of 6,888 non-financial firms find significant 
evidence that the use of financial derivatives reduces both total risk and systematic risk. 
They also find hedging with derivatives is associated with significantly higher firm value, 
abnormal returns and larger profits suggesting firms are hedging downside risk. Their 
results suggest that financial risk management with the help of derivatives significantly 
reduces firm’s cash flow risk, total risk and systematic risk. The effect of derivative use on 
firm value is positive but sensitive to endogeneity and omitted variables concerned. The 
authors use a propensity score matching method to match derivative user firms with non-
user firms based on their likelihood of using derivatives. They show that derivative users 
have 7%-8% lower cash flow volatility, 5%-10% lower stock return volatility and 15% to 
31% lower market beats compare to matched non-user firms. 
Campello et al. (2011) examine the effects of hedging on the loan spread of a sample of 
US firms. In particular, the authors examine the effects of hedging on the costs of raising 
external finance and investment spending. For this analysis, the authors use extensive 
manually collected data on firms hedging activities. The authors focus on private credit 
agreements in the syndicated loan market. They find that firms hedging activities reduces 
the cost of external financing. In economic significance their results show that a 1 standard 
deviation increase in the hedging intensity lowers the loan spread by 54 basis points, which 
represents 29% reduction in loan spread compared to average loan spread of 189 basis 
points. Their results also suggest that firms that hedge have less loan covenants in contract 
than non-hedger firms. The authors also find that hedging lowers the chances of negative 
outcomes and hence reduces the costs of financial distress. The results highlight the 
importance of hedging in reducing borrowing costs resulted because of reduced probability 
of default from hedging. They also find that hedging helps lower the true cost of debt and 
that hedging is more beneficial to firms that have higher distress risk. Hedging firms also 
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benefits from less capital expenditure constraints in loan agreements. In particular, the 
authors find that the average IR/FX hedger is 20% less probable to have capital 
expenditure restriction clause in future credit arrangements.   
Using a pair-matched sample of 344 US bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms for the period of 
1998 to 2005, Marin (2013) finds, consistent with hedging motives, that the probability of 
filing for bankruptcy are approximately 96% lower for firms that manages their risk 
compare to the firms that do not manage their risk. The author uses two alternate measure 
of risk 1) Distance to default calculated using Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing 
framework, which measures how far is firm’s asset values from its default point in terms of 
the number of standard deviation and 2) Accounting-based model of equity implied asset 
volatility. For the first measure of risk, the author finds that firms that use risk management 
are further away from their distance to default point. The author shows that the distance to 
default of a firm that uses risk management increases by 3.2 units. For the accounting-
based model the author finds that firms that manage risk with derivatives have significantly 
lower asset volatility. The author shows that when firms manage their risk their asset 
volatility reduces by 64%. The author also separately examines the effects of IR 
derivatives and FC derivatives on asset volatility and finds negative association between 
them. The author also finds significant positive relationship between changes in distance to 
default and changes in IR risk management as well as between changes in distance to 
default and changes in FC risk management. These results are suggestive of hedging 
motives of derivatives use. With regards to the CP exposure, the author finds that the 
distance to default reduces for the firms that use CP derivatives to manage their low IR and 
exchange rate exposures.  
Magee (2013) looks at the relationship between FC derivative use and the probability of 
financial distress for a sample of US firms for the period of 1996-2000. The author uses 
distance to default as a measure of firm financial distress and uses two measures of FC 
derivatives 1) a continuous measure of derivatives and 2) a dummy measure of derivatives 
use. The author finds that firms with an extensive use of FC derivatives exhibit a lower 
probability of financial distress after controlling for the endogeneity problem between 
hedging and leverage. In economic significance the results suggest that a 1 standard 
deviation increase in the extent of FC derivatives increases the distance to default by 
0.870. This is consistent with FC derivatives being used for hedging rather than 
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speculation. However, the author fails to find any significant effect of the decision to use 
derivatives on the proxy for the probability of default. A recent study by Boyer and Marin 
(2013) find that firms that use FC derivatives to manage foreign exchange exposure are 
less prone to financial distress risk. As a measure of firm financial risk, the author use 
distance to default, equity implied volatility of assets and moneyness of the debt calculated 
using the Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing model. The authors use a dummy measure 
for a firm’s use/non-use of FC derivatives. The authors also investigate the effect of 
foreign operation and FC debt on financial distress risks and find similar results. Similar to 
Magee (2013), the authors do not investigate the effect of IR derivatives use on the 
measures of financial distress. It is not clear why Boyer and Marin (2013) and Magee 
(2013) focus on FC derivatives only and not IR derivatives since the latter would be 
expected to have a stronger impact on the risk of financial distress. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that US firms are timing the market with respect to their use of IR derivatives.23 
2.8. Effect of Foreign Currency Derivatives on FX Exposure 
There are many studies that looked at the relationship between FC derivatives use and 
firms’ FX exposure and reported mixed results (Copeland and Joshi, 1996; Allayannis, 
Ihrig and Weston, 2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Carter, Pantzalis and Simkins, 2003; 
Kim, Mathur and Nam, 2006). Below, we discuss these studies. 
In a study of 198 firms with the highest sales in year 1994, Copeland and Joshi (1996) 
examine the effect of currency derivatives use on the volatility of cash flow as a result of 
changes in exchange rate. The authors argue that if, after the use of FC derivative, there 
were a substantial reduction in the cash flow volatility then it would suggest significant 
benefit of using FC derivatives; whereas small reduction in cash flow volatility would 
indicate low potential benefits. The authors find that the most superbly designed and 
executed FX management programmes seem not to reduce cash flow volatility for majority 
of their sample firms. The authors also argue that management time and substantial capital 
sums invested in FC derivatives use destroys firm value instead of protecting it. The 
authors indicate that the reason for the failure of the currency derivatives programme is 
that many economic factors also change while FX rates change, which are not considered 
while employing FC derivatives programme. This indicates that the FC derivatives are not 
                                                 
23 See Faulkender (2005) for more details. 
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suitable to manage FX exposure if they cannot control for other factors that also changes 
simultaneously with FX rates. 
Géczy et al. (1997) show that firms are more likely to use FC derivatives when they have 
high cost of financial distress and volatility of cash flow, which suggest that their sample 
firms are using derivatives to protect themselves from unanticipated changes in FX rates 
that are capable of moving firms into financial distress zone. However, they find no direct 
evidence that the use of FC derivatives reduced the exposure to FX risk and hence it may 
be possible that the use is related to expected gain from speculative use of derivatives. 
In a study of 171 Japanese MNCs, He and Ng (1998) show that 25% of their sample firms 
experienced a significant exposure to exchange rate changes and when they examine the 
relationship between variables that were assumed to reflect derivatives usage and FX 
exposure for their firms they find that firms that are more likely to use derivatives had 
lower FX exposure than firms that are less likely to use derivatives. In their sample, they 
find that large MNCs in machinery industries were not significantly exposed to FX 
exposure. They argue that the reason why these MNCs were not significantly exposed to 
FX exposure is that those firms might be using derivatives and other hedging instruments 
to immunise themselves from unanticipated changes in exchange rates. These suggest that 
the use of derivative instruments can reduce the sensitivity of a firm’s stock to the 
movement in exchange rates. They provide a survey example conducted by Nippon Life 
Insurance in 1996 that finds larger Japanese companies making extensive use of derivative 
instruments. The survey notes that companies use derivatives not only for hedging but also 
for speculative purposes.24 
In a study of East Asian non-financial firms for the period 1996 to 1998 Allayannis, Brown 
and Klapper (2001) examine the effect of FC derivatives on FX exposure. The authors find 
no evidence that the use of FC derivatives by East Asian firms reduce their FX exposures. 
Their results indicate that East Asian firms that were using derivatives prior to the 1997 
East Asian crisis performed similar to that of non-derivative user firms during the crisis. 
This may suggest that derivatives were not effective during the period of crisis. The 
authors also find that firms use foreign earnings as a substitute of hedging with derivatives. 
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Allayannis and Ofek (2001) using a data of 378 US non-financial S&P 500 firms for the 
period 1993 find evidence that firms’ use of FC derivatives significantly reduces FX 
exposure firms’ face. The authors use a continuous measure of FC derivatives. They also 
find that derivative user firms have lower estimated values of firm risk, which suggest that 
firms use derivatives for hedging financial risk and not for speculation in the FX market. 
The authors also provide evidence that firms’ exposure through foreign sales and foreign 
trade is a very important factor in deciding what exposure to hedge, the size of hedge and 
the maturity of contract. This suggests that firms are not taking decisions on FC derivatives 
use using market views but instead examine the source of their foreign exchange exposure 
and then firms hedge that exposure. The authors argue that the FC debt is a substitute for 
FC derivatives and suggest that firms can use FC debt to protect themselves from FX 
exposure. However, the authors do not examine the effects of FC debt on FX exposure. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine a sample of firms that are exposed to FX risk 
through foreign sales and investigate whether firms that have similar FX exposure differs 
in firm value based on whether they use FC derivatives or not. They find that FC derivative 
user firms have higher firm value than non-users firm among the sample of firms that are 
exposed to FX. This indicates that firms that use FC derivatives have higher market value 
despite the similar level of FX exposure. A study by Carter et al. (2003) use a dataset of 
208 MNCs from the US provide evidence that both operational hedging, such as 
production in other country, and financial hedging, such as financial derivatives, lowers the 
firms’ FX exposure. In a sample of 424 US MNCs Kim et al. (2006) find both operational 
and financial hedging strategies are effective in reducing FX exposure. They find higher 
usage of FC derivatives by non-operationally hedged firms compare to their level of FX 
exposure. They also find that lower FC derivatives usage by operationally hedged firms 
that have more FX exposure. This suggests that operational hedging is substitute of FC 
hedging.  
Nydahl (1999) studies a sample of 47 Swedish firms using a cross-section differences in 
exposure and find that foreign sales is positively related to the estimated FX exposure 
while use of FC derivatives has negative effect on the FX exposure. This is also consistent 
with hedging theories and the findings of Allayannis and Ofek (2001). In a study of firms 
during the year 1995 to 1999 that disclose the use of derivatives to hedge, Nelson, Moffitt 
and Affleck-Graves (2005) find evidence that firms that use derivatives for hedging 
consistently out-performed other firms by 4.3% per year on average on the stock return. 
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However, they note that this gain of stock market performance is observed only for those 
firms that are using FC derivatives. They report 21.6% of their sample firm disclosing use 
of derivatives and consistent with other studies majority of derivative users firms are 
larger. In support for theories on economies of scale and transaction cost they find 
evidence on relative valuation that suggests that only larger firms are getting benefits of 
hedging. Their results on use of IR derivative or CP derivatives suggest no abnormal 
returns for the user firms. 
For a sample of 144 Australian firms with average foreign sales of 40% of total sales for 
the year 1990, Nguyen and Faff (2003) examine the role of FC derivatives in reducing FX 
exposure. They find that the use of FC derivatives by Australian non-financial firms 
reduces the short-term FX exposure. They also find that FC derivatives are used to hedge 
an existing FX exposure and not to speculate in the derivatives market. Their results 
suggest that Australian firms use derivatives for hedging as its use reduces exposure to 
exchange rate. Jong, Ligterink and Macrae (2006) study Dutch firms over a period of 
1994-1998 using a questionnaire data and find that over 50% of the sample firms are 
significantly exposed to FX exposure. They find no significant effects of off-balancing 
hedging with derivatives on exposure. However, they find that exposure is significantly 
reduced by using natural hedge such as employing FC debt or producing in foreign 
countries. They also show that Dutch firms use derivatives to reduce the transaction risk 
where as economic exposure remains largely exposed to exchange rate movements25. 
Muller and Verschoor (2008), using a sample of 471 European non-financial firms, 
examine the effects of derivatives use on firms’ FX exposure. They find firms’ decision to 
use FC derivatives is negatively related to exchange rate sensitivity. This evidence 
suggests that non-financial firms use FC derivatives primarily for hedging purpose. 
However, the results they find are statistically and economically weak. The authors argue 
that the reason for these weak results is either 1) Managers are hedging a very small 
portion of exposure that they are facing or 2) while assessing the link between FC 
derivatives usage and firm’s risk exposures, investors make systematic errors. Allayannis 
et al. (2012) find positive and significant relationship between firms’ use of derivatives and 
the value of their sample firms. The authors suggest that the use of FC derivatives by firms 
                                                 
25 Bodnar, Jong and Macrae (2003) find similar results  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Vikram Finavker 40 M00281338 
with foreign exchange exposure increases the firm value. They report that firms that use 
FC derivatives have 10.7% higher firm value than the firms that do not use FC derivatives. 
Using a sample of 148 UK non-financial firms for the year 1999, Zhou and Wang (2013) 
test the relation between the use of FC derivatives and firm’s FX exposure. As opposed to 
others studies, this study uses fair values of FC derivatives instead of notional values. The 
authors calculate FX exposure using weekly data, similar to Allayannis and Ofek (2001). 
The authors find negative sign on the FC derivatives variable but the associated p-value is 
larger than the critical value of 0.10. The coefficient for which the associated p-value is 
closets to 0.10 is 0.1235 when the exposure variable includes both positive and negative 
exposures and suggests that the findings of the study are weak. However, it is hard to 
interpret the coefficient on FX exposure when FX exposure variable contains both positive 
and negative values as it creates problem in interpreting the effect of FC derivatives on FX 
exposure. 
2.9. The Effect of Foreign Debt on FX Exposure 
Majority of previous studies that looked at the risk management and FX exposure 
relationship focused mainly on the financial derivatives usage of the firms. To manage FX 
exposure a firm can create natural hedge by issuing debt in a currency in which it has 
exposure, to match foreign assets with foreign liabilities.26 There are other benefits of 
issuing FC debt such as borrowing in FC debt may have low cost of interest than 
borrowing in domestic currency.27 However, there are circumstances where the use of FC 
debt can increase FX exposure.28 Firms can also use other methods of natural hedging such 
as production in other countries, known as operational hedging. However, operational 
hedging is more costly as it requires a large cash outlay and a long-term commitment, 
which may not be feasible and economical for many firms. There is also a cost benefit of 
using FC debt to manage FX exposure as issuing FC debt is not costly and also it is not as 
complex as financial derivative instrument (Nandy, 2010). 
                                                 
26 Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) argue that by issuing FC debt a firm can 
create cash outflow and can match it with cash inflow from foreign sales and hence can mange FX exposure. 
27 Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) show three reasons for firms to issue debt. 1) FC debt provided hedging 
for FX exposure, 2) borrowing in FC may cost less than borrowing in the domestic currency and 3) 
speculative reasons may make FC debt an attractive alternative. For detailed discusses of these reasons see 
Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) 
28 Géczy et al. (1997) ague that FC debt can increase firms FX exposure if the cash-outflow associated with 
FC debt is negatively correlated with cash-inflows from foreign operations.  
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FC debt is also considered as natural hedge that may either complement of substitute FC 
derivatives. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) suggest that firms can use FC debt to protect 
themselves from FX exposure. They argue that firms can match their cash inflow (revenue 
denominated in FC) with cash outflow (expense denominated in FC) by issuing FC debt. 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) confirm the role FC debt as a tool for hedging, however the 
authors do not further investigate the role of FC debt as an alternative of FC derivatives in 
FX risk management. Natural hedge is more suitable than derivatives during the periods of 
uncertainty for FX risk management (Chowdhry and Howe, 1999). Empirically, very few 
studies examine the relation of FC debt and/or FC derivatives on FX exposure (Elliott, 
Huffman and Makar, 2003; Hagelin and Pramborg, 2004; Nguyen and Faff, 2006) while 
other studies incorporated natural hedge in the examination of FC derivatives (Géczy et al., 
1997; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). 
Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) investigate the role of FC debt by using a unique data set 
of 44 Finnish firms that have raised private and public debt between 1985 and 1991. The 
authors suggest that firms use FC debt for hedging as they find that firms with significant 
portion of foreign sales are more likely to use FC debt. This shows that Finnish firms are 
creating foreign liabilities to match with their foreign assets. The authors also find that 
firms use FC debt for speculation as firms borrow in certain currency when the rate of 
interest for borrowing in that currency is lower than usual compared to the rates in other 
currencies. They report that 54.9% of their sample firms use FC debt. 
Doukas, Hall and Lang (2003) in a study of 1079 Japanese firms traded on Tokyo stock 
exchange over 1975-1995 period examine role of FC debt as a hedging instrument. The 
authors use debt to asset ratio as a proxy for firms FC debt usage as most Japanese firms 
do not report consolidated accounting information and hence the data on FC debt is not 
available. The authors find that FX exposure of Japanese firms declines with increase in 
FC debt. The authors use 2 sub-sample 1) pre-plaza accord period Jan 1975- Sep 1985 and 
2) post-plaza accord period Oct 1985- Dec 1995 and find that the coefficient on debt to 
asset ratio is negative in both period and more significant in pre-plaza period during which 
derivatives and risk management strategies were not widely developed. This indicates that 
FC debt work as derivative substitute. 
Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) examine issuance of debt in 10 major currencies by sample 
of 523 large US firms for the year 1996 to investigate the role of FC debt in hedging 
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currency exposure. The authors find strong negative relationship linking FC debt and 
exposure to individual currencies as well as at aggregate level and suggest that firms use 
FC debt to hedge. They also find some support that firms issue FC debt in a currency 
where the information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors is low. They 
find strong evidence that the location of foreign operations increase the probability of FC 
debt issuance supporting the notion of natural hedge benefit of FC debt. Kedia and 
Mozumdar (2003) show reasons other than hedging for the use of FC debt. They argue that 
differences in cost of borrowing in different currencies, due to the capital market 
imperfection, decide firms’ choice of FC debt. The authors also provide evidence that the 
presence of information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors affects the 
choice of MNCs in FC debt. 
Chiang and Lin (2005) using a monthly data for Taiwanese non-financial firms for the 
period 1998-2002 examine the use of FC derivatives and FC debt. They calculate FX 
exposure using two-factor model as in Allayannis and Ofek (2001). The authors use binary 
variables as a proxy for both FC derivatives and FC debt. Consistent with hedging motive, 
they find that the use of FC derivatives is associated with a reduction in absolute values of 
the FX exposure. In respect of FC debt, they find that the use of FC debt increases FX 
exposure. This indicates that for Taiwanese firms, FC debt does not work as a natural 
hedge. They also find that for a given FX exposure an increase in the revenue from foreign 
sales increases the FX exposure. The authors find significant negative coefficient on firm 
size suggesting that firm size is significantly associated with lower FX exposure. This is 
consistent with the notion that larger firms have more geographical dispersed operations 
that leads to lower FX exposure. 
Nandy (2010) examines the determinants of decision to raise the loan in FC for the UK and 
Canadian firms. The author finds significant positive relationship between foreign sales 
and borrowing in FC. They find that firms that have high sales in US are more likely to 
hedge their FX exposure by borrowing in USDs. This shows that firms are matching their 
foreign assets with foreign liabilities. The author reports that a 1% increase in the ratio of 
foreign sales to US increases the probability of borrowing in USDs by 23%. The author 
argues that as firms can match foreign income with foreign liabilities by issuing FC debt, it 
works as low cost and less complicated hedging instrument compared to complex 
derivative instrument. Aabo, Hansen and Muradoglu (2013) examine foreign debt usage of 
Danish non-financial firms with international operations. The authors find that FC debt is 
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used to hedge foreign assets and subsidiaries as opposed to foreign sales. This indicates 
that FC debt is used to hedge accounting exposure and not the operating exposure. The 
authors have used questionnaire to collect the data on firms’ foreign debt usage. 
2.10. Effect of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Foreign Debt on FX Exposure 
Majority of the studies discussed above find that that FC derivatives and FC debt have risk 
reducing effect as the use of either of the financial instrument results in lower FX exposure 
(Nydahl, 1999; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003; Nguyen and Faff, 
2003; Chiang and Lin, 2005; Nelson et al., 2005; Gharghori, Chan and Faff, 2006; Jong et 
al., 2006; Muller and Verschoor, 2008; Nandy, 2010). Theses suggest that if firms use both 
of these instruments then it may get more benefits in terms of larger reduction in the FX 
exposure. 
Allayannis, Ihrig, et al. (2001) investigate the impact of financial and operation exchange 
rate risk management strategies on monthly FX exposure for a sample of US MNCs firms. 
In financial risk management, they consider firms that use either FC derivatives and/or FC 
debt and create a dummy variable based on this. Consistent with hedging motive for using 
FC derivatives and FC debt, the authors find significant negative relationship between FX 
exposure and financial risk management. The authors find that firms that are 
geographically dispersed have relatively higher FX exposure. Their results suggest that 
operational hedging is not a substitute for financial hedging. They find that geographically 
dispersed firms are more likely to use financial hedging to manage FX exposure. 
Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) investigate the effects of FX exposure hedging using a 
survey data for Swedish firms during a period of 1997 – 2001 and examine the risk 
reducing effects of FC derivatives and FC debt. The authors find a significant reduction in 
FX exposure from the use of both FC derivatives and FC debt. Moreover, the authors find 
that the independent use of FC derivatives and FC debt is associated with a significant 
reduction in the FX exposure. Their findings suggest that the translation and transaction 
exposure hedges also reduce the exposure. However, translation exposure is nothing but a 
cosmetic change in the appearance of the balance sheet and hence does not require 
hedging. They argue that translation exposure approximates the exposed value of future 
cash flow from operations in foreign subsidiaries and hence, hedging translation exposure, 
economic exposure is reduced. They also find that natural hedge also plays important role 
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in reducing FX exposure as for the sample of large firms they find lower FX exposure as 
they have operational hedges. 
Chiang and Lin (2005) investigate the effects of combined use of FC derivatives and FC 
debt besides investigating the relationship separately. In a cross-sectional framework, they 
model both FC derivatives and FC debt against FX exposure. They find opposite signs on 
proxies for FC derivatives and FC debt suggesting that the combined use is not effective in 
lessening the FX exposure. In particular, the authors find that use of FC derivatives lower 
the FX exposure whereas the use of FC debt increases the FX exposure suggesting that the 
use of FC derivatives reduces FX exposure while the use of FC debt increases FX 
exposure. 
For a sample of Australian firms Nguyen and Faff (2006) examine the effects of FC debt, 
as a natural hedging instrument, and FC derivatives on FX exposure. They find that the 
likelihood of issuing FC debt is highly associated with the extent of foreign operations. 
However, the authors fail to find any significant evidence at aggregate level that the use of 
FC debt is directly associated with a reduction in FX exposure. In further analysis the 
authors find that the use of FC debt by firms in industrial sector is associated with a 
reduction in FX exposure confirming that FC debt is used for hedging. The authors fail to 
find any significant evidence of risk reducing effect of FC debt on FX exposure for firms 
in resource sector. They report that the primary goal behind issuing FC debt is the cheaper 
cost of borrowing for firms in resource sector. 
2.11. Foreign Currency Derivatives and Foreign Debt: Complement or Substitute 
The review of literatures above showed that there is evidence that the use of FC derivatives 
on its own, FC debt on its own and the combined use of FC derivatives and FC debt are 
associated with alleviating the FX exposure. In this section, we discuss literatures that 
focus on the relationship between FC derivatives and FC debt. Previous studies that 
investigate this relationship have presented mixed results. Some researchers find that the 
use of FC debt complements the use of FC derivatives in reducing the FX exposure 
(Chiang and Lin, 2005; Bartram et al., 2009; Aabo, Hansen and Muradoglu, 2011). On the 
other hand, some researchers find that use of FC debt substitutes the use of FC derivatives 
in reducing FX exposure (Géczy et al., 1997; Elliott et al., 2003; Aabo, 2006). 
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Géczy et al. (1997) examine why firms use currency derivatives for a sample of 372 US 
corporations in 1990. They provide indirect evidence suggesting that firms use FC debt as 
a substitute for FC derivatives. They find that firms with greater growth opportunities and 
tighter financial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives but for a sub-
sample of naturally hedged firms, firms with foreign operation and FC debt, they find that 
research and development (R&D) expenses and short-term liquidity are not significant 
determinants of FC derivatives use. However, the authors find R&D expenses and short-
term liquidity significant determinants of FC derivatives when they use a sub-sample that 
has only foreign operations and not FC debt.  
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) fail to find any significant evidence that US MNCs prefer to 
use FC derivatives or FC debt to hedge FX exposure. However, the authors find significant 
evidence that firms with more export prefer to use FC derivatives than FC debt. This 
suggests that exporting firms are more interested in relatively short-term and customisable 
financial instruments such as FC derivatives rather than long-term FC debt. Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001) find positive but insignificant relationship between FC debt and FC 
derivatives. 
Elliott et al. (2003) examine the relationship between FC derivatives, FC debt and FX 
exposure using a unique dataset for US MNCs corporations for the period 1994-1997. The 
authors find significant negative relationship between FC debt and FX exposure and show 
that FC debt may be used as hedging. They also find negative relation between FC debt 
and FC derivatives indicating that FC debt is substitute for FC derivatives and hence again 
suggest that FC debt is a hedging tool. The authors use ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
as a measure of FX risk whereas majority of other studies that examine the effect of FC 
derivatives or FC debt on FX exposure used sensitivity of stock return volatility to changes 
in exchange rate as a measure of FX exposure (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Nguyen and 
Faff, 2003; Hagelin and Pramborg, 2004; Jong et al., 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 2006; Muller 
and Verschoor, 2008).  
Chiang and Lin (2005) investigate whether FC derivatives and FC debt are used as 
substitute or complement. Using logit regression estimation the authors regress FC 
derivatives on FC debt and other control variables and find significant positive relationship 
between FC derivatives and FC debt suggesting that the use of FC derivatives and FC debt 
is complement. However, when they regress FC debt on FC derivatives and other control 
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variables they find positive but insignificant coefficient on FC derivatives. This suggests 
that the relation they observed between FC derivatives and FC debt is weak. Aabo (2006) 
shows, using public information and data collected using questionnaire for Danish firms, 
that FC debt is a very important alternative to the use of FC derivatives in actual decision 
making in non-financial firms. They show that relative importance of FC debt is positively 
associated with 1) the number of countries in which the firm has subsidiaries, 2) the extent 
to which firms’ value is associated with the foreign assets in place and 3) the debt ratio. 
Using a sample of 7292 firms from 48 countries, Bartram et al. (2009) find positive and 
significant relationship between FC derivatives and FC debt. The authors argue that they 
add FC debt dummy variable in regression analysis as it may work as a hedging tool, that 
is a complement to FC derivatives, if they have cash inflow from the country of the debt or 
as a source of exposure, in case the firm issue FC debt in a country from where they have 
no cash inflow, which require hedging through the use of FC derivatives. Their positive 
relationship between FC derivatives and FC debt confirm that FC debt is either a 
complement to FC derivatives or may be increasing FX exposure for which FC derivatives 
is needed to lower the FX exposure. However, if FC derivatives and FC debt both are 
targeted to manage different source of FX exposure, the observed positive relationship will 
still hold. 
Using survey data for medium sized non-financial Danish firms Aabo et al. (2011) find 
that FC debt is not a substitute but the complement of FC derivatives. They find that the 
use of FC derivatives is associated with flow measures such as revenue from foreign sales 
and the use of FC debt is important for hedging FX exposure arising from stock measures 
such as foreign assets and foreign subsidiaries. The authors also find that the use of FC 
debt is not important to hedge revenues from foreign operations. This suggests that FC 
derivatives and FC debt are not applied similarly to manage FX exposure. This supports 
Bartram et al. (2009) finding that FC derivatives and FC debt are complements and both 
are used to manage different source of FX exposure.  
2.12. Conclusion 
In this chapter we review existing literature that investigate the motives behind the use of 
derivatives and the effect of derivatives use on the firm financial risk measures. This 
chapter discusses main theories of risk management with derivatives along with empirical 
findings. This chapter also highlights the lack of empirical studies that utilised UK firms’ 
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data to examine the derivatives use on firm risk, despite the fact that UK firms provide 
unique setting for this type of examination.  
This chapter shows that many existing studies that investigate the effect of derivatives on 
firm risk use measures such as total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk and show 
whether firms use derivatives for hedging or speculation (Guay, 1999; Hentschel and 
Kothari, 2001; Nguyen and Faff, 2010; Bartram et al., 2011) whereas recent empirical 
studies use market-based measure of firm risk such as distance to default, equity implied 
volatility of assets to examine the effects of derivatives (Boyer and Marin, 2013; Magee, 
2013; Marin, 2013). These suggest that there is no consensus in empirical literature on a 
good measure of firm risk. However, review of existing studies provides firm risk variables 
to be employed in the current study.  
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Chapter 3. Data and Methodology 
This chapter outlines the relevant data and research methodologies to be used in the 
following empirical chapters. The objective behind this chapter is to offer a clear logical 
reason behind the variables and the research methods used in this thesis. This chapter is 
organised as follow: Section 3.1 describes the sample selection procedure and sample 
period. Section 3.2 focuses on the sources of data collection and the measurement of 
proposed variables. Section 3.3 discusses the research methods employed in empirical 
chapters and Section 3.6 concludes this chapter. 
3.1. Sample Selection and Sample Period 
This section describes the sample selection procedure and sample period. This section is 
organised as follow: Section 3.1.1 describes the sample of this thesis and Section 3.1.2 
describes the sample period. 
3.1.1. Sample  
This study uses a large sample of UK non-financial firms listed on London Stock 
Exchange for investigating the effects of derivatives on firm risk. Following existing 
literature29, financial firms such as banks, financial institutions, insurance firms and other 
financial service sector firms are excluded from our sample, as these types of firms may 
have different motives for using financial derivatives product than non-financial firms. 
Financial firms may use derivative products for trading purposes and hence inclusion of 
such firms in the analysis will bias the result and the real effects of derivatives use on non-
financial firms will be misjudged. We have different number of firms each year as a firm 
can exit the database due to the prevalence of merger, delisting, and acquisition or if no 
financial information is available. Overall, we have 4264 firm year observations.  
3.1.2. Sample Period 
The variables subject to the examinations are taken for a period of 12 years. The exact 
period for the study started in year 1999 and finished in year 2010. The selection of the 
initial year for our sample period is driven by the availability of the data on firms’ use of 
                                                 
29 (Guay, 1999; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Glaum, 2002; Faulkender, 
2005; Judge, 2006b, 2006a; Chernenko, Faulkender and Jenkins, 2007; Purnanandam, 2008; Nguyen and 
Faff, 2010; Magee, 2013) 
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derivatives. Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 13 was introduced in year 1999, which 
required firms to disclose the use of derivatives. The period 1999 to 2010 examined in this 
study exhibits significant variation in macroeconomic and more importantly credit risk 
conditions. The study period covers the global recession of 2000 and 2001 and the recent 
financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. Both of these periods witnessed elevated levels of both 
macroeconomic uncertainty and corporate financial distress, with these distress levels 
reaching new heights during the most recent financial crisis. Between these two episodes 
of financial and economic crisis, macroeconomic conditions in the UK were relatively 
benign with gross domestic product (GDP) growth at around 2 per cent per annum. Our 
sample period provides a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of derivatives use on 
the firm risk during a time when one would expect such activity to be most beneficial. 
3.2. Sources of Data Collection 
The data for this study are collected from several sources. We source data for this study 
mainly from annual reports and DataStream. Few other data are collected from different 
sources, which are discussed along with the data in variable measurement section. Below 
we discuss the two main sources of data collection: Annual Reports and DataStream. 
3.2.1. Data from Annual Reports 
We use annual reports to collect data on derivatives use, foreign sales, foreign assets and 
foreign debt. 
One of the difficulties with research on the corporate use of derivatives is the availability 
of data on firms’ derivative usage. Due to the lack of disclosure in annual reports, prior 
studies heavily relied on surveys to collect data30. However, after the successive 
implementation of international financial reporting standard, the disclosures of derivatives 
use in annual reports are improved. In the UK several accounting standards relating to the 
reporting of derivatives in financial statements have been enacted during 1990’s. The first 
of these and the most relevant in the context of this study was FRS 13, which came into 
force in March 1999. FRS 13 required non-financial firms to provide both narrative and 
numerical disclosure on their derivative activities in their financial statements. The 
standard suggests that narrative disclosures should describe the role that financial 
                                                 
30Bodnar et al. (1996), Bodnar et al. (1998), Faff and Marshall (2005) and Judge (2006b) 
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derivatives have in creating or changing the risks that the firm faces, including the firm’s 
objectives and policies in using financial derivatives to manage these risks. The numerical 
disclosures in annual reports should explain how these objectives and policies are 
implemented and provide supplementary information for evaluating significant financial 
exposures. This disclosure requirement of narrative and numerical information is in 
response to the escalating use of derivative by corporations over last 20 years. FRS 13 was 
followed by FRS 26, which implemented the recognition, measurement and hedge 
accounting requirements of the international standard IAS 39 and came into operation on 
the 1st January 2005. FRS 26 permitted the use of hedge accounting for financial 
instruments such as derivatives.31 Finally, FRS 29 'Financial Instruments: Disclosure' was 
adopted on the 1st January 2007. FRS 29 requires firms to disclose information about their 
exposure to risks arising from financial instruments, such a credit, liquidity and market 
risks together with descriptions of management’s objectives, policies and processes for 
managing those risks. Quantitative disclosures are also required to provide information 
about the extent to which the entity is exposed to risk, based on information provided 
internally to the entity’s key management. FRS 13 was withdrawn on implementation of 
the disclosure requirements of FRS 29. Prior to FRS 13 it was hard to distinguish between 
firms that do not use derivatives and firms that uses derivative but did not disclose the use 
of derivatives. This resulted in the non-disclosure bias for studies prior to 1999. The 
disclosure requirement of FRS 13 benefited various stakeholders in valuing their 
investments and in analyzing the risk they are facing. It has also helped researchers in 
examining the effects of derivative use on various measures of firm risk. 
However, this disclosure requirement did not provide a standard reporting format. In the 
absence of a uniform reporting format, for the use of derivative instruments, firms disclose 
this information in different ways. As a result, some firms provide detailed information 
about the derivative instruments they use, the notional amount of derivative instruments 
and purpose of using derivative instruments where as other firms just disclose that they use 
derivative instruments but do not provide information on type of derivative instrument, 
notional amount and the purpose of using it. 
                                                 
31 Hedge accounting involves deferring the recognition in the profit and loss accont of gains and losses that 
would otherwise be recognized there immediately. 
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The data on firms’ use of financial derivative instruments are manually collected from 
annual reports of respective firms. We read the financial review section of the annual 
reports and the notes to the accounts relating to the firms’ use of risk management 
instruments to identify which firms use derivatives, the type of derivative instrument and 
to collect the quantitative data on the use of derivative instruments, notional values of 
derivatives. A qualitative discussion of corporate risk management policy will usually be 
found in the ‘Operating and Financial Review’ section of the annual report under the 
heading ‘Finance Directors Review’. In this section it is usually possible to determine if a 
firm is using FC and/or IR and/or CP derivatives, More specific data on the types of 
derivatives used and in some instances data on the notional amounts of FC, IR and CP 
derivatives outstanding at yearend are disclosed in the ‘Notes to the Financial Statements’ 
section of the annual report under the heading ‘Financial Instruments’. If there is no 
mention of the use of derivatives in the annual report we classify the firm as a non-
derivative user firm. Two types of variables are created based on the derivatives usage 1) a 
binary variable based on a firms’ decision to use derivative instrument and 2) An extent of 
derivatives based on a firms’ disclosure of notional values of derivatives. Earlier studies 
that used derivatives data also collect it from annual reports (Guay, 1999; Hentschel and 
Kothari, 2001; Bartram et al., 2011; Boyer and Marin, 2013; Magee, 2013). 
We also read the segmental reporting section of the annual reports to collect data on firms’ 
foreign sales and foreign assets. Firms report their sales and assets data, based on their 
geographical segments, under segmental reporting section. We collect these data and 
record it for UK, US, EU and Rest of the World (ROW). Data on firms debt denominated 
in foreign currencies are also collected from annual reports. This information is normally 
reported in the liabilities section. Firms disclose this information based on the currency of 
the debt. We also collect and record these data for UK, US, EU and ROW. This bifurcation 
of debt allows us further examination.  
3.2.2. Data from DataStream 
The firm level financial data are collected from DataStream. We collect raw data from 
DataStream and then calculate total risk, market risk, idiosyncratic risk, foreign exchange 
exposure, Z-score, leverage, firm size, profitability, liquidity, equity volatility, excess 
return, market to book, dividend yield and instrumental variables. These variables are 
discussed in more detail in following sections. 
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3.3. Variable Measurement 
This section discusses the measurement of firm risks, control and credit risks variables that 
we use in our empirical analysis. 
3.3.1. Dependent Variables32 
In this section, we discuss the risk variables (total risk, market risk, idiosyncratic risk, 
EDF, FX exposure and Z-score) that we use in empirical chapters and the methods used to 
calculate these variables. 
3.3.1.1. Dependent Variables in Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4 we examine the effects of derivative use on the total risk, market risk and 
idiosyncratic risk. These firm risk measures are calculated as follow: 
3.3.1.1.1. Total Risk 
Total risk is calculated as annualised standard deviation of weekly stock returns over two 
years multiplied by 521/2. This is a measure of aggregate firm risk. Bartram (2006) argues 
that total risk is a summary measure of the different financial risk. The data on sample 
firms share price are collected from DataStream. Total risk is further separated into market 
risk (systematic risk) and idiosyncratic risk (non-systematic risk). This break down of total 
risk into market risk and idiosyncratic risk allows us additional examination regarding the 
effects of derivatives use on the type of risk. 
3.3.1.1.2. Market Risk 
This is a measure of the extent to which a firm’s equity return moves with that of the stock 
market as a whole. This variable is calculated using a regression of firm’s weekly stock 
return against weekly return of FTSE all share price index over two years period. The data 
on FTSE all share price index is collected from DataStream. To calculate market risk 
following regression equation is estimated. 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 [1] 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the rate of return on the ith firm’s common stock in period t and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the 
rate of return on the market portfolio in period t. 
                                                 
32 To mitigate the effect of extreme values we winsorize each variable in the top and bottom 1 percentile. 
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The beta from this model measures a firm’s systematic or market risk. In equation [1], 𝛽1 
represents the systematic or market risk and measures the percentage change in the rate of 
return on a firm’s common stock against a 1% change in the market return.  
3.3.1.1.3. Idiosyncratic Risk 
Idiosyncratic risk measures the variability in a firm’s equity return that arises due to the 
specific and unique circumstance of a firm as opposed to overall movements in the stock 
market. This variable is calculated as the annualised standard deviation of the idiosyncratic 
component of stock returns calculated using equation [1]33. 
Several previous studies examine the effects of derivatives use on the above discussed 
measures of firm risk (Guay, 1999; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Bartram, 2006; Nguyen 
and Faff, 2010; Bartram et al., 2011). However, none of these studies specifically examine 
the effects of derivatives use on risk of UK non-financial firms. Bartram (2006) and 
Bartram et al. (2011) investigate this analysis for a sample of firms from 47 countries 
including UK. Bartram (2006) examines separately the effects of derivatives use on total 
risk, market risk, net foreign exchange exposure, net IR exposure and net CP exposure for 
UK non-financial firms. However, the author fails to find any significant effect of 
derivatives use on these measures of risk for UK non-financial firms. Bartram et al. (2011) 
do not investigate the effects of derivatives use separately for UK firms. As discussed in 
section 1.2, the UK is an interesting setting to examine the effects of derivatives use and 
the discussion above shows that not much is known about the effects of derivatives use on 
UK non-financial firms risk measures as majority of the earlier studies examine the 
research question using data from other countries. 
3.3.1.2. Dependent Variables in Chapter 5 
3.3.1.2.1. EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR 
In Chapter 5 we examine the effect of derivatives use on the expected default frequency 
(EDF). EDF measurers the probability that the market value of firm’s assets will be less 
than the book value of the firm’s liabilities by the time the debt matures. This measures the 
uncertainty surrounding a firm’s ability to payoff its debt and obligations (Bohn and 
Crosbie, 2003). In EDF default is defined as the non-payment of any scheduled payment, 
                                                 
33 Annualised by multiplying with 521/2 
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interest or principal (Bohn and Crosbie, 2003). EDF is advanced version of distance to 
default, which is also a measure of financial distress estimated using Merton’s (1974) 
option pricing model. EDF data is sourced from Moody’s. Moody’s has provided EDF data 
covering two time horizons: 1) 1-year EDF (Short-term: EDF1YEAR) and 2) 5-year EDF 
(Long-term: EDF5YEAR). 
Few of the recent studies examine the effects of derivatives on the measure of firm 
financial risk calculated using option-pricing model (Boyer and Marin, 2013; Magee, 
2013; Marin, 2013). Boyer and Marin (2013), Magee (2013) and Marin (2013) use 
distance to default as a measure of firm risk besides other measures and use data for US 
firms.  
3.3.1.2.2. EDF Model 
EDF is calculated for each firm at any point in time using the KMV-Merton model. 
Moody’s KMV used Vasicek-Kealhofer (VK) model to calculate EDF. VK model is the 
extension of Black-Scholes-Merton framework to calculate probability of default and 
assume the firms’ equity is a perpetual option and default point acts as the absorbing 
barrier for the firm’s asset value. In VK model a firm can continuously borrow and repay 
their debt unlike under Merton model. In this model, the default is defined as the non-
payment of any scheduled payment, interest or principal. When firm’s asset value reaches 
to its point of default, a firm is assumed to default. All different types of liabilities such as 
short-term liabilities, long-term liabilities and convertible and preferred equity are 
modelled to calculate default point. The default for a firm can occur on or before the date 
of maturity (Bohn and Crosbie, 2003). 
This model needs equity prices and certain financial items, such as total debt, from annual 
report to calculate default probabilities. To calculate the default point the model takes the 
difference between face value of firm’s debt and an estimate of market value of the firm, 
divided by an estimated volatility of firm. The result of above procedure is known as 
distance to default and it is substituted into a cumulative density function to calculate the 
probability that the value of the firm will be less than the face value of its debt at the 
forecasting horizon (Bohn and Crosbie, 2003). 
KMV model uses two important equations from Merton model to calculate probability of 
default from value and volatility of firm’s assets. Only two types of liabilities Black-
Scholes model allow a single class of equity and a single class of debt. If D is the face 
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value of debt that is due at time T then the market value of equity and the market value of 
assets are linked by the following equation; 
 𝐸 =  𝑉𝒩(𝑑1) − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇𝐷𝒩(𝑑2) [2] 
Where 𝐸 is the market value of firm’s equity, 𝑉 is the market value of firm’s assets, 𝐷 is 
the face value of firm’s debt which is due at time 𝑇, 𝑟 is the risk free interest rate, 𝒩 is the 
cumulative distribution function, 𝑑1 is given by 
 
𝑑1 =  
𝑙𝑛(𝑉/𝐷) + (𝑟 + 0.5𝜎𝑉
2)𝑇
𝜎𝑉√𝑇
 [3] 
Where 𝜎𝑉 is a standard deviation of the market value of firm’s assets and 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝑉√𝑇 
The second Merton equation that KMV uses relates the volatility of the firm’s value to the 
volatility of its equity,σE, and it is known as optimal hedge equation. Under the Merton 
model volatilities of firm and its value are related as follow; 
 
𝜎𝐸 = (
𝑉
𝐸
) 𝒩(𝑑1)𝜎𝑉 [4] 
Nonlinear equations [2] and [4] are used by KMV-Merton model to estimate value of firm 
and its volatility. In KMV-Merton model the value of option is observed as the total value 
of firm’s equity while the value of underlying asset is not directly observable. So, value of 
a firm can be calculated by multiplying the price of shares with number of shares 
outstanding. 
To implement KMV-Merton model, first 𝜎𝐸 is estimated using historical stock return data 
or from option implied volatility data. In the second step a time horizon and a measure of 
the face value of firm’s debt is chosen. In the third step, data is collected for risk free rate 
and market equity of the firm. In the last step equation [2] and [4] are simultaneously 
solved to get 𝑉 and 𝜎𝑉. However, KMV does not use the above equations simultaneously 
arguing that they provide bad results and instead uses another nontrivial iterative solution 
technique to estimate 𝑉 and 𝜎𝑉. After obtaining the value for 𝑉 and 𝜎𝑉 the distance to 
default is calculated as follow; 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 =  
𝑙𝑛(𝑉/𝐷) + (𝜇 − 0.5𝜎𝑉
2)𝑇
𝜎𝑉√𝑇
 [5] 
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Where μ is an estimate of the expected return on firm’s assets. Distance to default 
efficiently distinguish firms likely to bankrupt from those less likely to default (Sun, 
Munves and Hamilton, 2013). Distance to default measures the number of standard 
deviation a firm is away from its default point at given time. 
Distance to default measures a normalised distance of a firm’s asset value from its default 
point (Caouette, Altman and Narayanan, 1998). However, Bohn and Crosbie (2003) point 
out that in reality the assumption of normal distribution results in an underestimation of the 
calculated distance to default. To control for this underestimation problem, the KMV 
model goes one step forward and converts the distance to default estimation into an EDF. 
This is done by linking the distance to default with observed default rates based on 30 
years of default history data collected by KMV. Moody’s construct a calibration sample 
for which Moody’s has the most reliable default data. This database includes over 250,000 
company-years of data and more than 4700 incidents or bankruptcy (Bohn and Crosbie, 
2003). This step provides much wider tail for the normal distribution. The corresponding 
EDF is: 
 
𝜋𝐾𝑀𝑉 =  𝒩 (− (
𝑙𝑛(𝑉/𝐷) + (𝜇 − 0.5𝜎𝑉
2)
𝜎𝑉√𝑇
)) =  𝒩(−𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) [6] 
3.3.1.2.3. Market-based Vs. Accounting-based Measures of Default 
Market-based models of probability of default overcomes the problems of accounting-
based default models by estimating the distress risk by utilising the market price of firms 
assets with firms liability. The main assumption under the market-based default models is 
that the information provided by market contains all the available information for the 
particular firm. In 1974, Merton introduced the first market-based model. However, market 
models became popular among investors after the introduction of KMV in 1990 and the 
development of reduced models in year 2000. 
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) and Gharghori et al. (2006) investigate the 
performance of accounting-based and market-based probability of default models. They 
find that market-based models are superior to accounting-based models and also provide 
rich information. They argue that probability of default estimates the likelihood of future 
events while accounting-based models suffer from backward looking information and 
hence accounting information may not be very much relevant about the future prospect of 
the firm (Hillegeist et al., 2004; Gharghori et al., 2006). Financial statements are 
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formulated under the assumption that firm will not go bankrupt and hence they are limited 
by design to accurately predict probability of default (Hillegeist et al., 2004; Gharghori et 
al., 2006). Accounting-based models use ratios, which are calculated using delayed and 
infrequently updated information. As the accounting information is published infrequently, 
accounting based measures of default cannot be calculated at any point in time while 
market-based default models can be calculated at any time for any publicly-traded firm 
regardless of time and industry (Hillegeist et al., 2004). The other problem with items in 
accounting statement is reporting of assets in conservative principle that understates value 
of item than its market value and hence overstates the accounting-based leverage 
(Hillegeist et al., 2004; Gharghori et al., 2006). This method of reporting items in accounts 
also affects the calculated distress measure. Market-based models are derived from theory, 
which provides the theoretical determinants of default risk and how to extract the default 
related information from the market prices, and they are economically justifiable 
(Hillegeist et al., 2004). Market-based models can also be easily modified to calculate the 
probability of default for any time horizon by changing the time parameter. On the other 
hand, accounting-based measures are based on coefficients estimated in a first stage 
regression that are specific to a model’s prediction horizon and also depends on the 
characteristics of the first stage sample (Hillegeist et al., 2004). 
The other important weakness of accounting-based model of distress risk is that they do 
not use volatility of assets while calculating probability of default. However, volatility of 
asset is very vital determinant of probability of default. Volatility of assets captures the 
possibility of the firm value decline to the degree that the firm will not be able to service 
its debt (Hillegeist et al., 2004). Hillegeist et al. (2004) argue that two firms with identical 
leverage ratios can have different default probabilities based on their asset volatility and 
suggest that volatility is an important omitted variable from Altman Z-score and Ohlson O-
Score models of default probabilities. 
The main benefits of using option pricing models in prediction default probabilities are that 
they help in calculating default probabilities by supplying the necessary structure to extract 
information related to bankruptcy and they also provide theoretical determinants of default 
risk (Hillegeist et al., 2004). Market-based models provide timely warnings of credit risk 
and up-to-date view of firm’s value as they use market information. 
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The main assumption under market-based models is that the markets are efficient but if 
they are not then market prices may not reflect all the available information about the firm. 
However, if the markets are not efficient then the market-based models may not be perfect 
and may lead to potential bias in estimated default probabilities. There are 3 main elements 
that determine the probability of default of a firm: 1) The market value of firm’s assets 2) 
volatility of assets and 3) leverage. Two of these determinants, 1 and 2, are not directly 
observable and should be estimated. The other problem with market-based model is that 
they collect information from market prices of companies and hence requires companies to 
be listed on stock markets. This limits the calculation of default probabilities to only listed 
companies. However, market-based distress models provide rich information and are more 
flexible than accounting-based models. Hillegeist et al. (2004) show that market-based 
model of default provides significant more information than accounting based Z-score and 
O-score. 
3.3.1.3. Dependent Variables in Chapter 6 
3.3.1.3.1. Foreign Exchange Exposure 
In Chapter 6, we examine the effects of FC derivatives use and FC debt on FX exposure. In 
the first step we calculate FX exposure as the sensitivity of the value of the firm, proxy by 
the return on firm’s equity, to an unanticipated change in exchange rate using time-series 
data consistent with Jorion (1990), Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Nguyen and Faff 
(2003). We calculate FX exposure using weekly and monthly data.34 Majority of the 
previous studies also use weekly and monthly data to calculate FX exposure (Jorion, 1990; 
He and Ng, 1998; Guay, 1999; Nydahl, 1999; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Hagelin and 
Pramborg, 2004; Dominguez and Tesar, 2006; Muller and Verschoor, 2008). Using 
equation [7] we estimate FX exposure for our sample firms for the period 1999 to 2010. 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  [7] 
Where Rit is the rate of return on the ith firm’s common stock in period t; Rmt is the rate of 
return on the market portfolio in period t; STRt is the rate of return on a moving, trade-
weighted exchange rate index, measured in pounds per unit of basket of foreign currencies 
                                                 
34We use three years return data surrounding the particular year to calculate monthly FX exposure. For 
example to calculate the FX exposure for year 2010, we used monthly return starting in 2009:01 to 2011:12. 
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in period t; 𝛽2𝑖 is the coefficient of exchange rate sensitivity of the ith firm. We expect a net 
exporter firm to be hurt by appreciation of pound suggesting a positive FX exposure and a 
net importer firm should benefit from appreciation of pound suggesting a negative FX 
exposure. 
In the model above, the coefficient 𝛽2𝑖 represents FX exposure for the ith firm and 
measures the percentage change in the rate of return on an individual firm’s stock return 
given a 1% change in the exchange rate. We use Bank of England’s effective exchange 
rate index, which measures the strength of Sterling against a basket of 21 currencies that 
includes Britain's major trading partners. The trade-weighted exchange rate is appropriate 
in calculating FX exposure, as it is expected that a firm’s exposure to international 
currencies would be similar to that of national trade with foreign countries. Moreover, 
majority of previous studies use trade-weighted index (Jorion, 1990; Allayannis and Ofek, 
2001; Nguyen and Faff, 2003; Yip and Nguyen, 2012). 
3.3.1.3.2. Other Measures of FX Exposures 
To check for the robustness of our results, we also calculate FX exposure using 
Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD bilateral exchange rates. We do this by replacing return on 
trade-weighted effective exchange in equation [7] with return on Sterling/Euro and 
Sterling/USD exchange rates. We also calculate lagged FX exposure using lagged values 
of trade-weighted effective exchange rate. The data on exchange rates and exchange rate 
index are collected from Bank of England’s website. 
3.3.1.3.3. Z-score 
Z-score is a single measure returned from a number of appropriately chosen financial 
ratios, weighted and added together (Agarwal and Taffler, 2007). Altman (1968) applies a 
multivariate discriminant analysis to develop a model that can “Best” differentiate between 
distress firms and non-distressed firms. Altman (1968) uses a sample of 66 manufacturing 
industry firms out of which 33 firms have filed for bankruptcy and the other 33 firms are 
financially healthy and are similar to the firms that have filed bankruptcy in terms of size 
for the period 1946 to 1965. From the sample, Altman (1968) uses firms that have assets 
more than $1 million. Altman (1968) groups 22 ratios into five categories: profitability, 
liquidity, leverage, solvency and activity. After many statistical tests, Altman (1968) 
finally specified five ratios that are significant to determine financial distress risk. These 
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five ratios are also given weights to calculate Z-score. Following is the model to calculate 
general Z-score: 
 
𝑍 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1.2 ∗
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 1.4 ∗
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 3.3
∗
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
+ 0.6 ∗
𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 1 ∗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
[8] 
where 𝑍 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is over all score. If the calculated Z-score is above the cut off rate, 2.675, 
then the firm is classified as healthy firm and if Z-score is below the cut off rate, 2.675, 
then the firm is considered as risky firm35. 
After the introduction of the model, many researchers tested the accuracy of Altman’s Z-
score. Begley, Ming and Watts (1996) find Z-score unreliable during the period of 
different economic environment. They provide example of changes in bankruptcy laws and 
buyout activities in 1980s that changed the probabilities of bankruptcy and hence Z-score 
model which was introduced before these changes may increase the number of 
classification errors. A study by Grice and Ingram (2001) find considerably lower accuracy 
of original model in recent years.  
Accounting-based techniques to predict financial distress for firms are greatly improved by 
Altman’s Z-score. This measure of financial distress combines the ratios and weights them 
to discriminate between financial distress firm and financially healthy firm. Taffler 
introduced UK based Z score model in 1977 which is used to calculate the accounting 
based financial distress for UK based firms36. The model was developed explicitly for the 
analysis of UK based manufacturing and construction companies. This Z-score requires 
four financial ratios, which measures a distinct feature of a company’s performance, as 
input. Using a stepwise linear discriminant package for many times the following model is 
resulted: 
 𝑍 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 3.20 + 12.18 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 2.50 ∗ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 10.68
∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 0.029 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 
[9] 
Where 
Profitability = profit before tax/current liabilities (53%) 
                                                 
35 Altman (1968) 
36 (Agarwal and Taffler, 2007) 
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Working Capital = Current assets/Total liabilities (13%) 
Financial Risk = Current liabilities/Total assets (18%) 
Liquidity = Quick assets - current liabilities/ (Sales- profit before tax – 
depreciation)/365 days (16%)37 
We use UK based measure of Z-score in our analysis.  
In Chapter 6 we also use EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR as dependent variables. 
3.3.2. Main Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variables of interest in this study are the use of financial derivatives 
by our sample firms. Majority of the earlier studies use a binary variable and/or a 
continuous variable (notional amount of financial derivatives) to proxy for the use of 
financial derivatives. We follow this norm and employ two measures to capture the use of 
derivative instruments by UK non-financial firms. The first measure is a dummy variable 
and the second measure is the continuous measure of derivatives use. In Chapter 6, FC 
debt is an important explanatory variable besides financial derivatives. Majority of the 
previous studies use a binary variable for the use of foreign debt. We use a binary and a 
continuous measure as a proxy for foreign debt usage. Below we provide the measurement 
of these variables. 
3.3.2.1. Dummy Measure of Derivatives Use 
After carefully reviewing annual report of a firm, we assign ‘1’ to a firm if it discloses the 
use of derivatives and ‘0’ otherwise. The binary measure of derivative usage has been 
employed by many of previous studies (Géczy et al., 1997; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Purnanandam, 2008; Bartram et 
al., 2011; Campello et al., 2011; Boyer and Marin, 2013). We follow this norm and use 
multiple proxies for derivatives use. We classify derivative users based on the underlying 
asset: 1) All derivative users is a dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC and/or 
IR derivatives and ‘0’ for non-users 2) FC derivative users (B) is a dummy variable set 
                                                 
37The percentages in brackets after the variable descriptors represent the Mosteller-Wallace contributions of 
the ratios to the power of the model (Agarwal and Taffler, 2007). 
 
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
Vikram Finavker 62 M00281338 
equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives and ‘0’ for non-FC users 3) IR derivative users 
(B) is a dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses IR derivatives and ‘0’ for non- IR 
users. We argue that the inclusion of firms referred to as “other” derivative users in the 
non-user firms’ sample might potentially bias the results against finding particular 
hypothesized relationships. The majority of “other” derivative users in the non-FC users 
sample are IR derivative only users and in non-IR users sample are FC derivative only 
users. Hence, an analysis where “other” derivative users are included in non- users sample 
could make it difficult to detect a meaningful relationship between FC derivative users & 
firm risk and IR derivative users & firm risk. To control for this bias, we create 2 
additional dummy variables by removing “other” derivative users from non-users sample: 
1) FC derivative users (UB) is a dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC 
derivatives and ‘0’ for non-users 2) IR derivative users (UB) is a dummy variable set equal 
to ‘1’ if a firm uses IR derivatives and ‘0’ for non- users.38,39 
3.3.2.2. Continuous Measure of Derivatives Use 
Using dummy variables as a proxy for derivatives use has its limitation; they do not 
distinguish between firms that have high intensity derivative usage and those that have low 
intensity derivative usage. In order to overcome this problem, data is collected on the 
notional amount of derivatives use. We scale the notional values of derivatives by total 
assets to arrive at a proxy for the extent of derivatives use. This measure of derivatives use 
can distinguish between a firm with a low extent of derivatives use and a firm with high 
extent of derivatives use. In the absence of uniform reporting standard not all the UK firms 
report the notional amounts of their derivatives contract. This results in many missing 
values for the continuous measure of derivatives variable. We have also created several 
proxies for this measure: 1) an extent of all derivatives variable for the total notional values 
of FC derivatives, IR derivatives and CP derivatives contract scaled by total assets, 2) an 
extent of FC derivatives variable for the total notional values of FC derivatives contract 
scaled by total assets and 3) an extent of IR derivatives variable for the total notional 
                                                 
38 In empirical Chapter 5 we create additional categories of derivatives by combining all various derivatives 
dummy and then reclassifying firms based on the use of number of derivative instruments used and the 
combination of derivative used. See section 0 for more details. 
39 In Chapter 6 we create additional dummy variables to identify firms that use both FC derivatives and FC 
debt. See section 0 for more details.   
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values of IR derivatives contract scaled by total assets40. Some studies have used these 
continuous measures to proxy for the extent of derivatives (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; 
Carter et al., 2003; Purnanandam, 2008; Nguyen and Faff, 2010; Campello et al., 2011; 
Magee, 2013). 
3.3.2.3. Continuous Measure of Foreign Currency Debt 
In Chapter 6, we examine the effect of FC debt on the FX exposure, EDF1YEAR, 
EDF5YEAR and Z-score besides FC derivatives. We collect data on firms debt 
denominated in foreign currency to calculate FC debt. Annual reports of the sample firms 
are searched for a list of keywords.41 We read the surrounding text of the searched keyword 
and if available collect the data on debt. We collect data on debt denominated in Sterling, 
Euro, USD and ROW. Once we have data on firm’s debt structure, we calculate the 
percentage of debt in 4 categories: 1) Sterling debt 2) Euro debt 3) USD debt and 4) ROW 
debt. We calculate FC debt by aggregating Euro debt, USD debt and ROW debt 
percentages. This gives us the measure of firms’ extent of FC debt. Few of the previous 
studies use continuous measure of foreign debt (Elliott et al., 2003; Kedia and Mozumdar, 
2003; Nguyen and Faff, 2006; Aabo et al., 2013). 
3.3.2.4. Dummy Measure of Foreign Debt 
From the continuous data on FC debt, we also create a binary measure of FC debt use. In 
particular, we create: 1) FC Debt dummy which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses Euro 
and/or US and/or ROW debt and ‘0’ otherwise 2) EU debt dummy which is set equal to ‘1’ 
if a firm uses Euro debt and ‘0’ otherwise 3) US debt dummy which is set equal to ‘1’ if a 
firm uses US debt and ‘0’ otherwise and 4) ROW debt dummy which is set equal to ‘1’ if a 
firm uses ROW debt and ‘0’ otherwise. Few of the previous studies used a dummy 
measure of FC debt in their analysis (Allayannis, Ihrig, et al., 2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 
2001; Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001; Kim et al., 2006; Aabo et al., 2013). 
                                                 
40 We do not investigate the independent effect of CP derivatives use on firm financial risk measures as very 
small percentage of our sample firms use CP only derivatives. 
41 We search annual reports for: Sterling, Euro, US dollar, liabilities, debt, foreign, interest rate, fixed, 
floating, borrowings and other combination of these keywords. 
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3.3.3. Control Variables42 
In order to examine the effects of derivatives use on various firm risks, it is vital to 
separate other factors that may also contribute to firms’ level of risk. We use previous 
literature to determine the control variables that we can employ in our multivariate analysis 
(Mainly Guay, 1999; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Shumway, 2001; Chava and Jarrow, 
2004; Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008; Nguyen and Faff, 2010; Bartram, Brown and 
Stulz, 2012; Magee, 2013). Reviews of these literatures suggest that firm financial risk 
measures are shown to be associated with the following firm characteristics.  
3.3.3.1. Leverage 
The relationship between leverage and firm risk is well established in the literature. 
Hedging theory suggests that firms with higher leverage have a higher probability of 
default and therefore higher expected costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Guay (1999) uses leverage to explain variation in firm financial risk of new derivative 
users. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find a positive and significant association between 
leverage and the standard deviation of daily stock return volatility. They measure leverage 
as the ratio of book values of liabilities to the market value of equity. Shumway (2001) and 
Chava and Jarrow (2004) find a strong positive association between leverage and 
bankruptcy. Both of these studies measure leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. Bartram (2006) measures leverage as the ratio of total debt to size and shows that 
derivative user firms are more exposed to various measures of risks due to higher leverage 
before considering the potential effects of hedging. This suggests positive relationship 
between leverage and firm financial risk. Campbell et al. (2008) show that a 1 standard 
deviation increase in leverage increases the probability of failure by 156%. They calculate 
leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Nguyen and Faff (2010) use leverage 
as a control to explain the variation in total risk, market risk and in idiosyncratic risk. They 
measure leverage similar to Shumway (2001). Bartram et al. (2011) calculate leverage as 
the ratio of total debt to size and show that firms with more financial leverage have higher 
total and systematic risk. Bartram et al. (2012) show that leverage is an important 
                                                 
42 In this section we discuss all the control varaibles that we have used in this thesis. In Chapter 4 we use 
leverage, firm size, profitability, market to book, dividend yield and liquidity as control variables. In Chapter 
5 we use leverage, firm size, profitability, excess return, equity volatility and liquidity as control variables. In 
Chapter 6 we use foreign sales, leverage, firm size, market to book and liquidity as control variables. 
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determinant of both total risk and market risk and find positive relationship between 
leverage & total risk and leverage & market risk. Marin (2013) shows that leverage is 
associated with higher chances of filing for bankruptcy, higher asset volatility and higher 
probability of default. Marin (2013) also finds that leverage is associated with significantly 
smaller distance to default. Marin (2013) also shows that highly levered firms are more 
likely to fail. Magee (2013) finds that leverage is negatively associated with distance to 
default. Magee (2013) shows that a one standard deviation increase in leverage decreases 
the distance to default by 3.99%.  In this study, we calculate leverage as the ratio of total 
debt to book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. 
3.3.3.2. Firm Size 
Larger firms are more likely to produce and sell a diversified range of goods and services 
as well as operate in many geographical markets. This product and geographical 
diversification may lead to lower firm risk. It follows then that large firms may exhibit 
lower levels of financial risk. Empirical literature also supports this hypothesis. Hentschel 
and Kothari (2001) find a negative relationship between total risk and firm size. Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) find that size is negatively associated with bankruptcy risk. In contrast to 
this, Guay (1999) find positive effect of firm size on the total risk. Similarly, Campbell et 
al. (2008) find that the failure probability of their sample firms increases by 17% due to a 
one standard deviation increase in market capitalisation, their measure of firm size. 
Bartram (2006) also uses firm size in the model and reports mixed effects of firm size on 
firm risk.43 Nguyen and Faff (2010) find that firm size is negatively associated with firm 
risk measures. Bartram et al. (2012) find that firm size is an important determinant of both 
total and market risk and it is negatively related to both measures of risk. Marin (2013) 
provides evidence that suggest that firm size is negatively associated with probability of 
default and asset volatility. Similarly, Magee (2013) finds that firm size is directly 
associated with distance to default. We use natural log of total assets as a measure for firm 
size.44 
                                                 
43 Bartram (2006) finds that firm size is negatively associated with standardised equity volatilty, net FX 
exposure, net IR exposure and net CP exposure and positively associated with marke risk.   
44 In unreported regression results we use logarithm of total sales as a measure of firm size and find that our 
results are qualitatively similar.  
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3.3.3.3. Profitability 
Firms that are more profitable possess a greater ability to service their debt commitments 
and therefore are less likely to face the threat of bankruptcy. In addition, highly profitable 
firms are able to make greater use of internal funds to finance themselves rather than going 
through banks or capital markets and borrowing funds at increased cost. Using more of 
internal funds and relying less on external finance will result in a lower likelihood of 
default. Several previous studies establish a strong link between profitability and the firm 
risk. Guay (1999) uses profitability as a control to explain variation in total risk. Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) also use a measure of profitability in their model to determine bankruptcy. 
Campbell et al. (2008) find that profitability is negatively associated with the probability of 
firm failure. They show that a one standard deviation increase in profitability reduces the 
probability of failure by 44% of its initial value. Profitable firms are expected to have 
lower financial distress costs because they are less risky (Bartram et al., 2009). Bartram et 
al. (2011) and Bartram et al. (2012)find that profitability is negatively associated with 
various risk measures. Campello et al. (2011) show that profitable firms have lower cost of 
borrowing. Magee (2013) finds that profitability is associated with a greater distance to 
default. This shows that profitability plays an important role in predicting firm risk. These 
findings suggest that firms with higher profitability have lower financial risks and in 
particular lower credit risk. Therefore, in this study it is expected that more profitable firms 
are likely to have a lower firm risk than less profitable firms. We use the return on invested 
capital as a measure for profitability. 
3.3.3.4. Liquidity 
Hedging theories suggest that firms with an abundance of cash or liquidity on the balance 
sheet are faced with a lower level of financial risk (Nance et al., 1993). Firms possessing 
large holdings of cash can use it to manage their short-term liabilities, to pay interest on 
their borrowings and need to rely less on costly external debt finance for the purposes of 
financing investment expenditure. Copeland and Joshi (1996) argue that firms possessing 
fewer liquid assets are likely to face a higher probability of financial distress. Consistent 
with this Marin (2013) and Magee (2013) find that firm liquidity is positively associated 
with a firm's distance to default. Bartram (2006) and Bartram et al. (2012) show that firms 
are more exposed to IR risk if they have lower liquidity. Campbell et al. (2008) argue that 
a firm with sufficient liquid assets to make interest payments may postpone default with 
the likelihood of avoiding it all together if macroeconomic and firm-specific conditions 
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improve. They also find a negative association between liquidity and bankruptcy. Nguyen 
and Faff (2010) suggest that liquidity is associated with low underinvestment risk and 
hence low overall risk. Bartram et al. (2011) report a negative association between 
liquidity and IR risk. Bartram et al. (2012) show that liquidity is a determinant of various 
firm financial risks. We measure liquidity as ratio of total current assets minus total stock 
and work in progress over total current liabilities.45 
3.3.3.5. Equity Volatility 
It is expected that firms with greater equity return volatility should have a higher 
probability of default. Shumway (2001) uses the standard deviation of a firm’s stock 
returns as a measure of equity volatility and finds a strong positive relation between equity 
volatility and bankruptcy. Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008) also find 
that equity volatility is positively associated with bankruptcy. The latter find an increase of 
one standard deviation in equity volatility increases the probability of bankruptcy by 64% 
of its initial value. Magee (2013) finds a negative association between equity volatility and 
the distance to default. We follow these studies and calculate equity volatility as the 
standard deviation of each firm’s daily stock return over the entire fiscal year. 
3.3.3.6. Excess Return 
If equity markets discount the equity of the firms that are very close to their default point 
then a firm’s past excess return could predict firm’s bankruptcy (Shumway, 2001). 
Shumway (2001) finds statistically negative impact of excess return on bankruptcy. Chava 
and Jarrow (2004) also observe negative association between excess return and 
bankruptcy. Campbell et al. (2008) find a negative association between failure probability 
and excess return. They show that a one standard deviation increases in excess return 
reduces the probability of failure by 28%. Magee (2013) finds positive association between 
excess return and distance to default. We calculate excess return as annual equity return 
minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. 
Each firm’s annual return is calculated by cumulating its monthly return. 
                                                 
45 We also use the current ratio and cash holdings over the market value of assets as a measure of liquidity in 
unreported regressions and find similar results. 
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3.3.3.7. Market to Book 
Theoretically, firms with more growth options are considered risky due to the 
underinvestment problem. Froot et al. (1993) show firms’ that are underinvested are costly 
as they cannot maximise the shareholders value and hence are risky. Hentschel and Kothari 
(2001) and Bartram (2006) use book to market ratio as a control to investigate the effect of 
derivatives on firm risk measures. Nguyen and Faff (2010) find positive and significant 
relationship between market to book ratio and total risk and between market to book ratio 
and idiosyncratic risk. Bartram et al. (2012) find positive and significant relation between 
market risk and market to book and fail to find any significant relation between total risk 
and market to book. We calculate market to book as the ratio of market value of assets to 
book value of assets. 
3.3.3.8. Dividend Yield 
Earlier studies suggest that firms that pay dividends are less likely to be financially 
constrained and may thus have lower level of risk (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; 
Allayannis et al., 2012). Bartram (2006) controls for dividend yield while examining the 
effects of derivatives on firm risk. Nguyen and Faff (2010) find negative relationship 
between dividend yield and measures of risk. Bartram et al. (2011) argue that firms that 
pays higher dividend should have stable cash flow and hence are less likely to be 
financially constrained. We measure dividend yield as dividend per share divided by the 
share price. 
3.3.3.9. Foreign Sales 
A foreign sale is a measure of firm’s foreign operations and also measures firm’s exposure 
to foreign exchange. Majority of the previous studies that investigated the effects of 
derivatives use on foreign exchange exposure incorporated foreign sales in their model 
(Allayannis, Brown, et al., 2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Keloharju and Niskanen, 
2001; Nguyen and Faff, 2003; Muller and Verschoor, 2008; Zhou and Wang, 2013). We 
calculate this measure as foreign sales divided by total sales. 
3.3.3.10. Other Variables 
We also use several other variables such as measures of pre-derivatives exposure. We 
discuss these variables prior to their use in respective chapters. 
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3.3.4. Credit Market Proxies 
In Chapter 5 we examine the effect of derivatives use on the probability of default during 
the period of heightened credit risk conditions. For this analysis we use several measures 
of aggregate credit risk and interact them with our derivative dummies46. These aggregate 
credit risk proxies are measured as follows: 
3.3.4.1. Corporate Capital Gearing47 
For our first proxy, we employ aggregate corporate capital gearing data for UK firms. 
Corporate capital gearing is defined as debt net of liquid assets relative to the market value 
of capital. Figure 3-1 shows UK corporate capital gearing for the period 1998 to 2009. 
Figure 3-1 shows that there are two noticeable peaks in capital gearing these being around 
2002-2003 and 2008-2009. In June 1998 the capital gearing is around 15%. The capital 
gearing increased sharply from 26% at the end of 2001 to 40% around 2002-2003. This is 
the period of global economic slowdown. The capital gearing again peaked during recent 
financial crisis of 2008-2009. The lending rates to business were declining since recent 
financial crisis of 2008-2009 (Bank of England, 2010b). However, if there is an increase in 
the interest rate then many firms will face increased interest payment burden as firms are 
exposed to interest rate changes due to higher capital gearing. 
Figure 3-1: Corporate Capital Gearing for UK firms 
 
                                                 
46 See section 5.4.3 for more details.  
47 This data is collected from Bank of England (2010a). Data for this variable is available only up to year 
2009. 
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3.3.4.2. Interest Payment48 
Our second proxy for credit risk condition is interest payment. Interest payment is defined 
as the percentage of UK firms with interest payments greater than their profits for firms 
with turnover greater than £1 million. Similar to Figure 3-1 in Figure 3-2 we observe two 
peaks in this measure of corporate credit risk in years 2002-03 and 2008-09. These peaks 
coincide with those seen with aggregate capital gearing. 
Figure 3-2: Percentage of Firms with Interest payment greater than profits for companies 
with turnover greater than £1m 
 
The percentage of companies with interest payment greater than their profits were slightly 
above 20 per cent in 1998 and increased sharply between 2001 and 2002 peaking at just 
over 30 per cent in 2002 and then was on a downward trend during the 2003-2007 pre-
crisis periods but then went up again in 2008 and 2009 at the peak of the crisis. The aim of 
macroeconomic policies advanced by public policy makers during the financial crisis was 
to keep businesses going through an exceptionally difficult period and so to keep corporate 
insolvencies as low as possible. During the 2007-2009 financial crisis loss making 
companies have been able to survive in part due to low interest rates and in part due to a 
more tolerant attitude to corporate borrowers from the banks. This most probably explains 
why the increase in the percentage of firms for whom interest payments exceed profits is 
less during this financial crisis than the crisis in the early part of the decade, despite the 
fact that the recent crisis is of much greater severity than the one earlier in the decade. 
However, according to the Bank of England firms’ financial positions are still relatively 
fragile since they say “Data from companies’ accounts indicate that a fall in revenues of 
                                                 
48 Source: Bank of England (2011a) 
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only 2% would be sufficient to take the percentage of companies unable to service their 
debt out of profits above the levels seen in the early 1990s” (Bank of England, 2011a, Pg 
no. 25) 
3.3.4.3. Default Spread 
Default spread is defined as the difference between Moody’s yield on seasoned AAA and 
BBB Corporate Bond. Figure 3-3 shows the corporate default spread for the period 1998 
to 2010. 
Figure 3-3: Corporate Default Spread 
 
 
From Figure 3-3 it is clear that the spread between BAA and AAA corporate bonds 
increases during adverse economic conditions. Figure 3-3 shows a substantial increase in 
spread during 2001 to 2002 and 2007 to 2009 period. During favourable aggregate risk 
conditions the spread is smaller. The cost for BAA rated firm increases at least by 1% on 
their bonds compare to AAA rated firms. During the recent financial crisis of year 2007 to 
2009 BAA rated firms paid at least 1.5% more to their bondholders than AAA rated firms. 
This increase in the bond yield for BAA rated firms went up by almost 3 to 4 times to their 
yields in year 1998 and 1999. 
3.3.4.4. Debt Relative to Profit49 
Debt relative to profit is our fourth proxy and defined as debt net of an estimate of liquid 
assets, relative to a four-quarter moving sum of gross operating surplus. Figure 3-4 shows 
                                                 
49 Source: Bank of England (2011b) 
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that the debt is normally higher than the profit and during the adverse economic condition 
of 2001 to 2002 and 2007 to 2009 debt is comparatively higher. This also increases the 
probability of default during this period. 
Figure 3-4: UK Corporate Debt Relative to Profit 
 
3.3.4.5. Deloitte Financial Stress Index50 
Our sixth proxy is the Deloitte Financial Stress Index, which purports to measure stress in 
financial markets by aggregating measures of volatility, investor risk aversion and the 
health of major financial market participants such as banks. More specifically, the Deloitte 
Financial Stress Index is an arithmetic average of the ratio of the three-month LIBOR to 
base rates, the ratio of yield on high yield bonds to yield on government bonds, the VIX 
index51, the ratio of total market return to banking stocks return and the ratio of yield on 
long-term government bonds to yield on short-term bonds. The index normalizes daily 
data points from each of these series against a long-run average (01/01/98 to 31/12/10) 
and then averages the normalized values for the five series. 
Figure 3-5 shows that there was a small peak in the Deloitte Financial Stress Index in 2002 
followed by a very large peak in 2008. This shows that financial stress is at very high 
levels during the recent financial crisis. The stress level in 2007-2009 is more than the 
average of stress index from 1998-2007. 
 
                                                 
50 Source Deloitte (2012) 
51 VIX is a ticker symbole for Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. 
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Figure 3-5: Deloitte Financial Stress Index 
 
3.4. Methods of Estimation 
In this thesis, we use an unbalanced panel of UK non-financial firms for the period of 
1998-2010. We remove firms from our sample if they are merged, delisted, acquired or do 
not provide any financial information. Thus resulted in an unbalanced panel data set for 
our empirical work. The unbalanced panel data used for analysis contains two dimensions; 
a cross-sectional dimension and a time-series dimension. Contrast to time-series data and 
cross-section data, unbalanced panel data controls for the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. For example, sample firms are similar in factors like economical & financial 
development, government rules and regulations but they still have differences in managing 
their risk, managerial skills and expertise. This difference in sample firms cannot be 
controlled by time-series and cross-section data and may produce results that are biased. 
Panel data can be used where time-series and cross-section data fails that is the problem of 
omitted variable. Other benefit of using panel data format is that it provides data with more 
information and variability, less collinearity and more degree of freedom and efficiency 
(Baltagi, 2005). Time-series studies are also affected by multicollinearity problem; for 
example there could be a high collinearity between size and use of derivatives for an 
individual firm. In contrast, this multicollinearity is less likely with a panel data across a 
large sample of firms as this will add variability and information to the data. 
Additionally, studies that use panel data can produce results that are not detected using 
time-series and cross-section data. Determination of whether use of derivative instruments 
reduces financial risk or increases cannot be answered efficiently using either time-series 
data or cross-section data. This question can better be examined using panel data where 
firms are examined on many variables across number of years. Holding the firm’s 
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characteristics constant, panel data models are better equipped to determine whether use of 
derivative affect firm risk and by how much. 
3.4.1. Estimation Framework 
We use a range of statistical and econometric techniques for data analysis. Previous studies 
suggest that there are substantive differences, on an average, in the characteristics of the 
firms that use derivatives and those that do not.52 In order to examine whether such 
differences in characteristics exist in our sample firms, we employ univariate tests for 
difference in means and medians. However, univariate tests cannot reveal significant 
differences in firm characters, holding other firm attributes constant. To overcome this 
problem, we also employ empirical analysis within a multivariate framework. 
3.4.1.1. Estimation Framework in Chapter 4  
Multivariate analysis is used to establish the relationship between firm risk measures and 
derivatives use. To examine the effects of the use of derivatives on various measures of 
firm risk we estimate the following regression model: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
[10] 
Equation [10] examines the effects of derivatives on the various measures of risk. We use 
dummy variables for derivatives use based on the disclosure in annual reports. We perform 
this analysis for all derivative users, FC derivative users and IR Derivatives users. We also 
repeat this analysis for FC derivative users and IR derivative users after removing “other” 
users from non-users sample. 
To test for the linear relationship between the use of derivatives and various measures of 
firm risk we estimate the following regression models: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
[11] 
Equation [11] examines the effects of an extent of all derivative use on various firm 
financial risk measures. Extent of all derivative use is calculated using the cumulative 
notional amount of FC, IR and CP derivatives disclosed by firms and scaled by total assets. 
                                                 
52 Gay and Nam (1998); Guay (1999); Allayannis and Weston (2001); Bartram et al. (2009) 
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The extent of derivative use captures firms total notional derivatives use and helps in 
distinguishing between firms with different levels of derivatives use. We repeat equation 
[11] for extent of FC derivatives and IR derivatives separately. The empirical methods 
used in this chapter follows that used in previous studies (Allayannis and Weston, 2001; 
Bartram, 2006; Nguyen and Faff, 2010). 
We examine whether macroeconomic conditions are important in influencing the impact of 
derivatives use on a firm financial risk by interacting our derivatives variables with the 
year dummies (see Equation [12]). This allows us to examine the effect of derivatives 
coefficient over our sample period in a manner consistent with the changing economic 
circumstances witnessed during this period. This analysis will show whether there is any 
variation in the impact of derivatives use on the firm financial risk measures over-time and 
if so, whether this variation is consistent with changes in macroeconomic circumstances or 
not. We estimate the following model: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
19
𝑡=9
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
[12] 
Where all the variables are defined as above and GDPt is macroeconomic variable rate to 
control for time period effects that may influence the firm financial risk measures. In all 
the models in this chapter, we include year dummies to control for common shocks and 
industry dummies to control for industry effects. 
3.4.1.2. Estimation Framework in Chapter 5 
We use regression analysis to examine the effects of derivatives use on the probability of 
default. We largely follow the empirical work of Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow 
(2004) and Campbell et al. (2008) to arrive at a model that contains a list of drivers of the 
probability of default to which we add our derivatives use variable. Our regression model 
generally takes the following specification: 
 𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐸𝐷𝐹5𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
[13] 
We create many different derivatives variable and repeat equation [13] with new 
derivatives variables. In our model, we include year dummies to control for common 
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shocks to the probability of default for all firms and industry dummies to control for 
industry effects in the model. Standard errors are corrected for within-firm correlation 
(clustering) and heteroskedasticity using the White-Huber estimator. 
There are some important challenges in empirically testing the equation [13]. The first 
problem is of self-selection bias where firms self-select to use derivatives based on their 
benefits. The second challenge is that the independent variables leverage and derivative 
use are likely to be defined jointly by firms, which creates the problem of endogeneity. 
Theories based on ex-ante incentives show that by using derivatives, firms could increase 
their debt capacity as a result of a reduction in the likelihood of financial distress. This 
creates a reverse causation problem between these variables. We use a heckman treatment 
effects to control for self-selection bias and an instrumental variable model, PSM method 
and CEM method to address the issue of endogeneity. 
In Chapter 5, we examine whether the difference in the probability of default between 
derivative users and non-users depends on the level of aggregate credit risk using the 
following models: 
 𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐸𝐷𝐹5𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
[14] 
In equation [14] we use several measures of credit market conditions.53 In particular, we 
use corporate capital gearing, interest payment, default spread, debt relative to profit, 
income gearing and Deloitte stress index. We include GDP growth rate to control for 
macroeconomic conditions. All of the credit market condition proxies are standardised.54 
This facilitates an easy interpretation of the coefficients and suggests percentage change in 
EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR for a one standard deviation change in the credit market 
proxies. Definitions and sources of these proxies are defined in section 3.3.4. 
                                                 
53 All the variables are winsorised at 1% from both tails to control for the outliers. 
54 We subtract sample mean from actual values and divide it by standard deviation for each variable 
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In Chapter 5, we also examine time-varying effect of derivatives use on the probability of 
default. To examine whether the impact of derivatives on the probability of default varies 
over our sample period we estimate the following model: 
 𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝐷𝐹5𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
19
𝑡=9
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
[15] 
We include the annual GDP growth rate to control for time period effects that may 
influence the probability of default. We estimate equation [25] using pooled OLS, RE and 
FE model and present the results of only best model. 
To examine whether derivatives use by firms with higher pre-derivative firm-specific 
credit risk, as measured by a firm's Z-score, has a greater impact on default probabilities 
than derivative use by firms with lower pre-derivative firm-specific credit risk, we use 
following equation: 
 𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐸𝐷𝐹5𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑍 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑍 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
[16] 
3.4.1.3. Estimation Framework in Chapter 6 
We use the FX exposure calculated in equation [7] as a dependent variable and use it in our 
regression analysis where FX exposure is simultaneously determined by ratio of foreign 
sales to total sales, foreign operations, and notional values of FC derivatives to total assets, 
financial operations. The second stage regression equation takes following form: 
 ?̂?2𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 [17] 
Where β̂2i is a firm’s FX exposure estimated in equation [7]; FC derivatives is a firm’s 
ratio of FC derivatives to total assets; foreign sales is a firm’s ratio of foreign sales to total 
sales. 
Next, we follow He and Ng (1998) and Chow and Chen (1998) to include a set of control 
variables that proxy for the incentives of FC derivatives use namely: leverage, liquidity, 
firm size and market to book ratio. Moreover, we also include FC derivatives variable in 
the regression specification following Nguyen and Faff (2003) and Muller and Verschoor 
(2008). The regression model has following form; 
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 ?̂?2𝑖 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼5𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
[18] 
Where β̂2iis a firm’s FX exposure estimated in equation [7]
55; FC Derivatives is the 
notional value of FC derivatives use scaled by the firm’s total assets; Foreign Sales is a 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to book value of 
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity; Firm Size is the natural log 
of total assets; Liquidity is measured as the as ratio of total current assets minus total stock 
and work in progress over total current liabilities and Market to Book is calculated as the 
ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. 
Furthermore, We also calculate FX exposure of UK non-financial firms using lagged 
changes in exchange rates following He and Ng (1998), Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) and 
Jong et al. (2006). He and Ng (1998) argue that as financial information is published with a 
time lag, the exchange rate changes also take longer time to affect the firms’ cash flow. 
Jong et al. (2006) argue that changes in FX rates do not incorporated directly into stock 
prices and it may take some time before the stock prices react to these changes that suggest 
market inefficiency. Therefore, we calculate lagged FX exposure of UK non-financial 
firms to examine for the presence of such effect. We calculate the lagged FX exposure as 
follow: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 [19] 
Where 𝛽3𝑖𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡−1measures the effect of lagged exchange rate changes on stock return. 
Moreover, we investigate the impact of FC debt on FX exposure. As we discussed earlier 
firms can use financial and operation hedging techniques to manage exchange rate-
exposure. To examine the effects of FC debt we employ following models; 
 ?̂?2𝑖 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛼3𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
[20] 
  ?̂?2𝑖 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛼3𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
[21] 
                                                 
55 In later analysis we use equation [7] but change the dependent variable to other measures of FX exposure 
that we calculate such as Sterling/Euro exposure, Sterling/USD exposure and Lagged FX exposure. 
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These models examine risk-reducing effect of different financial instruments. We create 
three dummy variables to capture the use of different financial derivative instruments. FC 
derivatives and FC debt dummy is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses both FC derivatives and 
FC debt and ‘0’ otherwise; FC Derivatives only dummy is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC 
derivatives but not FC debt and ‘0’ otherwise; FC Debt only dummy is set equal to ‘1’ if a 
firm uses FC debt but not FC derivatives and ‘0’ otherwise;  ?̂?2𝑖 is the absolute value of 
monthly FX exposure calculated using equation [7]56; all other explanatory variables are 
measured as discussed above. 
We have also collected data on percentage of debt denominated in FC and use it to 
examine the effect of extent of FC debt use on FX exposure. We use equations [22] and 
[23] to investigate the impact of percentage of FC debt on exchange rate exposure. 
 ?̂?2𝑖 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
[22] 
 ?̂?2𝑖 =  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛼5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
[23] 
We expect a negative relationship between FC debt and FX exposure. We use dummy 
variable for FC derivatives use to control for other interpretation of coefficient on FC debt. 
To investigate the effects of FC debt on probability of default we use the following 
equation. 
 𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐸𝐷𝐹5𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑍 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  
=  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛼3𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼9𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
[24] 
3.5. Estimation Methods 
In this thesis, we use following econometric methods to examine the relationship between 
firms’ use of derivatives and firm financial risk measures: 
 Ordinary Least Square 
                                                 
56 In unreported regression results we repeat the regression analysis presented in Table 6-7 using absolute 
values of weekly FX exposures. The regressions results are slightly weaker and the coefficients on FC debt 
are insignificant with mixed signs.   
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 Random Effects 
 Fixed Effects 
 First Difference Estimator 
 Weighted Least Square 
 Instrumental Variable Approach 
a. Two Stage Least Squares 
b. Generalised Methods of Moments 
 Treatment Effects Model 
 Matching Methods 
a. Propensity Score Matching 
b. Coarsened Exact Matching 
3.5.1. Ordinary Least Squares 
We start our analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) methodology. A pooled OLS 
model uses data on different firms pooled together without controlling for individual 
differences. The pooled panel data model used in the empirical chapters has following 
general model: 
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
[25] 
Where 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a dependent variable. We use different firm risk measure 
in our empirical chapters. In Chapter 4 we use total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk 
as measures of firm risk. In Chapter 5 we use EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR as measures 
of firm risk. In Chapter 6 we use exchange rate exposure as a measure of firm risk.57 
𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a proxy for firm’s derivative use or foreign debt use as 
discussed in section 3.3.2. We use different control variables in our empirical chapters. In 
Chapter 4, we use leverage, firm size, profitability, market to book, dividend yield and 
liquidity as control variables. In Chapter 5, we use leverage, firm size, profitability, equity 
volatility, liquidity and excess return as control variables. In Chapter 6, we use foreign 
                                                 
57 In Chapter 6 we also use Z-score, EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR as dependent variables when we examine 
the risk reducing effect of foreign currency debt. 
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sales, leverage, firm size, market to book and liquidity as control variables. In equation 
[25] index i refers to the unit of observation, firm, and the index t refers to the time. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a 
disturbance term assumed to satisfy the regression model assumptions. The model also 
includes time and industry dummies. 
OLS model has several assumptions such as linearity in parameters, normality of data, no 
heteroskedasticity, no multicollinearity and no serial correlation. Further analyses on the 
data were carried out to determine that the data satisfies the assumptions. These analyses 
include descriptive statistics of variables and correlation analysis. The unobservable 
heterogeneity is captured by disturbance term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, from the obtained pooled OLS 
estimator. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 can be expressed as; 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡  [26] 
Where 𝜇𝑖 refers to unobservable individual firm-specific effect and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
remainder disturbance. t in equation [26] represents different times for the same firm. The 
unobserved effect is often interpreted as capturing features of a firm such as business 
practices, management skills and expertise in risk management that are constant over-time 
and which are not explicitly represented in the model and hence are included in 𝜇𝑖 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 𝑣𝑖𝑡 varies with firms and time and hence considered as usual 
disturbance in the regression. The pooled OLS estimates are consistent if the explanatory 
variables, derivative instrument and other control variables, are not correlated with the 
disturbance term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡. However, if there were a correlation between the disturbance term 
and the explanatory variables, then the OLS estimates would be biased. 
Two different techniques are available to control for the unobserved individual specific 
effects; 1) Fixed Effects (FE) Estimation Method and 2) Random Effects (RE) Estimation 
Method. 
3.5.2. FE Model 
If 𝜇𝑖 in equation [26] is considered as fixed, then FE estimation method can be used to 
control for the unobservable individual firm-specific effects. FE model examines the 
impact of variables that changes over-time and drops the variables that do not change over-
time such as business practices, management skills and expertise in risk management. The 
assumption is that the unobserved effects such as business practices, management skills 
and expertise in risk management affects the explanatory variable in OLS model and hence 
bias the results and to control for that FE model is used. 
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Equation [25] can be written as follow with the help of equation [26] as follow: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝜇𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 
[27] 
Averaging equation [27] over the time gives: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖
=  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ 𝜇𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖 
[28] 
Therefore, subtracting equation [27] from [28] gives: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖
=  𝛽1(𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
− 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖)
+ 𝛽2(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖) +  (𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑣𝑖) 
[29] 
In equation [29] the unobserved cross-section FE, 𝜇𝑖, and intercept, 𝛼𝑖 , has now 
disappeared. The process of change expressed in equation [29] is known as “within 
effects” as it explains the variation of the mean of dependent variable in terms of the 
variations in the means of independent variables relating to a given firm. FE model does 
not suffer from heterogeneity bias as they only estimate “within estimates” (Dougherty, 
2011). 
Dougherty (2011) argues that the use of FE is costly as the intercept, 𝛼𝑖, and any other 
variable that is not changing over the time for each firm will disappear from the model. 
Although, the intercept may not be of much importance but the removal of unvarying 
independent variables could be problematic. For example, this study investigates the 
effects of derivatives use on firms’ risk for a large sample of UK non-financial firms. 
Derivatives dummy for individual firm i in period t is 𝐷𝑖𝑡. Now if firms do not change their 
risk management activity during the period of study, i.e. they either use derivative 
instrument throughout the sample period or they do not, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 will remain unchanged for all t 
for that firm and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝐷𝑖 for all time period, t. Therefore, the difference (𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝐷𝑖) is 
zero for all the time periods and hence, the firm will not be included in the analysis. If all 
the firms in sample have not changed their risk management policy during the sample 
period, then 𝐷𝑖𝑡 will be zero for all i and t and hence, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 cannot be included in regression 
analysis. However, FE model provides robust results while controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
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3.5.3. Random Effects Model 
In the RE model the assumption is that all the firm differences are captured by the intercept 
parameter and as the firms in sample are selected randomly, the firm-specific effects are 
considered as a random variable and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included 
in the model. If 𝜇𝑖, in equation [27], is considered as RE instead of FE, then RE estimation 
method can be used (Hill, Griffiths and Lim, 2011). By allowing different intercepts RE 
model controls the shortcomings of FE model. RE model provides different intercepts for 
each firm similar to FE model. However, RE model assumes the different firm-specific 
terms as a random component and deviations from the random component are treated as a 
part of error term. Baltagi (2005) suggests random effects specification if a sample is 
randomly selected from a large population. 
In the RE model the error has two factors: the individual firm-specific error and the error 
term showing how far the intercept of each firm is compared to the overall intercept. As 
discussed above in RE model 𝜇𝑖 is considered as random element instead of fixed and with 
a mean value of 𝜇. In this instance, the firm-specific intercept can be expressed as; 
 𝜇𝑖 =  𝜇 +  𝑒𝑖  [30] 
Where 𝑒𝑖is an i.i.d error term with a zero mean value and constant variance of 𝜎𝑒
2. Now by 
substituting equation [30] into equation [27], we have; 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇 +  𝜔𝑖𝑡  
[31] 
where: 
 𝜔𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖 [32] 
The combined error term 𝜔𝑖𝑡includes two error elements, 𝑣𝑖𝑡, which is a panel error term, 
and 𝑒𝑖, which is a firm-specific error term. It is assumed that firm-specific error term is not 
correlated with each other and also not auto-correlated across both cross-section and time-
series units. RE model assumes that the firm-specific error term is not correlated with the 
explanatory variables, which allows the time-invariant variables to be included as 
explanatory variables, and shows advantage of RE model over FE model. RE model 
produces more estimators than FE model as observed characteristics that remain constant 
for each firm are retained in the regression analysis while they have to be dropped in FE 
model (Dougherty, 2011). Also, the degrees of freedom are more with random effects 
model than with FE model (Dougherty, 2011). 
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3.5.4. Tests to Choose Between OLS, RE and FE Models 
In our empirical analysis, we use OLS, RE and FE models but do not provide results for all 
these models. We employ several tests to select the best model among OLS, RE and FE 
and report the results of the best model in the empirical analysis. Below, we discuss these 
tests. 
3.5.4.1. F-Test 
First, OLS model is tested for the presence of heterogeneity using F-test as suggested by 
Greene (2002). This test compares the results of pooled OLS with the results of FE model. 
The pooled OLS is the restricted model and the rejection of H0 indicates the presence of 
FE. The F-test has following form: 
 
𝐹 =  
(𝑅𝑆𝑆 − 𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆) (𝑁 − 1)⁄
𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑆 (𝑁𝑇𝑖 − 𝑁 − 𝐾)⁄
~𝐹𝑁−1,𝑁(𝑇𝑖−1)−𝐾  [33] 
In equation [33] RSS is restricted sum of squares from OLS model; URSS is unrestricted 
sum of squares from FE model. The rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the FE 
model is better suited than pooled OLS model. 
3.5.4.2. Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Second, Breusch and Pagan LM test is used to test for the presence of random effects 
model based on the OLS residuals (Greene, 2002). This test compares the results of pooled 
OLS with the results of RE model. The LM test takes following form: 
 
𝐿𝑀 =
𝑛𝑇𝑖
2(𝑇𝑖 − 1)
[
∑  𝑛𝑖=1 [∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1 ]
2
∑  𝑛𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
2𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1
− 1]
2
 [34] 
The rejection of null hypothesis indicates presence of RE and suggests that RE model is 
suitable than pooled OLS model. 
3.5.4.3. RE vs. FE Test 
Third, a test for over identifying restrictions between FE and RE model is employed58. The 
FE estimator uses the orthogonality conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated with the 
idiosyncratic error while random effects estimator uses the additional orthogonality 
conditions that the regressors are uncorrelated with the group-specific error. The null 
                                                 
58 We use xtoverid command in stata created by Schaffer and Stillman (2006) to select between fixed effects 
and random effects model. The standard Hausman test for fixed effects and random effects cannot be 
calculated with robust standard errors and hence this command is used.  
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hypothesis for the test is that individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in 
the model. The rejection of null hypothesis suggests that the individual effects are 
correlated with regressors and FE model is best suited than random effects in such a 
scenario. 
3.5.5. First Difference Model 
We also analyse data using a second version of FE model called first difference (FD) 
model. In this model the unobserved effect is removed by taking the difference of 
observation for the previous time from observation with current time and this is repeated 
for all the periods Dougherty (2011). For a firm i in time period t the model is [27]. For the 
previous year, the relationship is as follow: 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
=  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜇𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 
[35] 
Now subtracting equation [35] from equation [27] gives: 
 
∆𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝛽1∆𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  ∆𝑣𝑖𝑡 
[36] 
In equation [36] the unobserved heterogeneity has disappeared. "∆" represents simple 
change from 𝑡 to 𝑡 − 1. Under the assumption of presence of unobserved heterogeneity, 
the coefficient on 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 provides better estimate when changes in probability of 
default are regressed on change in main explanatory variable and changes in other control 
variables. FD model will yield consistent estimates as ∆𝑣𝑖𝑡 is uncorrelated with 
∆𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 and ∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 and satisfies the assumption that 
𝐸(𝑣𝑖𝑡|𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) =  0. 
3.5.6. Weighted Least Square 
In Chapter 6, we use weighted least squares (WLS) methodology to control for the 
heteroskedasticity. We assign more weights to more precise estimates and less weight to 
less precise estimates. In un-weighted regression, the model prefers observations with 
larger values to observations with smaller values. Hence, generated regression curves fit 
points at higher levels than at lower levels ("NIST/SEMATECH E-Handbook of Statistical 
Methods," 2012). We use t-statistics of the FX exposure coefficients calculated using 
equation [7] as a weighting factor. WLS enables us to assign more weights to more precise 
FX exposure estimates and therefore can increase the accuracy of our second stage 
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regression estimation. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Muller and Verschoor (2008) also 
use the WLS estimation method. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) use inverse of standard errors 
estimated from equation that they used to calculate FX exposure whereas Muller and 
Verschoor (2008) use t-statistics from the exposure coefficients calculated from first stage 
model as a weighting factor. The benefit of WLS is that the estimates obtained from it have 
better efficiency properties than OLS. 
3.5.7. Instrumental Variable Approach 
The above discussed methods of panel data tries to control for the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity in data but still the estimate derived from the above models may not be 
completely reliable under the possible problem of endogeneity. Endogeneity arises because 
of simultaneous causality in this study. This occurs when the causality runs in both 
directions, that is, from the regressor(s) to the dependent variable and from the dependent 
variable to the regressor(s). In our case, the relationship between derivative use and the 
firm risk measures is affected by a feedback loop such that derivative use affects the firm 
risk but firm risk also affects the decision to use derivatives. In effect, derivative usage 
lowers the firm risk but it is also the case that firms with a high firm risk are more likely to 
use derivatives. Hence it becomes important to address this problem and to account for this 
bias. When there is simultaneous causality, the endogenous variables and the error term are 
correlated and OLS estimation picks up both forwards and backwards effects, thereby 
leading to bias and inconsistent coefficients. 
To better understand it, suppose main explanatory variable (𝑣𝑖𝑡) is the only explanatory 
variable available to explain the variation in firm financial risk (𝑦𝑖𝑡). To estimate the mean 
structure of a model following OLS (?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆) model can be used: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  [37] 
In the above equation, [37], 𝛽 is consistent and unbiased when explanatory variable (𝑣), 
derivatives use, and error term (𝜀) are uncorrelated, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝜀) = 0, However the estimated 
coefficient is biased and inconsistent when 𝜀 contains any omitted variable that is 
correlated with main explanatory variable 𝑣, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑣, 𝜀) ≠ 0. This problem can be 
controlled using an instrumental variable (IV) approach and the equation [37] can be used. 
To obtain unbiased and consistent estimates for 𝛽, when 𝑣 and 𝜀 are correlated, 
instrumental variables needed. A good instrumental variable affects dependent variable 
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through its effect via endogenous variable and not directly (Hill et al., 2011). In this study 
a good instrumental variable must affect firm risk trough its effect on derivatives use and 
not directly. These instrumental variables provide additional information. A good 
instrumental variable, ɀ, must satisfy the following two conditions: 
 ɀ is uncorrelated with 𝜀 that is, 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(ɀ, 𝜀) = 0 [38] 
In equation [38] ɀ is considered as exogenous and it mean that ɀ should not have any partial 
effect on other control variables and also it should not be correlated with other factors that 
affect control variables. This equation is also called “Instrument Exogeneity” (Wooldridge, 
2009). 
 ɀ is correlated with 𝑣 that is, 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣(ɀ, 𝑣) ≠ 0 [39] 
In the above equation ɀ must be either positively or negatively correlated with endogenous 
explanatory variable 𝑣. This condition is known as “Instrument Relevance” (Wooldridge, 
2009). 
If the instrumental variable satisfies the above two conditions only then it can be used as 
an instrumental variable for 𝑣. However, it is very hard to test the covariance between ɀ 
and unobservable error 𝜀, equation [38]. Generally, this assumption cannot be tested and in 
majority of cases researchers maintain 𝐶𝑜𝑣(ɀ, 𝜀) = 0 by intuition (Wooldridge, 2009). The 
second condition [39] can be tested given a random sample of population. A simple 
regression analysis between ɀ and 𝑣 can test the second condition (Wooldridge, 2009). 
If the selected instrumental variable satisfies the above-discussed conditions then it can be 
considered as valid instrumental variable and can be used to estimate 𝑦 using following 
equation: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽?̂?𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  [40] 
In equation [40] ?̂? is the predicted value of 𝑣 from the simple regression of 𝑣 on ɀ. This 
equation will provide unbiased and consistent estimate for 𝛽. 
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3.5.7.1. Two Stage Least Square Approach 
2SLS is used to control the problem of endogeneity by implementing instrumental variable 
regression analysis.59 This model combines multiple instruments into one instrument in 
first stage and then the predicted values of the endogenous variable can be used in second 
stage model. We use this analysis in section 5.4.7 where we use extent of derivatives 
variable as our main explanatory variable. We consider extent of derivatives use and 
leverage as endogenous variables and use instrumental variables to control for 
endogeneity. In the first stage, endogenous, extent of derivative use and leverage, variables 
are regressed using instrumental variables60. The extent of derivative use and leverage are 
regressed on all valid instruments and all other exogenous variables in the first stage. The 
instruments capture the variation in the extent of derivative usage and leverage. As the 
instrumental variables are uncorrelated with error term, the estimated endogenous 
variables, extent of derivative use and leverage, will not be correlated with the error term. 
In the second stage regression, the probability of default is estimated using the predicted 
values of extent of derivative use and leverage from the first stage regression and all other 
exogenous variables. 
In determining our choice of instrumental variables, we follow the literature (Géczy et al., 
1997; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Purnanandam, 2008; Magee, 
2013). The first instrumental variable is the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales. Géczy et al. 
(1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find a positive and significant relationship between 
this variable and the use of currency derivatives, which is consistent with the theory that 
firms use derivatives to reduce underinvestment costs. Magee (2013) also use R&D 
expenditure as an instrument for hedging. Our second instrumental variable is ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales. This variable measures the foreign exposure and hedging 
theories suggest that firms with more FX exposure are more likely to use derivatives 
(Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). This variable also measures firms’ real foreign operations. 
The third instrumental variable that we used is depreciation and amortisation scaled by the 
total assets of the firm as a measure of firms non-debt tax shield (Purnanandam, 2008). 
                                                 
59 Boyer and Marin (2013) and Magee (2013) uses 2SLS approach in their examination. 
60 The first stage instrumental variables estimation is to estimate the endogenous variables as a function of 
the exogenous variables in the second stage plus additional instruments. 
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Finally, we use property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets to control for the 
collateral available for borrowing (Purnanandam, 2008). 
The first stage regression form is as follow: 
 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡
=  𝜋𝑖 +  𝜋1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜔𝑖𝑡  
[41] 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝜋𝑖 +  𝜋1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 [42] 
The second stage regression form is as follow: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑈𝑠𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
[43] 
In equation [43], 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑈𝑠𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡 is the predicted value of extent of derivatives 
use from equation [41] and 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒̂ 𝑖𝑡  is the predicted value of leverage from equation [42]. 
2SLS provides consistent IV estimates; but it is suboptimal in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity (Magee, 2013). Due to the problem of omitted variables, the individual 
firm effects may change over-time. This means that individual firms may responds to the 
changing unobservable variables in different ways. The panel data model can be rewritten 
as follow to include the effects of time-varying unobservable variables. 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜉𝑖𝑡 
[44] 
Where 𝜉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 ∝𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. Because of this the variance of error term is no longer constant, 
𝜃𝑡
2𝜎∝𝑖𝑗
2 + 𝜎𝜀𝑖𝑗
2 , and leads to the problem of heteroskedasticity. This problem can be partially 
addressed using heteroskedasticity consistent or “Robust” standard errors and statistics. 
However, 2SLS-IV is suboptimal in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
3.5.7.2. Generalized Methods of Moments Approach 
As 2SLS is suboptimal, in the presence of heteroskedasticity, a GMM instrumental 
variables approach can be used. GMM, introduced by Hansen (1982), is the standard 
method when unknown form of heteroskedasticity is present (Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman, 2003). This method uses the orthogonality conditions to allow for efficient 
estimation under the presence of unknown heteroskedasticity (Baum et al., 2003). 
Complete distribution knowledge of data is not required for GMM. GMM estimates need 
only specified moments derived from an underlying model. GMM will work in a similar 
way as IV estimate if the moments are more than equations. It estimates the parameter 
vector by minimizing the sum of squares of the differences between the population 
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moments and the sample moments, using the variance of the moments as a metric. The 
adjustment to the covariance matrix accounts not only the moving average aspect of 
disturbances but also for heteroskedasticity aspect of the disturbance conditional on the 
explanatory variables. This is how GMM ensures efficient estimate in the presence of 
unknown heteroskedasticity. Under the problem of heteroskedasticity GMM estimator is 
more efficient than the standard IV estimator. However, if heteroskedasticity is not present 
the GMM estimator is no worse asymptotically than the IV estimator (Baum et al., 2003). 
We perform several checks of instrument validity on our instruments. In particular, we use 
Sargan-Hansen Test, Under-Identification test and Crag-Donald F-Stat. 
3.5.8. Selection Bias: Treatment Effects Model 
In Chapter 5, we use treatment effects model to correct for the possibility of self-selection 
bias. Self-selection occurs when firms self-select themselves into certain behaviours or 
programmes and hence participation is not randomly determined (Wooldridge, 2009). If 
derivative user firms are systematically different from the firms that do not use derivatives, 
then the problem of self-selection bias arises. If derivatives are used by firms with high 
firm financial risks for reasons other than risk management and if our control variables 
cannot capture this information, then it is best to use treatment effect model as it will 
correct the problem of self-selection bias and produces consistent results. 
In treatment effects model, we use predicted probabilities of firms using derivative 
instruments as an explanatory variable in the risk equation. Treatment effects model 
considers derivatives as endogenous and includes it on the right side of the first regression 
equation. The inverse mills ratio statistics from the treatment effects model shows whether 
a bias exists or not. To examine the effect of derivatives on firms’ probability of default, 
following treatment effect model is estimated: 
3.5.8.1. Treatment Effects: Two-Step 
Heckman’s two-step treatment effects model involves 2 equations: 1) the selection 
equation, where we model the firm’s decision to use derivatives, and 2) the regression 
equation considering mechanisms determining the outcome variable, using the predicted 
values of derivatives use from the selection equation. In our case, we assume that the 
probability of default of a firm is a function of derivatives use, leverage, firm size, 
profitability, liquidity, equity volatility and its excess return; whereas the probability of 
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
Vikram Finavker 91 M00281338 
derivatives use is a function of foreign sales, capital expenditure and interest coverage. We 
first estimate our selection equation model as follow: 
 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
[45] 
𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
Where Derivativesit
∗  is a latent variable. Instrumental Variablesit are instrumental variables. 
Control Variablesit  are set of observed variables that affect firms’ use of derivatives. 𝜇𝑖𝑡is 
an error term. 
We use the predicted value of Derivativesit
∗  in following outcome equation: 
 𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛿𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
∗ +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
[46] 
Where 𝐸𝐷𝐹1𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the probability of default, Derivatives𝑖𝑡  is a predicted value for 
derivatives variable from equation [45] and εitis an error term. In all the equations, we also 
include industry dummies and year dummies. The coefficient of interest is δ, which 
measures the average effect of derivative use on the probability of default. By using a 
treatment effects model, we can estimate the regression coefficients δ on our endogenous 
derivatives variable by using the observed variables. 
3.5.9. Matching Methods 
There are several problems that affect the results of studies that use observational data. The 
first problem is the distribution on observed characteristics between treatment and control 
group. Majority of the studies that examine the effects of derivatives uses on firm risk use 
a regression model where they regress measure of risk on a dummy or a continuous 
measure for derivatives and other control variables (Bartram, 2006; Boyer and Marin, 
2013; Magee, 2013). Researchers then examine the coefficient on derivatives by saying 
ceteris paribus and hence assume the value of coefficient as the casual effect of the 
derivatives. However, the problem with simple regression analysis is that they cannot 
identify whether the observed characteristics used have any comparable overlap. Li (2013) 
argues that the findings of studies that use regression model with observational data could 
be misleading as they do not control for the overlap between treated and control group. 
Endogeneity is other econometric issue that affects the result of studies that uses 
observational data. Endogeneity arises when the explanatory variable is correlated with the 
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error term. Many previous studies have raised the issue and tried to correct for it61. 
Endogeneity arises from three sources, measurement error, simultaneity and omitted 
variables62. If present, these problems results in biased estimation of the causal effects. In 
this study, we also use matching methods to control for the above-discussed problem of 
endogeneity. 
Assessing the impact of derivatives use is complex because of incomplete information. 
With observational data one can identify whether a firm uses derivatives or not and the 
firm financial risk conditional on derivatives use. However, the problem with making 
causal inference is how to identify the outcomes that are not observed. This means that if 
firm i used derivatives at time t, what would have happened if it had not used derivatives. 
Hence, the fundamental problem in estimating unbiased causal effects is constructing the 
unobserved counterfactuals for treated (derivative users) observations. 
In observational studies, the researcher has no control on observations. The treated and 
control groups may have substantial difference on the observed covariates and these 
differences can lead to biased estimates of treatment effects if not controlled. We show in 
our univariate results in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 that treated and control firms have large 
differences on the observed covariates and that there is a possibility of endogeneity. To 
control for these problems, majority of the studies use instrumental variable approach 
where they use instruments to control for endogeneity (Boyer and Marin, 2013; Magee, 
2013). However, instrumental variable approach for dealing with endogeneity requires 
finding instruments that are uncorrelated with error term and explain variation in 
dependent variable only through the endogenous variables. Finding good instruments is 
hard and researchers rely on economic intuition to justify the conditions of instrument 
validity. To examine the effect of a “Treatment” one could use two firms that have similar 
characteristics for all the variables except that one gets the treatment (uses derivatives) and 
the other does not (non-user). This examination will provide unbiased estimation effects of 
treatment on the outcome variable. However, in observed data, this is very hard to achieve 
and hence statistical method should be used which can create such a matching. In this 
                                                 
61 Hentschel and Kothari (2001); Purnanandam (2008); Magee (2013) 
62 Li (2013) 
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thesis, we use propensity score and coarsen exact matching methods to examine the impact 
of derivatives use (treatment effect) on firm risk measures (outcome variable). 
Matching methods control for the covariate imbalance before matching and prune 
observations that are out of balance for which a matching is not available (Blackwell, 
Iacus, King and Porro, 2009). This ensures comparison of treated & control firms and 
allows examination of causal effect of treatment on the outcome variables. 
3.5.9.1. Propensity Score Matching 
In this study, we examine the effect of derivatives use on the firm financial risk measures 
using regression analysis. However, the results of analysis could be biased due to the 
potential problem of endogeneity. We use propensity score matching (PSM) method, 
which is one of the econometric models that are used to calculate causal effects while 
controlling the endogeneity problem. PSM method matches the treated and control firms 
first on their propensity score and then calculate the mean difference for outcome variable. 
This makes sure that only comparable firms are used to calculate the mean difference and 
hence removes the bias. The optimal setting for this comparison could be one where firms 
are randomly allocated to use derivatives and to not. The random allocation of firms would 
control irrelevant influences by equating them in two groups. However, randomised 
experiments are difficult and costly to achieve in observational studies and hence, the 
advantage of PSM method is that it provides randomised experiment by matching firms on 
the observed covariates. This method matches derivative user firms with non-user firms 
and control for endogeneity. Li (2013) argues that if PSM technique is used appropriately 
then it can increase researchers’ ability to draw causal inferences with observational data. 
Researchers can use observational data and reconstruct the counterfactuals using PSM 
method. Li (2013) shows that PSM reconstructs counter factual by adjusting covariates 
between treated and control group using observational data. 
In this study, we use matching on propensity score method to match derivative user and 
non-users on various covariates. PSM is specifically designed to achieve balance on 
observed covariates between the treatment and control groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). PSM calculates conditional probability of receiving treatment based on observed 
covariates. In this thesis, the propensity score is the conditional probability of using 
derivatives. Propensity score is calculated using a logistic regression model where a 
dependent binary variable (use of derivatives) is regressed on covariates that are expected 
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to be related to both dependent variable and outcome variable (firm financial risk 
measures). PSM reduces the selection bias in results by matching on a single index 
propensity score and make derivative user firms and non-user firms as comparable as 
possible on covariates. 
We use propensity score estimation method to identity firms that have similar 
characteristics to use derivatives but differ only on their choice of using derivatives and 
then match the derivative user and non-user firms on the propensity score. Few studies 
earlier used a PSM method developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to examine the 
effects of a treatment on the outcome variable in finance field63. 
3.5.9.1.1. Propensity Score Estimation 
We calculate each firm’s propensity score (the estimated likelihood that firm will use 
derivatives) based on covariates that are expected to affect firm’s choice of whether to use 
derivatives. We use the following model to calculate the propensity score; 
 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖
=  𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑍 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖  + 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖  
+ 𝛼8𝐹𝐶 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  + 𝛼9𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
[47] 
Where Derivatives Use𝑖 is a dummy variable. Z-score, interest coverage, leverage, liquidity, 
firm size, market to book, FC debt dummy and foreign sales are the firm characteristics 
that are expected to affect firms’ choice of whether to use derivatives. 
We estimate the propensity score using a logit model on determinants of derivatives use64. 
Once the propensity score is calculated, we match a treated firm with a control firm 
without replacement using various methods. We also use a caliper value to create a 
tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance to be matched against. This 
matching is done on the individual propensity score of using derivatives. 
3.5.9.1.2. Matching Methods 
There are number of matching methods available to match treated firms with control firms 
on estimated propensity score. We use following matching methods to match treated firm 
with control firm based on their propensity score. 
                                                 
63 Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010); Bartram et al. (2011) 
64 We use psmatch2 Stata module created by Edwin and Barbara (2003) to calculate propensity score and to 
match derivative users and users.  
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
Vikram Finavker 95 M00281338 
3.5.9.1.2.1. One-to-One Matching Without Replacement 
This matching method is one of the most common and frequently used methods (Austin, 
2011). In this matching method a firm from derivative user group is matched one by one 
with a firm from non-derivative user group, without replacement, that is closets on the 
estimated propensity score. The firm from control group is used only once to match with a 
firm from treated group. We also impose a common support that drops treatment 
observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum 
from control group. As a result of this, a firm from treatment group is matched with a firm 
from control group whose propensity score difference is lowest. This matching method 
ensures that the difference between matched treated and control firm is minimum. 
3.5.9.1.2.2. One-to-One Matching Without Replacement with Caliper 
This method of matching is similar to one-to-one matching but creates a good match by 
imposing the tolerance level on the maximum propensity score distance defined by 
caliper65. Once the caliper value is assigned, a treated firm is matched against the control 
firm whose propensity score is within the ± of caliper value from the treated firm. This 
matching is better than the matching without caliper, as a treated firm is more likely to be 
matched with a control firm that has a similar propensity score due to caliper; whereas in 
nearest neighbour matching the match could be bad if the closest matching is far away. 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue that caliper and replacement work in similar way, 
reduces bad matching and increases the quality of matches. 
3.5.9.1.2.3. Kernel Matching 
The one-to-one matching discussed above uses only one observation from control group to 
match against treated group and because of this only few observations from control group 
are used. This limits the number of firms that are matched with control group and reduces 
the number of observations. Kernel method uses weighted averages of all the firms in the 
comparison group to calculate the counterfactual (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The 
benefit of kernel matching over one-to-one matching is that it uses more information and 
reduces the variance. However, the method can use bad matches as it takes weighted 
averages. 
                                                 
65 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) 
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3.5.9.1.3. Balancing Test 
To ensure the balance of the strata for the covariates the t-test and the standardized bias 
(SB) are two extensively used techniques (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The t-test simply 
compares the mean difference between treated and control groups both before and after 
matching. The insignificant value of t-test indicates the mean difference is not statistically 
important. We would expect insignificant mean difference after matching as we want the 
mean for covariates to be similar after matching for treated and control firms. This ensures 
good comparison for outcome variable. 
The main reason that we use PSM is to remove the bias from the data and calculate the 
unbiased causal effects. Therefore, it is important to know how successful is PSM method 
in removing the selection bias on observed covariates for treated and control firms. We 
calculate the SB for all the observed covariates as follow. 
 
𝑆𝐵𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ = 100
|?̅?𝑇 − ?̅?𝐶|
√0.5(𝜎𝑇
2 + 𝜎𝐶
2)
 
[48] 
Where ?̅?𝑇 and ?̅?𝐶  are sample means and 𝜎𝑇
2 and 𝜎𝑇
2
 are the variance for treated and the 
matched control group. The SB is calculated as the difference of sample means for treated 
and control firm as a percentage of the square root of the average sample variance for the 
two groups. 
3.5.9.1.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
Compare to a standard regression model the propensity score model provides more reliable 
and unbiased results by comparing treated firms with control firms that have similar 
propensity score. However, Rosenbaum (1991) argues that there are two situations under 
which groups are not comparable for studies that use observational data. First situation is 
of overt bias where groups differ on observable characteristics. For example, treated firms 
are generally larger than control firms. This situation can be solved with different matching 
algorithms where a treated firm is matched with control firm that has similar size. Second 
situation is of hidden bias where groups differ on unobserved characteristics that are not 
measured. This situation is hard to resolve as the hidden or unobserved variables are 
difficult to measure. If there are unobserved or hidden variables that affect treatment 
assignment (the decision to use derivatives) or outcome variable, then there is a problem of 
endogenous selection and under such circumstances the estimates obtained from PSM are 
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inconsistent and the results are no longer unbiased. These unobserved variables may 
compromise the validity of inferring causality from observational data. 
PSM allows sensitivity analysis on this selection bias and also estimates the extent to 
which this hidden bias may affect the inference about the effects of derivatives use. We 
perform a sensitivity analysis by looking at Rosenbaum bounds and hidden bias 
equivalents (Diprete and Gangl, 2004). This method determines the extent to which 
selection on unobserved variables needed in order to change the inferences calculated by 
the PSM. Using Rosenbaum bound this sensitivity of observed effects can be calculated for 
number of scenarios with various levels of gamma, . Gamma represents assumptions 
about unmeasured heterogeneity or endogeneity in treatment assignment expressed in 
terms of odds ratio of differential treatment assignment due to an unobserved covariate. A 
scenario of bound estimate  =1 suggests absence of hidden bias and shows that 2 firms 
have identical observable characteristics and no other unobserved variables affects it. 
Similarly, a gamma of 1.4 indicates that the unobserved variable that would increase the 
odds of using derivatives for the firm that actually is a user by 40% than a firm that is a 
non-user. We calculate the Rosenbaum bounds for our treatment variable at different levels 
of gamma that allows us to measure the strength of unobserved variables would require in 
order to overturn our inferences from PSM method. 
3.5.9.2. Coarsened Exact Matching66 
Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) is an exact matching method and hence does not require 
balance checking after matching (Blackwell et al., 2009). Similar to PSM, CEM is a 
member of the Monotonic Imbalance Bounding matching method which in our case 
matches derivative users (treated group) with non-users (control group) and improves the 
estimation of the treatment effect by reducing the covariates imbalance between treated 
and control groups and makes them more comparable (Blackwell et al., 2009). In this 
method, the covariates are first coarsened and then treated firms (derivative users) are 
exactly matched with control firms (non-users) on the coarsened data. Once the matching 
is done then the effect of treatment on outcome variable can be investigated using 
uncoarsened data.Blackwell et al. (2009) argue that in PSM user is required to set the size 
                                                 
66 We use cem command in stata to perfrom Coarsened Exact Matching. See Blackwell et al. (2009) for more 
details. 
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of the matching solution pre-matching and then they have to check the balance for matched 
variables after matching. This process needs to be repeated until the balance is achieved. 
These suggest that PSM method is slow and complicated to apply. Wells et al. (2013) show 
that a causal effect estimated from CEM produces a lower variance and bias for any given 
sample size compared with PSM. They also show that CEM retains more observations and 
achieves a better balance between matched samples. In contrast to PSM, CEM matches 
directly on the covariates and not on any intermediate score. “We discover a serious 
problem with PSM (and especially PSM with calipers) that causes it to approximate 
random matching in common situations. Moreover, and contrary to conventional wisdom, 
random matching is not benign; on average, it increases imbalance (and variance) 
compared to not matching.” Gay, Lin and Smith (2011, p. 1). King et al. (2011) did not 
find this problem with CEM. The above discussion shows that CEM is efficient than PSM.  
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discuss the sample and sample period that we use in empirical chapters. 
We provide the definitions, measurements and the sources of our firm risk, main 
explanatory, control and credit risk variables. This chapter also provides the theoretical and 
empirical reasoning behind the use of control variables. Furthermore, this chapter outlines 
the estimation methods that we use in the following empirical chapters.  
This chapter provides insight into the various econometrics issues, such as heterogeneity, 
endogeneity, self-selection bias and omitted variable bias, that we encounter in our data 
and also discusses the methods, such as random effects, fixed effects, first difference, 
instrumental variable, treatment effects and matching methods, that we employ to control 
for the econometric issues. 
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Chapter 4. The Effects of Derivatives Use on Equity Implied Risk 
4.1. Introduction 
In the last twenty years, there is a sharp increase of risk management activities with the use 
of financial derivatives instruments across the world. However, there are group of people , 
financial regulators, shareholders and employees, who become more and more concerned 
regarding how corporations use these financial derivatives in the wake of recent financial 
crisis. This group of people are worried about how the use of derivatives by corporations 
affects firm financial risk. 
Most UK non-financial firms disclose the use of derivatives and risk management 
activities in their annual reports. Unfortunately, the quality of derivatives disclosure in UK 
annual reports varies and in many instances, it is difficult to quantitatively assess the 
impact of derivatives use on firm risk. This has stimulated a debate among investors, 
creditors, regulators and dealers about the appropriate level of derivatives disclosure. This 
discussion has largely occurred in the absence of systematic empirical evidence about the 
effects of derivatives use on firms’ risk and value. The aim of this study is to contribute to 
this debate by examining the impact of UK non-financial firms’ use of derivatives on the 
firm financial risk. 
Figure 4-1: Notional Amounts of Outstanding OTC Derivatives of Non-Financial Users 
 
Figure 4-1 shows the usage of OTC FC and IR derivatives for non-financial firms since 
June 1998 to the first half of 2013. The figure shows that the demand for derivatives is on 
rise from June 1998 to June 2008 (Period of recent financial crisis). For the few years 
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staring June 1998, the demand for derivative instruments increased very gradually but after 
year 2001 the demand increased very sharply. The figure also shows that in last 10 years 
there is huge increase in the use of derivative instruments. During the period, there is a 
small decline in the usage of FC and IR derivatives. However, in December 2008 the 
demand for FC and IR derivatives dropped by 20% and 16% respectively. This decrease in 
demand may suggest that firms may have started to realise the credit constraint. The 
demand for FC and IR derivatives after this period remains stable over-time. The average 
growth in FC derivatives during 2009 to June 2013 is 2% and for IR derivatives the 
average growth is -0.75%.  
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether UK non-financial firms are using derivatives 
for hedging or speculation. This is done empirically by examining the effects of financial 
derivatives on firm financial risk measures of UK non-financial firms. We use total risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and market risk as a measure of firm financial risk. In this chapter, we 
use 3 broad categories derivatives 1) firms that use FC and/or IR and/or CP derivatives 2) 
firms that use FC derivatives and 3) firms that use IR derivatives. We use a large panel of 
UK non-financial firms for the period 1999 to 2010 for this analysis. This dataset covers a 
wide range of derivatives use and firm financial risk measures. We use both dummy and 
continuous measures of derivatives. The dataset also allows us to investigate the effect of 
derivatives use on firm financial risk during a period that includes two episodes of a 
significant increase in business risk, the 2001 and 2007 global recession. 
We show that a 1% increase in the extent of all derivatives use results in a reduction of 
2.52% of stock return volatility per annum. We also find that a 1% increase in extent of IR 
derivatives use reduces total risk by 9.74% (represents 22% of mean total risk) suggesting 
that IR derivatives use have economically large effect on total risk. For market risk, we 
find that a 1% increase in the extent of all and FC derivatives leads to a reduction of 
0.0651 and 0.0945 basis points in market risk. Our results suggest that a 1% increase in the 
extent of all and IR derivatives leads a 2.23% (represents 5.69% of mean idiosyncratic 
risk) and 6.82% (represents 17.40 % of mean idiosyncratic risk) reduction in idiosyncratic 
risk. When we use dummy measure for derivatives use our results suggest that all 
derivative users, FC derivative users and IR derivative users have both statistically and 
economically significant 4.16%, 3.62% and 4.82% lower total risk than non-users 
respectively. For idiosyncratic risk, we find that all and IR derivative users have 
Chapter 4: The Effects of Derivatives Use on Equity Implied Risk 
Vikram Finavker 101 M00281338 
statistically and economically significant 2.02% and 2.55% lower idiosyncratic risk than 
non-users respectively. 
In this chapter, we also investigate whether the effect of derivatives use on firm financial 
risk measures is influenced by macroeconomic conditions. Our sample period includes 
global economic uncertainty around 2002, a period of credit market tightening around 
2003, a period of strong economic growth with relatively loose credit market conditions 
between 2004-2006 and recent financial crisis of 2007. This investigation will highlight 
how derivatives affect firm financial risk in different economic times. We find that 
derivative users have significantly lower total risk than non-users during 2002-2010. 
Derivatives use has largest negative effect on firm financial risk during 2005-2006 of 12% 
to 13%. This is the period of strong economic growth with relatively loose credit market 
conditions. During recent financial crisis of 2007-2009, we find that derivative users have 
4.85% to 8.85% lower firm financial risk. Our results for year 2000 and 2001 shows that 
derivatives use has either no effect or it increase the firm financial risk during stable 
economic times. Overall, our results suggest that UK non-financial firms limiting their 
derivative activities to the hedging of downside risk and selectively hedging during 
favourable macroeconomic conditions. 
In this chapter, we also control for endogeneity by matching derivative users and non-users 
on their likelihood of using derivatives using PSM method and then examine the mean 
difference of firm financial risk between matched firms. The results of these analysis show 
that derivative users have significantly lower mean values for total risk and idiosyncratic 
risk. 
This chapter is organised as follow: Section 4.2 discusses the data employed in the study. 
Section 4.3 provides descriptive analysis of data. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results 
and section 4.5 draws some conclusions. 
4.2. Variable Description67 
This section describes the firm risk variables, main explanatory variables and control 
variables used in the empirical analysis of this chapter. 
                                                 
67 We winsorised all variables in this study by 1% from both tails to remove outliers affecting the analysis.  
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4.2.1. Dependent Variables 
To examine the effect of derivatives use on firm financial risk for UK non-financial firms, 
we use following firm risk measures calculated using equity share prices: 
 Total risk 
 Market Risk 
 Idiosyncratic Risk 
Total risk measures the aggregate firm risk and hence would show the effect of derivatives 
use on aggregate level instead of showing the effect on specific risks such as IR or FX e 
exposures. Next, we separate total risk into market risk and idiosyncratic risk68. These 
firms’ financial risk measures are defined in section Chapter 3 on page no 52. 
4.2.2. Main Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variable for our analysis is the coefficient on the derivatives 
variable. We are interested in knowing the effect of derivatives on firm financial risk. 
Following measures of derivatives are employed in this chapter: 
 Continuous Measure of Derivatives: 
We use year-end outstanding notional values of derivatives as a continuous 
measure of derivatives use. We scale notional values of derivatives by total assets. 
This gives an extent of derivatives use and can differentiate between a firm with 
high derivative usage and a firm with low derivative usage. We calculate this for 1) 
extent of all derivatives 2) extent of FC derivatives and 3) extent of IR derivatives. 
 Dummy Measure of Derivatives 
We create dummy measures of derivatives based on the firm’s decision to use 
derivatives. Based on firms disclosure in annual reports we assign ‘1’ to a firm that 
disclose use of derivatives and ‘0’ to a firm that does not report use of derivatives. 
We create following categories based on this definition 1) All Derivative Users is a 
dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm use FC and/or IR and/or CP derivatives and 
                                                 
68 Guay (1999), Hentschel and Kothari (2001), Nguyen and Faff (2010) and Bartram et al. (2011) also uses 
similar firm financial risk measures. 
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0 for non-users69 2) FC Derivative Users is a dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a 
firm uses FC derivatives and ‘0’ for non-users 3) IR derivative users (B) is a 
dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses IR derivatives and ‘0’ for non-users. 
4.2.3. Control Variables70 
In multivariate analysis, we control for other factors that also affect the firm financial risk. 
In particular, we control for following variables: 
 Leverage: We calculate leverage as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets 
minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. We expect a positive 
association between leverage and total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
 Firm Size: We use natural log of total assets as a measure for firm size. We expect 
that firm size will be negatively associated with total risk, market risk and 
idiosyncratic risk. 
 Profitability: We use the return on invested capital as a measure for profitability. 
We expect a negative association between profitability and total risk, market risk 
and idiosyncratic risk. 
 Market to Book: We calculate market to book as the ratio of market value of assets 
to book value of assets. We expect positive association between market to book and 
total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
 Dividend Yield: We measure dividend yield as dividend per share divided by the 
share price. We expect negative association between profitability and total risk, 
market risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
 Liquidity: We measure liquidity as ratio of total current assets minus total stock and 
work in progress over total current liabilities. We expect a negative association 
between profitability and total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
                                                 
69 We do not investigate the effects of CP only derivatives as there are very few firms in our sample that use 
CP only derivatives.  
70 See section 3.3.3 for information on the theoretical and empirical reasoning behind using these control 
variables. 
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4.3. Descriptive Analysis 
This section provides the summary analysis of our risk, extent of derivatives use and 
control variables, the frequency distribution of the derivatives variable and the Pearson 
correlation coefficients for derivatives, firm risk measures and control variables. 
4.3.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 4-1 presents summary statistics for the firm financial risk measures and the control 
variables.71 The table shows the number of observations, minimum and maximum value, 
means, median and standard deviation for the risk measures and independent or control 
variables. 
Panel A of Table 4-1 shows that the mean (median) total risk for our sample firms is 
42.98% (37.06%). This suggests that the average UK firm in our sample has very high 
total risk. Guay (1999) reports that their sample of US firms have 33.80% of median total 
risk. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find the mean total risk for their sample of US firms is 
1.81%. Bartram et al. (2011) report 56% of mean total risk for a sample of firms from 47 
countries. Bartram et al. (2012) show that the median total risk for UK firm is 33.9% and 
the median total risk for US firms is 44.8% for US firms. The average estimated value of 
market risk is 0.63 suggesting that the average firm in our sample have relatively low 
market risk. Guay (1999) reports 0.97 median market risk. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) 
report 1.02 mean market risk. Bartram et al. (2011) report 0.70 mean market risk. Bartram 
et al. (2012) show 0.178 and 0.215 mean market risk for UK and US firms respectively. 
The average idiosyncratic risk for our sample firm is 39.19%. Guay (1999) reports 32.07% 
median idiosyncratic risk for their sample firms. Bartram et al. (2012) report 28.3% and 
38.5% idiosyncratic risk for UK and US firms respectively. Overall, these summary 
statistics suggest that UK and US firms have higher total risk and higher idiosyncratic risk 
but low market risk. In panel B, we present summary statistics of our extent of derivatives 
use variables. We measure extent of derivatives use by scaling notional amounts of 
derivatives by firm total assets. Not all the firms in our sample disclose use of derivatives. 
The table shows that the average all derivatives use by our sample is 23.41% while the 
average extent of FC derivatives and IR derivatives is 13.87% and 13.81% respectively.72 
                                                 
71 See section 3.3.3 for variable definitions and justification  
72 We also include firms that specifically mention that they have zero notional values. 
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Table 4-1: Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Total Risk is calculated as the 
annualised standard deviation of weekly stock returns over two years. Market Risk is calculated as the 
coefficient of the market index from a regression of individual stock returns on returns of the market index. 
Idiosyncratic Risk is calculated as the variance of residuals from the regression used to calculate market 
risk. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Firm size is a natural logarithm of total 
assets. Profitability is calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested 
capital. Market to Book is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Dividend Yield is 
measured as dividend per share divided by the share price. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus 
total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities. Z-score is Altman’s Z-score for UK firms; 
Interest Coverage is the ratio of Earnings before Interest and Taxes to Interest Expenses on Debt; FC Debt 
is a dummy variable set is equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses Foreign Debt and ‘0’ otherwise. Foreign Sales is the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales. 
Variables N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Panel A: Firm Financial Risk Measures 
Total Risk 3586 42.9810 37.0662 14.4539 131.1462 23.0683 
Market Risk 3586 0.6323 0.5638 -0.3230 2.4849 0.4913 
Idiosyncratic Risk 3586 39.1931 33.7480 13.1242 125.473 21.1809 
Panel B: Extent of Derivatives Use 
All Derivatives 1152 0.2341 0.1280 0.0000 2.9237 0.3888 
FC Derivatives 845 0.1387 0.0536 0.0000 2.4139 0.2988 
IR Derivatives 942 0.1371 0.0789 0.0000 1.1909 0.1810 
Panel C: Control Variables 
Leverage 2995 0.2406 0.2101 0.0000 0.8920 0.1883 
Firm Size 2995 13.4688 13.3849 0.0000 17.2529 1.7561 
Profitability 2995 0.1031 0.1031 -1.0365 0.7632 0.1777 
Market to Book 2995 1.4631 1.0980 0.2781 14.3325 1.3937 
Dividend Yield 2995 3.2122 2.7724 0.0000 16.1528 2.6703 
Liquidity 2995 0.8824 0.7800 0.0000 8.8000 0.7018 
Z-score 2384 3.1501 2.5431 -4.5056 25.1795 3.2535 
Interest Coverage 2384 15.8771 5.5872 0.0000 100.0000 26.9284 
FC Debt 2384 0.7752 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4176 
Foreign Sales 2384 0.5706 0.5974 0.0000 1.0000 0.3397 
The summary statistics for control variables are presented in panel B of Table 4-1. Our 
sample firms have an average leverage ratio of 24.06%. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) 
show that the average leverage for their sample firms is 1.72%. Judge (2006b) reports 
32.7% of mean leverage ratio for a sample of UK firms. Clark and Judge (2009) report 
18.7% of average leverage for UK firms. Bartram et al. (2012) report 14% and 17.1% 
average leverage ratio for UK and US firms respectively. Moreover, average sample firm 
have 10.31% profitability, an average market to book ratio of 1.46, an average firm have 
dividend yield of 3.21% and an average liquidity of 0.8824. 
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4.3.2. Frequency Distribution of Derivatives Use 
Table 4-2 presents a frequency distribution of derivatives dummy employed in empirical 
examination. Panel A shows that 86.61% of firms in the sample use at least one type of 
derivatives while 13.39% of sample firms do not use any derivative instruments. Bartram 
(2006) finds that 60.5% of firms across all countries use at least one type of derivative and 
Bartram et al. (2011) reports 64.4% of derivative usage for their UK sample firms. Judge 
(2006c) reports 79.3% of derivative usage for a sample UK firms. For a sample of US 
firms Graham and Rogers (2002) report 35.7% of derivative usage, Purnanandam (2008) 
reports 28.60% of derivative usage and Campello et al. (2011) report 50.1 % of sample 
firms use derivatives. FC derivatives are the most frequently used with 74.01% of sample 
firms disclosing the use of FC derivatives followed by IR derivative users (70.61%) and 
CP derivative users (10.01%). Nelson et al. (2005) also find that majority of their sample 
firms also use FC and IR derivatives and only few uses CP derivatives. Graham and 
Rogers (2002) report 24.2% of FC derivative usage and 25% of IR derivative usage for US 
firms. Bartram et al. (2011) report 55% of FC derivative usage, 36.5% of IR derivative 
usage, 3.8% of CP derivative usage for UK firms and 37.8% of FC derivative usage, 
40.4% of IR derivative usage, 16.1% of CP derivative usage for UK firms. Campello et al. 
(2011) report 27.3% of FC derivative usage and 35.6% of IR derivative usage for US 
firms. A recent study by Magee (2013) reports 67.3% FC derivative usage for a sample US 
firms. Clark and Judge (2008) report 74.2% of FC derivative usage for UK firms. These 
show that UK firms have higher use of derivatives. When we look at those firms that use 
only one type of derivative instrument, we find that FC derivatives are again most common 
derivative instruments (17.49%) followed by IR derivatives (13.76%) and CP derivatives 
(0.19%). 57.11% of our sample uses both FC and IR derivatives, whereas firms that use CP 
derivatives with either FC or IR derivatives are less than 1% of user firms. 10% of sample 
derivative user firms use all the three types of derivatives. Overall, Majority of UK firms 
use FC and IR derivatives and very few firms use CP derivatives.73 
Table 4-2: Frequency Distribution of Derivatives Use 
This table provides data on the use of derivatives by our sample firms. In panel A, we present data for all 
derivatives usage. In panel B, we present broad categories of derivatives used by our sample. In panel C, we 
present different combinations of derivative used by our sample firms. 
                                                 
73 We do no investigate the effect of CP derivatives only use on firm financial risk as there are only few firms 
that use this derivative instrument. 
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Panel A: Derivative use N % 
Derivative Users 3693 86.61 
Non-Users 571 13.39 
Total 4264 100.0 
Panel B: Types Of Derivative Users74 N % 
FC Derivative Users 3156 85.46 
IR Derivative Users 3011 81.53 
CP Derivative Users 427 11.56 
Panel C: Combinations Of Derivative Used75 N % 
FC Derivatives Only 646 17.49 
IR Derivatives Only 508 13.76 
CP Derivatives Only 7 0.19 
FC & IR Derivatives Only 2109 57.11 
FC & CP Derivatives Only 29 0.79 
IR & CP Derivatives Only 22 0.60 
FC, IR & CP Derivatives 372 10.07 
Total 3693 100.0 
4.3.3. Correlation Analysis 
Table 4-3 presents the correlation coefficients for derivatives variables, firm risk 
characteristics and other control variables. As expected, derivatives use has significant 
negative correlation with total risk and idiosyncratic risk. The correlation is mixed between 
derivatives use and market risk, however insignificant. These support the notion that firms 
that employ derivatives are likely to experience a decline in risk. The largest negative 
coefficients are between profitability and measures of firm financial risk. This is what we 
would expect to find, as firms that are more profitable will possess a lower financial risk. 
In addition, the positive correlation between leverage and firm financial risk measures is in 
line with our expectations, as a higher leverage will give rise to a risk. Firm size is 
negatively correlated with total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Market to book ratio and 
liquidity has positive correlation and dividend yield has positive correlation with firm 
financial risk measures. Overall, there is some preliminary evidence in support of hedging 
motives behind derivatives use by UK non-financial firms. 
Table 4-3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
This table provides Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the analysis. All Derivative 
                                                 
74 Calculated as a percentage of 3693 derivative users.  
75 Calculated as a percentage of 3693 derivative users. 
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Users is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses at least one type of derivatives and 0 otherwise. FC 
Derivative Users (B) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses FC derivatives and 0 otherwise. IR 
Derivative Users (B) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses IR derivatives and 0 otherwise. Total 
Risk is calculated as the annualised standard deviation of weekly stock returns over two years. Market Risk 
is calculated as the coefficient of the market index from a regression of individual stock returns on returns of 
the market index. Idiosyncratic Risk is calculated as the variance of residuals from the regression used to 
calculate market risk. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Firm Size is a natural 
logarithm of total assets. Profitability is calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges 
divided by invested capital. Market to Book is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. 
Dividend Yield is measured as dividend per share divided by the share price. Liquidity is the ratio of total 
current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities. 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
All Derivatives Users (1) 1.000                       
FX Derivative Users (B) (2) 0.664 1.000           
IR Derivative Users (B) (3) 0.610 0.296 1.000          
Total Risk (4) -0.176 -0.073 -0.206 1.000         
Market Risk (5) -0.010 0.030 -0.041 0.480 1.000        
Idiosyncratic Risk (6) -0.199 -0.099 -0.236 0.878 0.412 1.000       
Leverage (7) 0.188 0.007 0.314 0.131 0.011 0.052 1.000      
Firm Size (8) 0.269 0.249 0.320 -0.268 0.046 -0.296 0.238 1.000     
Profitability (9) 0.138 0.115 0.129 -0.399 -0.186 -0.469 -0.156 0.303 1.000    
Market to Book (10) -0.114 -0.016 -0.151 0.080 0.077 0.168 -0.386 -0.305 0.013 1.000   
Dividend Yield (11) 0.075 0.095 0.076 -0.005 -0.099 -0.033 0.297 0.111 -0.059 -0.249 1.000  
Liquidity (12) -0.214 -0.063 -0.301 0.254 0.146 0.287 -0.278 -0.327 -0.209 0.223 -0.074 1.000 
4.4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we present and discuss the results of univariate and multivariate analysis 
examining the effects of derivatives use on the measures of firm financial risk. 
4.4.1. Univariate Analysis 
To begin, we compare the simple averages of firm financial risk measures and the sample 
characteristics by derivatives use. To measures the significance of differences between the 
derivative user and non-user firms we mean difference test, based on the parametric T-test, 
and the median difference test, based on the non-parametric Wilcoxon Test. We use 
several definitions of derivatives use in examining the differences. In particular, we use all 
derivatives, FC derivatives and IR derivatives.  
In panel A of Table 4-4, we present results for all derivative user and non-user firms. The 
mean difference test results show that derivative user firms have considerably lower total 
risk than non-users firms. In general, derivative user firms have an average (median) 
12.40% (12.51%) lower total risk than non-user firms. Our result is consistent with Guay 
(1999), Bartram (2006) and Bartram et al. (2011). Guay (1999) finds significant lower total 
risk for new derivative users compared to non-users. Bartram (2006) shows that the 
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median standardised total risk is 20.8% lower for derivative users than non-users. Bartram 
et al. (2011) report that the firms that use derivatives have 5% to 10% lower total risk 
compared to the matched sample of non-users.76 On contrary, Hentschel and Kothari 
(2001) show that the mean equity return volatility for derivative users firms is 1.85% 
compared to 1.77% for non-user firms. For market risk, we fail to find any significant 
difference between derivative users and non-users; that suggest derivative user firms have 
neither significantly lower nor higher market risk compared to non-users. Hentschel and 
Kothari (2001) report that the market risk is 1.07% for derivative users compared with 
0.95% that of non-users. On the other hand, Bartram (2006) find that the median market 
risk is 13.3% lower for derivative users compared with non-users and Bartram et al. (2011) 
report that the market risk of derivative users firms is 15% to 31% lower than the matched 
non-user firms. The result shows that derivative user firms have an average (median) 
13.46% (12.11%) lower idiosyncratic risk compared to non-users. The mean and median 
differences are both statistically significant. Our result is consistent with Guay (1999). 
Guay (1999) finds user firms have lower idiosyncratic risk and higher market risk. 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) also find that firms with derivatives appear to have lower 
idiosyncratic risk. It is widely held belief that firms use derivatives to target either 
systematic risk or unsystematic risk77 and our results for idiosyncratic risk and market risk 
suggest that UK non-financial firm’s targets unsystematic risk using derivatives. 
                                                 
76 Bartram et al. (2011) use a propensity score matching to match derivative a users firm with a non-user 
firm which is similar to derivative user firm on predefined variables except that it chose not to use 
derivatives. 
77 Nguyen and Faff (2010, p. 835) 
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Table 4-4: Mean and Median Difference Tests for Firm Financial Risk and Firm 
Characteristics 
This table provides number of observations (N), mean, median, mean difference and median difference for 
derivative users and non-users. In particular, Panel A presents results for All Derivative users, Panel B 
presents results for FC Derivative users, and Panel C presents results for IR Derivative Users. The mean 
difference is based on the parametric t-test and the median difference test is based on Non-Parametric 
Wilcoxon Test *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level. 
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Diff Median Diff 
 Users Non-Users   
Panel A: All Derivative Users 
Total Risk 3151 41.4767 35.8320 435 53.8769 47.9848 -12.4002*** -12.1528*** 
Market Risk 3151 0.6310 0.5667 435 0.6421 0.5526 -0.0111 0.0141 
Idiosyncratic Risk 3151 37.5600 32.6700 435 51.0200 44.7800 -13.4600*** -12.1100*** 
Leverage 2738 0.2532 0.2225 257 0.1061 0.0528 0.1472*** 0.1697*** 
Firm Size 2738 13.5835 13.4768 257 12.2462 12.4774 1.3373*** 0.9994*** 
Profitability 2738 0.1032 0.1017 257 0.1026 0.1255 0.0006 -0.0238* 
Market to Book 2738 1.4388 1.0911 257 1.7213 1.2109 -0.2825*** -0.1198** 
Dividend Yield 2738 3.2751 2.8282 257 2.5425 2.1560 0.7326*** 0.6722*** 
Liquidity 2738 0.8666 0.7800 257 1.0503 0.9000 -0.1837*** -0.1200*** 
Panel B: FC Derivative Users 
Total Risk 2693 42.0224 36.9468 435 53.8769 47.9848 -11.8546*** -11.0380*** 
Market Risk 2693 0.6405 0.5744 435 0.6421 0.5526 -0.0016 0.0217 
Idiosyncratic Risk 2693 37.9000 33.3900 435 51.0200 44.7800 -13.1200*** -11.3900*** 
Leverage 2358 0.2426 0.2149 257 0.1061 0.0528 0.1366*** 0.1621*** 
Firm Size 2358 13.7035 13.6052 257 12.2462 12.4774 1.4573*** 1.1277*** 
Profitability 2358 0.1074 0.1052 257 0.1026 0.1255 0.0047 -0.0203 
Market to Book 2358 1.4812 1.1063 257 1.7213 1.2109 -0.2402** -0.1046* 
Dividend Yield 2358 3.3416 2.8876 257 2.5425 2.1560 0.7991*** 0.7316*** 
Liquidity 2358 0.9174 0.8200 257 1.0503 0.9000 -0.1329*** -0.0800* 
Panel C: IR Derivative Users 
Total Risk 2566 40.0036 34.7481 435 53.8769 47.9848 -13.8734*** -13.2367*** 
Market Risk 2566 0.6219 0.5710 435 0.6421 0.5526 -0.0202 0.0184 
Idiosyncratic Risk 2566 35.8000 31.4400 435 51.0200 44.7800 -15.2200*** -13.3400*** 
Leverage 2295 0.2743 0.2465 257 0.1061 0.0528 0.1683*** 0.1938*** 
Firm Size 2295 13.7821 13.6870 257 12.2462 12.4774 1.5358*** 1.2096*** 
Profitability 2295 0.1055 0.0992 257 0.1026 0.1255 0.0029 -0.0263** 
Market to Book 2295 1.3755 1.0689 257 1.7213 1.2109 -0.3458*** -0.1420*** 
Dividend Yield 2295 3.3250 2.8639 257 2.5425 2.1560 0.7825*** 0.7079*** 
Liquidity 2295 0.7933 0.7400 257 1.0503 0.9000 -0.2570*** -0.1600*** 
Similar to Guay (1999) and Purnanandam (2008), we find that the average leverage ratio of 
derivative users is significantly higher than non-derivative users. This is consistent with the 
notion that derivative users can attract more debt because of lower financial risk. Hentschel 
and Kothari (2001) and Lin, Phillips and Smith (2008) also report higher leverage for their 
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sample of derivative use firms. Similar to Bartram (2006) and Purnanandam (2008), we 
find that derivative user firms have significantly lower levels of liquidity than non-user 
firms. The univariate results also suggest that derivative use firms are more exposed to IR 
risk due to higher levels of leverage and lower liquidity. 
Derivative user firms’ are also significantly larger than non-derivative user firms’. This 
finding supports the notion of scale economies in use of derivative instruments. Guay 
(1999) finds similar result. Mian (1996) finds that larger firms are more likely to use 
derivatives as they can benefit from economies of scale in derivative transaction costs. The 
results from parametric and non-parametric test of all derivative users and non-users show 
that derivatives users in general have more profits than non-derivative users. Bartram 
(2006) and Allayannis et al. (2012) also find similar results. Opposite to our expectations 
we find derivative user firms have lower growth opportunities than their non-user 
counterparts. The results show that derivative users firms have average 0.73% higher 
dividend yield than non-users suggesting that derivative user firms are financially healthy. 
Haushalter (2000) suggests that firms facing liquidity constraints might pay little or no 
dividend. We get qualitatively similar results when we examine the mean and median 
differences between 1) FC derivatives uses and non-users in panel B 2) IR derivative users 
and non-users in panel C. 
Overall, these results indicate that derivative user firms have lower total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk (large economic magnitude) compared with non-users but similar market 
risk. These results provide some evidence that firms are using derivative instruments for 
risk reducing as witnessed by lower total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Derivative user firms 
also have lower firm characteristics that are shown to be related to firm financial risk such 
as firm size, dividend yield and liquidity. Derivative user firms have higher leverage and 
low market to book ratio. It is important to note that univariate analysis does not control 
for other firm characteristics and hence multivariate analysis is used to examine the 
relationship between firm risk measures and derivatives. 
4.4.2. Multivariate Regression Analysis 
The previous section describes the results of tests of differences in means and medians 
between derivative users and non-users for various firm risk measures and firm-level 
characteristics. However, the problem with univariate tests is that they do not control for 
the correlations between different firm characteristics and hence, cannot show differences 
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in these characteristics, holding other firm-level attributes constant and also they cannot 
account for the differences in the risk that is not attributable to the use of financial 
derivatives use. Therefore, in this section we use multivariate tests to control the 
correlation between different firm characteristic variables while holding other firm-level 
attributes constant. 
In this section, we employ multivariate regression models to examine the relationship 
between measures of firm financial risk (total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk) and 
derivatives. These different measures of firm financial risk are separately regressed on 
continuous and dummy variables for derivatives use and on a set of control variables 
measuring leverage, firm size, profitability, market to book, dividend yield and liquidity. 
All of the regressions are carried out with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm 
level. 
4.4.2.1. Effects of Derivatives use on Firm Financial Risk Measures 
In this section, we use equation [10] to examine the effects of derivatives on various 
measure of firm risk. We use dummy variables as a measure of derivatives. Table 4-5 
shows the effect of derivatives use on total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk.78 In this 
table, we examine the effect of all derivatives use, FC derivatives use (B) and IR 
derivatives use (B) on firm risk. In Table 4-6, we examine the effects of FC derivative 
users (UB) and IR derivative users (UB) on the firm risk. Several estimation methods such 
as OLS79, RE80 and FE81 models are employed to examine the relationship. We employ 
various tests to select the best model among OLS, RE and FE.82,83 The second raw of Table 
4-5 shows the used model based on the tests. 
 
                                                 
78 Derivatives variables are defined in section 3.3.2 
79 See section 3.5.1 for more details 
80 See section 3.5.2 for more details 
81 See section 3.5.2 for more details  
82 See section 3.5.4 for more details. 
83 We report the results of only best model in Table 4-5. The results of these tests are reported in last rows. 
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Table 4-5: The Effect of All Derivatives Use, FC Derivatives Use (B) and IR Derivatives Use (B) on Firm Financial Risk Measures 
This table provides the results of Derivatives use on Firm Financial Risk. All Derivative Users is a dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses derivatives and ‘0’ 
otherwise. FC Derivative Users (B) is a dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives and ‘0’ non-FC users. IR Derivative Users (B) is a dummy variable set 
equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses IR derivatives and ‘0’ non-IR users. We use 3 measures of Firm Financial Risk 1) Total Risk calculated as the annualised standard deviation of 
weekly stock returns over two years 2) Market Risk is calculated as the coefficient of the market index from a regression of individual stock returns on returns of the market 
index 3) Idiosyncratic Risk is calculated as the variance of residuals from the regression used to calculate market risk. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of 
assets. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Market 
to Book is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Dividend Yield is measured as dividend per share divided by the share price. Liquidity is the ratio of 
total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities. White heteroskedasticity consistent errors, corrected for correlation across 
observations of a given firm, are reported in parentheses [White (1980)]. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Total Risk  Panel B: Market Risk  Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk 
(1) RE (2) RE (3) RE  (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE  (7) FE (8) FE (9) FE 
All Derivative Users -4.1619***    -0.0352    -2.0264*   
 (1.590)    (0.038)    (1.094)   
FC Derivative Users (B)   -0.3364    0.0107    -0.2339  
  (1.189)    (0.030)    (1.164)  
IR Derivative Users  (B)   -3.1541**    -0.0020    -2.0225 
   (1.263)    (0.043)    (1.250) 
Leverage 38.4212*** 37.5528*** 38.6695***  0.4030*** 0.3591*** 0.3982***  42.2737*** 41.9839*** 42.4312*** 
 (4.428) (4.390) (4.424)  (0.069) (0.110) (0.135)  (2.005) (4.705) (4.689) 
Firm Size -1.7279*** -1.8136*** -1.6084***  0.1741*** 0.0931*** 0.1745***  -3.6638*** -3.6462*** -3.5272*** 
 (0.520) (0.532) (0.513)  (0.021) (0.019) (0.038)  (0.604) (1.050) (1.038) 
Profitability -20.0668*** -20.2732*** -20.2723***  -0.1646*** -0.2102*** -0.1665**  -18.8754*** -18.9687*** -19.0104*** 
 (3.146) (3.187) (3.134)  (0.051) (0.067) (0.070)  (1.465) (2.851) (2.820) 
Market to Book 0.5574* 0.5387* 0.5659*  0.0442*** 0.0473*** 0.0442***  0.4086** 0.4087 0.4170 
 (0.301) (0.308) (0.302)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)  (0.208) (0.390) (0.387) 
Dividend Yield -0.7087*** -0.7108*** -0.7059***  -0.0221*** -0.0218*** -0.0221***  -0.8575*** -0.8596*** -0.8526*** 
 (0.178) (0.176) (0.180)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.095) (0.168) (0.170) 
Liquidity 2.0000** 2.0198** 1.9667**  0.0945*** 0.0928*** 0.0948***  1.3812*** 1.4025** 1.3734** 
 (0.835) (0.855) (0.842)  (0.016) (0.028) (0.034)  (0.462) (0.686) (0.680) 
Constant 65.9435*** 63.7057*** 62.7504***  -1.7699*** -0.5759** -1.8041***  81.3268*** 79.4866*** 79.1508*** 
 (7.670) (7.815) (7.609)  (0.292) (0.285) (0.532)  (8.476) (14.649) (14.339) 
N 2,936 2,936 2,936  2,993 2,993 2,993  2,993 2,993 2,993 
R2 0.4178 0.4155 0.4178  0.1588 0.1536 0.1585  0.4669 0.4663 0.4677 
F-Test: Heterogeneity  6.8647 6.6669  5.2474 5.2487 5.2193  8.2588 8.3070 7.9923 
LM Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 0.2366 0.2054 0.2771  0.0831 0.0126 0.0293  0.0021 0.0017 0.0036 
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In panel A of Table 4-5, we use total risk as a measure of firm risk. The results in column 1 
suggest that the all derivatives use is associated with a reduction in total risk, statistically 
significant at 1%. In economic terms, the results suggest that firms that use all derivatives 
have 4.16% lower total risk than non-user firms. This reduction in total risk for all 
derivative users is 10% compared to the mean total risk of our sample firms and indicates a 
larger difference in total risk. In column 2, we present the result of FC derivative user (B) 
firms. The results suggest that the coefficient on FC derivative users (B) is negative but not 
statistically different from zero. In this specification FC derivative user firms are compared 
against the non-FC derivative users where non-FC derivative users include firms that use 
IR only derivatives and hence the true effect of FC derivatives on total risk is 
underestimated. The results for IR derivative users (B) are presented in column 3. The 
results suggest that IR derivative users (B) have significantly lower total risk than non-IR 
users. This finding suggests that IR derivatives are more effective in reducing total risk 
than FC only derivatives. In terms of economic significance, the results suggest that IR 
derivative users have 3.15% lower total risk than non-IR users. In panel B, we use market 
risk as our firm risk measure and find that not any types of derivatives use have significant 
effect on market risk. These results are not surprising as we find in our univariate results 
that UK firms do not have significant market risk. In panel C, we use idiosyncratic risk as a 
measure of firm risk and find that derivative users have economically significant 2.03% 
lower idiosyncratic risk than non-users. We find negative but insignificant effect of FC 
derivatives (B) and IR derivatives (B) on the idiosyncratic risk. 
The results in Table 4-5 also show that firm risk measures are function of leverage, firm 
size, profitability, growth, dividend yield and liquidity. The results suggest that other 
things being constant, a firm with high leverage ratio is more risky than a firm with low 
leverage ratio. Levered firms are generally perceived to be more risky as they have more 
liabilities. Guay (1999) finds significant positive relation between leverage and total risk. 
Purnanandam (2008) shows that in the event of financial distress, highly levered firms in 
concentrated industries are more likely to lose their competitive position. On contrary, 
Bartram (2006) finds negative relationship between leverage and total risk. We find that 
larger firms are less risky than smaller firms in panel A and B. Larger firms are considered 
less risky as they are usually well diversified with product and geographical diversification 
that may lead to lower firm risk with good risk management practices. This finding is 
largely consistent with Hentschel and Kothari (2001) and Nguyen and Faff (2010) who 
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also observe a negative association between firm size and total risk. As expected, our 
results indicate that firms with higher profitability have lower stock return volatility. 
Profitability provides an indication to the capacity of a firm to internally finance itself 
rather than going for capital market or taking bank loans. By avoiding capital market and 
bank loans, a firm can reduce its costs of financial distress. Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
show that a firm with high gross profit margin could more easily pay IR payment. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) find positive association between profitability and firm 
value. Bartram et al. (2012) also find significant negative impact of profitability on total 
risk. As expected we find that firms with more growth options have higher total risk. 
Nguyen and Faff (2010) and Bartram et al. (2012) also find positive effect of market to 
book on total risk. We find significant negative effect of dividend yield on total risk. This 
is consistent with our expectations that firms that pay dividends are less likely to be 
financially constrained and may thus have lower level of risk. Bartram (2006) and Nguyen 
and Faff (2010) also find significant negative effect of dividend yield on total risk. We find 
that firms that have higher liquidity are more risky. This finding is opposite to our 
expectation. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) show that managers of firms invest 
excess liquidity in projects where their special skills are needed and hence makes it harder 
for shareholders to replace them. The authors argue that managers’ such behaviour 
increases firm risk, as in share holders’ value maximising strategy a firm should distribute 
excess cash to shareholders as dividend. This suggests the problem of agency problem. 
Nguyen and Faff (2010) and Bartram et al. (2012) also find positive and significant effect 
of liquidity on total risk. 
In Table 4-6, we remove IR only users from the sample of non-FC users and FC only users 
from the sample of non-IR users. These remove the bias from the non-users sample. In 
panel A we present the result of FC derivative user (UB) and IR derivative user (UB) 
firms. The results suggest that firms that use FC derivatives have 3.62% lower total risk 
than non-users. This shows that when non-users firms include IR only users the estimated 
effect of FC derivatives use on total risk is underestimated. Similarly, the results in column 
2 suggest that IR derivative users have significantly larger negative effect on total risk 
once we remove FC only users from non-users sample. In terms of economic significance 
the results suggest that IR derivative users have 4.82% lower total risk than non-users. 
Consistent with results presented in Table 4-5, we find that FC derivatives use (UB) and IR 
derivatives use (UB) have no significant effect on market risk in panel B. In panel C, we 
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show that IR derivative users (UB) have economically significant 2.55% lower 
idiosyncratic risk than non-users. However, the risk reducing effect of FC derivatives is 
absent for idiosyncratic risk.  
Table 4-6: The Effect of FC Derivative Users (UB) and IR Derivative Users (UB) on Firm 
Risk84  
This table provides the results of Derivatives use on Firm Financial Risk. FC Derivative Users (UB) is a 
dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives and ‘0’ otherwise. IR Derivative Users (UB) is 
a dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses IR derivatives and ‘0’ otherwise. We use 3 measures of Firm 
Financial Risk 1) Total Risk is calculated as the annualised standard deviation of weekly stock returns over 
two years 2) Market Risk is calculated as the coefficient of the market index from a regression of individual 
stock returns on returns of the market index 3) Idiosyncratic Risk is calculated as the variance of residuals 
from the regression used to calculate market risk. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of 
assets. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is calculated as the sum of pre-tax 
profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Market to Book is the ratio of market value of 
assets to book value of assets. Dividend Yield is measured as dividend per share divided by the share price. 
Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current 
liabilities. White heteroskedasticity consistent errors, corrected for correlation across observations of a 
given firm, are reported in parentheses [White (1980)]. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1% 
level, 5% level and 10% level respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Total Risk  Panel B: Market Risk  Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk 
(1) RE (2) RE  (3) FE (4) FE  (5) FE (6) FE 
FC Derivative Users (UB)  -3.6193**   -0.0102   -1.8481  
 (1.554)   (0.041)   (1.182)  
IR Derivative Users  (UB)  -4.8225**   0.0069   -2.5449* 
  (1.896)   (0.045)   (1.470) 
Leverage 34.0297*** 37.5513***  0.2921*** 0.2831**  36.9527*** 36.7704*** 
 (4.125) (4.853)  (0.075) (0.119)  (2.141) (4.490) 
Firm Size -1.5728*** -1.6632***  0.1982*** 0.0875***  -2.8918*** -2.1487*** 
 (0.528) (0.516)  (0.022) (0.020)  (0.631) (0.521) 
Profitability -20.2725*** -18.0543***  -0.1792*** -0.2504***  -19.1053*** -18.7159*** 
 (3.243) (3.308)  (0.051) (0.071)  (1.468) (3.007) 
Market to Book 0.4237 0.1638  0.0386*** 0.0415***  0.2699 0.4838 
 (0.302) (0.339)  (0.007) (0.009)  (0.208) (0.353) 
Dividend Yield -0.5705*** -0.7279***  -0.0209*** -0.0202***  -0.6749*** -0.8014*** 
 (0.183) (0.199)  (0.003) (0.005)  (0.099) (0.187) 
Liquidity 1.8153** 1.7893*  0.0937*** 0.0974***  1.1459** 0.9413 
 (0.830) (0.920)  (0.017) (0.027)  (0.480) (0.670) 
Constant 63.5584*** 66.5045***  -2.1353*** -0.4002  71.6922*** 63.8551*** 
 (7.916) (7.941)  (0.312) (0.296)  (8.912) (7.644) 
N 2,572 2,496  2,613 2,550  2,613 2,550 
R2 0.4229 0.4274  0.1466 0.1835  0.4747 0.4763 
F-Test: Heterogeneity 6.8699 5.8787  5.5695 5.4152  8.1573 7.7582 
LM Test 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 0.3567 0.1322  0.0010 0.1890  0.0027 0.0857 
                                                 
84 We report the results of only best model. The results of these tests are reported in last rows and the 
associated model is shown in second raw. 
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These analysis shows that it is important to control for the other users in the sample of non-
users as the inclusion of “other” users underestimate the actual effect of derivatives on firm 
risk. Our results are consistent with previous studies. Guay (1999) finds that the new 
derivative users have around 5% lower stock return volatility than non-users. Bartram 
(2006) uses standardised total risk and find significant negative effect of derivative use on 
it. The author also investigates the effect of FC derivatives and IR derivative use on total 
risk. The author finds positive but insignificant effect of FC derivatives use on total risk 
and significant negative effect of IR derivative use on total risk. However, Bartram (2006) 
find negative but insignificant results for all different types of derivatives variables when 
data for only UK firms are used.85 Bartram et al. (2011) also find that the derivative users 
have significantly lower total risk. They report 5% to 10% lower total risk for derivative 
users compared with matched non-users. 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that derivative users have 3.62% to 4.82% of 
significantly lower total risk and 1.84% to 2.55% of significantly lower idiosyncratic risk 
than non-user firms. The results from this section are also indicative that IR derivatives are 
more effective in reducing both total risk and idiosyncratic risk than FC derivatives. These 
findings support the notion that UK non-financial firms use derivatives for risk reduction. 
4.4.2.2. Effects of Extent of Derivatives use on Firm Financial Risk Measures 
In this section we examine the effect of extent of derivatives use on total risk, market risk 
and idiosyncratic risk using equation [11].86 Panel A of Table 4-7 provides the results of 
OLS regression of total risk on the extent of various derivatives use and other control 
variables.87 In column 1, we present the results for extent of all use of derivatives. The 
results suggest that the use of derivatives is associated with a significant reduction in total 
risk at 5% level. In economic terms, our result suggests that all derivative users with an 
average derivatives use have total risk that is 59% (-2.5288 * 0.2341 where 0.2341 (Table 
4-1) is the average of extent of all derivatives) lower than non-users. Compared to average 
total risk of 42.98% (Table 4-1), this represents a reduction of 25.35% in total risk. A 1% 
increase in the extent of all derivatives use results in a reduction of 2.52% of stock return 
                                                 
85 Bartram (2006) sample consists of total 6896 firm-year-observations from 47 countries. Their sample 
consist 860 UK firms.  
86 Extent of derivatives use variables are defined in section 3.3.2  
87 Hentschel and Kothari (2001),Bartram (2006) and Nguyen and Faff (2010) also use OLS methodology. 
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volatility per annum. Our results are consistent with Guay (1999), Bartram (2006) and 
Bartram et al. (2011). Guay (1999) examines the effect of new derivative users on total 
risk. The author reports an average reduction of 5% in total risk. Bartram et al. (2009) find 
significant negative effect of derivatives use when they use a sample firms from many 
countries. However, the author finds no significant reduction in standardised total risk 
when the effect is examined only for UK firms. Bartram et al. (2011) use a matching 
analysis based on propensity score and find significantly lower average total risk for 
derivative user. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) and Nguyen and Faff (2010) use similar 
model in their study and find that the all use of derivative is either associated with an 
increase in total risk or it has no impact on it. 
In column 2, we examine the effect of extent of FC derivative use on total risk. As 
expected we find negative but insignificant effect of extent of FC derivative use on total 
risk. However, this result is not surprising as firms mainly use FC derivatives to hedge 
short-term exposure. Bodnar et al. (1996) report that 84% of the firms use some FC 
derivatives with maturities less than 90 days and only 30% of firms use FC derivative with 
maturities greater than 3 years. The authors also reports that 91% of firms frequently or 
sometimes use FC derivatives to hedge anticipated transaction expected within 1 year. 
Nguyen and Faff (2010) find very weak effect of extent of FC derivative use on total risk. 
The authors report that for a 10% increase in the extent of FC derivatives the stock return 
volatility decreases by only 0.88% per annum. 
The results of extent of IR derivative use in column 3 suggest that firms’ use of IR 
derivatives is significantly associated with a reduction in total risk. In particular, a 1% 
increase in extent of IR derivatives use reduces total risk by 9.74% (represents 22% of 
mean total risk) suggesting that IR derivatives use has economically large effect on total 
risk. Bodnar et al. (1996) report that 73% of derivative user firms use IR derivatives and 
83% of this IR users use IR swaps. IR swaps are generally for a longer period and hence 
should have larger impact on total risk. Nguyen and Faff (2010) report 3.51% reduction in 
total risk as a result of a 1% increase in extent of IR derivatives. With regards to control 
variables, we find leverage, firm size and dividend yield have expected sign and are 
significant at minimum 5% level. 
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Table 4-7: The Effect of Extent of Derivatives Use on Firm Financial Risk Measures 
This table provides the results of Extent of Derivatives use on Firm Financial Risk using OLS. Extent of All Derivatives is the notional values of All Derivatives scaled by 
total assets; Extent of FC Derivatives is the notional values of FC Derivatives scaled by total assets; Extent of IR Derivatives is the notional values of IR Derivatives 
scaled by total assets. We use 3 measures of Firm Financial Risk 1) Total Risk is calculated as the annualised standard deviation of weekly stock returns over two years 2) 
Market Risk is calculated as the coefficient of the market index from a regression of individual stock returns on returns of the market index 3) Idiosyncratic Risk is 
calculated as the variance of residuals from the regression used to calculate market risk. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Firm Size is a 
natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Market to Book is the ratio 
of market value of assets to book value of assets. Dividend Yield is measured as dividend per share divided by the share price. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets 
minus total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities. White heteroskedasticity consistent errors, corrected for correlation across observations of a given 
firm, are reported in parentheses [White (1980)]. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Total Risk  Panel B: Market Risk  Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk 
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS  (4) OLS (5) OLS (6) OLS  (7) OLS (8) OLS (9) OLS 
            
Extent of All Derivatives -2.5288**    -0.0651**    -2.2284*   
 (1.122)    (0.032)    (1.195)   
Extent of FC Derivatives  -2.0803    -0.0945**    -2.3262  
  (1.364)    (0.041)    (1.421)  
Extent of IR Derivatives   -9.7463**    -0.1142    -6.8240* 
   (4.354)    (0.123)    (4.010) 
Leverage 34.4946*** 35.4048*** 38.2108***  0.4805** 0.5664*** 0.5163**  28.7657*** 28.0420*** 29.6506*** 
 (6.014) (6.590) (7.461)  (0.189) (0.188) (0.236)  (5.738) (5.293) (7.065) 
Firm Size -1.6752*** -1.2418** -1.6372***  0.0738*** 0.0783*** 0.0690***  -2.3626*** -1.8991*** -2.3140*** 
 (0.509) (0.548) (0.527)  (0.019) (0.022) (0.020)  (0.537) (0.560) (0.552) 
Profitability -5.4199 -6.9361 -5.9317  -0.1524 -0.1844 -0.1669  -8.0849** -10.5440*** -8.6619* 
 (4.234) (4.964) (5.055)  (0.129) (0.157) (0.150)  (3.863) (4.029) (4.670) 
Market to Book -1.0895 -0.5748 -0.3099  0.1227*** 0.1423*** 0.1298***  -2.3982** -2.0086* -2.1265* 
 (1.242) (1.447) (1.413)  (0.035) (0.040) (0.036)  (1.055) (1.198) (1.128) 
Dividend Yield -0.7305** -0.6981** -0.9233***  -0.0216*** -0.0227** -0.0255**  -0.6529** -0.6118** -0.8394** 
 (0.286) (0.308) (0.339)  (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.269) (0.262) (0.334) 
Liquidity 1.3704 1.6587* 1.1484  0.1135*** 0.1178*** 0.1051***  0.3103 0.6293 0.1746 
 (0.894) (0.845) (1.102)  (0.030) (0.031) (0.036)  (0.821) (0.729) (0.989) 
Constant 58.5055*** 52.2950*** 56.8409***  -0.5727* -0.7755* -0.5244  68.8512*** 68.5994*** 73.1740*** 
 (8.556) (9.353) (9.723)  (0.340) (0.404) (0.397)  (8.355) (8.103) (8.804) 
            
N 980 728 787  995 737 801  995 737 801 
R2 0.5142 0.5136 0.4956  0.2409 0.2569 0.2450  0.5044 0.5092 0.4818 
F-Test 22.3455 20.2333 17.8557  6.1302 6.2175 5.4953  19.0852 18.0140 13.7565 
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We further disaggregate total risk into market risk (systematic risk) and idiosyncratic risk 
(firm-specific risk). This helped us in further examining the effect of derivative use on type 
of risk being hedged. In panel B of Table 4-7, we examine the effect of derivative use on 
market risk measure. As expected, we find that use of derivatives has significant negative 
effect on market risk. In economic terms the results suggest that a 1% increase in extent of 
derivatives use lowers the marker risk by 0.07 basis points (represents 11.11% of mean 
market risk). Bartram (2006) and Nguyen and Faff (2010) find negative but insignificant 
effect of derivatives use on market risk. Bartram (2006) finds significant negative effect of 
all derivatives use on market risk when they use a sample of firms from 47 countries. In 
column 5, we investigate the effect of extent of FC derivatives use on market risk. 
Consistent with our expectations the results suggest that a 1% increase in the extent of FC 
derivatives use leads to a reduction of 0.094 basis points in market risk (represents 15% of 
average market risk). This reduction is economically and statistically significant. This 
result is consistent with Bartram (2006) and Nguyen and Faff (2010). Bartram (2006) finds 
significant negative effect of FC derivative use on market risk for their whole sample.88 
Nguyen and Faff (2010) find significant negative effect of FC derivatives on market risk, 
however weak. 
In column 6, we use extent of IR derivative use. We find negative but insignificant effect 
of IR derivatives use on market risk. Our results are consistent with Nguyen and Faff 
(2010). Bartram (2006) finds significant effect of IR derivatives on market risk for the  
whole sample. 
In panel C of Table 4-7, we examine the effect of derivatives use on idiosyncratic risk. We 
find that all use of derivatives have significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. In 
economic terms, the result suggests that a 1% increase in the extent of derivatives use 
result in a 2.22% decline in idiosyncratic risk (represents 5.66% of mean idiosyncratic 
risk). Nguyen and Faff (2010) also examine the effect of extent of all derivatives use on 
idiosyncratic risk and find negative but insignificant impact of extent of all derivative use 
on idiosyncratic risk. In column 8, we examine the effect of extent of FC derivatives use 
on idiosyncratic risk and find negative but insignificant effect. The result is consistent with 
Nguyen and Faff (2010) who also fail to find any significant effect of FC derivatives on 
                                                 
88 The author did not investigate the relationship for UK firms separately. 
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idiosyncratic risk. In column 9, we use extent of IR derivatives use. Consistent with our 
expectations, we find that the use of IR derivatives is significantly associated with a 
reduction in idiosyncratic risk. The result suggests that a 1% increase in the extent of IR 
derivatives use lowers the idiosyncratic risk by 6.82% (represents 17.40% of idiosyncratic 
risk). Nguyen and Faff (2010) find negative but insignificant effect of extent of IR 
derivatives use on idiosyncratic risk. 
Our results suggest that FC derivatives are more suitable to manage market risk whereas 
IR derivatives are more suitable to manage idiosyncratic risk. Overall, the results in this 
section suggest that derivative user firms have average 2.53% to 9.74% lower total risk, 
0.07 to 0.1142 basis point lower market risk and 2.22% to 6.82% lower idiosyncratic risk 
indicating that UK non-financial firms use derivative for hedging and not for speculation. 
4.4.2.3. 2Testing for Nonlinearity in the Use of Derivatives 
The results presented in Table 4-7 show that extent of derivatives use is associated with a 
reduction in firm financial risk measures. However, it is important to know what levels of 
derivatives use can reduce firm financial risk. We argue that derivatives use has nonlinear 
effect on firm financial risk. Hence, it is important to investigate the effect of various 
levels of derivatives use on firm financial risk measures. 
In Table 4-8, we divide extent of derivatives use into 5 categories based on the amount of 
derivatives used by firms. These categories are 1) firms with extent of derivatives use less 
than or equal to 20% (≤ 20% Derivatives Use) 2) firms with extent of derivatives use 
greater than 20% and less than or equal to 40% (20% < Derivatives Use ≤ 40%) 3) firms 
with extent of derivatives use greater than 40% and less than or equal to 60% (40% < 
Derivatives Use ≤ 60%) 4) firms with extent of derivatives use greater than 60% and less 
than or equal to 80% (60% < Derivatives Use ≤ 80%) and 5) firms with extent of 
derivatives use more than 80% (> 80% Derivatives Use). We create these categories for all 
derivative users, FC derivative users and IR derivative users. 
Panel A of Table 4-8 presents the results for all derivative users. The results suggest that 
firms with “≤ 20% Derivatives Use” have significant negative effect on total risk. In terms 
of economic significance, the results suggest that a 1% increase in the extent of “<= 20% 
Derivatives Use” decreases the total risk of user firms by 19.48%. Our results also suggest 
that extent of “> 80% Derivatives Use” is associated with a reduction in total risk. The 
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economic significance of this coefficient is lower compared to the coefficient on “≤ 20% 
Derivatives Use”. We find negative but insignificant coefficient on “20% < Derivatives 
Use ≤40%”, “40% < Derivatives Use ≤ 60%” and “60% < Derivatives Use ≤ 80%”. For 
market risk, our results suggest that only extensive level of derivatives, “> 80% 
Derivatives Use”, use has significant negative effect on market risk. In economic terms the 
risk reduction in market risk is not huge as the results suggest that a 1% increase in the 
extent of “> 80% Derivatives Use” leads to a risk reduction of 0.056 basis points in market 
risk. In column 3 we present the results for idiosyncratic risk. We find that firms with “≤ 
20% Derivatives Use” and firms with “20% < Derivatives Use ≤ 40%” have statistically 
and economically significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. The results also show 
that “> 80% Derivatives Use” is associated with a reduction in idiosyncratic risk. The 
economic significance is comparatively smaller. The results suggest that derivatives use of 
more than 40% have little or no effect on firm financial risk. We test for the coefficient 
equality and find that the coefficient on “≤ 20% Derivatives Use” is statistically different 
from other levels of derivatives use for total risk model. For market risk we find that the 
coefficient on “> 80% Derivatives Use” is not statistically different from other levels of 
derivatives. For idiosyncratic risk, the coefficient on “≤ 20% Derivatives Use” is 
statistically different from other levels of derivatives use. However, that the coefficient on 
“20% < Derivatives Use ≤ 40%” is not different from other levels of derivatives use except 
“≤ 20% Derivatives Use”. Our results are consistent with Nguyen and Faff (2010). The 
authors also find that derivative use of all less than 20% and less than 40% is associated 
with a reduction in total risk. Our results are in contrast to Hentschel and Kothari (2001), 
who find that total risk increases with derivatives.   
In panel B, we use various extents of FC derivatives. Our results suggest that the “> 80% 
FC Derivatives Use” is associated with a reduction in total risk. The reduction in total risk 
as a result of FC derivatives use is small in economic significance compared to the 
reduction achieved using all derivatives. This reduction in total risk is 5.51% of mean total 
risk. FC derivatives use of less than 80% has no significant effect on total risk. The results 
suggest that FC derivatives use of “40% < FC Derivatives Use ≤ 60%” and “> 80% FC 
Derivatives Use” are associated with a reduction in market risk. Other levels of FC 
derivatives use have no significant effect on market risk. The results for idiosyncratic risk 
are qualitatively similar to that of total risk. The results of FC derivatives use suggest that 
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low or medium use of FC derivatives is not economical enough to implement an effective 
risk management strategy. 
In last panel, we present the results of IR derivatives use. The results suggest that “≤ 20% 
IR Derivatives Use” leads to a reduction of 38.65% in total risk and 29.67% in 
idiosyncratic risk. The use of “20% < Derivatives Use ≤ 40%” leads to a reduction of 
16.69% in total risk and 12.71% in idiosyncratic risk. The results also show that the use 
“40% < Derivatives Use ≤ 60%” leads to a reduction of 13.06% in total risk. Our results 
show that medium to high levels of IR derivatives use has no significant effect on firm 
financial risks. 
Overall, the results in this section show that there is a nonlinear relationship between the 
use of derivatives and firm financial risk measures. Our results suggest that medium to 
high levels of derivatives use have either small or no effect on firm financial risk; while 
low levels of derivatives are associated with an economically large reductions in total risk 
and idiosyncratic risk. 
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Table 4-8: Effects of Low to High Extensive Use of Derivatives on Firm Financial Risk Measures 
This table provides the results of Low to High Extent of Derivatives use on Firm Financial Risk using OLS. We use 3 measures of Firm Financial Risk 1) Total Risk is 
calculated as the annualised standard deviation of weekly stock returns over two years 2) Market Risk is calculated as the coefficient of the market index from a 
regression of individual stock returns on returns of the market index 3) Idiosyncratic Risk is calculated as the variance of residuals from the regression used to calculate 
market risk. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is calculated as the sum of pre-tax 
profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Market to Book is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Dividend Yield is measured as 
dividend per share divided by the share price. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities. White 
heteroskedasticity consistent errors, corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm, are reported in parentheses [White (1980)]. ***, ** and * indicates 
statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level respectively. 
 
 Panel A: All Derivative Users  Panel B: FC Derivative Users  Panel C: IR Derivative Users 
Variables Total Risk Market Risk Idiosyncratic Risk  Total Risk Market Risk Idiosyncratic Risk  Total Risk Market Risk Idiosyncratic Risk 
≤ 20% Derivatives Use -19.4787** 0.0533 -18.9602**  -17.8282 -0.3440 -13.7893  -38.6532*** -0.1823 -29.6695*** 
 (7.897) (0.298) (7.434)  (11.825) (0.369) (10.357)  (11.497) (0.378) (9.739) 
20% < Derivatives Use ≤ 40% -7.5018 0.1046 -8.3347*  -3.2890 -0.0249 -3.2706  -16.6885** -0.1996 -12.7075* 
 (4.854) (0.177) (4.554)  (7.312) (0.250) (6.520)  (7.383) (0.217) (6.732) 
40% < Derivatives Use ≤ 60%  -3.0630 -0.0665 -0.8835  -4.0903 -0.2714* -5.5064  -13.0615* -0.3065 -5.7212 
 (3.882) (0.106) (3.436)  (5.832) (0.143) (4.964)  (7.203) (0.204) (6.133) 
60% < Derivatives Use ≤ 80%  -3.6136 -0.0507 -4.1554  3.1948 0.0330 1.7090  -3.0511 -0.0539 -2.7512 
 (4.618) (0.113) (3.705)  (5.108) (0.241) (5.737)  (11.962) (0.301) (9.066) 
> 80% Derivatives Use -2.6320** -0.0574** -2.3558**  -2.3743* -0.0922*** -2.3774*  -7.5796 0.0495 -7.1773 
 (1.096) (0.029) (1.181)  (1.221) (0.031) (1.417)  (4.732) (0.184) (5.449) 
Leverage 35.5477*** 0.4835** 29.6095***  35.7215*** 0.5794*** 28.3931***  39.7015*** 0.5542** 30.4211*** 
 (6.042) (0.198) (5.804)  (6.477) (0.185) (5.235)  (7.647) (0.251) (7.220) 
Firm Size -1.6261*** 0.0741*** -2.3235***  -1.2164** 0.0798*** -1.8672***  -1.5596*** 0.0714*** -2.2923*** 
 (0.510) (0.019) (0.540)  (0.540) (0.022) (0.563)  (0.544) (0.018) (0.552) 
Profitability -4.9521 -0.1445 -7.9058**  -7.3588 -0.2011 -10.8744***  -5.1600 -0.1404 -8.4354* 
 (4.247) (0.128) (3.852)  (4.957) (0.162) (4.066)  (4.962) (0.152) (4.547) 
Market to Book -0.9998 0.1244*** -2.3430**  -0.4602 0.1483*** -1.8704  -0.4557 0.1337*** -2.2780** 
 (1.241) (0.035) (1.069)  (1.407) (0.041) (1.167)  (1.364) (0.039) (1.137) 
Dividend Yield -0.7409** -0.0214*** -0.6668**  -0.6831** -0.0223** -0.5988**  -0.9252*** -0.0259** -0.8309** 
 (0.288) (0.008) (0.270)  (0.307) (0.009) (0.260)  (0.343) (0.010) (0.337) 
Liquidity 1.2637 0.1149*** 0.1910  1.6231* 0.1181*** 0.6006  0.9188 0.1025*** 0.0125 
 (0.886) (0.030) (0.805)  (0.850) (0.032) (0.745)  (1.057) (0.036) (0.937) 
Constant 64.4351*** -0.5931* 69.5026***  52.7309*** -0.7116* 62.4641***  56.4866*** -0.5687 74.5062*** 
 (8.039) (0.343) (8.487)  (9.123) (0.393) (8.593)  (9.894) (0.382) (8.940) 
N 980 995 995  728 737 737  787 801 801 
R2 0.5175 0.2422 0.5091  0.5164 0.2598 0.5115  0.5037 0.2480 0.4882 
F-Test 19.9099 5.5428 17.5640  17.7153 6.6232 15.9446  17.1336 4.7763 13.3468 
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4.4.3. Impact of Derivatives Use on the Firm Financial Risk Measures Over-Time 
In this section, we investigate whether the effect of derivatives use on firm financial risk 
measures is influenced by macroeconomic conditions using equation [12]. In other words, 
are firms hedging both upside and downside risk or limiting their derivative activities to 
the hedging of downside risk and selectively hedging during favourable macroeconomic 
conditions. This is important for our study because our sample includes 2007 to 2009 
period during which the UK economy experienced the worst financial crisis and deepest 
recession since 1930s. Our sample period also incorporates several years of global 
economic uncertainty around 2002 and a period of credit market tightening around 2003. 
Sandwiched between these episodes of economic downturn was a three-year period (2004 
and 2006) during which the UK economy experienced strong economic growth with 
relatively loose credit market conditions and credit spreads on a downward trajectory.  
Our key variables of interest are the interaction terms between derivatives and the year 
dummies. We estimate equation [12] using pooled OLS, RE and FE models. The results 
are reported only for the models that are suggested based on various tests.89 The results of 
these tests are reported in last columns of Table 4-9. Third row in the table shows the 
regression type. Table 4-9 is divided into three panels; Panel A reports the results of all 
derivatives users, panel B reports the results of FC derivatives users and panel C reports 
the results of IR derivative users. Our results in panel A of Table 4-9 show that the 
derivatives coefficient was negative in some years, positive in others and not always 
significantly different from zero. The results in column 1 show the derivative coefficients 
vary from 4.75% in 2000 to -13.90% in 2005. Our results show that the derivative 
coefficients are significantly negative in the period 2002 and the period 2004 to 2009. 
These suggest that derivative user firms had significantly lower total risk than non-users 
during the period of global economic uncertainty of year 2002. During 2004 to 2006 
period, macroeconomic conditions were relatively beginning to improve and firms’ 
financial positions improved as profitability increased. This led to a decline in corporate 
sector credit risks and our results suggest that derivative user firms also witnessed 
significant lower total risk than non-users during this period. 
                                                 
89 See section 3.5.4 for further details. 
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Table 4-9: Effect of Derivatives use on Firm Financial Risk Measures Over-Time 
This table provides the results of effects of Derivatives use on Firm Financial Risk over-time. In panel A, we interact All Derivative 
Users dummy with the year dummies. In panel B, we interact FC Derivative Users (UB) dummy with year dummies. In panel C, we 
interact IR Derivative Users (UB) dummy with year dummies. We use 3 measures of Firm Financial Risk 1) Total Risk calculated as 
the annualised standard deviation of weekly stock returns over two years 2) Market Risk is calculated as the coefficient of the market 
index from a regression of individual stock returns on returns of the market index 3) Idiosyncratic Risk is calculated as the variance of 
residuals from the regression used to calculate market risk. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Firm Size is a 
natural logarithm of total assets. Profitability is calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested 
capital. Market to Book is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Dividend Yield is measured as dividend per share 
divided by the share price. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current 
liabilities. GDP growth rate is sourced from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) official website.90 White heteroskedasticity 
consistent errors, corrected for correlation across observations of a given firm, are reported in parentheses [White (1980)]. ***, ** 
and * indicates statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level respectively. 
 Panel A: All Derivative Users Panel B: FC Derivative Users (UB) Panel C: IR Derivative Users (UB) 
Variables 
 Total  
Risk 
(1) FE 
Market 
Risk 
(2) FE 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
(3) FE 
 Total  
Risk 
(4) RE 
Market 
Risk 
(5) FE 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
(6) FE 
 Total  
Risk 
(7) FE 
Market 
Risk 
(8) FE 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
(9) FE 
Derivative Users -0.5309 -0.0988* 2.9058 0.9304 -0.0828 3.5349* -0.4744 -0.1273** 4.0317* 
 (2.154) (0.053) (1.878) (1.851) (0.059) (2.054) (2.693) (0.064) (2.271) 
Leverage 43.3579*** 0.4159*** 42.6417*** 34.4960*** 0.3039** 37.4124*** 41.7257*** 0.3435** 41.7052*** 
 (5.210) (0.132) (4.669) (4.109) (0.125) (4.317) (5.782) (0.141) (5.197) 
Firm Size -4.4756*** 0.1704*** -4.1927*** -1.6600*** 0.1928*** -3.4138*** -4.3281*** 0.1381*** -3.9228*** 
 (1.198) (0.038) (1.053) (0.534) (0.040) (1.025) (1.311) (0.041) (1.181) 
Profitability -19.8962*** -0.1598** -18.9105*** -20.5366*** -0.1772** -19.2412*** -17.5097*** -0.1765** -16.9130*** 
 (3.127) (0.070) (2.911) (3.331) (0.072) (3.050) (3.512) (0.074) (3.325) 
Market to Book 0.6224* 0.0432*** 0.5642 0.5346* 0.0380*** 0.4108 0.1378 0.0350*** 0.4128 
 (0.355) (0.009) (0.387) (0.304) (0.011) (0.401) (0.382) (0.011) (0.428) 
Dividend Yield -0.6815*** -0.0217*** -0.8268*** -0.5165*** -0.0204*** -0.6448*** -0.7115*** -0.0191*** -0.8591*** 
 (0.179) (0.005) (0.169) (0.182) (0.005) (0.169) (0.203) (0.005) (0.192) 
Liquidity 1.9794** 0.0918*** 1.4551** 1.9440** 0.0913** 1.3438* 0.9979 0.0770** 0.6204 
 (0.867) (0.034) (0.685) (0.841) (0.036) (0.739) (1.065) (0.036) (0.813) 
GDP Growth  -2.2261*** -0.0249** -1.5263*** -2.0053*** -0.0175* -1.5005*** -2.3069*** -0.0257** -1.6208*** 
 (0.416) (0.010) (0.397) (0.422) (0.010) (0.409) (0.429) (0.010) (0.400) 
2000 * Derivative 4.7549*** -0.0534 5.0810*** 4.7179*** -0.0585* 5.3374*** 4.0219*** -0.0653* 4.6941*** 
 (1.088) (0.033) (0.902) (1.111) (0.034) (0.935) (1.068) (0.034) (0.904) 
2001 * Derivative 0.0888 0.0959** -0.0081 0.7280 0.1255*** 0.4097 -2.0345 0.0451 -1.8147* 
 (1.293) (0.037) (0.981) (1.438) (0.041) (1.067) (1.269) (0.037) (0.937) 
2002 * Derivative -2.7991** 0.0214 -4.5407*** -2.1884 0.0559 -4.2311*** -4.1071*** 0.0076 -6.0240*** 
 (1.342) (0.034) (1.026) (1.495) (0.035) (1.149) (1.440) (0.036) (1.005) 
2003 * Derivative -0.6215 0.0227 -3.1747*** -1.0209 0.0506 -3.3009*** -1.7244 0.0219 -4.8727*** 
 (1.534) (0.032) (1.122) (1.623) (0.034) (1.194) (1.746) (0.036) (1.227) 
2004 * Derivative -8.5708*** 0.0623* -9.1276*** -9.6585*** 0.0900** -9.7742*** -8.9024*** 0.0811** -10.1548*** 
 (1.297) (0.033) (0.912) (1.347) (0.036) (0.963) (1.498) (0.037) (1.020) 
2005 * Derivative -13.8968*** 0.1519*** -13.8654*** -15.7754*** 0.1526*** -15.0948*** -14.0865*** 0.1757*** -14.4185*** 
 (1.135) (0.032) (0.890) (1.146) (0.034) (0.924) (1.249) (0.035) (0.965) 
2006 * Derivative -12.2072*** 0.2156*** -13.2964*** -14.4821*** 0.1843*** -14.6209*** -12.4173*** 0.2709*** -13.8490*** 
 (1.176) (0.034) (0.916) (1.207) (0.037) (0.962) (1.290) (0.038) (0.950) 
2007 * Derivative -8.8436*** 0.1958*** -10.8369*** -11.0134*** 0.1693*** -12.0364*** -8.5786*** 0.2708*** -11.1203*** 
 (1.283) (0.039) (0.941) (1.213) (0.040) (0.962) (1.493) (0.041) (1.046) 
2008 * Derivative -4.8574** 0.1255** -7.3221*** -5.9252*** 0.1461*** -8.8001*** -4.3677** 0.1870*** -7.8238*** 
 (1.961) (0.052) (1.791) (2.006) (0.054) (1.810) (2.124) (0.056) (1.889) 
2009 * Derivative -5.9163* 0.0583 -6.4834* -6.5933* 0.0969 -7.8051** -5.9314 0.1122 -7.9424** 
 (3.555) (0.090) (3.397) (3.645) (0.090) (3.479) (3.706) (0.092) (3.440) 
2010 * Derivative -0.6222 0.0363 -4.4047*** -2.9181* 0.0108 -6.0329*** -0.2394 0.1101** -4.9372*** 
 (1.675) (0.044) (1.387) (1.672) (0.045) (1.356) (1.866) (0.049) (1.504) 
Constant 100.2035*** -1.6400*** 90.1331*** 66.7233*** -1.9587*** 81.4490*** 99.8561*** -1.1668** 86.5203*** 
 (16.721) (0.528) (14.648) (7.980) (0.561) (14.592) (18.680) (0.570) (16.539) 
Observations 2,935 2,992 2,992 2,571 2,612 2,612 2,495 2,549 2,549 
R-squared 0.4066 0.1602 0.4480 0.4030 0.1464 0.4511 0.4147 0.1921 0.4575 
F-Test: 
Heterogeneity 
6.6691 5.2667 8.0577 6.6427 5.5750 7.9070 5.7217 5.4523 7.5665 
LM Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 0.0644 0.0286 0.0002 0.2386 0.0016 0.0002 0.0123 0.0970 0.0007 
 
                                                 
90 Available at the official IMF website at  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx 
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During 2007 to 2009 period, the UK economy experienced a sharp decline and fell into a 
deep and prolonged recession. A significant deterioration in credit market conditions, a 
hike in market-wide IR spreads and an increase in corporate bankruptcies accompanied 
this. This is a period of economic decline and sharp market correction. During this period 
UK economy faced a significant economic downturn and also experienced recession. This 
economic downturn and recession led to an increase in corporate bankruptcies. Here we 
argue that if one of the goals of use of derivatives is to lower the probability of default, 
then firms that use financial derivatives may have experienced significant benefits in the 
form of lower probability of default during these periods. Our results show that hedging 
with derivatives during these periods had a significant negative impact on total risk. 
In column 2, we examine the time-varying effect of derivatives use on market risk. We 
find the derivatives coefficients are all positive and significant during the period of 2004 to 
2008. This suggests that derivative user firms witnessed an increase in market risk during 
this period. In column 3, we use idiosyncratic risk as a measure of firm financial risk. The 
results suggest that derivatives coefficients are negative significantly different from zero 
(except for year 2000-2001). The results are consistent with firm using derivatives to 
hedge, as the results show that use of derivatives lowered idiosyncratic risk during the 
period of economic downturn, credit market tightening and during the recent financial 
crisis. The largest effects of derivatives on idiosyncratic risk are during the strong 
economic growth period of 2005-2006 and during the beginning of recent financial crisis, 
2007. We get similar results in panel B & C where we have interacted year dummies with 
FC derivatives use and IR derivatives use respectively.  
Overall, these results suggest that there is noticeable difference in firm financial risk 
measures between derivative users and non-users firms over this period. Our results also 
suggest that the magnitude effect of derivatives is lower during the period of crisis 
compared to strong economic growth period of 2004-2006. All of our results are highly 
significant for the year 2004- 2006, period of strong economic growth with relatively loose 
credit market conditions, and 2007-2008, which is at the core of recent financial crisis. 
In Figure 4-2, Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 we plot the yearly derivatives coefficients using 
the results from panel A, panel B and panel C respectively. The figure shows significant 
variation over-time in the effect of derivatives use on the firm financial risk measures. 
Taken together, these results suggest important time variation related to financial or 
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economic conditions in the effect of derivatives use on the firm financial risk measures. In 
particular, our results suggest that derivative user firms get the most benefit of derivatives 
during the time of market downturns and the recovery period. Overall, our results support 
hedging motives behind the use of derivatives. 
Figure 4-2: Effects of All Derivatives Use on Firm Financial Risk Measures Over-Time 
 
Figure 4-3: Effects of FC Derivatives Use on Firm Financial Risk Measures Over-Time 
 
Figure 4-4: Effects of IR Derivatives Use on Firm Financial Risk Measures Over-Time 
 
4.4.4. Issue of Endogeneity: Propensity Score Matching 
It is not possible to rule out the possibility that the use of derivatives in above regression 
analysis is endogenous. It may be possible that there is simultaneity bias between 
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derivatives use and firm risk measures. Endogeneity may also arise due to omitted 
variables that affect derivatives use and firm risk. If this is the case then a simple 
examination of derivatives use on risk measures may not provide compelling evidence of 
effects of derivatives use on firms various risks. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) argue that 
endogeneity problem affects all empirical research in corporate finance and is hard to solve 
entirely due to lack of exogenous variables. The authors also argue that except for prices, 
firms can partially control all other firm related variables including derivatives and hence 
they are all endogenous. Hence they argue that due to the lack of exogenous variables there 
is no obvious solution for the endogeneity of derivatives. However, by controlling for 
endogeneity problem we can at least reduce the bias. To control for this endogeneity 
problem we use PSM approach. Here we attempt to match derivative user firms with non-
user firms based on their likelihood of using derivatives and then we compare the firms on 
various measures of firm risk. 
We use PSM method to examine the impact of use of derivatives (treatment variable) on 
various firm risk measures (our outcome variables). This method is an alternative way of 
reducing selection bias by matching on a single index propensity score and making 
derivative user firms and non-user firms as comparable as possible on the confounding 
variables. This examination will provide unbiased estimation effects of derivative use, 
treatment, on the measures of risk, outcome variables. Propensity score is calculated for 
each firm using variables that are previously shown to influence firms’ decision to use 
derivatives. Once, the propensity score is calculated, derivative user firms are matched 
with non-user firms based on the score; hence, a matched derivative user and non-user 
firms are similar on observed variables but differs on their decision to use derivatives. We 
use the Rosenbaum bounds method to test our results against bias from unobserved 
covariates. 
4.4.4.1. Matching Analysis 
In Table 4-10, we present the results of mean and median comparison tests for all 
derivative users and non-users after matching them on their likelihood of using derivatives 
for various firm risk measures. In particular, we examine the mean and median difference 
for total risk, idiosyncratic risk and market risk. The table provides the number of 
observations (N), caliper value, mean and median for users and non-users, mean and 
median difference and the wilcoxon p-value. In model 1, we match derivative user firms 
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with non-user firms on one-to-one matching without replacement.91 In model 2, we follow 
Bartram et al. (2011) and use a tolerance level of 0.01 and in model 3, we follow Austin 
(2011) and match derivative users and non-users using caliper of width equal to 0.2 of the 
standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score.92 This limits the maximum 
propensity score distance for matching.93 This reduces bad matches and increases the 
quality of matches. 
The result in Table 4-10 for model 1 suggests that derivatives use has a significant negative 
effect for the users of -6.8093 for total risk. This suggests that the mean total risk of 
derivative users is 6.81% lower than the mean total risk of matched non-user firms. In 
model 2, we introduce a tolerance level of 0.01 and match the derivative user firms with 
non-user firms. This improves the matching as now a derivative user firms is marched 
against a non-user firm within a distance of ±0.01. The result shows that derivative users 
have mean (median) 5.74% (4.27%) lower total risk than matched non-users. In model 3, 
we calculate the caliper value as 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity 
score. Austin (2011) argues that when the covariates used to calculate propensity score 
include continuous variables, then the caliper calculated using above formula or a one 
close to it minimizes the mean square error for the resultant treatment effects. Cochran and 
Rubin (1973) calculate caliper values using 𝑎 ∗ √(𝜎1
2 + 𝜎2
2) 2⁄ , where 𝜎1
2is the variance on 
continuous confounding variable in ith group. The authors find that a bias of 99%, 95%, 
89%, 82% and 74% is removed due to the confounding variables when they use values of 
"𝑎" equal to 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1 respectively. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) use similar 
formula to calculate caliper; but instead of using the variance of continuous confounding 
variable they use variance of the logit of the propensity score in ith group. The authors 
suggest that the same level of bias will be removed by either of the method. The caliper 
size is 0.12 based on the formula and hence a derivative user firm is matched against a 
non-user firm whose propensity score is within ±0.12. This improves the matching but 
                                                 
91 The one to one matching method is one of the most common and frequently used methods. In this matching 
method a firm from derivative user group is matched one by one with a firm from non-derivative user group 
without replacement that has closest propensity score. This method finds the pair of firms with the shortest 
distance of their propensity score. 
92 The standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score is calculated as √(𝜎1
2 + 𝜎2
2) 2⁄ . Where 𝜎1
2 is the 
variance of logit of propensity score for derivative users and 𝜎2
2is the variance of logit of propensity score 
for non-users prior to matching. 
93 Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) 
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results in fewer matches. The result suggests that derivative user firms have average 5.75% 
lower total risk than matched non-users. Both the differences in mean and median are 
statistically significant. In panel B, we find that derivative user firms have significantly 
lower idiosyncratic risk than matched non-user firms. In particular, the average 
idiosyncratic risk is 4.08% to 5.17% lower for derivative users. For market risk (panel C), 
we find that derivative users have lower but insignificant mean market risk than matched 
non-users. Our results suggest that derivative users have significantly lower median market 
risk than matched non-users for model 1 and 3. 
Table 4-10: Firm Risk Matching Analysis Between All Derivative Users and Non-Users 
This table presents the results of mean and median differences for Total Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk and Market 
Risk for matched All Derivative Users and non-user firms. The table provides number of observations (N), 
caliper value, mean and median for derivative users and non-users, differences in mean and median and p-
value of wilcoxon test. Propensity score in Model 1 is calculated using common support and without 
replacement. Propensity score in Model 2 is calculated with common support, without replacement and with 
a caliper of 0.01. Propensity score in Model 3 is calculated with common support, without replacement and 
with a caliper of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score. The covariates that we use 
are Z-score, Interest Coverage, Leverage, Liquidity, Firm Size, Market to book, Foreign Debt and Foreign 
Sales. 
Model N Caliper 
Users  Non-Users  Difference Wilcoxon 
p-value Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean94 Median 
Panel A: Total Risk 
1 416 - 44.5683 37.6784  51.3776 45.6023  -6.8093*** -7.9239 0.002 
2 394 0.01 44.4855 40.9886  50.2346 45.2612  -5.7491** -4.2726 0.021 
3 412 0.12 45.3434 38.2254  50.8443 45.3734  -5.5009*** -7.1480 0.007 
Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk 
1 430 - 43.4685 38.0025  47.7033 41.9686  -4.2348** -3.9661 0.051 
2 412 0.01 41.6515 36.1997  46.8263 40.1658  -5.1748*** -3.9661 0.031 
3 428 0.44 43.5119 38.0025  47.6007 41.9686  -4.0888* -3.9661 0.051 
Panel C: Market Risk 
1 430 - 0.6482 0.5506  0.7212 0.6267  -0.0729 -0.0761 0.042 
2 412 0.01 0.6567 0.5760  0.7123 0.6134  -0.0556 -0.0374 0.223 
3 428 0.17 0.6578 0.5603  0.7245 0.6289  -0.0667 -0.0686 0.064 
In Table 4-11 we match FC derivative user firms with non-user firms on the propensity 
score. The results in panel A show that FC derivatives use has significant negative effect 
on total risk. The results indicate that FC derivative users have statistically lower 6.12% 
lower total risk than matched non-user firms. In second and third model we introduce 
caliper value of 0.01 and 0.12 respectively. The results suggest that FC derivative user 
                                                 
94 ***, ** and * are based on the t-test and shows the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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firms have statistically lower 5.75% total risk for model 2 and 5.47% total risk for model 3 
compared to matched non-users. The median differences between matched FC derivative 
users and non-user firms are -7.61%, -7.30% and -7.40% respectively for model 1, 2 and 3. 
These median differences are statistically significant at least at 5% significance level. 
Table 4-11: Firm Risk Matching Analysis Between FC Derivative Users and Non-Users 
This table presents the results of mean and median differences for Total Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk and Market 
Risk for matched FC derivative users and non-user firms. The table provides number of observations (N), 
caliper value, mean and median for derivative users and non-users, differences in mean and median and p-
value of wilcoxon test. Propensity score in Model 1 is calculated using common support and without 
replacement. Propensity score in Model 2 is calculated with common support, without replacement and with 
a caliper of 0.01. Propensity score in Model 3 is calculated with common support, without replacement and 
with a caliper of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score. The covariates that we use 
are Z-score, Interest Coverage, Leverage, Liquidity, Firm Size, Market to book, Foreign Debt and Foreign 
Sales. 
Model N Caliper 
Users  Non-Users  Difference Wilcoxon 
p-value Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean95 Median 
Panel A: Total Risk 
1 416 - 45.2556 37.9563  51.3776 45.6023  -6.1220*** -7.6460 0.005 
2 374 0.01 45.7637 37.9976  51.4103 45.2951  -5.7491** -7.2975 0.022 
3 406 0.12 45.6001 38.0537  51.0679 45.4516  -5.4677*** -7.3979 0.010 
Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk 
1 430 - 43.4269 36.8487  47.7033 41.9686  -4.2276** -5.1199 0.026 
2 394 0.01 43.3354 38.0025  47.7221 41.9686  -4.3867*** -3.9661 0.125 
3 424 0.44 43.0452 36.6685  47.6385 41.7883  -4.5933** -5.1198 0.026 
Panel C: Market Risk 
1 430 - 0.6600 0.5653  0.7211 0.6267  -0.0611 -0.0614 0.092 
2 394 0.01 0.6458 0.5772  0.7353 0.6426  -0.0896* -0.0654 0.060 
3 416 0.17 0.6614 0.5716  0.7272 0.6353  -0.0656 -0.0637 0.076 
In panel B of Table 4-11, we examine the mean and median differences for matched FC 
derivative users and non-users for idiosyncratic risk. The results suggest that FC 
derivatives use has statistically significant negative effect on idiosyncratic risk for all three 
models. In particular, FC derivative users have statistically lower idiosyncratic risk of 
4.23% for model 1, 4.39% for model 2 and 4.59% for model 3 compared to matched non-
users. The median difference is statistically significant under model 1 and model 3 
between matched FC derivative users and non-users. In panel C of Table 4-11 we examine 
the mean and median difference tests between matched FC derivative users and non-users 
                                                 
95 ***, ** and * are based on the t-test and shows the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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for market risk measure. The results suggest that FC derivative users have lower mean 
market risk compared to matched non-users for all three models but significant only for 
model 2. This shows that FC derivatives use has very weak negative effect on the market 
risk. The median difference for market risk is significant for all three models. 
Table 4-12: Firm Risk Matching Analysis Between IR Derivative Users and Non-Users 
This table presents the results of mean and median differences for Total Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk and Market 
Risk for matched IR derivative users and non-user firms. The table provides number of observations (N), 
caliper value, mean and median for derivative users and non-users, differences in mean and median and p-
value of wilcoxon test. Propensity score in Model 1 is calculated using common support and without 
replacement. Propensity score in Model 2 is calculated with common support, without replacement and with 
a caliper of 0.01. Propensity score in Model 3 is calculated with common support, without replacement and 
with a caliper of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score. The covariates that we use 
are Z-score, Interest Coverage, Leverage, Liquidity, Firm Size, Market to book, Foreign Debt and Foreign 
Sales. 
Model N Caliper 
Users  Non-Users  Difference Wilcoxon 
p-value Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean96 Median 
Panel A: Total Risk 
1 416 - 42.4791 36.3371  51.3776 45.6023  -8.8985*** -9.2652 0.000 
2 336 0.01 40.4416 35.7926  48.7374 41.732  -8.2958*** -5.9394 0.008 
3 358 0.12 41.8008 35.2969  49.2919 42.0256  -7.4910*** -6.7287 0.001 
Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk 
1 430 - 41.7660 36.3439  47.7032 41.9686  -5.9372** -5.6247 0.003 
2 352 0.01 39.4258 35.0099  46.3936 39.3726  -6.9677*** -4.3627 0.002 
3 402 0.44 42.3173 36.4160  46.8861 40.2379  -4.5688** -3.8219 0.033 
Panel C: Market Risk 
1 430 - 0.6579 0.6009  0.7211 0.6267  -0.0632 -0.0258 0.178 
2 352 0.01 0.6844 0.6145  0.7056 0.6065  -0.0212 0.0080 0.559 
3 378 0.17 0.6315 0.5884  0.7000 0.6061  -0.0684 -0.0177 0.153 
In Table 4-12, we examine the mean and median difference test between matched IR 
derivative users and non-users. In panel A, we test the mean and median difference for 
total risk. Similar to our earlier results, the results suggest statistically significant effect of 
IR derivatives use on the total risk. The results suggest that a matched IR derivative user 
has statistically lower 7.49% to 8.90% total risk than a matched non-user firm for models 
with different caliper values. The matched IR derivative users have statistically lower 
median values for total risk than matched non-users. The results in panel B also show 
significant negative effect of IR derivatives use on the idiosyncratic risk. The results 
suggest that matched IR derivative users have statistically lower idiosyncratic risk than 
                                                 
96 ***, ** and * are based on the t-test and shows the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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matched non-users. In panel C, we examine the mean and median difference test for 
market risk for matched IR derivative users and non-users and find insignificant effect of 
IR derivatives use on market risk. 
Overall, the results of Table 4-10, Table 4-11 and Table 4-12 suggest that, after controlling 
for firm-level characteristics that are associated with a firm’s decision to use derivatives, 
derivatives use is associated with a statistically and economically significant lower total 
risk and idiosyncratic risk. Our results also suggest that derivatives use has weak or no 
significant effect on market risk. These results support results presented above and support 
the notion that firms use derivatives with the intention of reducing risk and not to 
speculate. 
4.4.4.2. Balancing Test for Covariates 
In Table 4-13 we report the balancing results of one-to-one matching used in model 2 for 
total risk of Table 4-10. The table reports pre and post matching results of mean for users 
and non-users, % bias, % reduction in bias, t-test statistics and associated p-values. The t-
test and the SB are the main tests to ensure the balance of the strata for the covariates.97 
For our covariates we find that the bias in firm size, foreign debt dummy, interest 
coverage, leverage and liquidity prior to matching is 98.60%, 79.40%, 56.60%, 54.90% 
and 46.20% respectively. After matching, the bias for covariates is reduced by at least 
71.90%. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) the covariates between treatment and 
control group are out of balance when the absolute value of the SB is greater than 20.0 
after matching. The bias statistics are less than 20.0 for all covariates after matching. This 
result confirms that we have achieved balance on all the covariates that are used to 
calculate the propensity score. This ensures that firms with the same propensity score 
values have a chance of being both treated and untreated. The results of t-tests show that 
matched derivative user and non-user firms are not statistically different after matching. 
The process of matching created a high degree of covariate balance between the treatment 
and control group for the study. 
                                                 
97 We calculate the SB for all the observed covariates. See section 3.5.9.1.3 for more information.  
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Table 4-13: Balancing Test for Covariates 
This table presents the balancing test results for the covariates that are used to calculate the propensity 
score before and after matching. Z-score is Altman’s Z-score for UK firms; Interest Coverage is the ratio of 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes to Interest Expenses on Debt; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to 
market value of assets; Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress 
over total current liabilities. Firm size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Market to Book is the ratio of 
market values of assets to book value of assets; FC Debt is a dummy variable set is equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses 
Foreign Debt and ‘0’ otherwise; Foreign Sales is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. 
Variables  Sample 
Mean 
SB (%) 
Reduction 
in SB (%) 
T-Test p > |t| 
Users Non-Users 
Z-score Unmatched 3.0940 4.0797 -25.90 
 
-4.36 0.000 
 
Matched 3.8964 4.0861 -5.00 80.80 -0.43 0.665 
Interest Coverage Unmatched 12.7610 30.1790 -56.60 
 
-9.89 0.000 
 
Matched 26.1160 28.7650 -8.60 84.80 -0.74 0.462 
Leverage Unmatched 0.2324 0.1285 54.90 
 
7.75 0.000 
 
Matched 0.1338 0.1347 -0.50 99.10 -0.06 0.956 
Liquidity Unmatched 1.0061 1.8052 -46.20 
 
-9.57 0.000 
 
Matched 1.4295 1.6542 -13.00 71.90 -1.24 0.215 
Firm Size Unmatched 13.4000 11.5370 98.60 
 
14.25 0.000 
 
Matched 11.6760 11.6860 -0.50 99.50 -0.05 0.959 
Market to Book Unmatched 1.5733 2.0158 -21.80 
 
-3.48 0.001 
 
Matched 1.9660 2.0587 -4.60 79.10 -0.41 0.683 
FC Debt Unmatched 0.8165 0.4615 79.40 
 
12.20 0.000 
 
Matched 0.4416 0.4670 -5.70 92.90 -0.50 0.614 
Foreign Sales Unmatched 0.5686 0.5238 13.20 
 
1.82 0.069 
 
Matched 0.5273 0.5234 1.10 91.50 0.11 0.914 
4.4.4.3. Hidden Bias and Sensitivity Analysis 
Rosenbaum (1991) argues that under the situation of hidden or unobserved variables, 
where groups differ on unobserved characteristics that are not measured, the groups are not 
comparable. This situation is hard to resolve as the hidden or unobserved variables are 
difficult to measure. If there are unobserved or hidden variables that affect the decision to 
use derivatives or firm risk measures, then there is a problem of endogenous selection and 
under such circumstances the estimates obtained from PSM are inconsistent and the results 
are no longer unbiased. These unobserved variables may compromise the validity of 
inferring causality from observational data. PSM allows sensitivity analysis on the 
selection bias and also allows the estimation of the extent to which this hidden bias may 
affect the inference about the effects of derivatives use. We perform a sensitivity analysis 
by looking at Rosenbaum bounds and hidden bias equivalents (Diprete and Gangl, 2004). 
This method determines the extent to which selection on unobserved variables needed in 
Chapter 4: The Effects of Derivatives Use on Equity Implied Risk 
Vikram Finavker 136 M00281338 
order to change the inferences calculated by the PSM. Using Rosenbaum bound this 
sensitivity of observed effects can be calculated for number of scenarios with various 
levels of gamma. The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in (Diprete and 
Gangl, 2004). This method determines the extent to which selection on unobserved 
variables needed in order to change the inferences calculated by the PSM. Using 
Rosenbaum bound, this sensitivity of observed effects can be calculated for number of 
scenarios with various levels of gamma. The results of the sensitivity analysis are 
presented in Table 4-14. The table presents the value of gamma, , required in order to 
overturn our inferences from the PSM method.98 
In this study negative selection bias occurs, when firms most likely to use derivatives also 
have lower firm risk measures even without derivatives use; hence, the estimated treatment 
effects underestimate the true treatment effect. As we have negative estimated treatment 
effect we use p-values of negative bounds to calculate the hidden bias equivalent. We use 
following equitation to calculate hidden bias equivalent: 
 
𝑥 =  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝛤)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽))
 [49] 
In equation [49]  is the critical value of gamma and 𝛽is the coefficient value from logit 
estimation that used to calculate propensity score. 
Other columns in Table 4-14 show the magnitude of hidden bias required for each 
covariate that would cause us to review our findings of the causal effect of derivatives use 
on firm risk measures. For Z-score, the critical level of  is reached at a difference of 4.53. 
To alter our conclusions, the unobserved or hidden bias would have to produce a difference 
of similar magnitude. The unobserved variable would have to produce the effect of a 
difference of 0.29 in leverage, -8.33 in liquidity, 8.25 in market to book and 0.96 in foreign 
sales. All these differences are very large suggesting that to overturn our results of risk 
reducing effect of derivatives. The unobserved variables must have an effect that is as large 
as the magnitude of changes in the covariates. For model 2, the treatment effect is 
significant under the assumption of no hidden bias at value of 1.07. Hence, our 
conclusion that total risk after derivatives use is lower for user firms than non-user firms 
                                                 
98 Significant at 5% level 
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would be suspicious if an unobserved covariate would increase the odds of using 
derivatives for the firms that actually use derivatives by 7% against firms that do not use 
derivatives. To revise our findings of the causal effect of derivatives use on idiosyncratic 
risk, the unobserved variable or hidden bias has to produce an effect of 7% to 12% to alter 
our results.99 
Table 4-14: Sensitivity Analysis and Hidden Bias for the Effects of All Derivatives Use 
This table calculates the sensitivity analysis and Hidden Bias Equivalents for the effect of All Derivatives use 
on Total Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk. The table presents the critical values of gamma at 5% level of 
significance. The hidden bias equivalents are calculated using equation [49]. 
Model Gamma Z-score  
Interest 
Coverage 
Leverage Liquidity 
Firm 
Size 
Market 
to Book 
FC DEBT 
Dummy 
Foreign 
Sales 
Panel A: Total Risk 
1 1.25 4.5254 -41.5112 0.2885 -8.3332 0.8359 8.2510 0.2663 0.9565 
2 1.07 1.3721 -12.5865 0.0875 -2.5267 0.2534 2.5018 0.0807 0.2900 
3 1.15 2.8344 -25.9998 0.1807 -5.2194 0.5235 5.1679 0.1668 0.5991 
Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk 
1 1.08 1.9700 -15.4832 0.1026 -3.7685 0.3110 2.7875 0.0962 0.3574 
2 1.12 2.9009 -22.7998 0.1512 -5.5493 0.4580 4.1047 0.1417 0.5263 
3 1.07 1.7319 -13.6118 0.0902 -3.3130 0.2734 2.4506 0.0846 0.3142 
The sensitivity analysis and hidden bias in 
                                                 
99 We do not calculate the sensitivity analysis or hidden bias for Market risk variable as the effect of 
derivatives use on market risk is not significant. 
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Table 4-15 is calculated for the matching analysis presented in. The critical level of  is 
reached at the values of 1.1 and 1.15. This shows that the observed effect of FC derivatives 
use on total risk is sensitive to unobserved confounding variable that could change the 
odds of using derivatives for firms that actually use derivatives by 10% to 15% versus 
firms that do not use derivatives. Similarly, the results in panel B for the effect of FC 
derivatives on idiosyncratic risk shows that the critical values of gamma are reached at 
1.05 and 1.15 at 5% significance level. This shows that the observed effect of FC 
derivatives on idiosyncratic risk is sensitive to unobserved covariate. 
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Table 4-15: Sensitivity Analysis and Hidden Bias for the Effects of FC Derivatives Use 
This table calculates the sensitivity analysis and Hidden Bias Equivalents for the effect of FC derivatives use 
on Total Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk. The table presents the critical values of gamma at 5% level of 
significance. The hidden bias equivalents are calculated using equation [49]. 
Model Gamma Z-score  Interest 
Coverage 
Leverage Liquidity 
Firm 
Size 
Market 
to Book 
FC DEBT 
Dummy 
Foreign 
Sales 
Panel A: Total Risk 
1 1.1 1.9275 -17.4073 0.1517 -9.8167 0.3537 2.8120 0.0890 0.4805 
2 1.1 1.9275 -17.4073 0.1517 -9.8167 0.3537 2.8120 0.0890 0.4805 
3 1.15 2.8264 -25.5259 0.2225 -14.3951 0.5187 4.1235 0.1306 0.7047 
Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk 
1 1.15 3.5532 -26.4540 0.2382 -9.9804 0.5717 3.9599 0.1355 0.7464 
2 1.05 1.2404 -9.2350 0.0831 -3.4841 0.1996 1.3824 0.0473 0.2606 
3 1.15 3.5532 -26.4540 0.2382 -9.9804 0.5717 3.9599 0.1355 0.7464 
In Table 4-16, we calculate sensitivity analysis and hidden bias equivalent for the matching 
analysis presented in Table 4-12. For total risk, the critical values of gamma are reached at 
1.30 to 1.45. These suggest that the estimated effect of IR derivatives on total risk is 
questionable when the odds ratio of derivatives use between users and non-users differs by 
more than the critical values of gamma. We also calculate the hidden bias equivalent for 
the covariates. These shows how much effect the unobservable variables needs to produce 
to alter the results of effect of IR derivatives on total risk. For example, Table 4-16 shows 
that the unobserved covariates have to produce an effect of 5.1804 for Z-score and 0.4045 
for leverage. In panel B we calculate the sensitivity analysis and hidden bias for the effect 
of IR derivatives on idiosyncratic risk. The critical values of gamma are reached at the 
values of 1.10 and 1.25. This shows that the observed effect of IR derivatives use on 
idiosyncratic risk is sensitive to unobserved confounding variable that could change the 
odds of using IR derivatives for firms that actually use IR derivatives by 10% to 25% 
versus firms that do not use derivatives. 
Diprete and Gangl (2004) argue that Rosenbaum bound is the “worst case” scenario. 
Therefore, a low gamma value does not suggest that an unobserved variable or a hidden 
bias exists and that there is no effect of derivatives use on firm risk measures. This only 
suggests that the effect of derivatives use on firm risk would be zero if there were an 
unobserved or a hidden bias that would change the odds ratio treatment assignment. 
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Table 4-16: Sensitivity Analysis and Hidden Bias for the Effects of IR Derivatives Use 
This table calculates the sensitivity analysis and Hidden Bias Equivalents for the effect of IR derivatives use 
on Total Risk and Idiosyncratic Risk. The table presents the critical values of gamma at 5% level of 
significance. The hidden bias equivalents are calculated using equation [49]. 
Model Gamma Z-score  
Interest 
Coverage 
Leverage Liquidity 
Firm 
Size 
Market 
to Book 
FC DEBT 
Dummy 
Foreign 
Sales 
Panel A: Total Risk 
1 1.45 5.1804 -34.5361 0.4045 -4.0299 1.3317 13.4153 0.4220 1.9320 
2 1.30 3.6579 -24.3862 0.2856 -2.8456 0.9403 9.4727 0.2980 1.3642 
3 1.35 4.1841 -27.8941 0.3267 -3.2549 1.0756 10.8353 0.3408 1.5604 
Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk 
1 1.25 4.4040 -23.8391 0.2448 -3.8215 0.8488 7.0068 0.2717 1.3472 
2 1.25 4.4040 -23.8391 0.2448 -3.8215 0.8488 7.0068 0.2717 1.3472 
3 1.10 1.8810 -10.1823 0.1046 -1.6323 0.3625 2.9928 0.1161 0.5754 
4.5. Summary of Research Findings 
The main focus of this chapter was to investigate the effect of derivatives use on equity 
price risk measures using a large dataset of UK non-financial firms for the period 1999-
2010. Our results in this chapter show that the use of derivatives is, on average, associated 
with a reduction in various measures of firm risks. In univariate tests we find that firms 
that use derivatives have lower estimated values of total risk and idiosyncratic risk 
suggesting that derivatives are associated with lower firm risk. We find that market risk for 
derivative users is not statistically different from non-users. Univariate results also shed 
light on the characteristics of derivative user and non-user firms and suggest that derivative 
user firms are generally larger, more indebted, pay more dividends and hold less cash. 
We find that firms’ use of derivatives is associated with a reduction in financial risk 
measures. Our results suggest that a 1% increase in the use of all derivatives lowers the 
total risk by 2.53%, market risk by 0.0651 basis points and idiosyncratic risk by 2.23%. 
We find that a 1% increases in the extent of FC derivatives use lowers the market risk by 
0.0945 basis points while it has no effect on total risk and idiosyncratic risk. The results for 
extent of IR derivatives suggest that a 1% increase leads to a reduction of 9.75% in total 
risk and 6.82% in idiosyncratic risk. We test for the nonlinearity in the use of derivatives 
and find that firms that use moderate to low levels of derivatives have economically larger 
negative effect on total risk than other levels of derivative use. We also use indicator 
variables for derivatives use and find that derivative users have economically lower 4.16% 
to 4.82% total risk and 2.02% and 2.55% lower idiosyncratic risk than non-users. We 
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examine the effect of derivatives on financial risk measures over-time by interacting year 
dummies with derivatives dummies. We find that derivative users have lowest total risk 
and idiosyncratic risk during the economically stable period of 2004-2006 followed by the 
period of recent financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
It is argued that empirical works in corporate financial field are affected by the problem of 
endogeneity. We control for the endogeneity problem by examining the mean and median 
differences between derivative users and identical non-users. We use PSM analysis to 
match derivative users and non-users. We employ different matching methods and find that 
derivative users have statistically lower mean total risk and idiosyncratic risk. In particular, 
derivative users have 5.50% to 6.80% statistically lower total risk and 4.08% and 5.17% 
lower idiosyncratic risk. 
Overall, our results in this chapter suggest that UK firms use of derivatives is associated 
with a reduction in equity price risk. Our results also suggest that IR derivatives have 
statistically and economically larger negative effect on total risk and idiosyncratic risk than 
FC derivatives. These findings are consistent with the results of Guay (1999); Bartram 
(2006); Nguyen and Faff (2010); Marin (2013). 
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Chapter 5. The Effect of Derivatives Use on The Probability of Default 
5.1. Introduction 
“I have never bought into the argument that corporate users of derivatives give rise 
to systemic risk – that's a completely misguided view of the significance of 
corporate transactions,” Richard Raeburn, chairman of the European Association 
of Corporate Treasurers in London, Risk Magazine, 15 June 2010100 
In October 2008, a month after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, financial market 
regulators in the European Union began an investigation into the global derivatives market 
looking at ways of reducing systemic risk within the financial sector. The concern for 
European regulators is that when a derivatives trade goes “bad”, an outcome that is more 
likely when derivatives are used for speculation, they have the potential to spread the 
negative consequences of defaults to all corners of the global financial market. 
Regulators in both the US and Europe are primarily concerned about the systemic risks 
arising from positions in the OTC derivatives market. Establishing central clearing houses 
or central counterparties (CCP) is considered a way of reducing systemic risk related to 
derivatives transactions. Instead of being exchanged privately via the OTC market, they 
could be processed through an intermediary, a move that is expected to improve 
transparency and reduce risk. However, non-financial firms using derivatives to hedge 
their risks would be required to keep large amounts of extra financing available for the 
purposes of putting up margin dependent on daily mark-to-market valuations. Capital and 
undrawn lines of credit will need to be held against potential margin for significant price 
changes in the price of the asset underlying the derivative transaction. 
Companies will be required to be able to pay margin to their contracted counterparty for 
negative positions during the life of a derivative contract; although the offsetting, hedged, 
underlying cash flows will not materialize until the maturity of the underlying exposure. 
While margin payments would be received for derivatives positions showing a gain, they 
                                                 
100http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/news/1685735/ec-derivatives-consultation-stops-short-
corporate-exemptions 
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could not be used in the business prior to maturity as this cash could flow out again just as 
quickly as underlying prices moved in the opposite direction. 
One of the advantages of OTC derivatives is that they usually require no cash flows prior 
to maturity. But if the move to CCP will require non-financial firms to provide collateral to 
their counterparty daily during the life of the derivative hedge, the hedge cash flows 
become immediate and companies would have to finance them up to maturity. This could 
be a significant financial burden for many companies particularly at a time when the flow 
of bank credit to the corporate sector is running at historically low levels. The net result 
could be an increase in liquidity risk for firms. Another problem with enforcing clearing on 
non-financial firms is that it could stop them meeting hedge accounting requirements, as 
standardized, exchange-traded contracts would not match the financial exposures on their 
balance sheet. 
Many voices from the corporate sector are arguing that there is a strong possibility that 
compulsory clearing will hamper firms’ ability to hedge because they would have to post 
initial and variation margin, utilizing a firm’s scarce working capital. For example, Richard 
Raeburn, chairman of the European Association of Corporate Treasurers in London, is 
lobbying hard for non-financial firms to be exempt from being required to post margin. 
Speaking to Risk Magazine Christopher Whittall101 says, 
"Forcing corporates into central clearing creates an unmanageable liquidity risk 
challenge. You can also argue that incremental systemic risk is created because of 
the hazards corporates will face if they are required to set aside almost unlimited 
liquidity to meet uncertain future margin calls. I would argue that faced with the 
volatility of currency and interest rate markets, corporates are left with a very 
large contingent exposure to post collateral if the mark-to-market goes against 
them…If corporates don't get some kind of exemption from central clearing, they'll 
basically just see prices go up, as banks will have to pass prices on. That's the 
biggest issue at the moment." 
                                                 
101 16 June 2010 - Corporates should be forced onto central counterparties – BIS, http://www.risk.net/risk-
magazine/news/1686244/corporates-forced-central-counterparties-bis 
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Christopher Whittall from Risk Magazine points out that many corporate treasurers have 
previously told “Risk” of their opposition to central clearing. He provides the following 
quote from a treasurer of a major airline, 
"When fuel prices spiked prior to the financial crisis and then dropped 
significantly, the mark-to-market impact was huge. Margin calls would have tied 
up a good few $100 million at the very time we needed the money. Clearing would 
be a disaster: all it will do is stop people hedging as they can't afford it." 102 
Corporate end-users are lobbying hard to be exempted from any clearing obligations, 
arguing that their use of derivatives does not impose any systemic risk and that any 
mandatory clearing requirement would require them to eat into vital working capital to 
meet margin calls by CCP. Derivative end–users are concerned that the requirement to 
centrally clear all OTC derivatives trades will force them to put aside large amounts of 
cash for margin calls and consequently increase their costs of derivatives use. This will 
lower the net benefits of derivatives use and hence decrease firm value. The tying up of 
cash in this way has the potential to adversely affect firm value in another way, (as firms 
may be forced to forego valuable investment opportunities) as that cash could otherwise be 
deployed in the firm, such as for investment purposes. For practitioners it seems that there 
are clear economic and financial implications to the proposed clearing rules. Firstly, 
increased costs of derivative use leading to less derivative use and therefore firms 
subjected to greater financial price exposure. It follows that this could result in greater 
credit risk for firms’ financial counterparties (such as the banks that lend to corporate) that 
could increase systemic risk within the financial sector. This outcome would be opposite to 
that envisaged by regulators. Secondly, firm’s cash resources are likely to be diverted away 
from productive use, such as funding value increasing investment, for the purposes of 
meeting margin and collateral requirements on their derivative transactions. The 
implications of this would be a likely reduction in corporate economic activity with 
obvious consequences for employment, growth and the real economy. Given the strong 
possibility that the proposed clearing and margin obligations could significantly hinder 
firms’ ability to hedge their financial price exposures. An important question is whether 
                                                 
102 16 June 2010 - Corporates should be forced onto central counterparties – BIS, http://www.risk.net/risk-
magazine/news/1686244/corporates-forced-central-counterparties-bis. 
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the proposed move to central clearing is really necessary or not. It will be necessary only if 
corporate users of derivative instruments give rise to systematic risk. We should therefore 
attempt to establish if the corporate use of derivatives poses a systemic threat. We would 
argue that it would only do so if non-financial firms are using derivatives for speculation. 
In this chapter we examine the link between the use of derivatives by UK non-financial 
firms and their likelihood of default measured using expected default frequencies. A key 
advantage of our indicator of firm risk is that it is a direct measure of firm’s credit risk.  
The focus of this chapter is to examine the effect of derivatives use on the probability of 
default. We do this by investigating the effect of derivatives use on the probability of 
default for the period from 1999 to 2010. For the overwhelming majority of our firms, 
disclosures in annual reports indicate that firms are using financial derivatives for hedging, 
that is, risk reduction. Our empirical results are consistent with this as they show that 
derivative using firms have a significantly lower probability of default than non-users. This 
result is consistent with the notion that firms are using derivatives for hedging rather than 
speculation. Furthermore, we find that the use of IR derivatives lowers the probability of 
default more than FC derivatives. We use a treatment effects, instrumental variable and 
PSM approach to control for endogeneity of derivative use and the probability of default 
and find a strong negative association between derivative use and the probability of 
default. 
This chapter is organized as follow. Section 5.2 provides description of pre-derivative 
measure of exposure, dependent variables, derivatives variables and other control 
variables. Section 5.3 provides Descriptive Statistics for the variables used in this analysis. 
Section 5.4 presents the empirical results and section 5.5 draws some conclusions. 
5.2. Variable Description 
This section presents definitions of pre-derivative use measures of exposures, dependent 
variables, derivatives variables and other control variables. 
5.2.1. Pre-Derivative Measures of Exposure 
 Foreign Sales: Calculated as foreign sales divided by total sales. This provides a 
pre-derivative measure of exposure to FX rate risk. 
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 Foreign Assets: Calculated as foreign assets divided by total assets. This provides a 
pre-derivative measure of exposure to FX rate risk. 
 Foreign Income: Calculated as foreign income divided by total income. This 
provides a pre-derivative measure of exposure to FX rate risk. 
 Foreign Debt: Calculated as foreign debt divided by total debt. This provides a pre-
derivative measure of exposure to FX rate risk. 
 Z-score: Z-score is Altman’s modified Z-score for UK and is a measure of distress 
calculated using accounting ratios.103 
 Interest Coverage: Calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation divided by interest payments. This provides a pre-derivative measure 
of exposure to IR risk. 
5.2.2. Measures of the Likelihood of Financial Distress 
In order to examine the effects of derivative use on the likelihood of firms suffering 
financial distress, we need a variable that can capture a firms’ likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Proxies for the probability of financial distress can be calculated using both accounting and 
market-based structural models. The problem with accounting-based measures of the 
likelihood of bankruptcy is that they use information from financial statements that by 
definition are backward looking and hence may not be very informative about the future 
financial prospects of a firm. In contrast, market-based structural models use information 
contained in the market value of a firms’ equity to calculate the probability of financial 
distress and since market prices reflects the market’s expectations about the future 
financial performance of a firm they contain forward looking information which in turn is 
more likely to provide a better assessment of a firms future creditworthiness. Hillegeist et 
al. (2004) investigate the performance of the accounting-based and market-based models 
of bankruptcy. The authors conclude that the market-based measure of bankruptcy 
provided richer information due to forward-looking characteristics of financial markets. In 
view of this we use a market-based measure of the likelihood of firm defaulting on its debt 
commitments. We use a firm’s one-year and five-year EDF or probability of default as a 
measure for the likelihood of financial distress. This is estimated using Merton’s (1974) 
                                                 
103 For more details see Section 3.3.1.3.3 
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option pricing model.104 We source this data from Moody’s KMV. In simple terms the 
probability of default measures the likelihood that the market value of a firm’s assets will 
be less than the book value of its liabilities by the time the debt matures. 
5.2.3. Main Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variable for our analysis is the coefficient on the derivatives 
variable. We are interested in knowing the effect of derivatives on the probability of 
default. Following measures of derivatives are employed in this chapter: 
 Dummy Measure of Derivatives 
We create dummy measures of derivatives based on the firm’s decision to use 
derivatives. We create following categories of derivatives use 1) All Derivative 
users: A dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm use FC and/or IR and/or CP 
derivatives and 0 for non-users105 2) FC Derivative users with bias: A dummy 
variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives and ‘0’  for non-FC users106 3) 
FC Derivative users without bias: A dummy variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses 
FC derivatives and ‘0’  for non-users107 4) IR derivative users with bias: A dummy 
variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses IR derivatives and ‘0’  for non-IR users108 and 
5) IR derivative users without bias: FC Derivative users without bias: A dummy 
variable set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives and ‘0’  for non-users109 
In section 0, we examine the effects of different numbers and combinations of 
derivatives use on the probability of default. We have created different categories 
of derivatives based on the numbers and types of derivatives firms use. We have 
created: 1) One type of derivative user which is set equal to 1 if a firm uses only 
one type of derivative i.e. either FC or IR or CP and 0 otherwise 2) Two types of 
derivatives user which is set equal to 1 if a firm uses two types of derivatives i.e. 
Foreign Currency and Interest Rate (FC&IR) or Foreign Currency and Commodity 
                                                 
104 Detailed information on how a firm's expected default frequency is calculated is provided in Section 
3.3.1.2.2. 
105 We do not investigate the effects of CP only derivatives as there are very few firms in our sample that use 
CP only derivatives.  
106 Non-FC users include “Other”users that use IR only, CP only or a combination of both. 
107 We exclude “Other” users from non-user sample. 
108 Non-IR users include “Other”users that use FC only, CP only or a combination of both. 
109 We exclude “Other” users from non-user sample. 
Chapter 5: The Effect of Derivatives Use on The Probability of Default 
Vikram Finavker 148 M00281338 
Price (FC&CP) or Interest Rate and Commodity Price (IR&CP) and 0 otherwise 
and 3) Three types of derivatives which is set equal to 1 if a firm uses all three 
types of derivatives i.e. FC&IR&CP and 0 otherwise. We also breakdown one type 
of derivative users into its 3 components: 1) FC derivative users, 2) IR derivative 
users and 3) CP derivative users and two types of derivatives into 3 subcategories: 
1) FC&IR derivative users, 2) FC&CP derivative users and 3) IR&CP derivative 
users. In all subcategories we assign 1 to users and 0 to non-users. Majority of the 
firms in our sample are FC and IR derivative users and there are few firms that use 
all three types of derivatives FC, IR and CP together. 
 Continuous Measure of Derivatives: 
We use year-end outstanding notional values of derivatives as a continuous 
measure of derivatives use. We scale notional values of derivatives by total assets. 
This gives an extent of derivatives use and can differentiate between a firm with 
high derivative usage with a firm with low derivative usage. We calculate this for 
1) extent of all derivatives 2) extent of FC derivatives and 3) extent of IR 
derivatives. 
5.2.4. Control Variables110 
In multivariate analysis we control for other factors that also affect the firm financial risk. 
In particular, we control for following variables: 
 Leverage: We calculate leverage as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets 
minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. We expect a positive 
association between leverage and the probability of default. 
 Profitability: We use the return on invested capital as a measure for profitability. 
We expect a negative association between profitability and the probability of 
default. 
 Firm Size: We use natural log of total assets as a measure for firm size. We expect 
that firm size will be negatively associated with the probability of default. 
                                                 
110 See section 3.3.3 for information on the theoretical and empirical reasoning behind using these control 
variables. 
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 Equity Volatility: We calculate equity volatility as the standard deviation of each 
firm’s daily stock return over the entire fiscal year. We expect a positive coefficient 
for this variable. 
 Excess Return: We calculate excess return as annual equity return minus the value 
weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Each 
firm’s annual return is calculated by cumulating its monthly return. We expect a 
negative association between excess return and the probability of default. 
 Liquidity: We measure liquidity as ratio of total current assets minus total stock and 
work in progress over total current liabilities. We expect a negative association 
between profitability and the probability of default. 
5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides the summary analysis of pre-derivatives measures of exposure, the 
probability of default variables, extent of derivatives use and control variables. It presents 
frequency distribution of the derivatives variable and the Pearson correlation coefficients 
for derivatives, probability of default measures and control variables. Finally, this section 
provides the time-series profile of the probability of default measures for various 
derivative users and non-users. 
5.3.1. Summary Statistics 
In Table 5-1, we present summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. In panel 
A we display data for variables described as pre-derivative use measures of exposure. We 
define these as measures of financial exposure that generally do not incorporate the effect 
of derivatives, in other words they are not affected by the use of derivatives.111 Firms in our 
sample have high levels of foreign sales with the mean and median values of foreign sales 
close to 60 per cent. On average a little over a third of firms' income is generated outside 
the UK and a quarter of firms' assets are located in foreign countries. Firms in our sample 
possess higher levels foreign trading activity than the firms in Bartram et al. (2011), where 
the mean level of foreign sales and foreign income are 23% and 20%, respectively. 
However, firms in Bartram et al. (2011) sample originate from several countries and so 
their mean values might mask large differences across countries. A more appropriate 
                                                 
111 Bartram et al. (2011) refer to these as measures of gross or pre-hedging exposure. 
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comparison might be against another developed country such as the US. Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001) show that non-financial US firms in the S&P 500 have on average around 20 
per cent of foreign sales with a median value of only 12.5 per cent. Our sample made up of 
firms in the FTSE 500 possess nearly five (three) times the median (mean) level of foreign 
sales which suggests that UK firms have relatively large levels of foreign operations which 
could generate high levels of FX exposure and resulting cash flow variability. These 
exposure characteristics support our assertion that the UK is a good setting for examining 
the effects of derivatives on firm default probabilities.112 
Panel B of Table 5-1 shows summary statistics for our probability of default variable, 
which we consider to be a post-derivative use measure of firm risk, which means that its 
value incorporates the effects of the firm's risk management activities such as the use of 
derivatives. The average one-year default probability (EDF1YEAR) is 1.3116 per cent and 
the median value is 0.1637 per cent. For our five-year default probability (EDF5YEAR) 
variable the mean and median values are 1.2436 and 0.3727 per cent, respectively. A 
comparison of median values shows that as expected one-year default probabilities are 
smaller than five-year probabilities.113 
                                                 
112 Bartram et al. (2011) include leverage, interest cover and liquidity as measures of gross interest rate 
exposure. It is conceivable that leverage and interest cover could also be post derivative (or net) measures of 
exposure as the use of derivatives for hedging should lower firm risk and so can facilitate the uptake of 
greater levels of debt (Graham and Rogers, 2002). 
113 A small proportion of extreme values influences the mean one-year EDF values. If we winsorize at the 2.5 
percentile top and bottom we find in a paired t-test that five year EDF values are greater than one year EDF 
values. 
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Table 5-1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the standard summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis. This table 
includes following variables. Foreign Sales is foreign sales over total sales. Foreign Assets is foreign assets 
over total assets. Foreign Income is foreign income over total income. Foreign Debt is foreign Debt over 
total debt. Z-score is Altman’s Z-score for UK firms. Interest Coverage is earnings before interest and taxes 
over interest expense. EDF1YEAR is probability of default in 1-year time. EDF5YEAR is probability of 
default in 5-years time. Extent of Derivatives is notional values of derivatives scaled by total assets. Extent 
of FC Derivatives is notional values of FC derivatives scaled by total assets Extent of IR Derivatives is 
notional values of IR derivatives scaled by total assets Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of 
assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which is calculated as the sum of pre-tax 
profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm 
minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Equity Volatility is 
expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard deviation of natural log of the 
daily price growth rate. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of total current 
assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. 
Variables N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Panel A: Pre-Derivative use Measures of Exposure 
Foreign Sales 3422 56.9791 59.095 0.0000 100.0000 34.3514 
Foreign Assets 3374 24.9075 18.4000 0.0000 91.9500 25.2718 
Foreign Income 2881 34.7812 19.7900 0.0000 100.0000 37.0461 
Foreign Debt 2845 46.6638 46.8700 0.0000 100.0000 38.8519 
Z-score 3422 3.6566 3.2996 -47.4732 48.6113 11.2632 
Interest Coverage 3422 17.1008 5.3818 0.0000 100.0000 28.9672 
Panel B: Post-Derivative use Measure of Risk 
EDF1YEAR 3422 1.3351 0.1701 0.0100 28.5976 4.0100 
EDF5YEAR 3422 1.2682 0.3715 0.0133 18.5867 2.7450 
Panel C: Extent of Derivatives Use 
Extent of All Derivatives 1152 0.2341 0.1280 0.0000 2.9237 0.3888 
Extent of FC Derivatives 845 0.1387 0.0536 0.0000 2.4139 0.2988 
Extent of IR Derivatives 942 0.1371 0.0789 0.0000 1.1909 0.1810 
Panel D: Control Variables 
Leverage 3422 0.2220 0.1852 0.0000 0.8920 0.1943 
Profitability 3422 0.0700 0.0953 -1.0365 0.7632 0.2271 
Firm Size 3422 13.5545 13.3873 9.0882 17.9283 1.7893 
Equity Volatility 3422 0.4024 0.3455 0.0979 1.2841 0.2148 
Excess Return 3422 -0.0238 0.0331 -1.9106 1.3488 0.5016 
Liquidity 3422 1.1436 0.8500 0.0000 8.8000 1.2801 
Panel C displays summary statistics for our variables measuring the notional amount of 
derivatives scaled by total assets, which we use as proxy for the extent of derivatives use. 
Not all of the firms in our sample disclose in their annual reports notional values of 
derivatives employed and hence the numbers of firm-year observations for these notional 
value variables are around a third of those available for the derivative dummy variables. If 
we include firms that do not use derivatives the mean (median) notional value of all 
derivatives as a percentage of total assets is 23.4% (12.8%). The mean value of total FC 
derivatives as a percentage of total assets is 13.9% and the mean value of total IR 
derivative as a percentage of total assets is very similar at 13.7%. 
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Panel D of Table 5-1 presents summary statistics results for our control variables. The 
mean value for leverage is 22.2%, which is a little lower, but not too dissimilar to the 
25.5% reported by Bartram et al. for their sample of firms.114 Our sample firms' 
profitability ranges between -103.7% to 76.3% indicating both profitable and loss making 
firms in our sample. On average the firms in our sample earn returns lower than the market 
as a whole albeit with a median excess return of 3.3%. The average value of liquidity for 
our sample is 1.14 and the median value is 0.85, which are lower than the corresponding 
values reported by Bartram et al. (2011). Overall, our summary statistics suggest that our 
sample is made up of a rich cross-section of firms, some of which possess financial price 
exposure characteristics that might necessitate the use of derivatives for risk mitigation. 
5.3.2. Frequency Distribution of Derivative Usage 
Table 5-2 presents the frequency distribution of derivatives usage among our sample firms. 
Panel A provides usage data for all derivatives use (FC, IR, CP) and shows that 86.6% of 
our sample discloses in their annual reports that they use derivatives, while 13.4% do not 
use derivatives. The proportion of derivative users in our sample is greater than that 
reported by Bartram et al. (2011) for their sample of UK firms (64%), French firms (66%) 
and German firms (47%) and that indicated by Campello et al. (2011) for US firms (50%). 
In panel B we break down our sample into firms that use FC derivatives and those that do 
not. Nearly three quarters of our sample, 74%, use FC derivatives. Again this is greater 
than the corresponding derivative usage frequencies in Bartram et al. (2011) (UK=55%, 
France=53%, Germany=39%) and Campello et al. (2011) (27%). In panel C we show that 
70.6% of our sample use IR derivatives which is double the figure reported by Bartram et 
al. (2011) for their sample of UK firms (36.5%) and also double the proportion of US firms 
using IR derivatives as reported by Campello et al. (2011) (35.6%). Notwithstanding the 
possibility that the size composition of the Bartram et al. (2011) and Campello et al. (2011) 
samples are not directly comparable with our sample; these comparisons suggests that the 
use of derivative instruments is more prevalent among UK firms. This implies that an 
investigation into the impact of derivatives on the risk of default is highly relevant within a 
UK context. Finally, only 10% of our sample firms use CP derivatives, which is consistent 
with the relatively low exposure to commodity prices faced by our sample firms. 
                                                 
114 We calculate leverage similar Bartram et al. (2011) and also source our data from DataStream. 
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Table 5-2: Frequency Distribution of Derivative Usage 
This table provides data on the use of derivatives by our sample firms. In panel A we present data 
for all derivatives usage. In panel B we present broad categories of FC derivatives used by our 
sample. In panel C we present broad categories of IR derivatives used by our sample. 
 
Derivative Categories Frequency Percentage 
Panel A: Derivative users and Non-users 
Derivative Users 3693 86.61 
Non-users 571 13.39 
Total 4264 100 
Panel B: FC Derivative users and FC Non-users 
FC Derivatives 3156 74.02 
IR Derivatives Only 508 11.91 
IR&CP Derivatives 22 0.52 
CP Derivatives Only 7 0.16 
Non-users 571 13.39 
Total 4264 100 
Panel C: IR Derivative users and IR Non-users 
IR Derivatives 3011 70.61 
FC Derivatives Only  646 15.15 
FC&CP Derivatives 29 0.68 
CP Derivatives Only 7 0.16 
Non-users 571 13.39 
Total 4264 100 
5.3.3. Correlation Analysis 
Table 5-3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for probability of default, derivative 
use and our independent variables. As expected, the results indicate a negative correlation 
between EDF1YER and derivative dummy variables and EDF5YEAR and derivative 
dummy variables. This suggests that derivative user firms have a lower probability of 
default. As expected, leverage and equity volatility are positively correlated and firm size, 
profitability, liquidity and excess return are negatively correlated with EDF1YEAR and 
EDF5YEAR. The highest correlation of EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR is with equity 
volatility, 0.5507 & 0.5953 respectively. These suggest that firms that have higher equity 
volatility also have higher probability of default. The observed positive correlation of 
EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR with leverage is of higher magnitude, 0.4115 & 0.4443 
respectively. The highest negative correlation of EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR is with 
excess return. This shows that firms that generate excess return have lower probability of 
default. 
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Table 5-3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
This table presents the correlation coefficients for the main variables used in this analysis. EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR measure expected default frequencies 
and proxy for the probability of financial distress. All Derivatives is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is derivative user and 0 otherwise. FC Derivative 
Users (B) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses FC derivatives and 0 otherwise. IR Derivative Users (B) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm 
uses IR derivatives and 0 otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which 
calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus the value 
weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by 
standard deviation of natural log of the daily price growth rate. Firm size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus 
total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
EDF1YEAR 1 1.0000           
EDF5YEAR 2 0.9854 1.0000          
All Derivative Users 3 -0.1234 -0.1243 1.0000         
FC Derivative Users (B) 4 -0.1127 -0.1169 0.6653 1.0000        
IR Derivative Users (B) 5 -0.1128 -0.1195 0.6111 0.2968 1.0000       
Leverage 6 0.4115 0.4443 0.1894 0.0086 0.3153 1.0000      
Firm Size 7 -0.2884 -0.3325 0.3191 0.2641 0.4348 0.1444 1.0000     
Profitability 8 -0.3618 -0.3930 0.1374 0.1151 0.1299 -0.1446 0.2781 1.0000    
Liquidity 9 -0.0314 -0.0225 -0.2116 -0.0619 -0.3005 -0.2777 -0.2700 -0.2085 1.0000   
Equity Volatility 10 0.5507 0.5953 -0.0860 -0.0230 -0.1241 0.1535 -0.2498 -0.4059 0.2319 1.0000  
Excess Return 11 -0.4460 -0.4705 0.0405 0.0222 0.0232 -0.2531 0.1965 0.2268 -0.0663 -0.3469 1.0000 
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5.3.4. Time-Series Profile of Probability of Default for Derivative Users and Non-Users 
In this section, we examine the time-series variation in the probability of default by 
plotting the mean values of EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR for all derivative users and non-
users, FC derivative users and non-FC users and IR derivative users and non-IR users for 
the period 1999 to 2010. It is important to note that we are not controlling for firm-level 
difference between users and non-users in this graphical analysis. 
Figure 5-1 shows that derivative users and non-users have similar default probabilities at 
the start of our sample period in 1999; but as we move towards 2002 average one-year and 
five-year default probabilities for derivative user firms fall below those of non-user firms. 
Although default probabilities for both groups are increasing, they are going up at a faster 
rate for non-users. Default probabilities reach a peak for both users and non-users in 2002, 
which coincides with a period of global macroeconomic uncertainty and heightened credit 
risk. After 2002 the probability of default is falling for both the types of firm and on the 
whole the difference between users and non-users decreases until the beginning of 2007. In 
2007 the plot shows that average default probabilities for non-users start to increase 
whereas those for users remain very stable. Non-users experience a rapid increase in 
default probabilities from the middle of 2007 and accelerate further in 2008 reaching a 
peak by the end of 2008. Derivative users show an increase in default probabilities from 
the middle of 2008 peaking at the end of 2008 but remaining well below those witnessed 
by non-users. The plot also shows that the highest levels of default probabilities for user 
firms in recent financial crisis are still lower than the default probabilities during the 
heightened credit risk conditions of year 2002. This highlights that derivatives are much 
more important in recent financial crisis than they were in 2002. The difference in default 
probabilities between derivative users and non-users reaches its maximum at the end of 
2008 at the height of the financial crisis. The previous maximum difference between 
derivative users and non-users was during the economic slowdown of 2002, which seems 
to suggest that derivatives have their greatest impact on default probabilities during periods 
of heightened economic and financial market uncertainty. Additionally this plot shows that 
since 2001 derivative users have had lower default probabilities than non-users and that 
they are less volatile for users compared to non-users. 
Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 plot the average probability of default for FC derivative users 
and IR derivative users and their corresponding non-users, respectively. The time-series 
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variation in default probabilities for users and non-users depicted in these plots are very 
similar to that presented in Figure 5-1. 
Figure 5-1: Time-Series plot of Mean Probability of default of All Derivative Users and 
Non-user 
 
Figure 5-2: Time-Series plot of Probability of default of FC Derivative Users and Non-FC 
Derivative Users 
 
Figure 5-3: Time-Series plot of Probability of default of IR Derivative Users and Non-IR 
Derivative Users 
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5.4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. We start analysis with 
univariate analysis where we examine the mean and median difference between various 
derivative users and non-users for the probability of default measures, control variables 
and pre-derivatives measures. This will highlight the significance differences in the 
characteristics of derivative users and non-user firms. Next, we use multivariate analysis to 
examine the effects of derivatives use on the probability of default. We use various 
regression models to investigate the research question. 
5.4.1. Univariate Tests 
Previous studies suggest that there are substantive differences, on an average, in the 
characteristics of the firms that use derivatives and those that do not.115 In order to examine 
such differences in characteristics in our sample firms, we use univariate tests for 
difference in means and medians between derivative users and non-users. We present 
univariate results in Table 5-4 to Table 5-7. Table 5-4 shows the results of comparisons 
between derivative users and non-users, Table 5-5 presents the results for FC derivative 
users and non-users, and Table 5-6 for IR derivative users and non-users using both 
parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon rank sum test) tests. The number of 
observations may differ for the various comparisons due to data availability. 
Table 5-4 presents mean and median difference tests for the variables proxying for 
financial distress and firm-level characteristics between derivative users and non-user 
firms. Our results show that the probability of default for derivative users is statistically 
lower than for non-users based upon both means and medians tests. In particular, the 
results show that derivative users have 1.60% and 1.11% lower EDF1YEAR and 
EDF5YEAR. As our probability of default measure is market based and therefore 
measured post the effect of derivatives, our results are consistent with firms using 
derivatives for hedging purposes. 
In line with Guay (1999) and Purnanandam (2008), we find a statistically higher leverage 
ratio for derivative user firms than non-users under both means and medians difference 
                                                 
115(Gay and Nam, 1998; Guay, 1999; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Bartram et al., 2009). 
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tests. This is consistent with firm using derivatives in an effort to increase debt capacity. 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) and Lin et al. (2008) also report higher leverage for their 
sample of derivative use firms. Bartram et al. (2011) include leverage as a pre-hedging 
measure of exposure, which might be because firms with higher leverage are considered to 
have higher IR exposure. However, it is conceivable that a firm's leverage includes the 
effect of derivatives use via debt capacity effects as demonstrated by Graham and Rogers 
(2002). Several previous studies such as Bartram et al. (2011) find that derivative users 
have higher leverage than non-users. This is usually interpreted as derivatives users having 
greater exposure to IR changes. However, it could be argued that while measuring IR 
exposure it is not the amount of debt that matters but more so the ability to service the 
interest payments. Therefore, perhaps a more appropriate measure of IR exposure might be 
the interest cover ratio. Consistent with this, we find derivative users have lower interest 
coverage ratios. This is opposite to the finding of Bartram et al. (2011) who report higher 
coverage ratios for derivative users. 
Table 5-4: Mean Difference Test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of All Derivative Users 
Versus Non-Users 
Table displays the results of tests of mean differences and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test between derivative user 
firms and non-user firms across firm risk measures and firm-level characteristics. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% for a two-tailed test. 
 
Variables 
All Derivative Users 
 
Non-Users 
 Difference Test 
  Mean Median 
N Mean Median  N Mean Median  T-Test Wilcoxon 
EDF1YEAR  3005 1.1398 0.1604  417 2.7428 0.3232  -1.6030*** -0.1629*** 
EDF5YEAR  3005 1.1329 0.3496  417 2.2431 0.5957  -1.1102*** -0.2461*** 
Leverage 3005 0.2364 0.2032  417 0.1184 0.0284  0.1180*** 0.1748*** 
Firm Size 3005 13.7755 13.6078  417 11.9623 12.0670  1.8132*** 1.5408*** 
Liquidity 3005 1.0243 0.8200  417 2.0034 1.1600  -0.9791*** -0.3400*** 
Profitability 3005 0.0835 0.0968  417 -0.0271 0.0574  0.1106*** 0.0394*** 
Equity Volatility 3005 0.3906 0.3392  417 0.4874 0.4162  -0.0968*** -0.0769*** 
Excess Return 3005 -0.0127 0.0393  417 -0.1042 -0.0371  0.0916*** 0.0764*** 
Interest cover 3005 14.4845 5.1637  417 35.9548 10.7402  -21.4703*** -5.5765*** 
Z-score 3005 3.8858 3.2786  417 2.0055 3.5478  1.8803** -0.2692 
Foreign Sales 3005 57.6556 59.8800   417 52.1043 52.1700  5.5513*** 7.7100*** 
Foreign Assets 2686 27.2901 21.8500  362 17.7204 1.8400  9.5696*** 20.0100*** 
Foreign Income 2223 36.1355 22.9100  328 32.3199 6.5700  3.8156*** 16.3400** 
Foreign Debt 2577 48.5558 50.6300  268 28.4708 0.5900  20.0850* 50.0400*** 
Similar to Guay (1999), we find derivative user firms  are also significantly larger than 
non-derivative user firm based upon both means and medians tests. This finding supports 
the hypothesis of scale economies in use of derivative instruments; the findings of Mian 
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(1996), Hentschel and Kothari (2001) and Bartram (2006) also reveals that larger firms are 
more likely to use derivatives as they can benefit from economies of scale in derivative 
transaction costs. The results from means and medians tests of derivative users and non-
users show that derivatives users in general have higher profits than non-derivative users. 
Bartram (2006) and Allayannis et al. (2012) also find similar results. Similar to Bartram 
(2006), we find derivative users are less liquid than non-derivative users for both mean and 
medians tests. Purnanandam (2008) also reports that derivative users keep less liquid assets 
as compared to the non-derivative users. Results from Table 5-4 also shows that derivative 
users have statistically lower equity volatility and higher excess return than non-users for 
both means and medians difference tests. 
Another variable of interest is the Z-score. A Z-score is an accounting based measure of 
the likelihood of default. Accounting based models of default utilise data from financial 
statements which tend to focus on recent historical financial performance rather than a 
forward looking financial assessment and therefore the Z-score may not fully reflect a 
firm's future financial prospects. Furthermore, since derivatives can have an impact on 
future cash flows a backward looking assessment of default risk, such as Z-score, is less 
likely to incorporate the effects of derivatives.  We would therefore argue that Z-score 
would display characteristics in common with that of a pre-derivative measure of risk.  The 
non-parametric tests in Tables 5, 6 and 7 show that all derivative users, FX derivative users 
and IR derivative users possess lower median Z-scores than non users with the difference 
being statistically significant in the case of IR derivative users.  These results are consistent 
with our assertion above that the Z-score provides a pre-derivative measure of the 
likelihood of default, that is, firms with lower Z-scores, which implies a higher likelihood 
of default, are more likely to use derivatives for hedging. Furthermore, the fact that IR 
derivative users possess the lowest median Z-score compared to all derivative and FX 
derivative users would also imply that Z-score is a pre-derivative indicator of firm credit 
risk.  Firms with low Z-scores are more likely to use IR derivatives as this type of 
derivative is expected to have the greatest impact on a firm's probability of default. These 
univariate tests together with those relating to expected default frequencies show that 
derivative users have higher default risk than non-users when default risk is measured 
using Z-score but lower default risk when it is measured using EDFs. Bartram et al. (2011) 
report a somewhat similar result as they find that firms that use derivatives possess lower 
Z-scores but have similar default probabilities. We would argue that our findings and those 
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of Bartram et al. are consistent with our assertion that Z-score is a pre-derivative measure 
of default risk whereas EDF is post-derivative measure of default risk.  Interestingly, 
Campello et al. (2011) find that derivative users (hedgers) have higher Z-scores and 
therefore lower default risk than non-users.  This result is contrary to what we find and that 
reported by Bartram et al.  The use of derivatives may materially change the probability of 
bankruptcy but until recently derivative values were not included in firms' financial 
statements. Our results on the efficacy of Z-score as a measure of default prediction are 
consistent with recent evidence that suggests that the Z-score measure needs to be treated 
with caution with respect to the prediction of financial distress (Charalambakis, 
Espenlauby and Garrett, 2009).  Our evidence suggests that this might be the case in part 
because the Z-score measure does not appear to take derivatives used by a firm into 
consideration when calculating the probability of bankruptcy This is because a firm's 
derivative transactions have until recently been off the balance sheet and therefore not 
reflected in the financial ratios used in the Z-score calculation.  International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 39 brought derivatives that used to be off-balance sheet on to financial 
statements.  IAS 39 requires all derivative instruments to be carried at fair value on the 
balance sheet with any changes in values being recognised in the profit and loss statement.  
The inclusion of derivative transactions in the balance sheet values of firms' assets and 
liabilities and the increased disclosure of derivatives in the notes to financial statements 
will only help, that is make Z-score more like a post derivative measure, if their effects are 
then reflected in the ratios that make up the Z-score formula.  If this does not happen then 
the Z-score computation would require the inclusion of a separate variable to control for 
the effect of derivatives. 
We also examine differences between FC derivative users against non-FC users & non-
users and between IR derivative users against non-IR users & non-users. In Table 5-5, we 
present mean and median difference test between FC derivative users and non-FC 
derivative users and between FC derivative users and non-users.  
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Table 5-5: Mean Difference Test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of FC Derivative Users and Non-FC Derivative Users and Non-users 
Table displays the results of tests of mean differences and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test between FC derivative user firms and non-user firms across firm risk measures and 
firm-level characteristics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% for a two-tailed test. 
 FC Derivative Users  Non-FC Users  Non-Users  Mean Difference Test  Median Difference Test 
Variables N Mean 
(1) 
Median 
(2) 
 N Mean 
(3) 
Median 
(4) 
 N Mean 
(5) 
Median 
(6) 
 1- 3 1 – 5  2- 4 2-6 
EDF1YEAR 2646 1.0658 0.1596  776 2.2534 0.2250  417 2.7428 0.3232  -1.1876*** -1.6770***  -0.0654*** -0.1636*** 
EDF5YEAR 2646 1.0770 0.3469  776 1.9201 0.4679  417 2.2431 0.5957  -0.8431*** -1.1661***  -0.1210*** -0.2487*** 
Leverage 2646 0.2284 0.1984  776 0.2003 0.1097  417 0.1184 0.0284  0.0282*** 0.1100***  0.0888*** 0.1701*** 
Firm Size 2646 13.8263 13.6538  776 12.6278 12.6897  417 11.9623 12.0670  1.1985*** 1.8641***  0.9641*** 1.5868*** 
Liquidity 2646 1.0648 0.8500  776 1.4123 0.8300  417 2.0034 1.1600  -0.3475*** -0.9386***  0.0200 -0.3100*** 
Profitability 2646 0.0855 0.0985  776 0.0173 0.0805  417 -0.0271 0.0574  0.0682*** 0.1126***  0.0180*** 0.0411*** 
Equity Volatility 2646 0.3922 0.3432  776 0.4370 0.3545  417 0.4874 0.4162  -0.0449*** -0.0952***  -0.0113*** -0.0730*** 
Excess Return 2646 -0.0114 0.0350  776 -0.0661 0.0308  417 -0.1042 -0.0371  0.0546*** 0.0928***  0.0041 0.0721*** 
Interest Coverage 2646 14.9080 5.2461  776 24.5779 6.5782  417 35.9548 10.7402  -9.6699** -21.0468***  -1.3321*** -5.4941*** 
Z-score 2646 3.8860 3.2442  776 2.8745 3.5023  417 2.0055 3.5479  1.0115* 1.8805**  -0.2581 -0.3037 
Foreign Sales 2646 57.7694 59.9000  776 54.2844 56.4900  417 52.1042 52.1700  3.4850** 5.6651***  3.4100** 7.7300** 
Foreign Assets 2335 29.2951 24.6800  713 15.8651 0.0800  362 17.7204 1.8400  13.4301*** 11.5747***  24.6000*** 22.8400*** 
Foreign Income 1886 39.9217 32.7100  665 23.5153 0.0000  328 32.3199 6.5700  16.4064*** 7.6019***  32.7100*** 26.1400*** 
Foreign Debt 2229 52.1815 56.6200  616 26.6979 0.0000  268 28.4708 0.5900  25.4836*** 23.7107***  56.6200*** 56.0300*** 
Similar to Table 5-4, Table 5-5 shows similar results on risk and firm-level characteristics. In particular FC derivative user firms have lower 
EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR than non-FC users based on both mean and median difference tests. These results are as expected and in line 
with theories and previous findings. We find that FC derivative user firms have statistically higher average leverage ratio, firm size, 
profitability and excess return than non-FC user firms. We also see that FC derivative user firms have lower liquidity ratio and lower equity 
volatility than non-FC users. FC derivative users have significantly higher values for foreign exposure variables and lower interest coverage. 
We find qualitatively similar results when we examine the mean and median difference test between FC derivative users and non-users. These 
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results suggest that FC derivative users firms have significantly higher pre-derivatives measure of exposure and lower post-derivatives 
measure of firm risk. 
Table 5-6: Mean Difference Test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of IR Derivative Users and Non-IR Derivative Users & Non-users 
Table displays the results of tests of mean differences and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test between IR derivative user firms and non-user firms across firm risk measures and 
firm-level characteristics. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% for a two-tailed test. 
Variables 
IR Derivative Users  Non-IR Users  Non-Users  Mean Difference Test  Median Difference Test 
N Mean 
(1) 
Median 
(2) 
 N Mean 
(3) 
Median 
(4) 
 N Mean 
(5) 
Median 
(6) 
 1- 3 1 – 5  2- 4 2 - 6 
EDF1Year 2419 1.0369 0.1451  1003 2.0543 0.2807  417 2.7428 0.3232  -1.0173*** -1.7058***  -0.1356*** -0.1781*** 
EDF5Year 2419 1.0481 0.3269  1003 1.7989 0.5572  417 2.2431 0.5957  -0.7508*** -1.1950***  -0.2302*** -0.2688*** 
Leverage 2419 0.2619 0.2293  1003 0.1260 0.0431  417 0.1184 0.0284  0.1359*** 0.1435***  0.1862*** 0.2010*** 
Firm Size 2419 14.0806 13.9467  1003 12.2859 12.2687  417 11.9623 12.0670  1.7947*** 2.1183***  1.6780*** 1.8798*** 
Liquidity 2419 0.8758 0.7700  1003 1.7896 1.1300  417 2.0034 1.1600  -0.9138*** -1.1276***  -0.3600*** -0.3900*** 
Profitability 2419 0.0925 0.0982  1003 0.0157 0.0865  417 -0.0271 0.0574  0.0769*** 0.1197***  0.0117*** 0.0408*** 
Equity Volatility 2419 0.3789 0.3331  1003 0.4590 0.3867  417 0.4874 0.4162  -0.0801*** -0.1085***  -0.0536*** -0.0831*** 
Excess Return 2419 -0.0118 0.0363  1003 -0.0528 0.0203   417 -0.1042 -0.0371   0.0409* 0.0924***  0.0161 0.0735*** 
Interest Coverage 2419 10.5321 4.7241  1003 32.9429 9.7750  417 35.9548 10.7402  -22.4108*** -25.4227***  -5.0509*** -6.0161*** 
Z-score 2419 3.20001 3.0961  1003 4.7577 4.1322  417 2.0055 3.5479  -1.5576*** 1.19451  -1.0361*** -0.4518 
Foreign Sales 2419 56.7949 58.9700  1003 57.4233 59.4400  417 52.1042 52.1700  -0.6284 4.6907***  -0.4700 6.8000** 
Foreign Assets 2241 28.0604 23.2000  807 20.85823 11.3700  362 17.7204 1.8400  7.2022*** 10.3399***  11.8300*** 21.3600*** 
Foreign Income 1854 36.8975 24.0750  697 32.31301 11.4400  328 32.3199 6.5700  4.5845*** 4.5776*  12.6350*** 17.5050*** 
Foreign Debt 2150 47.6980 49.2450  695 43.46439 37.7700  268 28.4708 0.5900  4.2336** 19.2272***  11.4750** 48.6550*** 
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Table 5-6 shows that IR derivative user firms have statistically lower interest coverage, 
liquidity and equity volatility than non-IR users. We also find that the mean difference for 
foreign sales is not statistically different between IR derivative users and non-IR 
derivatives users. These show that IR derivatives are used to manage interest rate. In the 
same table, we examine mean and median differences between IR derivative users and 
non-users, where we remove firms that use derivatives other than IR. The mean and 
median differences are larger once we remove other derivative users from non-users 
sample. As expected, we find that the mean difference on probability of default is lower for 
IR only derivative users than non-users for both EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR under 
means and medians difference tests. Consistent with the economies of scale argument we 
find that IR derivative user firms are bigger than non-user firms. IR derivative user firms 
are more profitable and have more excess return. Average leverage ratio is statistically 
higher for IR derivative user firms than non-user firms. IR only derivative users have 
significantly lower equity volatility and interest coverage. 
Table 5-7: Mean Difference Test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of IR Derivative Only Users 
and FC Derivative Only Users 
Table displays the results of tests of mean differences and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test between IR derivative 
only user firms and FC Derivative only user firms across firm risk measures and firm level characteristics. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% for a two-tailed test. 
Variables 
IR Derivative Only Users  FC Derivative Only Users  Difference Test 
N Mean  
(1) 
Median  
(2) 
 N Mean  
(3) 
Median  
(4) 
 Mean 
(1)-(3) 
Median 
(2)-(4) 
EDF1Year 330 1.8042 0.1678  556 1.6114 0.2591  0.1928 -0.0913** 
EDF5Year 330 1.6329 0.3893  556 1.5182 0.5429  0.1147 -0.1536** 
Leverage 330 0.3044 0.2473  556 0.1295 0.0509  0.1749*** 0.1964*** 
Firm Size 330 12.9769 13.0505  556 12.0176 12.2160  0.9593*** 0.8345*** 
Liquidity 330 0.7287 0.6300  556 1.6552 1.1100  -0.9265*** -0.48*** 
Profitability 330 0.0632 0.0870  556 0.0437 0.0903  0.0195 -0.0033** 
Equity Volatility 330 0.3830 0.3051  556 0.4419 0.3787  -0.0589*** -0.0736*** 
Excess Return 330 -0.0295 0.0757  556 -0.0238 0.0400  -0.0057 0.0357 
Interest Coverage 330 10.8726 3.8470  556 31.0347 8.9679  -20.1621*** -5.1209*** 
Z Score 330 3.7467 3.4923  556 6.5365 4.4681  -2.7898*** -0.9758** 
Foreign Sales 330 56.4346 58.8700  555 61.4800 65.3900  -5.0454 7.62 
Foreign Assets 331 13.3839 0.0000  419 23.2316 15.4000  -9.8477*** -15.4*** 
Foreign Income 317 13.8989 0.0000  347 32.1222 17.4500  -18.2233*** -17.45*** 
Foreign Debt 330 24.2661 0.0000   400 52.6395 58.0800   -28.3734*** -58.08*** 
In Table 5-7, we report univariate tests for differences for IR only derivative users and FC 
only derivative users.  We believe this categorisation of derivative users is helpful when 
trying to disentangle pre and post-derivative measures of financial risk, in effect to identify 
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which measures of financial risk are pre and post derivative. Our results show that firms 
that only use FC derivatives possess lower EDFs (i.e., default probabilities) than non-users, 
which implies they have lower credit risk.  These firms also possess higher Z-scores, 
which also indicates lower credit risk. For firms that use IR derivatives only the results are 
a little different.  Like FC only derivative users IR only derivative users have lower default 
probabilities than non-users, which suggest they have lower credit risk, however, unlike 
FC only users, IR only derivative users possess lower Z-scores than non-users, implying 
they have higher credit risk. Both of these categories of derivative user have lower default 
probabilities than non-users but their results for Z-score differ in a manner, which is 
consistent with Z-score being a pre-derivative measure of credit risk.  We would argue that 
the lower Z-score for IR only users explains why they use IR derivatives and the higher Z-
score of FC only derivative users explains why they do not use IR derivatives, the former 
need to use IR derivatives because they possess a high level of pre-derivative credit risk 
whereas the latter have no need to use IR derivatives because they have low pre-derivative 
level of credit risk as indicated by the high Z-score.  Both IR only and FC only derivative 
users possess lower default probabilities than non-users, which we argue is consistent with 
our measure of default probability being a post-derivative measure of credit risk.  The 
results in Table 5-7 suggest that other measures of credit risk also seem to display 
characteristics consistent with being pre-derivative indicators of credit risk.  For example, 
the median leverage for IR derivative only users is nearly five times that of FC derivative 
only users, the median interest coverage for IR derivative only users is less than half the 
median level of FC derivative only users and the median liquidity for IR derivative only 
users is just over half the median level of FC derivative only users.  All these results are 
consistent with these measures of credit risk being pre-derivative. 
These results provide some support for the argument that firms are using derivatives for 
hedging rather than speculating with derivatives. 
5.4.2. Multivariate Tests 
The previous section showed the results of tests of differences in mean and median 
between derivative users and non-users for various default measures and firm-level 
characteristics. However, the problem with univariate tests is that they do not control for 
the correlations between different firm characteristics and hence, cannot show differences 
in these characteristics, holding other firm-level attributes constant. Therefore, in this 
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section we use multivariate tests to control the correlation between different firm 
characteristic variables while holding other firm-level attributes constant. We have used 
binary measures of derivative use in multivariate tests. 
5.4.2.1. Impact of Derivative Use on the Probability of Default 
We examine the effects of all derivatives use on the probability of default using various 
regression models such as OLS, RE, FE and FD. 
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Table 5-8 presents the results of FE and first difference regressions from equation [13]. 
The main variable of interest is a dichotomous variable representing derivatives use. The 
dependent variable is EDF1YEAR in panel A and EDF5YEAR in panel B. Prior to 
discussing our regression results, we present the results of a F-test, the Breusch and Pagan 
LM test and a hausman test to choose the best model. The results of the F-test are provided 
under FE model in 
Chapter 5: The Effect of Derivatives Use on The Probability of Default 
Vikram Finavker 167 M00281338 
Table 5-8 for both EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. The F-tests in panel A (F = 3.7468) and 
panel B (F = 3.9506) of 
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Table 5-8 are statistically significant, which suggest a firm-specific effect in data and a 
significant probability of default difference across different firms that is not accounted for 
by the explanatory variables. The rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the FE 
model is better suited than pooled OLS model. The results of LM test are presented under 
FE model and are statistically significant implying rejection of null hypothesis for both 
EDF1YEAR (p-value < 0.001) and EDF5YEAR (p-value < 0.001). These indicate the 
differences across units and suggest that random effects model is suitable than pooled OLS 
model. The results of hausman test between FE and random effects are statistically 
significant for both EDF1YEAR (p-value < 0.001) and EDF5YEAR (p-value < 0.001). 
Based on all the above three tests, we conclude that the FE model is the better choice 
among OLS, random effects and FE and we therefore discuss results from this model. 
In 
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Table 5-8, we estimate FE within estimates based on firm variation. In this specification, 
derivative use cannot be a proxy for any unobservable firm factor that reduces the firm’s 
probability of default. Once we include a dummy for each firm in sample, the coefficient 
on firms’ use of derivatives is -0.8653% (p-value < 0.05) for EDF1YEAR. The coefficient 
shows that derivative users have economically and statistically lower EDF1YEAR by 66% 
(0.8653 as a per cent of mean EDF1YEAR 1.3116) than non-users. The results in panel B 
of 
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Table 5-8 also show that derivative users have a statistically and economically lower 
EDF5YEAR by 41 per cent (0.5145 as a per cent of mean EDF5YEAR 1.2436) than non-
users. When we include firm-specific dummies in the FE regression, we are able to explain 
around 50% (59%) of the variability in firms EDF1YEAR (EDF5YEAR). This suggests 
derivatives use has a strong, sizable impact on the probability of default. This finding 
supports the finding of Guay (1999), Bartram (2006), Marin (2013), Bartram et al. (2011) 
and Magee (2013) who also find that firms use of derivatives lowers the risk. 
Regarding the control variables, each of the firm characteristics in the model has expected 
coefficient and all of them are statistically significant under both panel A and panel B in 
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Table 5-8. For example, leverage has positive and statistically significant impact on 
EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR, which is consistent with the theories that more debt 
increases financial risk. Marin (2013), Campbell et al. (2008) and Magee (2013) also find 
that firms with more leverage have higher measure of financial distress. Profitability has 
statistically significant positive effect on EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR and suggests that 
firms with higher profits have lower probability of default. Campbell et al. (2008) and 
Magee (2013) also find that profitability has negative impact on financial distress measure. 
As expected, large firms have lower probability of default; the coefficient on firm size has 
negative and statistically significant effect on EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. In unreported 
regression results, we use the square of size to control for potential nonlinear effects of size 
and find negative (positive) relationship between firm size and EDF1YEAR for moderate 
(Larger) firm size. This suggests that the relationship between firm size and probability of 
default is nonlinear. We find that equity volatility has positive and statistically significant 
effect on EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. Theories also indicate that firms with higher 
equity volatility should have higher probability of default. We find that excess return has 
negative and statistically significant effect on EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. Finally, firms 
with more liquidity also have lower probability of default. 
The inclusion of the firm-specific dummies in the FE model suggests that the firm 
characteristics that are constant and unobserved over-time cannot affect our results. Thus, 
the only explanation in which our derivative variable could be a proxy for reduction in the 
probability of default is if a firm’s probability of default falls over the sample period in 
unobserved ways. If the firm also starts using derivatives during the sample period, then it 
could induce a spurious correlation between derivative use and the probability of default. 
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Table 5-8: Impact of Derivative Use on the Probability of Default 
This table presents the results of FE and FD regressions of Derivatives on the probability of default. In 
panel A we use EDF1YEAR as the probability of default in 1-year time and in panel B we use EDF5YEAR 
as the probability of default in 5-years time five-year probability of default. All Derivative Users is a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses derivatives and 0 otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market 
value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which is calculated as the sum of pre-
tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Firm size is a natural logarithm of total 
assets. Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard 
deviation of natural log of the daily price growth rate. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus 
the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Liquidity is the ratio of 
total current assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. In parentheses are 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also include year and 
industry dummies. 
VARIABLES 
PANEL A: EDF1YEAR   PANEL B: EDF5YEAR 
(1) FE (2) FD  (3) FE (4) FD 
All Derivative Users -0.8653** -0.6777**  -0.5145** -0.4327** 
 (0.356) (0.301)  (0.200) (0.170) 
Leverage 9.9778*** 12.4190***  7.2328*** 8.6383*** 
 (1.224) (1.554)  (0.714) (0.892) 
Profitability -1.1342* -1.0342*  -0.7648* -0.6946* 
 (0.634) (0.613)  (0.390) (0.374) 
Firm Size -1.0954*** -0.6211***  -0.8521*** -0.4191*** 
 (0.159) (0.223)  (0.102) (0.142) 
Equity Volatility 4.8616*** 3.0445***  3.6286*** 2.2595*** 
 (0.610) (0.817)  (0.373) (0.494) 
Excess Return -1.0744*** -1.4753***  -0.7014*** -0.9827*** 
 (0.161) (0.209)  (0.098) (0.118) 
Liquidity -0.1459* -0.0726  -0.1000* -0.0398 
 (0.078) (0.106)  (0.056) (0.083) 
Constant 13.1694*** 0.1883  10.3889*** 0.1557 
 (2.233) (0.254)  (1.407) (0.147) 
N 3,422 2,947  3,422 2,947 
R2 0.5081 0.4146  0.5931 0.4837 
F-Test Heterogeneity 3.7468   3.9506  
LM Test 0.0000   0.0000  
Hausman Test 0.0000   0.0000  
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a first difference version of the model. The first 
difference estimator uses the one-period changes for each firm.116 
If, during the sample period, a firm’s probability of default is decreasing in unobservable 
ways, then the estimate of FE model in column 1 of 
                                                 
116 In this regression estimation we lose the first observations for each firm because of differencing and we 
have 𝑁 (𝑇 − 1) observations. 
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Table 5-8 will be much larger than the estimate under first difference model, column 2. 
The first difference coefficient is the difference between EDF1YEAR in the first year the 
firm uses derivatives and the EDF1YEAR in the previous year. Our results show that the 
first difference coefficient, -0.6777, is relatively larger compared to the within estimate -
0.8653 for EDF1YEAR. A comparison of the coefficients shows that an economically 
significant 78% (-0.6777 as a per cent of-0.8653) of the reduction in EDF1YEAR is 
accounted for in the first year the firm starts using derivatives. Similarly, 84% (-0.4327 as 
a per cent of -0.5145) of economically significant reduction in EDF5YEAR is witnessed in 
the first year the firms start using derivatives. This result highlights the importance of 
derivatives in reducing the probability of default. We would argue that the only way our 
finding could be driven by unobserved financial risk factors is, if these factors are constant 
across time, then change dramatically in the year the firm starts using derivatives, and 
finally then remain constant for the rest of the sample period. 
5.4.2.2. Impact of FC Derivatives Use on the Probability of Default 
In this study we also examine separately the impact of FC and IR derivative use on the 
probability of default. We begin by looking at the impact of FC derivative use on 
EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. 
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Table 5-9 shows the regression results of FC derivatives use on both EDF1YEAR and 
EDF5YEAR. The main variables of interests are the derivatives dummy 1) FC derivatives 
use dummy, which is set equal to 1 if a firm uses FC derivatives and 0 for non-FC 
derivative users (includes “other” derivative users firms which are those firms that use 
derivatives other than FC such as IR and/or CP) 2) FC derivatives use dummy, which is set 
equal to 1 if a firm uses FC derivatives and 0 for non-users derivative users (excludes 
“other” derivative users).117 The results for EDF1YEAR are reported in panel A and 
EDF5YEAR are reported in panel B of 
                                                 
117 We argue that the inclusion of these firms, referred to as “other” derivative user firms, in the non-user 
firms’ sample might potentially bias the results against finding particular hypothesized relationships. Since 
majority of “other” derivative users are interest rate derivative users, this might make it difficult to detect a 
meaningful relationship between FC derivative user and probability of default as probability of default might 
have greater relevance with IR derivative user. 
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Table 5-9 for FE and FD models. In unreported results we use OLS and RE model and 
employ 3 tests to select the best model among OLS, RE and FE.118 The results support FE 
model and hence we discuss these results only. 
                                                 
118 See section 3.5.4 for more details 
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Table 5-9: Impact of FC Derivative Use on the Probability of Default 
This table presents the results of FE & FD regressions of FC Derivatives use on the probability of default. In 
panel A we use EDF1YEAR as the probability of default in 1-year time and in panel B we use EDF5YEAR 
as the probability of default in 5-years time five-year probability of default. FC Derivative Users (B) is 
dummy variables set equal to 1 if a firm uses FC derivatives and 0 otherwise. FC Derivative Users (UB) is 
dummy variables set equal to 1 if a firm uses FC derivatives and 0 for non-users. Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which calculated 
as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Firm size is a natural 
logarithm of total assets. Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied 
by standard deviation of natural log of the daily price growth rate. Excess Return is the annual return on 
the firm minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Liquidity 
is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. In 
parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering. ***, **, 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also include year and 
industry dummies. 
 PANEL A: EDF1YEAR  PANEL B: EDF5YEAR 
Variables (1) FE (2) FD  (3) FE (4) FD  (5) FE (6) FD  (7) FE (8)FD 
 FC Derivative Users (B)  FC Derivative Users (UB)  FC Derivative Users (B)  FC Derivative Users (UB) 
FC Derivatives -0.4886** -0.3964*  -0.9759** -0.8079**  -0.3195** -0.2508**  -0.5627** -0.4811** 
 (0.236) (0.204)  (0.422) (0.379)  (0.140) (0.119)  (0.241) (0.214) 
Leverage 9.8419*** 12.3910***  9.0324*** 12.0065***  7.1516*** 8.6203***  6.5955*** 8.3527*** 
 (1.215) (1.554)  (1.340) (1.674)  (0.709) (0.891)  (0.792) (0.959) 
Profitability -1.1336* -1.0475*  -1.2145* -0.9548  -0.7637* -0.7032*  -0.8721** -0.6727* 
 (0.637) (0.613)  (0.682) (0.646)  (0.392) (0.374)  (0.420) (0.395) 
Firm Size -1.1073*** -0.6227***  -0.9977*** -0.6111***  -0.8569*** -0.4201***  -0.7952*** -0.4154*** 
 (0.161) (0.223)  (0.156) (0.222)  (0.102) (0.142)  (0.100) (0.142) 
Equity Volatility 4.9053*** 3.0315***  4.8527*** 3.2600***  3.6553*** 2.2511***  3.5385*** 2.3837*** 
 (0.609) (0.813)  (0.679) (0.868)  (0.372) (0.492)  (0.417) (0.530) 
Excess Return -1.0801*** -1.4758***  -1.1054*** -1.4478***  -0.7055*** -0.9830***  -0.7215*** -0.9597*** 
 (0.161) (0.208)  (0.169) (0.224)  (0.098) (0.118)  (0.102) (0.126) 
Liquidity -0.1401* -0.0720  -0.1415* -0.0762  -0.0966* -0.0394  -0.1015* -0.0416 
 (0.077) (0.106)  (0.081) (0.114)  (0.056) (0.083)  (0.059) (0.089) 
Constant 12.9512*** 0.1873  12.1856*** 0.0446  10.2517*** 0.1551  9.8713*** 0.1028 
 (2.220) (0.255)  (2.222) (0.273)  (1.398) (0.147)  (1.389) (0.156) 
            
N 3,422 2,947  3,063 2,585  3,422 2,947  3,063 2,585 
R2 0.5066 0.4141  0.4818 0.4053  0.5921 0.4976  0.5683 0.4729 
F-Test 
Heterogeneity 
0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
 
LM Test 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Hausman Test 3.7884   3.8570   3.9956   4.0383  
Column 1 in 
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Table 5-9 presents the results of FE model for EDF1YEAR for FC derivatives use. 
Consistence with the expectations of this study, we find that FC derivative users have 
statistically lower EDF1YEAR. The coefficient value for FC derivative use is -0.4886% 
(p-value < 0.05) suggesting that FC derivative users have 37% (0.4886 as a per cent of 
mean EDF1YEAR 1.3116) lower probability of default than non-FC derivative users. The 
coefficient on FC derivatives use in column 5 of panel B for EDF5YEAR shows similar 
results. However, the reduction in EDF5YEAR as a result of firms FC derivatives use is 
about 25% (0.3195 as a per cent of mean EDF5YEAR 1.2436) than non-user firms, which 
is lower than the reduction observed for EDF1YEAR. All of the control variables are 
significant and have expected sign. We also use first difference model (column 2 of 
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Table 5-9) for FC derivative users. The coefficient on first difference model is -0.3964 for 
EDF1YEAR. The comparison of this coefficient with the coefficient on FE model shows 
that 81% (-0.3964 as a per cent of -0.4886) reduction in EDF1YEAR is accounted for in 
the first year the firms started using FC derivatives. Similarly, a reduction of 78% (-0.2508 
as a per cent of -0.3195) is observed for EDF5YEAR in the first year firms started using 
FC derivatives (column 6 of 
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Table 5-9). 
In 
Chapter 5: The Effect of Derivatives Use on The Probability of Default 
Vikram Finavker 180 M00281338 
Table 5-9 we also use FC users where we remove “other” derivative users from the sample 
of non- derivative and remove the bias from the non-user sample. When we compare these 
results with the results where non-users include “Other” users, we detect the effect of bias. 
The coefficient on FC derivative use is now bigger and almost double for EDF1YEAR. 
The FC derivatives use coefficient under FE model in column 3 increases to -0.9759 per 
cent after we remove the bias. This result suggests that FC derivative users have 74% 
(0.9759 as a per cent of mean EDF1YEAR 1.3116) lower probability of default than non-
user firms where as it is 37% when the non-users sample includes “other” users. Column 7 
also suggests that FC derivatives users have 45% (0.5627 as a per cent of mean 
EDF5YEAR 1.2436) lower EDF5YEAR than non-users. The reduction in EDF1YEAR in 
the first year of derivatives use is 83% (-0.8079 as a per cent of -0.9759), a 2% increase 
after we removed “Other” derivative users from non-users sample. For EDF5YEAR the 
reduction in first year of derivative use is 85% (-0.4811 as a per cent of -0.5627), an 
increase of 7% after “other” derivative users are removed from non-users. We find that all 
of the control variables have expected sign and majority of them are statistically 
significant. Overall, the results from 
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Table 5-9 show that FC derivative users have statistically and economically lower 
probability of default than non-users. 
5.4.2.3. Impact of IR Derivatives Use on the Probability of Default 
Table 5-10 shows the regression results of IR derivatives use on both EDF1YEAR and 
EDF5YEAR. Following similar methodology to FC we use 1) IR derivatives use dummy, 
which is set equal to 1 if a firm uses IR derivatives and 0 for non-IR derivative users 
(includes “other” derivative users firms which are those firms that use derivatives other 
than IR such as FC and/or CP) 2) IR derivatives use dummy, which is set equal to 1 if a 
firm uses IR derivatives and 0 for non-users derivative users (excludes “other” derivative 
users). The results from F-test, Breusch and Pagan LM test and over identification tests are 
presented under the FE model and suggest that the FE model is best suitable to the data. 
Table 5-10: Impact of IR Derivative Use on the Probability of Default 
This table presents the results of FE & FD regressions of IR derivatives use on the probability of default. In 
panel A we use EDF1YEAR as the probability of default in 1-year time and in panel B we use EDF5YEAR 
as the probability of default in 5-years time five-year probability of default. IR Derivative Users (B) is 
dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses IR Derivatives and 0 otherwise. IR Derivative Users (UB) is 
dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses IR Derivatives and 0 for non-users. Leverage is the ratio of total 
debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which calculated as 
the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Firm size is a natural 
logarithm of total assets. Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied 
by standard deviation of natural log of the daily price growth rate. Excess Return is the annual return on the 
firm minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Liquidity is 
the ratio of total current assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. In 
parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering. ***, **, 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also include year and 
industry dummies. 
Variables 
PANEL A: EDF1YEAR   PANEL B: EDF5YEAR 
(1) FE (2) FD  (3) FE (4) FD  (5) FE (6) FD  (7) FE (8)FD 
 IR Derivative Users (B)  IR Derivative Users (UB)  IR Derivative Users (B)  IR Derivative Users (UB) 
IR Derivative Users -0.5178** -0.3903*  -1.0382** -0.5518*  -0.3156** -0.2981**  -0.6426** -0.3881* 
 (0.244) (0.234)  (0.447) (0.324)  (0.149) (0.145)  (0.257) (0.212) 
Leverage 9.9854*** 12.4185***  9.3490*** 11.5991***  7.2393*** 8.6432***  6.7776*** 8.0013*** 
 (1.234) (1.552)  (1.377) (1.778)  (0.720) (0.891)  (0.799) (1.025) 
Profitability -1.1761* -1.0537*  -1.0397 -0.5912  -0.7902** -0.7057*  -0.6908 -0.4492 
 (0.633) (0.614)  (0.701) (0.708)  (0.389) (0.374)  (0.423) (0.428) 
Firm Size -1.1134*** -0.6247***  -1.1672*** -0.8677**  -0.8623*** -0.4221***  -0.9243*** -0.5241** 
 (0.162) (0.224)  (0.206) (0.378)  (0.103) (0.143)  (0.134) (0.238) 
Equity Volatility 4.8417*** 3.0133***  4.9779*** 3.7833***  3.6160*** 2.2401***  3.7579*** 2.7447*** 
 (0.610) (0.812)  (0.762) (1.033)  (0.373) (0.492)  (0.460) (0.625) 
Excess Return -1.0758*** -1.4786***  -1.0856*** -1.3456***  -0.7023*** -0.9847***  -0.7117*** -0.9290*** 
 (0.161) (0.209)  (0.183) (0.231)  (0.098) (0.118)  (0.114) (0.137) 
Liquidity -0.1458* -0.0740  -0.1249 -0.0240  -0.1000* -0.0406  -0.0489 0.0185 
 (0.077) (0.106)  (0.109) (0.133)  (0.056) (0.082)  (0.074) (0.103) 
Constant 13.0309*** 0.1948  14.2499*** 0.2484  10.3059*** 0.1608  11.4179*** 0.1845 
 (2.231) (0.255)  (2.914) (0.275)  (1.403) (0.147)  (1.872) (0.165) 
N 3,422 2,947  2,836 2,358  3,422 2,947  2,836 2,358 
R2 0.5071 0.4141  0.4991 0.3946  0.5923 0.4977  0.5863 0.4860 
F-Test 3.7058   3.8325   3.8958   3.8522  
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Heterogeneity 
LM Test 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Hausman Test 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
The results are consistent with our earlier results and suggest that IR derivative user firms 
have 39% (0.5168 as a per cent of mean EDF1YEAR 1.3116) lower EDF1YEAR and 25% 
(0.3156 as a per cent of mean 1.2436 in EDF5YEAR) lower EDF5YEAR than non-IR 
users. Compared to FC derivatives use the reduction in EDF1YEAR is bigger for IR 
derivatives use. This may not be surprising as probability of default measures firms 
probability of failure on its debt covenants and IR derivatives are used to manage the 
interest rate exposure that reduces firm’s risk and hence lower probability of default. With 
regards to control variables, all of them attract expected sign and all are significant at least 
at 10%. The results from first difference model show that in the first year of initiation of IR 
derivatives use a reduction of 75% (0.3903 as a per cent of 0.5178) and 94% (0.2981 as a 
per cent of 0.3156) is observable for EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR respectively. Majority 
of the control variables are significant under FE model and have predicted sign. 
Table 5-10 also shows that when we remove the “other” users from the non-user sample, 
the results improved significantly. The impact of IR derivatives use on EDF1YEAR 
increased and it shows that IR derivative users have 79% (51%) lower EDF1YEAR 
(EDF5YEAR) while the reduction in EDF1YEAR (EDF5YEAR) in the first year of IR 
derivatives use is 53% (60%) than non-users. As discussed above we expect that IR 
derivatives may have higher relevance with the probability of default. Our findings suggest 
that the use of IR derivatives have significant negative effect on the probability of default. 
5.4.2.4. Impact of Different Combinations of Derivatives Use on The Probability of 
Default 
Hedging theory suggests that firms that use derivatives have greater expertise and lower 
transaction costs in entering into derivatives contract (Géczy et al., 1997) and hence they 
are more likely to use different types of derivatives. We argue that if derivatives are used 
for hedging than we expect that firms that use different derivative instruments to manage 
their exposure may benefit more as a result of larger reduction in the probability of default. 
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The regressions in Table 5-11 are analysed using different categories of derivatives.119 The 
results in columns 1 to 2 are for EDF1YEAR. The result in column 1 shows that one type, 
two types and three types of derivatives users have statistically lower probability of default 
than non-users. The results show that the probability of default is 0.78% to 0.99% lower 
for various types of derivative users than non-users. In terms of economic significance it 
shows that the use of one type of derivatives reduces EDF1YEAR by 59%, two types of 
derivatives use reduces EDF1YEAR by 75% and three types of derivatives reduces 
EDF1YEAR by 65%.120 Our results suggest that two types of derivatives use has largest 
negative impact on EDF1YEAR. There are very few firms in our sample that use three 
types of derivatives together and that could be the reason that we have a smaller reduction 
in EDF1YEAR as a result of three types of derivatives use compare to the use of two types 
of derivatives. In column 3, panel B, we repeat the analysis for EDF5YEAR and find 
qualitative similar results. 
In column 2 and 4 of Table 5-11 we use the subcategories of one type of derivatives and 
two types of derivatives. The results show that firms that use FC derivatives and IR 
derivatives have significantly lower EDF1YEAR than non-users. The coefficient sign on 
CP only is negative; however, we fail to find any significant effect of CP derivatives on 
EDF1YEAR. FC only derivative use reduces EDF1YEAR of user firms by 58% while IR 
only derivatives use reduces EDF1YEAR by 62%. Under the two types of derivative user 
breakup, FC&IR and IR&CP have statistically significant negative effect on EDF1YEAR. 
In economic terms the reduction in EDF1YEAR is 75% for FC&IR derivatives users while 
85% for firms that use IR&CP. It is important to note that there are very few firms that use 
both IR&CP derivatives and that the reduction is in EDF1YEAR may be driven by IR 
derivatives use as CP only derivatives on its own has no significant impact on 
EDF1YEAR. The coefficient on FC&CP is negative but not significant. The coefficient on 
three types of derivatives user is still negative and significant. We observe similar signs on 
coefficients of various derivative variables for EDF5YEAR. All other control variables 
have expected sign and are significant. Overall, our results suggest that IR derivative user 
                                                 
119 See Section 5.2.3 for more details 
120 The percentage reduction in probability of default is calculated as coefficient value as a per cent of mean 
EDF1YEAR or EDF5YEAR. 
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firms have larger negative effect on the probability of default than other types of derivative 
user firms. 
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Table 5-11: Impact of Different Combinations of Derivatives Use on The Probability of Default 
This table presents the results of FE regressions of different derivatives variables on the probability of default. In panel 
A we use EDF1YEAR as the probability of default in 1-year time and in panel B we use EDF5YEAR as the probability 
of default in 5-years time five-year probability of default. One Type of Derivative User is dummy variables set equal to 1 
if a firm use either FC only or IR only or CP only derivatives and 0 otherwise. Two Types of Derivatives User is a 
dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses either FC&IR or FC&CP or IR&CP derivatives and 0 otherwise. Three 
Types of Derivatives User is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm uses FC and IR and CP derivatives and 0 
otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested 
capital, which calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Firm size is 
a natural logarithm of total assets. Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by 
standard deviation of natural log of the daily price growth rate. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus 
the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Liquidity is the ratio of total current 
assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities.. In parentheses are standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The regressions also include year and industry dummies. 
VARIABLES PANEL A: EDF1YEAR  PANEL B: EDF5YEAR 
 (1)FE (2)FE  (3)FE (4)FE 
One Type Of Derivative Used -0.7805**   -0.4511**  
 (0.349)   (0.193)  
CP Derivative  -0.4009   -0.1441 
  (0.811)   (0.472) 
FC Derivative  -0.7611**   -0.4594** 
  (0.367)   (0.205) 
IR Derivative  -0.8188**   -0.4503** 
  (0.405)   (0.229) 
Two Types Of Derivative Used -0.9869**   -0.6055***  
 (0.392)   (0.227)  
FC & CP  -0.1113   -0.0396 
  (0.493)   (0.315) 
IR & CP  -1.1240**   -0.7351** 
  (0.449)   (0.306) 
FC & IR  -0.9961**   -0.6119*** 
  (0.394)   (0.228) 
Three Types Of Derivative Used -0.8537** -0.8127*  -0.5065** -0.4819* 
 (0.434) (0.432)  (0.257) (0.255) 
Leverage 9.9958*** 10.0139***  7.2462*** 7.2516*** 
 (1.225) (1.230)  (0.713) (0.717) 
Profitability -1.1417* -1.1427*  -0.7704** -0.7691** 
 (0.632) (0.631)  (0.389) (0.389) 
Firm Size -1.0868*** -1.0886***  -0.8456*** -0.8461*** 
 (0.161) (0.160)  (0.103) (0.102) 
Equity Volatility 4.8539*** 4.8560***  3.6228*** 3.6269*** 
 (0.609) (0.610)  (0.373) (0.373) 
Excess Return -1.0791*** -1.0801***  -0.7049*** -0.7061*** 
 (0.160) (0.160)  (0.097) (0.097) 
Liquidity -0.1464* -0.1488*  -0.1003* -0.1018* 
 (0.078) (0.078)  (0.057) (0.057) 
Constant 13.1100*** 13.1327***  10.3442*** 10.3505*** 
 (2.246) (2.242)  (1.413) (1.409) 
N 3,422 3,422  3,422 3,422 
R2 0.5085 0.5088  0.5935 0.5938 
F-Test Heterogeneity 3.7191 3.6962  3.9227 3.8952 
LM Test 432.66 425.58  450.23 442.58 
Hausman Test 91.035 92.963  111.613 112.907 
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5.4.3. Credit Risk Conditions and The Effect of Derivatives Use on the Probability of 
Default 
In this section we take different approach to examine the link between macroeconomic 
conditions and the impact of derivatives use on firms’ probability of default. We use 
economy-wide measures of firms’ ability to service their debt as proxies for market–wide 
credit risk. We interact our derivative variables with these aggregate indicators of 
economic and financial wellbeing. We use several proxies for aggregate credit risk 
conditions in the UK. Our regression specification now includes interaction terms between 
derivative use and various proxies for changes in aggregate credit risk conditions. 
In equation [14] we use several measures of credit market conditions.121 In particular, we 
use corporate capital gearing, interest payment, default spread, debt relative to profit, 
income gearing and Deloitte stress index. We include annual GDP growth rate to control 
for macroeconomic conditions. All of the credit market condition proxies are 
standardised.122 This facilitates an easy interpretation of the coefficients and suggests % 
change in EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR for a one standard deviation change in the credit 
market proxies. Definitions and sources of these proxies are defined in section 3.3.4. 
In the regression analysis that follows, we interact our derivative variables with the 
aggregate credit risk variables (see equation [14]). A negative coefficient on our derivative 
interaction term will show that at higher levels of credit risk the negative difference in the 
probability of default between derivative users and non-users increases. In effect the 
analyses will show whether derivatives use leads to a greater reduction in the probability of 
default at higher levels of credit risk, that is, when firms are more financially vulnerable. It 
is conceivable that firms that use derivatives for hedging will employ derivatives more 
intensively during periods of high credit risk. If this is the case, then the impact of 
derivatives on the probability of default should be greater during these periods and we 
would expect a significant negative value for our derivative-credit risk interaction term. 
Our key variables of interest are the interaction terms between derivatives use and proxies 
for aggregate credit risk conditions. Consistent with our earlier results, we use pooled 
                                                 
121 All the variables are winsorised at 1% from both tails to control for the outliers. 
122 We subtract sample mean from actual values and divide it by standard deviation for each variable 
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OLS, RE and FE regression methodology with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the 
firm level. To avoid redundancy, we only discuss the results of the best model based on the 
tests.123 This controls for the residual correlation across years for a given firm and is an 
alternative method to the FE demeaning method to control for each firm’s individual 
characteristics.124 
The regression results, for EDF1YEAR as dependent variable, are presented in panel A 
and EDF5YEAR are presented in panel B of Table 5-12 to Table 5-14. In Table 5-12, we 
interact credit risk proxies with all derivatives use. We expect that un-interacted credit risk 
proxies to have positive impact on EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR since, all else equal, 
probability of default should be higher in the period of higher levels of credit risk. This is 
what we find in Table 5-12. The results show the coefficients on credit risk proxies are 
positive and statistically significant. The coefficient values range from 0.3637 to 0.6146 
for EDF1YEAR and 0.2565 and 0.5057 for EDF5YEAR. These suggest that a one 
standard deviation increase in credit risk proxies increases EDF1YEAR by 27.73% to 
46.86% of the mean EDF1YEAR and 20.68% and 40.78% of the mean in EDF5YEAR for 
non-users. Consistent with our expectations and hedging theories, the coefficient on 
interaction term between derivatives use and credit risk proxies is negative and statistically 
significant for all credit risk proxies for EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR (except for debt to 
profit for EDF1YEAR). These suggest that derivatives are valuable during the period of 
high capital gearing, interest payment than profits, default spread, debt to profit, financial 
stress and default rate loan. The interaction coefficients suggest that derivative users have 
statistically lower -0.3763 (28.69% of mean) to -0.7324 (55.84% of mean) for EDF1YEAR 
and -0.2912 (23.42% of mean) to -0.3845 (30.92% of mean) for EDF5YEAR than non-
users during the times of higher credit risk. The coefficients of credit risk proxies and its 
interaction with derivatives show that the effects of credit risk proxies are mixed in their 
magnitude for non-derivative users than derivative users, that is higher levels of credit 
risks increases the probability of default of non-derivative users more/less than they reduce 
the probability of default of derivative users. As a result, the difference between derivative 
users and non-users with the credit risk conditions depends on the level of credit risk 
conditions. This suggests that the magnitude of probability of default difference between 
                                                 
123 See section 3.5.4 for more details. 
124 See Chapter 11 for more details of Wooldridge (2002) 
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firms with and without derivatives is greater in periods of high aggregate credit risk 
conditions and smaller in periods of low aggregate credit risk conditions. All of the control 
variables in Table 5-12 have predicted sign and majority of them are highly significant. 
We repeat the analysis presented in Table 5-12 for FC derivative users and IR derivative 
users. The regression results of FC derivative users and non-users are presented in Table 
5-13. The results show that the interaction term between FC derivative users and credit risk 
proxies are negative and highly significant in both panel A and panel B. These suggest that 
EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR of FC derivative users are statistically lower than non-users 
in the period of high credit risk. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on un-
interacted credit risk proxies is consistent with our expectations suggesting higher 
probability of default during heightened credit risk period. In Table 5-14, we present 
regression results for IR derivative users and non-users. The results show that the 
interaction term between IR derivative users and credit market conditions is negative and 
statistically significant except for debt to profit credit risk proxy. 
In summary, our results show that the estimated coefficients on the interaction term 
between derivative users and aggregate credit risk conditions are negative and significant. 
These results suggest that derivative is most valuable to firms during the periods of high 
credit risk conditions when borrowing cost is higher, more chances of firms’ bankruptcy 
and lower chances of profits. Our results provide strong evidence in support of the notion 
that use of financial derivatives has a greater impact on the probability of default of the 
firm, and therefore is more important for firms in terms of lowering their probability of 
default, when financial market conditions are weak or gloomy. 
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Table 5-12: Credit Market Conditions: The Effects of Derivatives Use on the Probability of Default 
The table presents estimates of equation [14] using annual data of UK listed non-financial firms for the period from 1999 to 2010 using FE Model. The dependent 
variable is EDF1YEAR in panel A and EDF5YEAR in panel B. All Derivatives Users is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a derivative user and 0 otherwise. 
Corporate Capital Gearing is defines as debt net of liquid assets relative to the market value of capital. Interest Payment is defined as the percentage of firms with 
interest payments greater than their profits for firms with £1 million turnover. Default Spread is the difference between Moody’s yield on seasoned AAA and BBB 
Corporate Bond. Debt Relative to Profit is defines as debt net of an estimate of liquid assets, relative to a four-quarter moving sum of gross operating surplus. Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest 
charges divided by invested capital. Firm size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by 
standard deviation of natural log of the daily price growth rate. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual 
return over the entire fiscal year. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. All specifications include 
annual GDP growth rate to control for macroeconomic conditions. GDP growth rate is sourced from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) official website.125 Standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by firms. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Panel A: EDF1YEAR   Panel B: EDF5YEAR  
 Corporate 
Capital 
Gearing 
Interest 
Payment 
Default 
Spread 
Debt 
Relative 
to Profit 
Deloitte 
Financial 
Stress Index 
 Corporate 
Capital 
Gearing 
Interest 
Payment 
Default 
Spread 
Debt 
Relative 
to Profit 
Deloitte 
Financial 
Stress Index 
VARIABLES  
            
All Derivative Users -0.6129** -0.8314** -0.8758*** -0.7977** -0.9827***  -0.3247* -0.4734** -0.5180*** -0.4468** -0.5682*** 
 (0.310) (0.363) (0.334) (0.331) (0.354)  (0.174) (0.207) (0.189) (0.184) (0.199) 
All Derivative Users * Corporate Capital Gearing -0.5408**      -0.3845***     
(0.235)      (0.146)     
Corporate Capital Gearing 0.6146***      0.4988***     
 (0.220)      (0.140)     
All Derivative Users * Interest Payment  -0.3763*      -0.2912**    
 (0.220)      (0.139)    
Interest Payment  0.3637*      0.3357**    
  (0.207)      (0.132)    
All Derivative Users * Default Spread   -0.7324***      -0.3809***   
  (0.232)      (0.125)   
Default Spread   0.5109**      0.2565**   
   (0.239)      (0.130)   
All Derivative Users *Debt Relative to Profit    -0.4964      -0.3617*  
                                                 
125 Available at the official IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx 
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   (0.304)      (0.185)  
Debt Relative to Profit    0.6073**      0.5057***  
    (0.283)      (0.173)  
All Derivative Users * Deloitte Financial Stress Index     -0.7174***      -0.3516** 
    (0.266)      (0.139) 
Deloitte Financial Stress Index     0.4782*      0.1718 
    (0.253)      (0.132) 
Leverage 9.5970*** 10.1921*** 10.4412*** 10.0838*** 10.4533***  6.9266*** 7.3540*** 7.5453*** 7.2775*** 7.5848*** 
 (1.151) (1.222) (1.224) (1.212) (1.212)  (0.655) (0.712) (0.713) (0.701) (0.704) 
Profitability -1.5170** -1.4101** -1.4363** -1.3756** -1.3503**  -1.0572*** -0.9788** -1.0408*** -0.9671** -0.9351** 
 (0.608) (0.627) (0.635) (0.639) (0.635)  (0.375) (0.386) (0.395) (0.392) (0.392) 
Firm Size -1.0658*** -1.0657*** -1.0554*** -1.0532*** -1.0626***  -0.8467*** -0.8362*** -0.8590*** -0.8423*** -0.8675*** 
 (0.164) (0.160) (0.160) (0.156) (0.162)  (0.100) (0.102) (0.104) (0.099) (0.104) 
Equity Volatility 3.7901*** 3.7907*** 3.8700*** 3.8537*** 4.1271***  2.9887*** 2.9620*** 3.0021*** 3.0192*** 3.2494*** 
 (0.485) (0.473) (0.505) (0.474) (0.527)  (0.306) (0.297) (0.316) (0.299) (0.328) 
Excess Return -1.1519*** -1.0942*** -1.0786*** -1.1032*** -1.0598***  -0.7517*** -0.6988*** -0.6798*** -0.7025*** -0.6690*** 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.165) (0.159) (0.164)  (0.095) (0.097) (0.100) (0.097) (0.100) 
Liquidity -0.1554** -0.1294 -0.1160 -0.1249 -0.1296  -0.0963* -0.0866 -0.0737 -0.0818 -0.0839 
 (0.079) (0.081) (0.080) (0.079) (0.081)  (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Constant 12.7261*** 12.8631*** 12.7987*** 12.5731*** 12.8188***  10.2725*** 10.2587*** 10.6415*** 10.2316*** 10.6692*** 
 (2.296) (2.246) (2.219) (2.185) (2.258)  (1.388) (1.408) (1.418) (1.362) (1.424) 
            
N 3,220 3,422 3,422 3,422 3,422  3,220 3,422 3,422 3,422 3,422 
R2 0.4998 0.4948 0.4987 0.4957 0.5006  0.5873 0.5804 0.5813 0.5821 0.5839 
F-Test Heterogeneity 3.6488 3.7357 3.7465 3.7347 3.7857  3.8197 3.9375 3.9468 3.9392 3.9779 
LM Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 5-13: Credit Market Conditions: The Effects of FC Derivatives Use on the Probability of Default 
The table presents estimates of equation [14] using annual data of UK listed non-financial firms for the period from 1999 to 2010 using FE Model. The dependent 
variable is EDF1YEAR in panel A and EDF5YEAR in panel B. FC Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variables set equal to 1 if a firm is a FC derivative user and 0 for 
non- users. Corporate Capital Gearing is defines as debt net of liquid assets relative to the market value of capital. Interest Payment is defined as the percentage of firms 
with interest payments greater than their profits for firms with £1 million turnover. Default Spread is the difference between Moody’s yield on seasoned AAA and BBB 
Corporate Bond. Debt Relative to Profit is defines as debt net of an estimate of liquid assets, relative to a four-quarter moving sum of gross operating surplus. Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest 
charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal 
year. Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard deviation of natural log of the daily price growth rate. Firm size is a 
natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. All variables are 
winzorised at 1% level in order to prevent potential outliers driving the results. All specifications include annual GDP growth rate to control for macroeconomic 
conditions. Annual GDP growth rate is sourced from the IMF official website.126 Standard errors (in parenthesis) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by 
firms. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Panel A: EDF1YEAR  Panel B: EDF5YEAR 
 Corporate 
Capital 
Gearing 
Interest 
Payment 
Default 
Spread 
Debt 
To 
Profit 
Deloitte 
Financial 
Stress 
Index 
 Corporate 
Capital 
Gearing 
Interest 
Payment 
Default 
Spread 
Debt 
Relative 
to Profit 
Deloitte 
Financial 
Stress Index 
VARIABLES  
            
FC Derivative Users (UB) -0.6385* -0.8952** -0.9747** -0.8564** -1.0912***  -0.3176 -0.4909* -0.5550** -0.4576** -0.6134** 
 (0.356) (0.433) (0.400) (0.394) (0.421)  (0.204) (0.253) (0.232) (0.224) (0.241) 
FC Derivative Users (UB) * Corporate Capital Gearing -0.6647***      -0.4648***     
(0.242)      (0.150)     
Corporate Capital Gearing 0.7357***      0.5820***     
 (0.220)      (0.140)     
FC Derivative Users (UB) * Interest Payment  -0.4244*      -0.3181**    
 (0.228)      (0.144)    
Interest Payment  0.4379**      0.3867***    
  (0.212)      (0.135)    
FC Derivative Users (UB) * Default Spread   -0.7881***      -0.4258***   
  (0.234)      (0.126)   
Default Spread   0.6345***      0.3370***   
                                                 
126 Available at the official IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx 
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   (0.234)      (0.128)   
FC Derivative Users (UB) * Debt Relative to Profit    -0.6005*      -0.4317**  
   (0.317)      (0.193)  
Debt Relative to Profit    0.6922**      0.5672***  
    (0.292)      (0.179)  
FC Derivative Users (UB) * Financial Stress Index     -0.7271***      -0.3718*** 
    (0.270)      (0.141) 
Financial Stress Index     0.5027*      0.1903 
    (0.257)      (0.135) 
Leverage 9.0092*** 9.2754*** 9.4968*** 9.2167*** 9.5351***  6.5016*** 6.7135*** 6.9133*** 6.6869*** 6.9760*** 
 (1.229) (1.341) (1.333) (1.318) (1.322)  (0.712) (0.790) (0.788) (0.772) (0.780) 
Profitability -1.5156** -1.4383** -1.5117** -1.4270** -1.4326**  -1.1195*** -1.0629** -1.1543*** -1.0668** -1.0476** 
 (0.648) (0.676) (0.684) (0.687) (0.684)  (0.399) (0.417) (0.425) (0.422) (0.423) 
Firm Size -1.0183*** -0.9859*** -0.9683*** -0.9808*** -0.9919***  -0.8203*** -0.7870*** -0.8108*** -0.8003*** -0.8290*** 
 (0.160) (0.157) (0.157) (0.154) (0.162)  (0.098) (0.099) (0.102) (0.097) (0.104) 
Equity Volatility 3.7712*** 3.7169*** 3.7126*** 3.7762*** 4.0260***  2.9096*** 2.8450*** 2.8414*** 2.9032*** 3.1452*** 
 (0.532) (0.506) (0.555) (0.510) (0.580)  (0.334) (0.318) (0.347) (0.322) (0.361) 
Excess Return -1.1620*** -1.1303*** -1.1255*** -1.1360*** -1.0883***  -0.7588*** -0.7236*** -0.7077*** -0.7241*** -0.6850*** 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.174) (0.169) (0.175)  (0.101) (0.102) (0.105) (0.102) (0.106) 
Liquidity -0.1448* -0.1343 -0.1191 -0.1256 -0.1328  -0.0923 -0.0929 -0.0782 -0.0847 -0.0889 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.084)  (0.060) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) 
Constant 12.2363*** 12.0797*** 11.9309*** 11.8901*** 12.2219***  10.0344*** 9.8070*** 10.2091*** 9.8691*** 10.3881*** 
 (2.240) (2.215) (2.173) (2.157) (2.263)  (1.342) (1.372) (1.391) (1.332) (1.418) 
            
N 2,883 3,063 3,063 3,063 3,063  2,883 3,063 3,063 3,063 3,063 
R2 0.4749 0.4689 0.4735 0.4698 0.4748  0.5638 0.5560 0.5564 0.5573 0.5589 
F-Test Heterogeneity 3.7102 3.8532 3.8652 3.8531 3.8949  3.8795 4.0355 4.0417 4.0373 4.0661 
LM Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 5-14: Credit Market Conditions: The Effects of IR Derivatives Use on the Probability of Default 
The table presents estimates of equation [14] using annual data of UK listed non-financial firms for the period from 1999 to 2010 using FE Model. The dependent 
variable is EDF1YEAR in panel A and EDF5YEAR in panel B. IR Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variables set equal to 1 if a firm is a IR derivative user and 0 for 
non- users. Corporate Capital Gearing is defines as debt net of liquid assets relative to the market value of capital. Interest Payment is defined as the percentage of firms 
with interest payments greater than their profits for firms with £1 million turnover. Default Spread is the difference between Moody’s yield on seasoned AAA and BBB 
Corporate Bond. Debt Relative to Profit is defines as debt net of an estimate of liquid assets, relative to a four-quarter moving sum of gross operating surplus. Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest 
charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal 
year. Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard deviation of natural log of the daily price growth rate. Firm size is a 
natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. All specifications include 
annual GDP growth rate to control for macroeconomic conditions. Annual GDP growth rate is sourced from the IMF official website.127 Standard errors (in parenthesis) 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by firms. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Panel A: EDF1YEAR  Panel B: EDF5YEAR 
 Corporate 
Capital 
Gearing 
Interest 
Payment 
Default 
Spread 
Debt 
To 
Profit 
Deloitte 
Financial 
Stress Index 
 Corporate 
Capital 
Gearing 
Interest 
Payment 
Default 
Spread 
Debt 
Relative 
to Profit 
Deloitte 
Financial 
Stress Index 
VARIABLES  
            
IR Derivative Users (UB) -0.7873** -1.0386** -1.1180*** -1.0211** -1.2037***  -0.4539** -0.6247** -0.6928*** -0.6100*** -0.7306*** 
 (0.373) (0.454) (0.425) (0.411) (0.442)  (0.214) (0.264) (0.245) (0.234) (0.254) 
IR Derivative Users (UB) * Corporate Capital Gearing -0.4793*      -0.3683**     
(0.247)      (0.153)     
Corporate Capital Gearing 0.5679**      0.4706***     
 (0.229)      (0.145)     
IR Derivative Users (UB) * Interest Payment  -0.4275*      -0.3368**    
 (0.219)      (0.139)    
Interest Payment  0.3934*      0.3438**    
  (0.207)      (0.133)    
IR Derivative Users (UB) * Default Spread   -0.6750***      -0.3590***   
  (0.242)      (0.136)   
Default Spread   0.3843      0.1908   
   (0.240)      (0.136)   
IR Derivative Users (UB) * Debt Relative to Profit    -0.4322      -0.3276  
                                                 
127 Available at the official IMF website at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx 
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   (0.330)      (0.199)  
Debt Relative to Profit    0.5690*      0.4813***  
    (0.302)      (0.183)  
IR Derivative Users (UB) * Financial Stress Index     -0.6967***      -0.3368** 
    (0.267)      (0.144) 
Financial Stress Index     0.4128*      0.1456 
    (0.247)      (0.133) 
Leverage 8.8629*** 9.6429*** 9.9662*** 9.4302*** 9.9786***  6.4306*** 6.9848*** 7.1884*** 6.8064*** 7.2117*** 
 (1.243) (1.355) (1.375) (1.349) (1.350)  (0.706) (0.789) (0.800) (0.778) (0.784) 
Profitability -1.4954** -1.3282* -1.3383* -1.3048* -1.2456*  -1.0236*** -0.9050** -0.9448** -0.8933** -0.8470** 
 (0.653) (0.682) (0.708) (0.704) (0.703)  (0.394) (0.412) (0.432) (0.425) (0.425) 
Firm Size -1.1100*** -1.1018*** -1.0872*** -1.0924*** -1.0789***  -0.9012*** -0.8876*** -0.9048*** -0.8911*** -0.9033*** 
 (0.211) (0.201) (0.207) (0.196) (0.206)  (0.133) (0.131) (0.136) (0.128) (0.135) 
Equity Volatility 3.6910*** 3.6767*** 3.8342*** 3.7759*** 4.1541***  2.9469*** 2.9290*** 3.0243*** 3.0154*** 3.2863*** 
 (0.623) (0.617) (0.653) (0.616) (0.676)  (0.390) (0.381) (0.405) (0.381) (0.414) 
Excess Return -1.1919*** -1.1345*** -1.1133*** -1.1518*** -1.0922***  -0.7747*** -0.7264*** -0.7057*** -0.7392*** -0.6960*** 
 (0.180) (0.180) (0.186) (0.177) (0.182)  (0.110) (0.112) (0.116) (0.111) (0.114) 
Liquidity -0.1271 -0.1202 -0.0905 -0.1071 -0.1033  -0.0379 -0.0446 -0.0237 -0.0336 -0.0313 
 (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.109) (0.114)  (0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.073) (0.077) 
Constant 13.6699*** 13.6904*** 13.5772*** 13.4455*** 13.2904***  11.2423*** 11.1732*** 11.4909*** 11.1168*** 11.3303*** 
 (3.015) (2.872) (2.932) (2.799) (2.950)  (1.887) (1.852) (1.899) (1.795) (1.902) 
            
N 2,661 2,836 2,836 2,836 2,836  2,661 2,836 2,836 2,836 2,836 
R2 24.9876 26.9142 26.3712 27.8841 26.6135  43.6447 46.1649 44.5204 46.8006 45.1199 
F-Test Heterogeneity 3.7418 3.8176 3.7958 3.8074 3.8548  3.7208 3.8346 3.8211 3.8258 3.8664 
LM Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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5.4.4. Time-Varying Effect of Derivatives Use on the Probability of Default 
In this section we are interested in examining whether the effect of derivative on a firm’s 
probability of default is influenced by macroeconomic conditions. We interact our 
derivatives variables with the year dummies (see Equation [15]). This allows the 
coefficient on our derivatives dummy to vary by year. This analysis will show whether 
there is any variation in the impact of derivatives on the probability of default over-time 
and whether it is consistent with changes in macroeconomic circumstances. It is 
conceivable that firms classified as derivative users will hedge more intensively during 
periods of economic and financial downturn. If this is the case, then the impact of 
derivatives use on the probability of default should be greater during these periods and 
consequently we would expect a larger negative value for our derivatives coefficient at this 
time. Conversely, firms might undertake less hedging activity with derivatives during 
favourable macroeconomic conditions in which case we would expect a smaller difference 
in the probability of default between derivative user and non-user firms. It follows then, 
that we would expect the absolute value of the derivatives coefficient to fall when 
macroeconomic and financial market conditions are good.  
The regression results are presented in Table 5-15. The results show that the derivative 
interaction coefficient has mixed sign and not always significantly different from zero. In 
column 1 of Table 5-15, the derivatives coefficient varies from 0.46% in 2004 to -1.62% in 
2009. The results show that the derivatives coefficient is significantly negative in the 
period 2000 to 2001 and the period 2007 to 2009 and positive during the years 2005 to 
2006. This variation in the impact of derivatives on the probability of default seems to 
follow closely the performance of the UK economy as indicated by the annual GDP 
growth rate (right-hand scale of Figure 5-4). Although the UK economy was not in 
recession during 2000 to 2001, there was an economic downturn in several major 
economies such as the United States and real GDP growth in the UK fell from a peak of 
4.36% in the 2000 to 2.18% in 2001 and 2.3% in 2002. 
During 2004 to 2006 period macroeconomic conditions were relatively beginning to 
improve and firms’ financial positions improved as profitability increased. This led to a 
decline in corporate sector credit risks. During this period the coefficient on interaction 
term on derivatives is positive and significant for year 2005-2006. During 2007 to 2009 
period the UK economy experienced a sharp decline and fell into a deep and prolonged 
recession. This was accompanied by a significant deterioration in credit market conditions, 
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a hike in market-wide IR spreads and an increase in corporate bankruptcies. This economic 
downturn and recession led to an increase in corporate bankruptcies. Then, we argue that if 
one of the goals of use of derivatives is to lower the probability of default, then firms that 
use financial derivatives may have experienced significant benefits in the form of lower 
probability of default during these periods. Our results show that hedging with derivatives 
during these periods had a significant negative impact on default probabilities, whereas 
hedging with derivatives during favourable economic conditions had either a positive 
impact or very little effect on default probabilities. This is consistent with theory that 
hedging with derivatives is more valuable during economical and financial downtime. 
We get qualitatively similar results when we interact year dummies with FC and IR 
derivatives. Overall, these findings suggest that there was noticeable difference in 
probability of default levels between derivative users and non-users firms over this period. 
These results are consistent with the fact that financial markets were crashed in year 2000 
after the corporate corruptions and dotcom bubble and in year 2007 after the sub-prime 
mortgages. All of our results are highly significant for the year 2008, which is the heart of 
recent financial crisis. We find qualitatively similar effect of derivatives interaction term 
on EDF5YEAR. 
Regarding the control variables, each of the control variables we use attracts the expected 
coefficient and majority of them are statistically significant. For example, firms with more 
leverage and more equity volatility have higher probability of default and firm that have 
low probability of default are more profitable, are larger, have more excess return and have 
more liquidity. 
In Figure 5-4, we plot the yearly derivative coefficients using the results from Table 5-15 
for EDF1YEAR. The figure shows significant variation over-time in the effect of 
derivatives on the probability of default irrespective of the type of derivative instruments 
used for hedging. It is noticeable from the figure that the effect of derivatives on the 
probability of default is negative during the heightened risk. The magnitude effect of 
derivatives increases depending on the level of economic and financial crisis. The 
magnitude effect is larger during 2008 and 2009 than it was in 2001-2002. We plot yearly 
derivatives coefficients for EDF5YEAR in Figure 5-5. The effect of derivatives on 
EDF5YEAR over the time follows similar patter but the effect is less in magnitude. 
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Table 5-15: Time-Varying Effects of Derivatives Use on the Probability of Default 
The table presents estimates of equation [15]. The dependent variable is EDF1YEAR in panel A and EDF5YEAR in 
panel B. All Derivative Users is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a derivative user and 0 otherwise. FC 
Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a FC derivative user and 0 for non-users. IR 
Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variables set equal to 1 if a firm is a IR derivative user and 0 for non- users. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, 
which calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is 
the annual return on the firm minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. 
Equity volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard deviation of natural log of 
the daily price growth rate. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets 
minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. All specifications include annual GDP growth rate to 
control for macroeconomic conditions. GDP growth rate is sourced from the IMF official website.128 Industry dummies 
are included across all specifications to control for industry-specific effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by firms. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. 
Variables Panel A: EDF1YEAR  Panel B: EDF5YEAR 
Model 
All Derivative 
Users  
FC Derivative 
Users (UB) 
IR Derivative 
Users (UB) 
 All Derivative 
Users  
FC Derivative 
Users (UB) 
IR Derivative 
Users (UB) 
 FE FE FE  FE FE FE 
Derivative Users -0.6128** -0.7156** -0.9841**  -0.4588** -0.5019** -0.7007*** 
 (0.311) (0.358) (0.392)  (0.178) (0.210) (0.225) 
Leverage 10.2776*** 9.3681*** 9.7571***  7.4051*** 6.7936*** 7.0126*** 
 (1.234) (1.338) (1.402)  (0.720) (0.792) (0.817) 
Profitability -1.1412* -1.2287* -1.0452  -0.8012** -0.9159** -0.7272* 
 (0.634) (0.681) (0.704)  (0.394) (0.423) (0.429) 
Firm Size -1.1098*** -1.0160*** -1.1969***  -0.8743*** -0.8204*** -0.9602*** 
 (0.163) (0.161) (0.215)  (0.106) (0.105) (0.141) 
Equity Volatility 4.8533*** 4.8331*** 4.9779***  3.6269*** 3.5398*** 3.7490*** 
 (0.597) (0.665) (0.756)  (0.367) (0.410) (0.456) 
Excess Return -1.0343*** -1.0644*** -1.0338***  -0.6695*** -0.6882*** -0.6717*** 
 (0.165) (0.174) (0.189)  (0.101) (0.107) (0.119) 
Liquidity -0.1408* -0.1364* -0.1176  -0.0929 -0.0934 -0.0427 
 (0.079) (0.082) (0.111)  (0.058) (0.061) (0.076) 
GDP Growth -0.1145 -0.1236 -0.0632  -0.0319 -0.0384 -0.0109 
 (0.9044) (0.092) (0.095)  (0.0526) (0.054) (0.058) 
2000* Derivative -0.4931*** -0.5122*** -0.4745**  -0.2926*** -0.2960** -0.2593** 
 (0.182) (0.190) (0.196)  (0.110) (0.116) (0.119) 
2001 * Derivative -0.7346*** -0.7372*** -0.4977**  -0.2875** -0.2713** -0.1675 
 (0.196) (0.211) (0.213)  (0.114) (0.123) (0.128) 
2002 * Derivative -0.0999 -0.0385 -0.0807  0.1486 0.2102 0.1245 
 (0.252) (0.274) (0.268)  (0.152) (0.166) (0.161) 
2003 * Derivative -0.2115 -0.1983 -0.1073  -0.0145 -0.0010 0.0191 
 (0.188) (0.196) (0.200)  (0.118) (0.124) (0.128) 
2004 * Derivative 0.3163 0.3063 0.5481**  0.3247*** 0.3224** 0.4295*** 
 (0.193) (0.210) (0.223)  (0.117) (0.127) (0.135) 
2005 * Derivative 0.4626** 0.4627** 0.6242***  0.3179*** 0.3104*** 0.4216*** 
 (0.183) (0.192) (0.201)  (0.114) (0.119) (0.125) 
2006 * Derivative 0.3665** 0.3146* 0.7590***  0.2301** 0.1885 0.4986*** 
 (0.185) (0.188) (0.217)  (0.117) (0.119) (0.136) 
2007 * Derivative -0.3617* -0.2631 -0.0598  -0.2643** -0.2166* -0.0456 
 (0.206) (0.204) (0.232)  (0.129) (0.131) (0.146) 
2008 * Derivative -1.5350*** -1.5412*** -1.2905**  -0.8265*** -0.8797*** -0.6677* 
 (0.489) (0.501) (0.582)  (0.286) (0.289) (0.349) 
2009 * Derivative -1.6186** -1.8236** -1.0116  -0.6145 -0.7633 -0.2994 
 (0.807) (0.819) (0.873)  (0.471) (0.479) (0.526) 
2010 * Derivative 0.3596 0.1954 0.5793*  0.3625** 0.2368 0.5498*** 
 (0.293) (0.263) (0.330)  (0.181) (0.165) (0.206) 
Constant 13.3885*** 12.4905*** 14.6759***  10.6917*** 10.2319*** 11.9396*** 
 (2.265) (2.257) (3.003)  (1.440) (1.430) (1.945) 
N 3,422 3,062 2,835  3,422 3,062 2,835 
R2 0.5105 0.4846 0.5025  0.5929 0.5679 0.5870 
F-Test Heterogeneity 3.8217 3.9100 3.8800  4.0352 4.1100 3.9300 
LM Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Taken together, these results suggest important time variation in the effect of derivative on 
the probability of default during different financial or economic conditions. In particular, 
our results suggest that derivatives are the most valuable during the time of market 
downturns. Our results also suggest that hedging with derivatives was more valuable in 
recent financial crisis than it was during 2000-2001. 
Figure 5-4: Effects of Derivatives on EDF1YEAR Over-Time 
 
Figure 5-5: Effects of Derivatives on EDF5YEAR Over-Time 
 
5.4.5. Effects of Derivative Use on The Probability of Default of Firms with Different 
Levels of Accounting-based Risk 
The results above showed that derivatives have a greater (negative) impact on default 
probabilities during periods of economic downturn and heightened aggregate credit risk. 
We do this by interacting derivatives use with Z-score (see Equation [16]). We argue that 
firms that possess a lower level of credit worthiness measured before the effects of 
derivatives (that is, lower Z-score) should benefit more from derivatives use than firms that 
are financially strong (that is, higher Z-score). If this is the case, then the impact of 
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derivatives use on the probability of default should be more negative for firms with lower 
Z-scores and less negative for firms with higher Z-scores. 
As mentioned previously Z-score is an accounting-based measure of the likelihood of 
financial distress and as suggested by our univariate analysis it seems to exclude the effects 
of derivatives. Therefore we would argue that it can be considered as an appropriate 
measure of pre-derivative default risk. Firms with a high Z-score are considered financially 
healthy whilst firms with a low Z-score are less so. In equation [16], we expect the 
coefficient on our Z-score variable to be negative. All else being equal a financially 
healthy firm should have lower probability of default. We expect a positive coefficient on 
the interaction term between derivatives and Z-score. This is because at higher Z-scores we 
would expect the effects of derivatives on default probabilities to be lessened. Derivatives 
should be more beneficial for firms with higher pre-derivative distress risk (i.e. lower Z-
score) and hence the interaction coefficient (derivatives dummy * Z-score) is expected to 
be positive which would imply a weakening of the association between Z-score and the 
probability of default. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5-16. Consistent with our expectations, 
we find a statistically significant negative effect of Z-score on the probability of default 
suggesting that firms exhibiting a high degree of creditworthiness have a lower probability 
of default. The coefficient on the interaction term between derivatives and Z-score is 
positive and statistically significant in both model 1 and model 4. This shows that the 
negative effect of derivatives on default probabilities is greater (smaller) at lower (higher) 
Z-scores (i.e. firms with a greater (smaller) risk of financial distress). The results in column 
1 show that for a derivative user a one standard deviation increase in Z-score reduces the 
negative effect of derivatives on its post-derivatives default probability by 0.5556%. We 
repeat the analysis for FC and IR derivative users in columns 2 and 3 for one-year default 
probabilities and in columns 5 and 6 for five-year default probabilities and find 
qualitatively similar results. Majority of the control variables have expected sign and are 
statistically significant. 
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Table 5-16: Effect of Derivatives Use on The Probability of Default: Firms with Different 
Levels of Risk 
The table presents estimates from equation [16]. The dependent variable is EDF1YEAR in panel A and 
EDF5YEAR in panel B. All Derivatives Users is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a derivative user 
and 0 otherwise. FC Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variables set equal to 1 if a firm is a FC derivative 
user and 0 for non- users. IR Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variables set equal to 1 if a firm is a IR 
derivative user and 0 for non- users. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets. 
Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and 
total interest charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus the 
value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Equity volatility is expressed 
as square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard deviation of natural log of the daily price 
growth rate. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets 
minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. All specifications include annual GDP 
growth rate to control for macroeconomic conditions. Annual GDP growth rate is sourced from the IMF 
official website.129 Industry dummies are included across all specifications to control for industry-specific 
effects. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering by firms. ***, **, 
* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  Panel A: EDF1YEAR  Panel B: EDF5YEAR 
Variables  (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE  (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE 
         
All Derivative Users  -0.8755**    -0.5097**   
  (0.359)    (0.202)   
All Derivative Users * Z-score  0.5556**    0.3401**   
  (0.224)    (0.139)   
FC Derivative Users (UB)   -0.9632**    -0.5448**  
   (0.423)    (0.243)  
FC Derivative Users (UB) * Z-score   0.5747**    0.3569**  
   (0.241)    (0.150)  
IR Derivative Users (UB)    -1.0204**    -0.6263** 
    (0.440)    (0.254) 
IR Derivative Users (UB) * Z-score    0.6484***    0.4342*** 
    (0.244)    (0.153) 
Z-score  -0.4525** -0.4777** -0.4799**  -0.3267*** -0.3378*** -0.3557*** 
  (0.191) (0.203) (0.196)  (0.123) (0.130) (0.125) 
Leverage  10.0678*** 9.1251*** 9.5455***  7.2574*** 6.6261*** 6.8915*** 
  (1.223) (1.338) (1.366)  (0.712) (0.790) (0.791) 
Profitability  -0.9078 -0.9484 -0.7386  -0.5312 -0.6288 -0.4241 
  (0.707) (0.760) (0.766)  (0.438) (0.473) (0.451) 
Firm Size  -1.0617*** -0.9599*** -1.1058***  -0.8264*** -0.7674*** -0.8801*** 
  (0.154) (0.148) (0.195)  (0.098) (0.094) (0.126) 
Equity Volatility  4.8844*** 4.8417*** 4.9889***  3.6358*** 3.5260*** 3.7609*** 
  (0.600) (0.666) (0.752)  (0.367) (0.408) (0.454) 
Excess Return  -1.0778*** -1.1048*** -1.0812***  -0.7046*** -0.7218*** -0.7091*** 
  (0.160) (0.168) (0.180)  (0.097) (0.102) (0.112) 
Liquidity  -0.1383 -0.1327 -0.0910  -0.0813 -0.0847 -0.0156 
  (0.092) (0.097) (0.118)  (0.067) (0.070) (0.079) 
Constant  13.2057*** 12.0264*** 13.9521***  10.4156*** 9.7627*** 11.2714*** 
  (2.251) (2.193) (2.852)  (1.410) (1.355) (1.825) 
N  3,408 3,050 2,826  3,408 3,050 2,826 
R2  0.5126 0.4875 0.5051  0.5974 0.5738 0.5926 
F-Test Heterogeneity  3.7326 3.8323 3.8511  3.9486 4.0329 3.8917 
LM Test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hausman Test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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5.4.6. Controlling for Endogeneity 
It is not possible to rule out the notion that the use of derivatives in the above regression 
analysis is endogenous. In our model, endogeneity might arise because of simultaneous 
causality. This occurs when the causality runs in both directions, that is, from the 
regressor(s) to the dependent variable and from the dependent variable to the regressor(s). 
In our case, the derivatives–probability of financial distress relationship is affected by a 
feedback loop such that the use of derivatives affects the probability of default but the 
probability of default also affects the decision to use derivatives. In effect, if derivatives 
are used for hedging then they could lower the probability of default but it is also the case 
that firms with a high probability of default are more likely to use derivatives for hedging 
purposes. However, we also need to recognize the role of leverage in this circular 
relationship. By reducing the likelihood of default, derivatives increase a firm’s debt 
capacity (Stulz, 1996; Ross, 1997; Leland, 1998). It follows from this that any initial 
reduction in the probability of default could be offset by a return to the pre-derivative-use 
probability of default as firms take advantage of the additional debt capacity by increasing 
their holdings of debt. In effect, we have a circular relationship that creates an endogeneity 
problem between probability of default, leverage and derivatives. When there is 
simultaneous causality, the endogenous variables and the error term are correlated and 
OLS estimation picks up both forward and backward effects, thereby leading to bias and 
inconsistent coefficients. 
As discussed earlier there is a problem of selection bias in studies that use observation 
data. For this study it means that firms are assigned or assign themselves to use derivatives 
is not typically ignorable and hence suggest that the use of derivatives is endogenous. 
Endogeneity also occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term and 
hence restricts from getting unbiased estimates from regression analysis (Wooldridge, 
2002). We control for endogeneity using treatment effects and propensity score model. 
5.4.6.1. Controlling for Self-Selection Bias: Treatment Effects Model 
In selection equation [45] we model the decision to use derivatives as a function of 
instrumental variables and firm-specific variables that have been shown to be important 
determinants of derivative use previously. In determining our choice of instrumental 
variables we follow the literature (Géczy et al., 1997; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Muller 
and Verschoor, 2005; Bartram et al., 2011; Gay et al., 2011; Allayannis et al., 2012; 
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Magee, 2013; Marin, 2013). The first instrument that we use is the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales. Géczy et al. (1997), Marin (2013), Gay et al. (2011), Allayannis et al. (2012) 
and Magee (2013) use foreign sales to total sales and find that its positively and 
significantly associated with use of derivatives. For second instrumental variable, we use 
capital expenditure to sales. This variable is a measure of growth. Several papers use 
research & development expenditure to sales as a measure of growth and as an instrument 
for derivative use (Géczy et al., 1997; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Gay et al., 2011; Magee, 
2013; Marin, 2013). Géczy et al. (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find significant 
and positive relation between derivatives use and their growth variable. The last 
instrumental variable that we use is the interest coverage ratio calculated as the ratio of 
EBIT to interest payment. Muller and Verschoor (2005) and Bartram et al. (2011) use 
interest coverage as an indicator for gross IR exposure. Muller and Verschoor (2005) find 
positive relation between EBIT/interest expense and firms use of FC derivatives. 
5.4.6.2. Treatment Effects Results 
Regression results from this treatment effects estimation on the effects of derivatives use 
constitute our main results and are presented in Table 5-17. The first conclusion that we 
can draw from the treatment effects regression is that we can reject the null hypothesis that 
the correlation between the error terms of the selection and outcome equations is zero. The 
χ2 statistics shown at the bottom of the Table 5-17 are all significantly different than zero 
at least at 10% level of significance. Thus, we have strong empirical support for selection 
bias in our study and this also suggests that applying the treatment effects model is 
appropriate. 
We present the selection equation results in odd columns and outcome equation results in 
even columns of Table 5-17. The selection equation results in column 1 of Table 5-17 uses 
derivative users as a dependent variable and reports that all the instruments for derivatives 
have expected sign and all are significantly associated with firms’ decision to use 
derivatives. In particular, we find that firms with more capital expenditure to sales are 
more likely to use derivatives and firm with higher interest coverage ratio are less likely to 
use derivatives. Hedging theories argue that firms that have more growth options benefits 
from hedging as it helps resolve the problem of underinvestment (Myers, 1977; 
Bessembinder, 1991; Froot et al., 1993) and firm with high interest coverage ratio are 
financially healthy and hence needs less hedging with derivatives. The estimation results in 
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column 2 of Table 5-17 shows the results of outcome equation where we use the predicted 
values of derivatives use from the selection equation and examine its effects on probability 
of default. The reported inverse mills ratio is positive and significant (0.2440, p < 0.05), 
which indicates the presence of omitted variable. This suggests that the unobserved 
information that leads to firms self-selecting themselves to use derivatives is also 
associated with a higher probability of default. We use LR test of independent equation to 
test the hypothesis that the correlation between the error terms of the selection and 
outcome equations is non-zero. Violation of this assumption can result in the estimation 
bias. We can reject the null hypothesis as χ2 = 3.63 (p < 0.10) at a 10% significance level 
and conclude that the ρ is not equal to zero, which suggests that the use of treatment effects 
model is appropriate as there is a self-selection bias. 
The coefficient on all derivatives in outcome equation is negative and significant, which 
indicates that firms that are using derivatives have lower probability of default and less at 
risk of defaulting than non-users. This coefficient on all derivatives is net of observed 
selection bias as we use the predicted value from our selection equation. The coefficient 
value is -1.4926 and it is significant at 1% level, suggesting that other things being equal 
firms that use derivatives have a mean probability of default that is 1.4926 % lower than 
firms that do not use derivatives. For our other explanatory variables in the outcome 
regression, we find majority of them have expected signs and are highly significant. We 
find that firms with higher leverage and higher stock return volatility have more 
probability of default while larger, more profitable, more liquid and firms with excess 
return have lower probability of default. 
Treatment effects model is also used for different FC and IR derivatives variables. The 
selection equation in column 3 of Table 5-17 is for FC derivative user firms where non-
user firms include “other-users”. All instruments are significant at 1% level and have the 
predicted sign in the selection equation. The results suggest that firms with more foreign 
sales and capital expenditure to sales are more likely to use FC derivatives while firms 
with high interest coverage ratio are less likely to use FC derivatives. The result of LR test 
(𝜒2= 14.3132, p < 0.001) suggests correlation between the error terms of the two 
equations. We find coefficient on FC derivatives is negative and significant suggesting that 
firms that use FC derivatives have 1.7373% lower probability of default than non-FC 
derivative user firms (Column 4, Table 5-17). When we remove the IR only derivative user 
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firms form our sample of non-users, Column 6 of Table 5-17, we find that FC derivative 
user firms have 1.5080% lower probability of default than non-derivative users. Majority 
of the explanatory variables are highly significant and have predicted sign. Our results for 
the selection equation are significant for all the instruments (column 5, Table 5-17). The 
inverse mills ratio and the LR test of independent equations are highly significant. 
Table 5-17: Treatment Effects Model: MLE 
This table presents results of treatment effects model estimated using maximum likelihood model. For each 
specification we report results from the selection equation, where All Derivative Users, FC Derivatives Users (B), 
FC Derivative Users (UB), IR Derivative Users (B) and IR Derivative Users (UB) are dummy dependent 
variables, which are separately regressed on firm-level factors and instruments. In the adjacent column, we report 
results of our outcome regression where the dependent variable is the one-year default probability (EDF1YEAR), 
which is regressed on the predicted values of Derivatives Use from the first stage regression and other firm-level 
factors. Instruments we use are 1) Foreign Sales as measured by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales; 2) 
Interest Coverage as measure by the ratio of Earnings before Interest and Taxes to total interest expense and 3) 
Growth as measured by the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Firm-level factors include Leverage is the 
ratio of total debt to market value of assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which is 
calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is the 
annual return on the firm minus the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal 
year. Equity Volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard deviation of 
natural log of the daily price growth rate. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of 
total current assets minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. In parentheses are standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also include year dummies. 
Equation Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
VARIABLES 
Derivative 
Users 
EDF1 
YEAR 
FC 
Derivative 
Users (B) 
EDF1 
YEAR 
FC 
Derivative 
Users (UB) 
EDF1 
YEAR 
IR 
Derivative 
Users (B) 
EDF1 
YEAR 
IR 
Derivative 
Users (UB) 
EDF1 
YEAR 
Users  -1.4922***  -1.7373***  -1.5080***  -1.9680***  -1.8547*** 
  (0.336)  (0.300)  (0.334)  (0.332)  (0.332) 
Foreign Sales   0.1630**  0.2501**      
   (0.001)  (0.001)      
Capital Expenditure / Sales 2.4695***  1.1825**  2.5844***  1.5433**  2.6951***  
(0.876)  (0.597)  (0.899)  (0.621)  (1.027)  
Interest Coverage -0.0067***  -0.0068***  -0.0069***  -0.0115***  -0.0128***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Leverage 1.0835*** 7.2623*** -0.2452 6.8862*** 0.9661*** 7.1071*** 1.1712*** 7.8360*** 1.1895*** 7.2699*** 
 (0.300) (0.650) (0.180) (0.622) (0.314) (0.733) (0.206) (0.690) (0.326) (0.722) 
Profitability 0.3352** -1.4038*** 0.5015*** -1.3758*** 0.3308** -1.3983*** 0.3558** -1.4929*** 0.5949*** -1.4614*** 
 (0.165) (0.464) (0.139) (0.468) (0.167) (0.487) (0.157) (0.466) (0.196) (0.526) 
Firm Size 0.3393*** -0.3944*** 0.2637*** -0.3592*** 0.3521*** -0.3883*** 0.3901*** -0.2835*** 0.4229*** -0.3327*** 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.020) (0.043) (0.030) (0.039) (0.022) (0.051) (0.033) (0.043) 
Equity Volatility -0.5273*** 5.4814*** 0.0331 5.6065*** -0.5365*** 5.4376*** -0.3696** 5.4230*** -0.4505** 5.6942*** 
 (0.178) (0.456) (0.153) (0.469) (0.186) (0.504) (0.171) (0.457) (0.211) (0.525) 
Excess Return -0.0432 -1.6574*** -0.1005* -1.6842*** -0.0503 -1.6228*** -0.0852 -1.6819*** -0.0405 -1.7349*** 
 (0.066) (0.182) (0.058) (0.184) (0.067) (0.195) (0.061) (0.182) (0.075) (0.211) 
Liquidity -0.0240 -0.3634*** 0.0004 -0.3523*** -0.0184 -0.3751*** -0.0937*** -0.4013*** -0.0875*** -0.4366*** 
 (0.025) (0.052) (0.024) (0.051) (0.026) (0.054) (0.031) (0.053) (0.034) (0.070) 
Constant -2.8170*** 4.7550*** -2.2541*** 4.4175*** -3.1245*** 4.6842*** -4.4930*** 3.2303*** -4.0951*** 4.2216*** 
 (0.419) (0.662) (0.313) (0.645) (0.430) (0.683) (0.324) (0.700) (0.490) (0.747) 
N 3,417 3,417 3,399 3,399 3,041 3,041 3,417 3,417 2,831 2,831 
rho 0.0880 0.0880 0.2544 0.2544 0.0910 0.0910 0.2585 0.2585 0.1313 0.1313 
𝜒2 3.6313 3.6313 14.3132 14.3132 4.3080 4.3080 11.4584 11.4584 6.4093 6.4093 
Inverse Mills 0.2440 0.2440 0.7129 0.7129 0.2500 0.2500 0.7258 0.7258 0.3656 0.3656 
S.E. Inverse Mills 0.1295 0.1295 0.1894 0.1894 0.1223 0.1223 0.2153 0.2153 0.1466 0.1466 
In Table 5-17, we also present treatment effects results for IR derivatives variables. In 
selection equation, we use capital expenditure to sales and interest coverage ratio as 
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instruments. Both of the variables have predicted sign and are significant (column 7, Table 
5-17). The coefficient on IR derivative (non-users include “other” users) in column 8 of 
Table 5-17, is negative and significant. This suggests that firms that use IR derivatives 
have a probability of default that is 1.9680% lower than firms that do not use IR 
derivatives. The inverse mills ratio and the LR test of independent equations are highly 
significant. We find similar results when we remove FC only derivative use firms from 
non-user sample, column 10 of Table 5-17. In the selection equation (column 9 of Table 
5-17) we find that all instruments are significant and have predicted sign. The coefficient 
on IR derivative users in column 10 shows that firms that use IR derivatives have 1.8547% 
lower probability of default than non-derivative user firms. The inverse mills ratio and LR 
test indicates that running treatment effects model is appropriate. 
5.4.7. Instrumental Variable Approach 
In this section we use a continuous measure of derivatives use as opposed to a dummy 
variable. The data on notional values is available only for a smaller sample since not all the 
sample firms disclose the data on notional amount of derivatives use. As reported in Table 
5-1, we have 1152 firm-year observations on notional amounts of derivatives use on FC 
and/or IR and/or CP. We calculated the extent of derivatives use variable as total notional 
values for FC and IR and CP scaled by total assets. This measure captures the size of firms 
derivatives programme. 
We control for endogeneity using a two stage least square model (2SLS). We also employ 
the GMM’s instrumental variables approach, as 2SLS is suboptimal in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. In the first stage of both the models, we model our endogenous 
variables using instrumental variables.130 The instruments capture the variation in the 
extent of derivatives use and leverage. In the second stage regression, the probability of 
default is estimated using the predicted values of extent of derivatives use and leverage 
from the first stage regression and the exogenous variables. The advantage of GMM is that 
it models parameters of the observed variables without making strong assumptions 
regarding the distributional properties of those variables and hence provides solution for 
                                                 
130 The first stage in instrumental variables estimation is to estimate the endogenous variables as a function 
of the exogenous variables in the second stage plus additional instruments. 
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the problem when the statistical independence between error term and regressors is not 
satisfied. 
In this section we control for the endogeneity between the probability of default, 
derivatives and leverage. We also recognize the role of leverage in this circular 
relationship. By reducing the likelihood of default, derivatives use increases a firm’s debt 
capacity (Stulz, 1996; Ross, 1997; Leland, 1998). It follows from this that any initial 
reduction in the probability of default could be offset by a return to the pre-derivative 
usage probability of default as firms take advantage of the additional debt capacity by 
increasing their holdings of debt. This may indicate that derivatives helped firm in 
increasing debt capacity by keeping the same probability of default. In effect we have a 
circular relationship that creates an endogeneity problem between probability of default, 
leverage and derivative usage. A good instrumental variable is one that will affect the 
probability of default only through its impact on the extent of derivatives use and leverage 
and not directly by itself that suggests that a valid instrumental variable must be correlated 
with derivatives and leverage but uncorrelated with error term, εit.  
5.4.7.1. Instrumental Variable Regression Results 
Column 1 of Table 5-18 presents the results of OLS regression. Consistent with our 
expectations, the estimated coefficient on the extent of derivative use is negative but 
insignificant, suggesting that the extent of a firm’s all derivative use does not affect its 
probability of default. However, due to the problem of simultaneity between derivatives, 
leverage and probability of default, these results are not surprising. If firms employ more 
leverage in their capital structure then firm will face high probability of financial distress 
and this will motivate firm to use derivatives to hedge. With the help of derivatives firm 
can lower its financial distress. This will help firm in borrowing more debt from the 
market. This relationship between derivatives and leverage suggests that they are 
endogenous and positively related. Due to this relationship it is difficult to observe a 
significant relationship between the probability of default and the extent of derivative use. 
Other results indicate that firms with more leverage in capital structure and firms with high 
asset volatility are more likely to default. There is a strong relation between profitability 
and probability of default and firm size as measured by total assets and probability of 
default. These findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction and earlier empirical 
studies. This study finds negative relation between excess return and probability of default. 
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The results suggest that probability of default is associated with the scale of the firm: the 
bigger the firm the lower probability that the firm will default. Similarly, more profitable 
firms have less probability of default. Firm with higher equity volatility have more chances 
of default. 
Table 5-18: Effect of Extent of Derivatives on the Probability of Default 
This table presents the results of OLS, 2SLS and GMM-IV regressions of the probability of default on the 
Extent of All derivatives use. EDF1YEAR is the probability of default in 1-year time. Extent of derivative 
Use is calculated as sum of notional value of FC derivatives, IR derivative and CP derivatives divided by 
total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of equity plus total debt. Profitability is 
measured as return on invested capital, which is calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest 
charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus the value 
weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Equity volatility is expressed as 
square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard deviation of natural log of the daily price 
growth rate. Firm size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets 
minus total stock & work in progress over total current liabilities. In parentheses are standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also include year and industry dummies. 
Variables OLS 2SLS-IV GMM-IV 
Extent Of Derivative Use -0.2241 -1.7898** -1.5298* 
 (0.158) (0.724) (0.873) 
Leverage 3.8063*** 4.4074*** 4.4201*** 
 (0.345) (0.818) (0.889) 
Profitability -2.6964*** -1.3721** -1.4105* 
 (0.788) (0.612) (0.828) 
Excess Return -0.9143*** -0.8226*** -0.7891*** 
 (0.113) (0.127) (0.165) 
Equity Volatility 2.3430*** 1.3878*** 1.3855*** 
 (0.349) (0.336) (0.369) 
Firm Size -0.1811*** -0.4827*** -0.4840*** 
 (0.038) (0.119) (0.126) 
Liquidity -0.0215 -0.0094 0.0044 
 (0.054) (0.068) (0.067) 
Constant 2.1537***   
 (0.617)   
N 1,038 979 979 
R2 0.5776 0.4482 0.4677 
F-Test 13.2612 15.1795 9.3652 
Hausman Test  10.7179 6.8713 
Hausman  0.0047 0.0322 
Under-identification Test  51.1611 27.1643 
Under-identification Test (P-value)  0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan-Hansen J-Stat  3.3009 2.7591 
Sargan-Hansen J-Stat (P-value)  0.1920 0.2517 
Crag-Donald F-Stat  13.1652 13.1652 
To control for the above-discussed issue of endogeneity, this study uses instrumental 
variable regression using 2SLS and GMM approach. A Hausman (1978) test is performed 
to determine whether extent of derivative use and leverage are jointly endogenous. This 
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test is based on the difference between OLS estimator and instrumental variables estimator. 
The null hypothesis for the test states that an OLS estimator for the same equation would 
yield consistent estimates. This means that any endogeneity among the regressors would 
not have adverse effects on OLS estimates. A rejection of null hypothesis indicates that 
instrumental variables techniques are required. Our result rejects the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity at the 1% level and suggests OLS regression generates inconsistent estimates 
and ignores the endogeneity of extent of derivative use and leverage with respect to 
probability of default and due to that potentially misleading. 
Columns 2 and 3 present the 2SLS and GMM-IV results respectively. For the 2SLS 
regression, the extent of derivative use is negatively and significantly related to the 
probability of default at 5% level. The results suggest that a 1% increase in the extent of all 
derivatives use leads to an economically large reduction of 1.79% in EDF1YEAR. Except 
for liquidity, all other control variables are significant and have predicted sign. For the 
GMM-IV regression, the estimated coefficient on the extent of derivative use is still 
negative but significant at 10%. The results suggest that a 1% increase in the extent of all 
derivatives use lowers the probability of default by 1.53%. Smaller coefficient and 
significance is expected, as GMM is more robust than 2SLS. These results suggest that 
after controlling for endogenous derivative use and leverage, the extent of derivatives use 
is associated with economically lower probability of default. 
5.4.7.2. Validity of Instrumental Variables 
In this section, the validity of instrumental variables is discussed. A valid instrument must 
be uncorrelated with error term in the regression equation and it must be correlated with 
the endogenous explanatory variables in regression. That is, a valid instrumental variable is 
one that affects the probability of default through its impact on extent of derivative use and 
leverage and not directly by itself. To test the first condition, that is, the instrument must be 
uncorrelated with error term, this study conducts a Sargan-Hansen Test of over identifying 
restrictions. Under this test the joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid 
instruments, that is uncorrelated with error term and that the excluded instruments are 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The Sargan-Hansen statistics are small 
with a p-value of 0.1920 and 0.2517 respectively for 2SLS and GMM-IV regressions. 
Therefore, this study cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with the error term. 
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To test the second condition, that is instrument must be correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variables, this study employs Under-Identification test (LM statistic). Under 
this test that null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified, that is excluded 
instruments are “irrelevant”, meaning uncorrelated with endogenous regressors. The p-
value of Under-Identification tests for both 2SLS and GMM-IV is 0.0000. Therefore, this 
study rejects the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the 
endogenous variables. This suggests that that equation is identified and excluded 
instruments are correlated with endogenous regressors. 
5.4.8. Propensity Score Matching 
To control for the problem of endogeneity we have used a treatment effects specification 
and an instrumental variable technique. In this section we use PSM to control for 
endogeneity. Here we attempt to match derivative user firms with non-user firms based on 
their propensity score and then compare their respective default probabilities. We use PSM 
method to examine the impact of the use of derivatives (treatment variable) on the 
probability of default (our outcome variable). This method is an alternative way of 
reducing selection bias by matching on a single index propensity score and making 
derivative user firms and non-user firms as comparable as possible on the confounding 
variables. This examination will provide unbiased estimation effects of treatment, 
derivative use, on the outcome variable, default probability. To calculate a propensity score 
for each firm we employ variables that are deemed to influence the decision to use 
derivatives to create matched pairs of observations where the observed covariates on 
determinants for derivatives use are similar for derivative user firms (treated firms) and 
non-user firms (control firms). We use the Rosenbaum bounds method to test our results 
against bias from unobserved covariates. 
There are several problems that affect the results of studies that use observational data. The 
first problem is the distribution on observed characteristics between treatment and control 
group. Majority of the studies that examines the use of derivatives, use a regression model 
where they regress measure of risk on dummy for derivatives and other control variables. 
Researchers then examine the coefficient on derivatives by saying ceteris paribus and 
hence assume the value of coefficient as the casual effect of the derivatives. However, the 
problem with simple regression analysis is that they cannot identify whether the observed 
characteristics used have any comparable overlap. Li (2013) argue that the findings of 
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studies that use regression model with observational data could be misleading as they did 
not control for the overlap between treated and control group. 
Assessing the impact of derivatives use is complex because of incomplete information. 
With observational data one can identify whether a firm uses derivatives or not and the 
probability of default conditional on derivatives use. However, the problem with making 
causal inference is how to identify the outcomes that are not observed. This means that if 
firm i used derivatives at time t, what would have happened if it had not used derivatives. 
Hence, the fundamental problem in estimating unbiased causal effects is constructing the 
unobserved counterfactuals for treated (derivative users) observations. With PSM 
counterfactuals can be reconstructed for observational data. Li (2013) shows that PSM 
reconstructs counter factual by adjusting covariates between treated and control group 
using observational data. PSM calculates counterfactuals by reducing bias due to lack of 
distribution overlap and bias due to different density weighting. 
5.4.8.1. Propensity Score Estimation and Results 
In Table 5-19, we present our results of the PSM analysis.131 We have 3693 observations 
for derivative user firms and 571 observations for non-users. It was not possible to match 
all the derivative user firms with unique non-user firms, as the control group (non-user 
firms) is smaller than treated group (derivative user firms). In Table 5-19 we present the 
results of PSM for our two outcome variables EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. The table 
reports the numbers of firms, caliper value, mean and median values for the derivative 
users (treated) and non-users (control firms), the difference in mean and median values and 
the Wilcoxon p-value. We can use the simple mean difference test to obtain an estimate of 
the average treatment effect on the treated as the propensity score-matching method 
removes the bias related to observable covariates. Our results show that the estimated 
effect from PSM supports our hypothesis on effects of derivatives use: firms that use 
derivatives have lower probability of default than non-users on matched basis. 
In model 1 we use one-to-one matching without replacement to match a derivative user 
firm with a non-user firm. This is one of the most common and frequently used methods. 
In this matching method a firm from derivative user group is matched one by one with a 
                                                 
131 The model to calculate propensity score is provided in section 3.5.9.1.1 on page no 67. 
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firm from non-derivative user group without replacement that has closest propensity score. 
This method finds the pair of firms with the shortest distance of their propensity score. The 
result shows that we get a significant negative effect of the use of derivatives (treatment) 
on the user firms of -1.7442 for 1-year probability of default. That is the average 
EDF1YEAR for derivative user firms is around 1.74% lower than that of matched non-user 
firm (control group). For EDF5YEAR, we also get significant negative effect of the use of 
derivatives on the users of -1.1805 that shows that the average EDF5YEAR is 1.18% lower 
for users compared to non-users. 
In model 1, a treated firm is matched against a control firm without limiting the difference 
between their propensity score and hence may lead to a bad match if the difference is huge. 
To control for this we introduce a tolerance level, caliper, on the difference between a 
treated and a control firms propensity scores. This limits the maximum propensity score 
distance for matching.132 This reduces bad matches and increases the quality of matches. In 
model 2 and 3, we use one-to-one matching without replacement with caliper. We use two 
values of tolerance level. In model 2 we use 0.01 and in model 3 we follow Austin (2011) 
and calculate caliper of width equal to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the 
propensity score.133 The numbers of firms matched are reduced as now a treated firm is 
matched with a control firm that is within the distance set by the tolerance level. The mean 
difference between a derivative user firm and a non-user firm is still statistically negative 
and suggest that derivative user (treated) firms have lower probability of default than non-
users (control firms) and that the use of derivatives have statistically significant negative 
effect on both EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR for derivative user firms. In particular, the 
average EDF1YEAR for derivative users is 1.70% and 1.61% lower than non-users for 
models 2 and 3 and for the average EDF5YEAR this difference is 1.12% and 1.11% lower 
for derivative users. 
Model 4 and model 5 we use radius and kernel matching estimation. The one-to-one 
matching discussed above uses only one observation from control group to match against 
treated group and because of this only few observations from control group are used. This 
                                                 
132 See for more details Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) 
133 The standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score is calculated as √(𝜎1
2 + 𝜎2
2) 2⁄ . Where 𝜎1
2 is 
the variance of logit of propensity score for derivative users and 𝜎2
2is the variance of logit of propensity 
score for non-users prior to matching. 
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limits the number of firms that are matched with control group and reduces the number of 
observations. Radius matching matches derivative user firms against all the non-user firms 
within the caliper value. Kernel method uses weighted averages of all the firms in the 
comparison group to calculate the counterfactual (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The 
benefit of radius and kernel matching over one-to-one matching is that they use more 
information and reduces the variance. The results of matching analysis show significant 
effect of the derivatives use on our outcome variable EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. The 
result suggests that derivative user firms have significantly lower probability of default 
than non-user firms. The results show that derivative user firms have 1.83% and 2.10% 
lower EDF1YEAR and 1.24% and 1.41% lower EDF5YEAR than matched non-users 
under radius and kernel matching methods respectively. 
Table 5-19: Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
This table presents the results of mean and median difference for our outcome variable EDF1YEAR and 
EDF5YEAR for All Derivative User and Non-User firms matched using propensity score. The table 
provides caliper size, number of observations, Mean for derivative users and non-users, difference in mean 
and t-test for significance. The propensity score for Model 1 is calculated with common support and without 
replacement. The propensity score for Model 2 is calculated with common support, without replacement and 
with a caliper of 0.01. The propensity score for Model 3 is calculated with common support, without 
replacement and with a caliper of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score. The 
propensity score for Model 4 is calculated with common support using radius matching with caliper of 0.2 of 
the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity score. The propensity score for Model 5 is calculated 
with common support using kernel matching with bi-weight. The covariates that we use are Z-score, Interest 
Coverage, Leverage, Liquidity, Firm Size, Market to book, Foreign Debt and Foreign Sales. 
Model N Caliper 
Users  Non-Users  Difference Wilcoxon 
p-value Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean134 Median 
Panel A: EDF1YEAR 
1 418 - 0.6696 0.1160  2.4138 0.2807  -1.7442*** -0.1647 0.000 
2 398 0.01 0.7391 0.1381  2.4427 0.2682  -1.7036*** -0.1301 0.001 
3 414 0.032 0.7887 0.1274  2.3954 0.2682  -1.6067*** -0.1408 0.000 
4 1731 0.032 1.0472 -  2.8825 -  -1.8353*** - - 
5 1731 Bi-weight 1.0472 -  3.1460 -  -2.0988*** - - 
Panel B: EDF5YEAR 
1 418 - 0.8033 0.2561  1.9838 0.5201  -1.1805*** -0.2640 0.000 
2 398 0.01 0.8634 0.3175  1.9860 0.5169  -1.1226*** -0.1994 0.004 
3 414 0.032 0.8533 0.3001  1.9649 0.5169  -1.1116*** -0.2168 0.000 
4 1731 0.032 1.0695 -  2.3105 -  -1.2409*** - - 
5 1731 Bi-weight 1.0695 -  2.4748 -  -1.4053*** - - 
                                                 
134 ***, ** and * are based on the t-test and shows the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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5.4.8.2. Balancing Test 
In Table 5-20 we report the balancing results for the covariates used in model 3 of Table 
5-19. The table shows how the control sample is selected to match the treated sample so 
that they are directly comparable to the treated sample to estimate the effects of the 
treatment. The table presents before and after matching mean for the treated and control 
group, the SB statistics that represents the mean difference as a percentage of the average 
standard deviation between the groups, per cent reduction in bias, t-tests and p-value for 
the observed covariates. The t-test and the SB are the main tests to ensure the balance of 
the strata for the covariates. 
Table 5-20: Balancing Test for Covariates 
This table presents the balancing test results for the covariates that are used to calculate the propensity 
score before and after matching. Z-score is Altman’s Z-score for UK Firms; Interest Coverage is the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to interest expenses on Debt; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market 
value of assets; Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total 
current liabilities. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Market to Book is the ratio of market 
values of assets to book value of assets; FC Debt is a dummy variable set is equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses 
Foreign Debt and ‘0’ otherwise; Foreign Sales is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. 
Variables  Sample 
Mean 
SB (%) 
Reduction 
in SB (%) 
T-Test p > |t| 
Users Non-Users 
Z-score Unmatched 3.0546 4.0885 -26.90 
 
-4.47 0.000 
 
Matched 4.1902 4.0215 4.40 83.70 0.37 0.714 
Interest Coverage Unmatched 12.8790 30.0420 -55.70 
 
-9.72 0.000 
 
Matched 30.8900 29.3660 4.90 91.10 0.41 0.682 
Leverage Unmatched 0.2279 0.1257 55.00 
 
7.88 0.000 
 
Matched 0.1140 0.1269 -7.00 87.30 -0.78 0.433 
Liquidity Unmatched 1.0065 1.8312 -47.90 
 
-9.94 0.000 
 
Matched 1.6166 1.7639 -8.60 82.10 -0.76 0.448 
Firm Size Unmatched 13.3900 11.5310 97.50 
 
14.06 0.000 
 
Matched 11.4450 11.5930 -7.80 92.00 -0.69 0.488 
Market to Book Unmatched 1.5739 2.0336 -22.90 
 
-3.70 0.000 
 
Matched 2.1582 2.0443 5.70 75.20 0.49 0.624 
FC Debt Unmatched 0.8068 0.4641 76.10 
 
11.62 0.000 
 
Matched 0.3720 0.4589 -19.30 74.60 -1.80 0.073 
Foreign Sales Unmatched 57.1300 53.3200 11.20 
 
1.55 0.122 
 
Matched 51.9200 53.4900 -4.60 58.70 -0.46 0.649 
The t-test simply compares the mean difference between treated and control group for both 
before and after matching. The insignificant value of t-test indicates the mean difference is 
not statistically important. The results in Table 5-20 show that the t-test value is very small 
for all the covariates after matching. This suggests that after matching the mean difference 
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for treated and control group is not significantly different. In the matched sample the p-
values are higher than 0.05 for all the covariates. This ensures good comparison for 
outcome variable as there is no significant difference in covariates after matching. We 
calculate the SB for all the observed covariates.135 
Our results in Table 5-20 show that before matching, many covariates had bias greater than 
20%. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) the covariates between treatment and 
control group are out of balance when the absolute value of the standardized difference is 
greater than 20.0. After matching the derivative user firms and non-user firms on 
propensity score, the bias for covariates are reduced by at least 58%. The bias statistics are 
less than 20.0 for all covariates. This result confirms that we have achieved balance on all 
the covariates that are used to calculate the propensity score. This ensures that firms with 
the same propensity score values have a chance of being both derivative users (treated) and 
non-users (untreated). The process of matching created a high degree of covariate balance 
between the treatment and control group for the study. 
5.4.8.3. Sensitivity Analysis and Hidden Bias Equivalent 
Compared to a standard regression model the propensity score model provides more 
reliable and unbiased results by comparing treated firms with control firms that have a 
similar propensity score. Rosenbaum (1991) argues that under the situation of hidden bias 
where groups differ on unobserved characteristics that are not measured the groups are not 
comparable. This situation is hard to resolve as the hidden or unobserved variables are 
difficult to measure. If there are unobserved or hidden variables that affect treatment 
assignment (the decision to use derivatives) or outcome variable, then there is a problem of 
endogenous selection and under such circumstances the estimates obtained from PSM are 
inconsistent and the results are no longer unbiased. These unobserved variables might 
compromise the validity of inferring causality from observational data to which PSM 
method is not robust. 
PSM allows sensitivity analysis on this selection bias and also estimates the extent to 
which this hidden bias may affect the inference about the effects of derivatives use. We 
perform a sensitivity analysis by looking at Rosenbaum bounds and hidden bias 
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equivalents (Diprete and Gangl, 2004). This method determines the extent to which 
selection on unobserved variables needed in order to change the inferences calculated by 
the PSM. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5-21. The table provides the 
value of gamma significant at 5% level. A gamma value indicates how much an 
unobserved variable is associated with a change in odds ratio of whether a firm is treated, 
for example the gamma value of 1.50 in Table 5-21 indicates that the unobserved variable 
that would increase the odds of using derivatives for the firm should have 50% hidden 
effect on derivative users than a firm that is a non-user. 
Table 5-21: Sensitivity Analysis and Hidden Bias Equivalents 
This table presents the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds and Hidden Bias Equivalents for our first 3 models for 
outcome variable EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR136. The table provides the gamma values (the change in 
odds ratio) that are significant at 5% and the associated Hidden Bias Equivalents. 
Model Gamma Z-score 
Interest 
Coverage 
Leverage Liquidity 
Firm 
Size 
Market 
to Book 
FC DEBT 
Dummy 
Foreign 
Sales 
Panel A: EDF1YEAR 
1 1.50 10.9862 -77.3198 0.5195 -13.7681 1.6976 15.7708 0.5049 192.00 
2 1.30 7.1088 -50.0313 0.3361 -8.9089 1.0985 10.2048 0.3267 124.24 
3 1.40 9.1168 -64.1633 0.4311 -11.4254 1.4087 13.0873 0.4189 159.33 
Panel B: EDF5YEAR 
1 1.40 9.1168 -64.1633 0.4311 -11.4254 1.4087 13.0873 0.4189 159.33 
2 1.20 4.9401 -34.7677 0.2336 -6.1910 0.7633 7.0915 0.2270 86.33 
3 1.40 9.1168 -64.1633 0.4311 -11.4254 1.4087 13.0873 0.4189 159.33 
Table 5-21 also provide the magnitude of hidden bias for each covariate that would require 
us to revise our results for the effect of derivatives use on the probability of default. As we 
have negative estimated treatment effect, we use p-values of negative bounds to calculate 
the hidden bias. For model 1, the critical level of gamma is reached at a 1.50. To alter our 
conclusions, the unobserved or hidden bias would have to produce the effect of a 
difference of 10.98 in Z-score, which is double than the average Z-score value for whole 
sample, -77.3198 (more than 4 times the mean) in interest coverage, 0.5195 in leverage 
(more than double the mean), -13.76 in liquidity (more than 12 times the mean) and 
15.7708 in market to book (more than 9 times) and 192% in foreign sales (more than 3 
times). All these differences are very large suggesting that to overturn our results of risk 
reducing effect of derivatives the unobserved variables must have an effect that must be as 
large as the magnitude of changes in the covariates. For other models also the hidden bias 
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affects needs to be large to overturn the significant effect that we find of derivatives use on 
the probability of default. 
Diprete and Gangl (2004) and Becker and Caliendo (2007) argue that these sensitivity 
analysis is a worst case scenario. So a small gamma value does not show existence of 
heterogeneity and that treatment has no effect on outcome variable but it shows at what 
level the confidence interval for effect will include zero if a hidden bias caused the odds 
ratio to differ between the treatment and control group. 
Overall, the results of PSM analysis show that derivative user firms have statistically and 
economically significant lower EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR than matched non-users. 
There are a considerable bias in the covariates prior to matching and a simple matching 
and a regression analysis that does not control for the difference in covariates would suffer 
from a biased estimation results. With the help of PSM method we remove a large portion 
of standardised bias. Our results for propensity score model are also robust to hidden bias. 
5.4.9. Coarsened Exact Matching 
In previous section we used PSM method to match derivative users with non-users firms. 
The drawback of PSM is that it improves balance between treated and control group for 
most of the covariates but at the same time leave some of the variables unbalanced and 
hence the balance of covariates needs to be checked and if the covariates are out of balance 
then PSM needs to be re-estimated. In this section we use CEM to match derivative user 
firms with non-user firms. We match derivative users and non-users on Z score, interest 
coverage, leverage, liquidity, firm size, market to book and foreign sales.137 
5.4.9.1. Balance Statistics After CEM 
In this section, we discuss imbalance in covariates before and after using CEM method. 
Particularly, we discuss Multivariate L1 and univariate L1. L1 is a an imbalance statistics 
proposed by Iacus, King and Porro (2011). The Multivariate L1 statistic compares 
empirical histogram of all pre-treatment covariates between treated and control groups. 
This statistics ranges between 0 and 1; where 0 indicates perfect balance and 1 indicates 
perfect imbalance. Larger values of L1 indicate larger imbalance and smaller value 
                                                 
137 This covariates are similar to the one we used to calculate propensity score in section 5.4.8.  We did not 
use foreign debt with CEM as it resulted in a small matched sample. 
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indicate smaller imbalance (Blackwell et al., 2009). The Univariate L1 statistic compares 
empirical histogram of a pre-treatment covariate between treated and control groups.  
In Table 5-22 we provide information on number of observations for both control and 
treated groups, Multivariate L1 before and after CEM and univariate L1 after CEM. CEM 
automatically prune the data by applying exact matching and removed observations that 
are not matched from the analysis. Because the method uses exact matching, the matching 
is results in fewer observations. With each additional continuous variable the matched 
observations reduces significantly as it will result in fewer observations matched. 
Table 5-22: Balance of Control Variables after CEM 
This table provides the imbalance statistics for All Derivative Users, FC Derivative Users (UB) and IR 
Derivative Users (UB). All Derivatives Users is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a derivative user 
and 0 otherwise. FC Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a FC derivative 
user and 0 for non-users. IR Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is an IR 
derivative user and 0 for non-users. The table provides number of observations in treated and control group, 
Multivariate L1 before & after CEM Matching and after matching Univariate L1. 
CEM 
 All Derivative Users FC Derivative Users (UB) IR Derivative users (UB) 
Treated 181 330 287 
Control 101 237 197 
Multivariate L1 Before 0.9989 0.9955 0.9945 
Multivariate L1 After 0.6049 0.8297 0.8277 
Univariate L1 
Z-score 0.0718 0.1339 0.1443 
Interest Coverage 0.0000 0.0061 0.0035 
Leverage 0.0387 0.0227 0.0354 
Liquidity 0.0746 0.0879 0.1283 
Firm Size 0.0138 0.0333 0.0418 
Market to Book 0.1206 0.0855 0.1069 
Foreign Sales 0.0221 0.0354 0.0244 
The results in Table 5-22 show that 181 derivative users firm-year-observations are 
matched against 101 non-user firm-year-observations. Prior to matching there is a perfect 
imbalance (Multivariate L1 = 0.9989). Blackwell et al. (2009) argue that L1 is not valuable 
on its own but works as a comparison for matching results. The Multivariate L1 is 0.6049 
after matching. Compared with before matching multivariate L1 this shows a substantial 
reduction after matching. Table 5-22 also provides the L1 for each covariate after 
matching. We also apply CEM for FC derivative users and IR derivative users. These 
results are also reported in Table 5-22. 
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Figure 5-6: Univariate L1 Statistics Before and After CEM for All Derivative Users 
 
Figure 5-7: Univariate L1 Statistics Before and after CEM for FC Derivative Users 
 
Figure 5-8: Univariate L1 Statistics Before and after CEM for IR Derivative Users 
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In Figure 5-6, we use univariate L1 imbalance statistics for before and after CEM 
matching. The derivative users and non-users in the unmatched sample are largely 
unbalanced than after matching. Prior to matching the L1 statistics for foreign sales is 
0.1368 and after matching it is 0.0221. This shows that after using CEM derivatives users 
and non-users are more comparable on foreign sales. Derivative users and non-users have 
large imbalance prior to matching on firm size, liquidity, leverage, interest coverage and Z-
score. However, after matching derivative users and non-users are more comparable on all 
these variables. There is a small change in before and after imbalance in market to book for 
derivative users and non-users. 
In Figure 5-7 we present before and after CEM matching univariate L1 for FC derivative 
users. Prior to matching, highest imbalance between FC derivative users and non-FC 
derivative users is for firm size, leverage, liquidity and interest coverage. The imbalance is 
reduced after the matching except for market to book where the imbalance is increased 
after matching. Figure 5-8 show the imbalance results for before and after matching for IR 
derivative users. Similar to FC derivative users, the highest imbalance prior to matching is 
for firm size, leverage interest coverage and liquidity. The imbalance in all the covariates 
is reduced after matching using CEM. Overall, Figure 5-6, Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8 
shows that prior matching the covariates were not comparable between derivative users 
and non-users. However, after applying CEM the imbalance between derivative users and 
non-users reduced and hence allows the examination of impact of derivatives use on the 
EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR (outcome variables) on a list of comparable covariates. 
5.4.9.2. Impact of Derivatives Use on the Probability of Default After CEM 
In this section we estimate the causal effect of derivatives use on the probability of default 
after matching derivative users and non-users using CEM. We present results of this 
estimation in Table 5-23. We match users and non-users on three treatments (All 
Derivative Users, FC Derivative users and IR derivative users) and for two outcome 
variables (EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR). After matching derivative users and non-users 
using CEM, we run regression analysis of matched firms and apply CEM weights.138 
                                                 
138 We conducted parametric analysis after matching. We also included all of the covariates to account for 
any potentially remaining balances. 
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Table 5-23: Impact Estimate of Derivative Use on The Probability of Default 
This table provides the results of treatment effect on the EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR after matching firms 
on CEM. All Derivatives Users is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a derivative user and 0 
otherwise. FC Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is a FC derivative user 
and 0 for non-users. IR Derivatives Users (UB) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is an IR 
derivative user and 0 for non-users.  In parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and firm clustering. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The regressions also include year and industry dummies.  
Treatment 
EDF1YEAR  EDF5YEAR 
Const. Impact  Const. Impact 
      
All Derivatives Users 19.0675*** -1.6279**  12.8979*** -1.0648** 
 (7.0718) (0.8523)  (4.3467) (0.5238) 
FC Derivative Users (UB) 10.8007*** 0.0072  7.5200*** 0.0872 
 (2.5537) (0.3330)  (1.6565) (0.2160) 
IR Derivative Users (UB) 12.9547*** -0.6872**  8.9819*** -0.4841** 
 (3.1382) (0.3672)  (2.0092) (0.2350) 
The results in Table 5-23 show that there is a significant (p-value <0.05) effect of 
derivatives use on the EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. These suggest that firm’s all 
derivatives use reduces the EDF1YEAR by 1.6279% and EDF5YEAR by 1.0648%. The 
detected impact of all derivative use is consistent with the results of PSM matching.139 We 
repeat the analysis for FC and IR derivative users. We fail to find any impact of FC 
derivatives use on EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. Similar to all derivatives use, we find 
significant negative impact of IR derivatives use on both EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR (p-
value < 0.05). The results suggest that IR derivative use reduces EDF1YEAR by 0.6872% 
and EDF5YEAR by 0.4841%. 
Overall, the results in this section provided further evidence of the significant negative 
effect of derivatives use on the probability of default. The results in this section showed 
that after matching derivative user firms with non-user firms on the CEM, we removed a 
large imbalance from the covariates. After matching, we run the analysis on data and find 
that all derivatives use and IR derivatives use have statistically significant negative impact 
on the EDF1YEAR and EDF5YEAR. 
5.5. Summary of Research Findings 
The main objective of this chapter was to examine the effects of derivative use on the 
probability of default for a large cross-section of UK non-financial firms during the period 
                                                 
139 See section 5.4.8.1 
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1998 to 2010. This question is important in UK setting, as UK is creditor friendly country 
that makes the likelihood of bankruptcy, all else being equal, much greater, UK economy 
is more open and more exposed to foreign exchange risk and UK firms are one of the 
biggest users of derivatives. We examined the effects of all, FC and IR derivatives use on 
1-year and 5-year probability of default and show that derivative users have statistically 
lower probabilities of default than non-users both in univariate and multivariate analysis. 
We find that derivatives use lowers the probability of default for both one and five-year 
horizons, with a larger effect on near term default probabilities as measured by one-year 
expected default frequencies. Our regression analysis shows that the use of IR derivatives 
has a larger negative impact on default probabilities than FC derivatives. We find that the 
use of CP derivatives has a non-significant impact on default probabilities. When we look 
at combinations of derivatives used, we find that firms using both FC and IR derivatives 
and IR and CP derivatives generate the greatest reduction in the probability of default. The 
common factor in these instances is IR derivatives use. Financial distress is a direct result 
of a firms’ inability to service the interest on its debt and payback debt when it matures and 
by using IR derivatives firms can directly manage this risk and in so doing more 
effectively reduce their probability of default. Our results also suggest that firms that use 
two types of derivatives for risk management benefits more as a result of larger reduction 
in the probability of default than one type of derivatives use. In this chapter, we interacted 
derivatives dummy with credit risk proxies and year dummies. The results of interaction 
with credit risk proxies suggest that derivatives use is associated with a significant 
reduction in the 1-year and 5-year probability of default during the period of elevated 
credit risk. The results of interaction between derivatives and year dummies show that 
derivatives use has larger negative effect on the probability of default during the period of 
economic crisis such as witnessed during the period of 2000-2001 and during recent 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. This analysis also reveals that derivatives were more 
beneficial during the period of recent financial crisis than the one before. In year 2008, the 
all derivative user firms have 1.54% (0.83%), the FC derivative users have 1.56% (1.02%) 
and IR derivative users have 1.39% (0.73%) lower 1-year (5-year) probability of default 
than non-users. We also interact derivatives dummy with Z-score. The positive coefficient 
on the interaction term suggests that the effect of derivatives on the probability of default is 
lessened and suggests that derivatives are more beneficial for firms with higher financial 
distress risk. 
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We control for the self-selection bias by using heckman treatment effects model and find 
that derivatives use has a statistically significant negative impact on the probability of 
default. We control for the problem of endogeneity by using instrumental variable. In 
instrumental variable model, we use a continuous measure of derivatives. The results of 
instrumental variables are consistent with our earlier results and suggest that extent of 
derivatives use is associated with a reduction in the probability of default. We also use 
PSM and CEM methods to control for the problem of endogeneity. In PSM, a derivative 
user firm is matched with a non-user firm based on their likelihood of using derivatives 
and in CEM a derivative user firms is matched with a non-user firm directly on the 
covariates. The mean difference test between a matched derivative user and non-user firm 
showed that derivative user firms have statistically and economically lower values of both 
1-year and 5-year probability of default. 
Overall, our results provide evidence consistent with the view that the use of derivatives by 
UK firms reduces their probability of default. This empirical evidence is consistent with 
the notion that UK firms on average are using derivatives for hedging rather than 
speculation. 
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Chapter 6. The Effects of FC Derivatives and FC Debt on FX Exposure 
6.1. Introduction 
The contemporary drive of globalisation has opened world markets for firms. Business 
operations are pursued in diverse markets and therefore they have become intensively 
competitive and highly risky. With the expansions, many difficulties may come. 
Organisations encounter fresh challenges and less surfaced areas of risk. These expansions 
have opened new sources of risk for firms e.g. foreign exchange (FX) risk, IR risk, CP risk 
etc. Firms have also created liabilities and assets overseas which also faces risk. These all 
affect the value of a firm. A sudden unfavourable change in the FX rate, IR and CP may 
have huge negative impact on the current and future cash flows of the firm. Such changes 
may negatively affect firm value, increase financial distress costs and may increase 
probability of bankruptcy. 
To reduce the cash flow volatility and chances of bankruptcy as a result of unanticipated 
changes in FX rates, firms may use financial hedging and operational hedging. Financial 
hedging is implemented by using derivative instruments such as forwards, futures, swaps 
and options; whereas operational hedging is implemented by diversifying foreign 
operations across foreign countries to reduce FX exposure. The derivative instruments are 
used by offsetting the underlying value of foreign assets as much as possible so that a 
firm’s stock return sensitivity to changes in FX rates is as low as possible. The cost of 
implementing a financial hedge is lower than the cost of implementing an operational 
hedge and hence smaller and financially constrained firms are more likely to use financial 
hedge to manage their FX exposure. While it is true that both financial hedge and 
operational hedge are implemented with the intention of lowering the FX, they both differ 
in terms of the type of FX risk that they hedge. Financial hedging techniques are more 
suitable to hedge short-term (transaction) exposure whereas operational hedge is more 
suitable in reducing long-term (operating) exposure. Chowdhry and Howe (1999) show 
that derivative instruments are used by firms at a greater extent to hedge short-term FX 
exposure and operational hedging to hedge long-term exposure. 
UK firms are more exposed to FX rate changes compared to their US counterparts due to 
relatively open economy and more foreign sales as a proportion of total sales. The firms in 
our sample have an average ratio 57% of foreign sales to total sales. For a sample of US 
firms, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find that the average foreign sales for their sample firms 
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is approximately 20%. Elliott et al. (2003) report 44% of average foreign sales for their 
sample of 88 US firms. Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) report average foreign sales of 18.5% 
for a sample of 472 large US firms. For a sample of UK firms Muller and Verschoor 
(2008) report average foreign sales of 60.65%. A recent study by Zhou and Wang (2013) 
find 46.71% of average foreign sales of UK firms. These suggests that UK firms have 
more to lose if there is an unfavourable sudden change in FX rate due to higher FX 
exposure from their real foreign operations. UK firms actively use FC derivatives to 
manage their exposures. Demographic distribution of derivative usage shows that EU 
accounts for 66% of the global IR derivatives market and 60% of the global FC derivatives 
market. Out of that, London accounts for 39% and 44% of these respective global markets. 
The US has 24% and 15% of the value of global OTC derivatives market respectively140. 
The above discussion provides an important motivation for investigating the effects of FC 
derivatives use on FX exposure in the UK setting. Moreover, there are only couple of 
studies that examined the effects of derivatives use on FX exposure (Muller and 
Verschoor, 2008; Zhou and Wang, 2013). However, the effect of FC derivatives on FX 
exposure for UK firms is not clear. This study tries to fill this gap by examining the effects 
of FC derivatives use on FX exposure of a large sample of UK non-financial firms. Both 
Muller and Verschoor (2008) and Zhou and Wang (2013) examine the effects of FC 
derivatives on FX exposure using 1 year’s data. Both studies provide weak results for the 
effect of FC derivatives use on FX exposure. The present study also contributes to the 
literature by investing the impact for a much larger period of 12 years starting from 1999 
to year 2010.141 
In this study, we examine the effects of FC derivatives use on FX exposure. We calculate 
FX exposure for UK firms in 3 ways 1) using Sterling broad effective exchange rate, 2) 
using lagged changes in Sterling broad effective exchange rate and 3) using Sterling/Euro 
and Sterling/USD bilateral exchange rates. If firms are using FC derivatives for hedging, 
then it should reduce the FX exposure of a firm whereas it should increase the FX 
exposure if derivatives are used for speculative purposes. To test the relationship between 
FC derivatives use and FX exposure, we include operating and financing decisions. We 
                                                 
140Bank for International Settlements (2007) 
141 The sample period is 12 years when we use dummy variable as a proxy for FC derivatives use. However, 
the sample period is 9 years when we use notional values of FC derivatives. 
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find that firms use FC derivatives to hedge unexpected changes in FX rates and not to 
speculate as we find that the use of FC derivatives, financing decision, reduces FX 
exposure. Our finding is consistent with previous studies that examined the relationship 
between FC derivatives use and FX exposure. (Nydahl, 1999; Allayannis, Ihrig, et al., 
2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Nguyen and Faff, 2003; Zhou and Wang, 2013). Our 
results also indicate that the stock return is sensitive to not only the current changes but 
also to the lagged changes in exchange rates and that the use of FC derivatives also 
significantly reduces the sensitivity of stock return to the lagged changes in exchange rates. 
Next, we examine the role of FC debt as a natural hedging instrument in reducing FX 
exposure of UK non-financial firms. Empirical results suggest that a large numbers of UK 
non-financial firms are use FC debt.142 However, there are no studies that investigated the 
effect of FC debt use on FX exposure for UK firms. We try to fill this gap in literature by 
investigating the effect of FC debt on FX exposure for UK firms. We find results 
suggesting that firms’ use of FC debt is associated with a reduction in FX exposure. This 
result is generally consistent with Keloharju and Niskanen (2001), Elliott et al. (2003), 
Doukas et al. (2003) and Kedia and Mozumdar (2003). The major contribution of this 
study is that we use not only percent of FC debt usage but also debt denominated in Euro 
and USD. This information of UK firms debt in different currencies allow us to do further 
analysis than previous studies on the importance of foreign debt in reducing risk. This 
makes our study more important for understanding foreign debt usage of UK firms and its 
effect in reducing FX exposure. We perform separate analysis of use of FC debt 
denominated in Euro and USD and examine its impact on FX exposure arising from 
changes in Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD respectively. We find significant negative 
relationship between Euro debt and FX exposure arising from Sterling/Euro exchange rate 
changes suggesting that use of EU debt work as natural hedge for the exposure arising 
from Sterling/Euro exchange rate changes. We find no evidence that the US debt is 
associated with lower FX exposure arising from Sterling/USD exchange rate changes. 
                                                 
142 The average firm in our sample has 46% of FC debt usage. Judge (2006a) and Bartram et al. (2009) 
show that large number of UK firms use FC debt. Bartram et al. (2009) show that 85.6% of their UK sample 
uses FC debt whereas Judge (2006a) find that 65.8% of UK sample firms use FC debt. Clark and Judge 
(2008) show that out of 128 UK non-financial firms that hedge FX exposure 49.2% of firms hedge it with 
combined use of FC derivatives and FC debt, 25.8% of firms with only FC debt and 25% of firms used FC 
derivatives only. 
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After showing that FC debt can be used as a risk management instrument, we examine the 
effect of FC debt on the probability of default and Z-score. We argue that there are two 
opposite effects of FC debt use in relation to risk management: 1) Hedging effect - a 
reduction in cash flow volatility by matching foreign assets with foreign liabilities and 
hence, we argue FC debt should lower the probability of default and 2) Leverage effect –an 
increased level of debt from use of FC debt that may increase the probability of default due 
to increased interest payment. We find that firms that use FC debt have lower Z-score but 
not statistically different probability of default. Our insignificant results for FC debt on 
probability of default suggests that the leverage effect from the use of FC debt is 
neutralised by the hedging effect resulting in an overall insignificant effect of FC debt on 
the probability of default. These results combined with our earlier results suggest that FC 
debt can be used to manage FX exposure without increasing overall probability of default 
due to increased leverage. 
This chapter is organized as follow: Section 6.2 provides variable description, Section 6.3 
describes our methodology, Section 6.4 presents the empirical results and section 6.5 
summarises research findings. 
6.2. Variable Description 
6.2.1. Measure of Foreign Exchange Exposure 
In this chapter, we examine the effects of FC derivatives and FC debt on the FX exposure. 
We use equation [7] and calculate FX exposure using weekly and monthly data.143 This is a 
proxy for the level of exchange rate risk. We calculate FX exposure in various ways: 
 Using a trade-weighted exchange rate index 
 Using a lagged trade-weighted exchange rate index 
 Using a bilateral Sterling/Euro exchange rate index 
 Using a bilateral Sterling/USD exchange rate index 
The exchange rate exposure calculated using equation [7] measures the sensitivity of the 
stock return to the unanticipated changes in the above-mentioned exchange rates. The 
                                                 
143We use three years return data surrounding the particular year to calculate monthly FX exposure. For 
example to calculate the FX exposure for year 2010, we used monthly return starting in 2009:01 to 2011:12. 
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calculated FX exposure could be either positive or negative. In empirical examination, we 
use raw, absolute, positive and negative values of FX exposure.144 
6.2.2. Main Explanatory Variables 
Following are the variables of interest in this chapter. All else being equal, if firms are 
using FC derivatives and FC debt for hedging then the FX exposure of user firms should 
decline after firm start using FC derivatives and FC debt. We employ both continuous and 
dummy measure of FC derivatives and FC debt as discussed below; 
 Continuous Measure of FC Derivatives and FC Debt 
We use yearend outstanding notional values of FC derivatives as a continuous 
measure of FC derivatives use. We scale notional values of FC derivatives by total 
assets. This gives an extent of FC derivatives use and can differentiate between a 
firm with high FC derivative usage with a firm with low FC derivative usage. 
We also collected data on the percentage of firms debt denominated in FC. We 
specifically collect this information for 1) debt denominated in Euro 2) debt 
denominated in USD and 3) debt denominated in any other currency than Sterling. 
Based on this data, we calculate 1) FC debt percentage 2) EU debt percentage and 
3) US debt percentage. 
 Dummy Measure of FC Derivatives and FC Debt 
In this chapter, our measure of FC derivatives use is a dummy variable set equal to 
‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives and ‘0’ for non-users.145 We also investigate the 
effect of FC debt on the FX exposure. We create a FC debt dummy by setting it 
equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC debt and ‘0’ otherwise. We also create several 
categories of FC debt dummy based on the currency of the FC debt. We create EU 
debt dummy, which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses EU debt and ‘0’ otherwise, and 
US debt dummy, which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses US debt and ‘0’ otherwise. 
We also create following combination of FC derivatives and FC debt dummies 1) 
FC derivatives and FC debt dummy which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses both FC 
                                                 
144 After initial multivariate analysis with raw and negative FX exposures, we restrict our empirical 
examination to absolute and positive FX exposures.  
145 We exclude “Other” users from the sample of non-users. 
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derivatives and FC debt and ‘0’ otherwise 2) FC derivatives and EU debt dummy 
which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses both FC derivatives and EU debt and ‘0’ 
otherwise 3) FC derivatives and US debt dummy which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm 
uses both FC derivatives and US debt and ‘0’ otherwise. For each of these three 
categories of dummy variables, we also create corresponding FC derivatives only, 
which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives only and ‘0’ otherwise, FC 
debt only, which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC debt only and ‘0’ otherwise, 
EU debt only, which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses EU debt only and ‘0’ 
otherwise, and US debt only, which is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses US debt only 
and ‘0’ otherwise. 
6.2.3. Control Variables 
We use following control variables while examining the effects of FC derivatives and FC 
debt on the FX exposure. 
 Foreign Sales: A foreign sale is a measure of firm’s exposure to foreign exchange 
exposure. Majority of the previous studies that investigated the effects of 
derivatives use on foreign exchange exposure incorporated foreign sales in their 
model (Allayannis, Brown, et al., 2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Keloharju and 
Niskanen, 2001; Nguyen and Faff, 2003; Muller and Verschoor, 2008; Zhou and 
Wang, 2013). We calculate this measure as a ratio of foreign sales divided by total 
sales. 
 Leverage: We calculate leverage as the ratio of total debt to book value of assets 
minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. Smith and Stulz (1985) 
argue that by reducing the likelihood of default hedging reduces the expected costs 
of financial distress. This indicates that firms with high levels of debt are more 
likely to use derivatives and hence are less exposed to exchange rate risk. However, 
net of derivatives use leverage should increase the FX exposure. We expect a 
positive association between leverage and FX exposure. 
 Firm Size: We use natural log of total assets as a measure for firm size. We expect 
that firm size will be negatively associated with FX exposure. 
 Liquidity: We measure liquidity as ratio of total current assets minus total stock and 
work in progress over total current liabilities. Liquidity is also considered as a 
hedging substitute and hence firms with more liquidity may not use derivatives for 
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hedging. This suggests that firms with high levels of liquidity should have higher 
FX exposure. 
 Market to Book: We calculate market to book as the ratio of market value of assets 
to book value of assets. We expect positive association market to book and FX 
exposure. 
6.2.4. Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 6-1 provides the summary statistics for FX exposure variables that we 
calculate using equation [7] for two periods weekly and yearly. We have total 4194 firm-
year-observations for each weekly and monthly FX exposures. Around 51% of these 
observations are positive FX exposure. The mean value for whole sample suggests that 
firms have positive FX exposure for yearly FX exposure and negative for weekly FX 
exposure. When we look at positive and negative exposure, the results show that the 
positive FX exposures for weekly are less in magnitude than negative exposure while 
monthly exposure is milder for negative exposure than positive exposure. Overall, the 
results indicate that UK non-financial firms are more exposed to positive FX exposure. 
In our sample of weekly FX exposure, we have 490 (11.6%, Positive – 46.93%, Negative - 
53.06%) observations that are significant at 10% and 266 (6.34%, Positive – 46.61%, 
Negative - 53.38%) observations are significant at 5% level. The numbers of significant 
monthly exposures at 10% level are 617 (14.71% Positive – 57.69%, Negative – 42.31%) 
and 388 (9.25%, Positive – 63.14%, Negative – 38.86%) observations are significant at 5% 
level. There are more significant positive cases for monthly FX exposure than negative 
significant cases. Weekly significant cases are higher for negative exposure. These results 
indicate that sample firms are sensitive to both positive and negative FX exposures. Other 
studies also find similar percentage of firms exposed to exchange rate risk in their sample. 
Dominguez and Tesar (2006) find around 9% of firms are exposed to FX risk when they 
use currency of major trade partners to calculate FX exposure and 11% of firms are 
exposed to exchange rate risk when they use trade-weighted exchange rate. Nguyen and 
Faff (2003) report that 14.58% of their sample observations are significant for weekly FX 
exposure while 10.34% of monthly FX exposures are significant. Zhou and Wang (2013) 
find 9.46% of firms exposed to FX risk in their sample of UK non-financial firms for the 
year 1999. The numbers of significant firms in our study are similar to the above studies. 
These results suggest that UK non-financial firms are more exposed to positive exchange 
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rate risk. These suggest that the appreciation of the pound will unfavourably affect the 
performance of the UK non-financial firms’ than the depreciation of pound. 
Table 6-1: Summary Statistics for Exposure to Fluctuations in Trade-Weighted Sterling 
Index 
The table provides summary statistics for FX exposure calculated using equation [7], derivatives variables 
and other determinants of FX exposure variables. Extent of FC Derivatives is the notional amount of FC 
derivatives scaled by the firm’s total assets; FC Derivatives is a dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ if a firm is 
FC derivatives users and ‘0’ otherwise; FC Debt is a ratio of foreign debt to total debt; Foreign Sales is the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets; Liquidity is 
the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities; Firm 
Size is a natural logarithm of total assets; Market to Book is the ratio of market value of assets to book 
value of assets. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Exposure to Fluctuations in Trade-Weighted Sterling Index 
Statistics 
Whole Sample  Positive Exposure  Negative Exposure 
Weekly Monthly  Weekly Monthly  Weekly Monthly 
Observations 4194 4194  2147 2221  2047 1973 
Mean -0.0583 0.2132  0.6858 1.1592  -0.8386 -0.8517 
Median 0.0258 0.0716  0.5180 0.7500  -0.5640 -0.6441 
Minimum -3.7020 -3.2275  0.0006 0.0005  -0.0003 -0.0003 
Maximum 2.8450 5.7536  2.8450 5.7536  -3.7020 -3.2275 
Standard Deviation 1.0543 1.4266  0.6136 1.2089  0.8323 0.7347 
Significant Expo -5% 266/6.34% 388/9.25%  124/5.77% 245/11.03%  142/6.93% 143/7.24% 
Significant Expo -10% 490/11.68% 617/14.71%  230/10.71% 356/16.03%  260/12.70% 261/13.23% 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Derivatives and Determinants of FX Exposure Variables 
Variables Observations Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
Extent of FC Derivatives 845 0.1387 0.0536 0.0000 2.4139 0.2988 
FC Derivatives (Dummy) 2706 0.8684 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3381 
FC Debt (% of Total Debt) 2966 0.4574 0.4529 0.0000 1.0000 0.3888 
Foreign sales 2706 0.5761 0.5989 0.0000 1.0000 0.3383 
Leverage 2706 0.2035 0.1675 0.0000 0.8920 0.1824 
Liquidity  2706 1.2057 0.8800 0.0000 8.8000 1.3197 
Firm Size 2706 13.0905 13.1766 0.0000 17.2529 2.0716 
Market to Book 2706 1.7278 1.1626 0.2781 14.3325 1.9673 
In panel B of Table 6-1, we present the summary statistics for the variables that we used in 
regression analysis. We have 845 firm-year-observations for notional values of FC 
derivatives. The mean value indicate that as a percentage of total assets an average firm 
use 13.87% of FC derivatives. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) for a sample of US firms find 
that the average firm in their sample use 3% of FC derivatives as a percentage of total 
sales. Allayannis, Ihrig, et al. (2001) report that the average use of FX derivatives among 
their sample user firms is 2.40% of total assets. For 88 US MNCs, Elliott et al. (2003) find 
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that the average use of FC derivatives among user firms is 10.26% of total assets. Magee 
(2013) reports the derivative use of average user firms is 4.8% of total assets. Zhou and 
Wang (2013) report that the average fair value of FC derivative usage of their sample firms 
is 1.59% of total assets. These suggest that UK firms’ higher extent of FC derivatives use 
compared to their US counterparts. 
The mean value for FC derivatives dummy shows that 85.87% of firms in our sample 
report the use of FC derivatives. 42.6% of sample firm in Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
report use of FC derivatives. Allayannis and Weston (2001) report that 37% of their 
sample firms use FC derivatives. Muller and Verschoor (2008) report 66.6% of their 
Belgian, German and Dutch firms sample firms use FC derivatives whereas 97.8% of their 
UK sample firms use FC derivatives. Clark and Judge (2008) report that 74.2% of 366 of 
their UK sample firms use FC derivatives. Bartram et al. (2009) report that 54.5% of 886 
UK firms use FC derivatives compared with 37.7% of 2231 US firms. Magee (2013) 
reports that 67.3% of their US sample firms use FC derivatives. Zhou and Wang (2013) 
report that 75% of their initial sample firms use FC derivatives. These comparisons of 
percentage of FC derivative users between UK and US suggest that large numbers of UK 
firms are using FC derivatives. 
The average foreign sale as a percentage of total sales of our sample firms is 57.16% 
suggesting pre-derivatives use FX exposure. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) report 19.80% of 
foreign sales as a percentage of total sales for their sample US firms. Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) report average foreign sales of 18% for a sample of large US MNCs. Elliott 
et al. (2003) report that the average foreign sales for their sample of US firms is 44.30%. 
Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) report that the average foreign sales of 18.5% of their 472 US 
firms. Nguyen and Faff (2003) report average foreign sales of 40% for a sample of 
Australian firms. Faff and Marshall (2005) report that the average US firm in their sample 
have foreign sales of 29.3%, the average foreign sales of UK firms is 41.8%. Nandy (2010) 
reports 64% of foreign sales for their sample of UK firms. Magee (2013) reports 33.20% of 
foreign sales for a 401 US firms. For a sample of Belgian, German and Dutch firms Muller 
and Verschoor (2008) find that the average foreign sales is 35.74% whereas the average 
foreign sales for UK firms is 60.65%. This indicates that UK firms are more exposed to FX 
risk than US firms due to their foreign operations. We also present descriptive statistics for 
other control variables. The table shows that the sample firms have average 20.35% 
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leverage. The mean liquidity of our sample firms is 1.2057. The average market to book 
ratio of our sample firm is 1.7278. 
6.3. Methodology 
The regression estimated using equation [17] would assess whether the use of derivatives 
increases, decreases or has no impact on the level of FX exposure. The coefficient on the 
FC derivatives variable is an important parameter in this case. If firms are using FC 
derivatives for hedging purpose then we expect a negative coefficient on FC derivatives 
indicating that the more a firm uses FC derivatives the less it is exposed to exchange rate 
risk assuming that FC derivatives can reduce the exchange rate risk. We expect that the use 
of FC derivatives should minimize the FX exposure for firms with positive exposure and 
should increase (decrease in absolute term) for firms with negative FX exposure. We 
expect a positive coefficient on foreign sales as we expect that an increase in foreign sales 
should increase FX exposure. 
6.4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we examine the effects of FC derivatives and FC debt on FX exposure and 
the probability of default in a multivariate framework. We use both continuous and dummy 
measure of derivatives and FC debt in the analysis. We calculate several measures of FX 
exposure based on various exchange rates.146 
6.4.1. Effect of Foreign Currency Derivatives on FX Exposure 
To examine the effect of FC derivatives use on FX exposure we use equation [17]. 
Consistent with Jorion (1990), Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Nguyen and Faff (2003) 
we expect that a firms’ FX exposure should be positively related to its ratio of foreign sales 
to total sales, as for a given exposure an increase in income from foreign operations should 
increase FX exposure. About FC derivatives, we expect that if firms use derivatives for 
hedging and assuming that FC derivatives are effective in hedging then it should lessen a 
firm’s FX exposure. 
Table 6-2 provides the regression results for equation [17] and examines the relationship 
between a firm’s FC derivatives use and a firm’s weekly and monthly FX exposure. The 
                                                 
146 See section 6.2.2 for more information 
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main independent variable in the regression model is FC derivatives, which is a continuous 
measure of FC derivative use. In panel A of Table 6-2 we use raw values weekly and 
monthly values of FX exposure, which includes both positive and negative values of FX 
exposure, as our dependent variables. The results show a negative but insignificant 
relationship between weekly and monthly FX exposure and use of FC derivatives. For 
foreign sales, the relationship is negative and insignificant for weekly FX exposure and 
positive but insignificant for monthly FX exposure. Previous studies also find insignificant 
coefficient on FC derivatives when they use raw values of FX exposure (Allayannis and 
Ofek, 2001; Nguyen and Faff, 2003; Zhou and Wang, 2013). Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
and Nguyen and Faff (2003) uses same model. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) uses monthly 
FX exposure and find that the coefficient on FC derivatives is negative but insignificant. 
Nguyen and Faff (2003) uses weekly and monthly FX exposure and find positive but 
insignificant coefficient on FC derivatives for weekly and monthly FX exposure. Zhou and 
Wang (2013) include firm size and incorporate a dummy variable for negatively exposed 
firms in the sample along with fair values of FC derivatives and ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales when they model for all FX exposure (raw values). They find negative 
coefficient on fair values of FC derivatives with stastically weak significance. 
As our raw FX exposure variable includes both positive and negative observations, it is 
puzzling to interpret the coefficient on FC derivatives; as we expect a negative coefficient 
on FC derivatives when there is a positive FX exposure and positive coefficient when the 
FX exposure is negative indicating reduction in FX exposure. For an easier interpretation, 
we use the absolute values of FX exposure and re-examine the relationship between FX 
exposure and firm’s use of FC derivatives147. If use of FC derivatives is motivated by 
hedging intentions then we expect the use of FC derivatives should reduce both positive 
and negative FX exposure in absolute values. Therefore, we expect that use of FC 
derivatives should be negatively related to absolute values of FX exposures. Panel B of 
Table 6-2 presents the results of absolute values of FX exposure. The coefficient on FC 
derivatives is negative but insignificant for both weekly and monthly FX exposures.  
Table 6-2: The Effect of Foreign Currency Derivatives Use on FX Exposure 
The table provides regression results of effects of Extent of FC Derivatives on FX exposure using equation 
[17]. The dependent variable is ?̂?𝟐𝒊𝒕 estimated using equation [7]; Extent of FC Derivatives is the notional 
amount of FC derivatives scaled by the firm’s total assets; Foreign Sales is the ratio of foreign sales to total 
                                                 
147
 Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Nguyen and Faff (2003) also uses absolute values of FX exposures 
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sales. In panel A, we use raw values of FX exposure as a dependent variable. In panel B, we use absolute 
values of FX exposure as a dependent variable. In panel C, we use only positive values of FX exposure as a 
dependent variable. In panel D, we use only negative values FX exposures as a dependent variable. In 
parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and clustering at the firm 
level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also 
include year and industry dummies. 
 Panel A  Panel B 
Raw Values of Betas Absolute Values of Betas 
Variables Weekly Monthly  Weekly Monthly 
Extent of FC Derivatives  -0.0782 -0.1802  -0.1187 -0.0803 
 (0.088) (0.153)  (0.075) (0.093) 
Foreign Sales -0.0809 0.2406  0.0047 0.3268*** 
 (0.085) (0.159)  (0.069) (0.124) 
Constant 0.0774 0.2125  0.6834*** 0.5418** 
 (0.242) (0.303)  (0.163) (0.232) 
N 825 825  825 825 
Adj. R2 0.0524 0.0421  0.0408 0.0615 
F-Value 2.7876 2.9085  2.4445 2.5353 
 Panel C  Panel D 
Positive Values of Betas Negative Values of Betas 
Variables Weekly Monthly  Weekly Monthly 
Extent of FC Derivatives -0.1960*** -0.0654  0.0055 0.0348 
 (0.057) (0.169)  (0.156) (0.082) 
Foreign Sales 0.0244 0.4736**  0.0184 -0.1593* 
 (0.082) (0.193)  (0.119) (0.086) 
Constant 0.3876*** 0.6199  -0.4486*** -0.3118** 
 (0.130) (0.788)  (0.162) (0.130) 
N 488 454  337 371 
Adj. R2 0.0730 0.0743  0.0515 0.1214 
F-Value 3.0989 1.7056  1.8445 2.9303 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find significant negative coefficient on FC derivatives when 
they use absolute value of monthly FX exposure. Nguyen and Faff (2003) find significant 
negative impact of FC derivatives on monthly FX exposure and insignificant positive 
coefficient on FC derivatives when they use weekly FX exposure. We find significant 
positive effect of foreign sales on absolute monthly FX exposures. These results suggest 
that for a given FX exposure the revenue from foreign sales makes the FX exposure larger. 
These indicate that the FX exposure of net-exporting firms is appears to be increasing with 
increase in ratio of foreign sales to total sales. For monthly FX exposure Nguyen and Faff 
(2003) find positive but insignificant coefficient on ratio of foreign sales to total sales and 
for weekly FX exposure they find negative and significant coefficient. This indicates that 
higher ratio of foreign sales to total sales is associated with lower FX risk whereas 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find positive and significant coefficient on foreign sales 
indicating that foreign sales increases FX exposure. 
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As reported above more than half of our observations have negative FX exposure and 
hence it is important that we model positively and negatively exposed firms separately. To 
further address the issue and examine the effects of FC derivatives use on FX exposure we 
separately run regression with positive and negative values of FX exposures using equation 
[17] separately. 
Panel C of Table 6-2 presents regression results where we use positive FX exposures. For 
positive FX exposures, the negative coefficient on FC derivatives would indicate reduction 
in exchange rate risk and hence we expect negative coefficient on FC derivatives. As per 
our expectations, we find use of FC derivatives has statistically negative impact on weekly 
FX exposures that suggests that firms’ use of FC derivatives reduces the FX exposure. The 
results are statistically significant at 1% level. The results indicate that a 1% increase in FC 
derivatives use reduces the weekly FX exposure by an average 0.1960 units in magnitude. 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) also find statistically negative coefficient on FC derivatives.148  
Nguyen and Faff (2003) find negative relationship between FX exposures and FC 
derivatives.149 Muller and Verschoor (2008) find FC derivatives reduce weekly and 
monthly FX exposure, however insignificant. Their finding suggests that the use of FC 
derivatives by European firms does not significantly reduce the FX exposure. Zhou and 
Wang (2013) find negative but insignificant impact on weekly positive FX exposures. 
Similar to Nguyen and Faff (2003) and Zhou and Wang (2013), we find positive but 
insignificant relationship between weekly FX exposure and ratio of foreign sales to total 
sales. We find significant positive impact of foreign sales on FX exposure. 
Finally, panel D of Table 6-2 presents the results of negative FX exposures. For negative 
FX exposures, the positive coefficient on FC derivatives would indicate reduction in FX 
exposure and would indicate that hedging is the motive for derivatives use. As expected, 
we find positive coefficient on FC derivatives use however insignificant. Our results 
                                                 
148Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Zhou and Wang (2013) measured effective exchange rate index as units of 
home currency per unit of basket of foreign currencies. Our measure of the effective exchange rate is 
measured in similar way and hence the positive and negative exchange exposures for net exporters and net 
importers are the same.  
149Nguyen and Faff (2003) and Muller and Verschoor (2008) measure effective exchange rate index as units 
of FC per unit of home currency. Therefore, a decrease in the index suggests that home currency is 
depreciating. In their study a net   has negative exposure where as a net importer have positive exposure. In 
our study a net exporter has a positive exposure where as a net importer has a negative exposure. Hence, we 
compare their results of negative exposure with our positive exposures.    
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suggest that neither ratio of foreign sales to total sales nor FC derivatives have any 
explanation power in explaining the variation in weekly FX exposure. However, we find 
that for a given FX exposure the revenue from foreign sales makes the FX exposure 
larger.150 Nguyen and Faff (2003) find insignificant coefficient on FC derivatives when 
they use weekly FX exposure and significant when they use monthly FX exposure. Muller 
and Verschoor (2008) find insignificant results for net-importers. Zhou and Wang (2013) 
uses negative FX exposures and find positive but insignificant impact of FC derivatives 
use on their weekly FX exposures. The insignificant results observed for monthly FX 
exposure indicate that longer horizon FX exposure captures the effect of economic 
exposure that is difficult to hedge with derivatives. Nguyen and Faff (2003) find no 
relationship between long horizon exposure and FC derivatives. 
In Table 6-3, we re-estimate the relationship between FX exposure and FC derivatives, as 
in Table 6-2, using a dummy variable as a proxy for FC derivatives use instead of notional 
values of FC derivatives for absolute and positive FX exposures. Henceforth, we restrict 
our analysis to only absolute values of FX exposures and firms with positive FX 
exposures.151 The FC derivatives dummy variable is set equal to ‘1’ if a firm disclosed that 
it uses FC derivatives and ‘0’ otherwise. The problem with notional values of FC 
derivatives is that not all the firms disclose it and hence we lose firms that do not report 
this quantitative information. In FC derivatives dummy variable, we include all the firms 
that mention quantitative and qualitative use of derivatives and hence we have more 
observations. As expected the coefficients on FC derivatives dummy in both panel A and B 
of Table 6-3 are negative and statistically significant for both weekly and monthly FX 
exposures. These results suggest that FC derivative user firms have lower FX exposures 
than non-FC derivative user firms. As expected, the coefficient on ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales is positive but insignificant. 
Table 6-3: The Effects of Foreign Currency Derivatives Use on FX Exposure 
The table provides regression results of effects of FC Derivatives use on FX exposure using equation [17]. 
The dependent variable is ?̂?𝟐𝒊𝒕 estimated using equation [7]; FC Derivatives is a dummy variable that is set 
to ‘1’ if a firm is FC derivatives users and ‘0’ otherwise; Foreign Sales is the ratio of foreign sales to total 
                                                 
150 For negative exposure the revenue from foreign sales makes the negative exposure larger in absolute 
terms and in relative terms its taking it away farther from zero making it larger negative number. 
151 Allayannis and Ofek (2001) argue that foreign sales create positive FX exposure and in the absence of 
imports data it would be better to use positive FX exposure to examine the effects of FC derivatives use 
otherwise it will create problem of omitted variable. 
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sales. In panel A, we use absolute values of FX exposure as a dependent variable. In panel B, we use only 
positive values of FX exposure. In parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The regressions also include year and industry dummies. 
Variables 
Panel A  Panel B 
Absolute Values of Betas Positive Values of Betas 
Weekly Monthly  Weekly Monthly 
FC Derivatives -0.1355** -0.2292***  -0.1255** -0.2730*** 
 (0.054) (0.066)  (0.061) (0.095) 
Foreign Sales 0.0473 0.0093  0.0081 0.1258 
 (0.038) (0.051)  (0.048) (0.080) 
Constant 0.5261*** 0.7214***  0.9905*** 1.1782*** 
 (0.093) (0.099)  (0.117) (0.183) 
N 3,552 3,573  1,668 1,602 
Adj. R2 0.1930 0.1208  0.1064 0.1141 
F-Value 21.8155 16.0465  10.4394 6.2092 
6.4.2. Controlling for Incentives of Derivatives Use 
The regression results are estimated using equation [18] and presented in Table 6-4. In 
panel A and B we use notional values of FC derivatives and in panel C and D we use a 
dummy variable for FC derivatives use. The regression results in panel A show 
insignificant mixed effect of FC derivatives use on absolute values of weekly and monthly 
FX exposures. When we examine the effect of FC derivatives on firms with positive FX 
exposures in panel B we find significant negative effect of FC derivatives on weekly FX 
exposure suggesting that use of FC derivatives lowers weekly FX exposures of firms with 
positive FX exposure. The results indicate that a 1% increase in FC derivatives use reduces 
weekly FX exposure by an average 0.1757 units. The risk reducing effect of FC derivatives 
is absent for monthly positive FX exposure. Muller and Verschoor (2008) uses similar 
models and examine the relationship between FC derivatives and FX exposure. The 
authors fail to find any significant reduction in FX exposure from FC derivatives use in 
their OLS model. However, when they use WLS they find significant reduction in both 
positive and negatives monthly FX exposures. We find that FX exposure increases with the 
use of leverage. This is consistent with Chow and Chen (1998) who find that firms with 
high leverage ratio have more FX exposure. Nguyen and Faff (2003) examine similar 
model using absolute values of monthly FX exposure and find positive coefficient on 
leverage, however insignificant. Muller and Verschoor (2008) also find significant positive 
effect of leverage on monthly FX exposure. 
Table 6-4: FC Derivatives Effect on FX Exposure: Controlling for Incentives for FC Derivatives 
This table presents the regression results for equation [18]. In panel A and B, we use Extent of FC 
derivatives and in panel C and D, we use FC derivatives dummy. In both models the dependent variable is 
?̂?𝟐𝐢𝐭 estimated using equation [7]; Extent of FC Derivatives is the notional value of FC derivatives scaled by 
the firm’s total assets; FC Derivatives dummy is a variable that is set to ‘1’ if a firm is FC derivatives users 
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and ‘0’ otherwise; Foreign Sales is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales; Leverage is the ratio of total debt 
to market value of assets; Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress 
over total current liabilities; Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets; Market to Book is the ratio of 
market value of assets to book value of assets. In parentheses are standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also include year and industry dummies. 
Variables 
Panel A: Absolute Values Panel B: Positive Values 
Weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly 
Extent of FC Derivatives -0.0641 0.0032 -0.1757*** 0.1071 
 (0.063) (0.101) (0.048) (0.142) 
Foreign Sales -0.0169 0.2795** 0.0154 0.4040** 
 (0.062) (0.113) (0.074) (0.170) 
Leverage 0.6063*** 1.2649*** 0.3246* 1.6384*** 
 (0.180) (0.356) (0.173) (0.479) 
Liquidity 0.0595* 0.0695 0.0639 0.1073 
 (0.036) (0.049) (0.039) (0.070) 
Firm Size -0.0752*** -0.1745*** -0.0911*** -0.2455*** 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.018) (0.043) 
Market to Book 0.0155 0.1055*** 0.0298 0.1584*** 
 (0.020) (0.037) (0.041) (0.049) 
Constant 1.3863*** 3.1037*** 1.8028*** 2.9024*** 
 (0.267) (0.542) (0.368) (0.779) 
N 808 808 474 443 
Adj. R2 0.1307 0.1883 0.1671 0.2237 
F-Value 3.4704 6.5925 4.3757 5.4264 
Variables 
Panel C: Absolute Values Panel D: Positive Values 
Weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly 
FC Derivatives (Dummy) -0.0968* -0.2149*** -0.1314** -0.2837*** 
 (0.054) (0.068) (0.063) (0.095) 
Foreign Sales 0.0139 -0.0081 -0.0266 0.1108 
 (0.038) (0.051) (0.048) (0.077) 
Leverage 0.8012*** 0.8088*** 0.5730*** 1.0171*** 
 (0.116) (0.156) (0.135) (0.216) 
Liquidity 0.0257 0.0201 0.0236 -0.0098 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) 
Firm Size -0.0681*** -0.0576*** -0.0502*** -0.0530*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.020) 
Market to Book 0.0017 0.0211* 0.0128 0.0261* 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) 
Constant 1.2287*** 1.3652*** 1.5530*** 1.3860*** 
 (0.217) (0.220) (0.204) (0.305) 
N 3,270 3,248 1,517 1,480 
Adj. R2 0.2493 0.1557 0.1623 0.1625 
F-Value 23.6251 14.8553 11.3874 6.1747 
 
The coefficient on firm size is negative and statistically significant at 1% indicating that 
larger firms have less FX exposure and provides support for the economies of scale in use 
of derivatives hypothesis. Larger firms are more likely to hedge as they may already have 
human resource and financial capital to effectively enter into financial derivatives market. 
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Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) argue that larger firms may have lower inherent exposure 
due to their ability to use operational hedges. Nguyen and Faff (2003) also use firm size in 
their model to determine FX exposure of Australian firms and find significant negative 
coefficient on firm size. In contrast, Zhou and Wang (2013) find positive association 
between firm size and sub-sample of firms that have positive FX exposure. This suggests 
that FX exposures increase with firm size, which is in contrast to other studies and 
theoretical expectations. One possible explanation for this behaviour of firm size could be 
that larger firms have lower costs of financial distress and hence they may have less need 
to hedge. However, as we discussed earlier larger firms are more likely to use derivatives 
and as a result should have lower FX exposures if derivatives have risk reducing impact. 
Larger firms also benefits from international diversification and operational hedging, 
which reduces FX exposure. Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) and Muller and Verschoor 
(2008) find significant negative relationship between firm size on FX exposure. 
In panel C and D, we re-estimate equation [18] using a binary variable for FC derivatives 
use. As expected, the regression results suggest that the FC derivative users have lower FX 
exposures for both weekly and monthly and for both absolute and positive FX exposures 
than non-users suggesting reduction in FX exposure as a result of FC derivatives use. We 
find that the monthly FX exposure increases with the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. 
The other control variables in the model attract expected signs. In particular, we find that 
FX exposure increases with leverage and reduces with firm size. 
6.4.3. The Effect of Foreign Currency Derivatives use on Lagged FX Exposure 
Part A of Table 6-5 presents the descriptive statistics for 𝛽3𝑖𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡−1 calculated for both 
weekly and monthly exposures using equation [19]. The table shows that 3.92% (1.88%) 
and 6.74% (3.76%) of sample firms are significantly exposed to weekly and monthly FX 
exposure at 10% (5%) significance level, respectively. The numbers of significant 
exposure are less compare to Table 6-1, where FX exposures are calculated as the current 
changes in Sterling effective exchange rate index. These suggest that the stock prices of 
majority of UK firms incorporate changes in FX rate without any time delay. However, 
exchange rate changes affect stock return of few sample firms with time delay. For firms 
with positive FX exposure 8.35% and 14.47% of the firms have significant exposure to 
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weekly and monthly lagged FX exposures, respectively.152 Overall, this indicates that there 
are firms in our sample that are affected by changes in the lagged Sterling exchange rate 
index. 
Part B of Table 6-5 presents the results of regression where FX exposure is calculated 
using the lagged changes in Sterling exchange rate index. Similar to Hagelin and Pramborg 
(2004), the results in panel A of Table 6-5 shows that FC derivatives use has significant 
negative impact on β2iSTRt−1 for weekly and monthly FX exposure. This suggests that use 
of FC derivatives significantly reduce sensitivity of stock return to time delayed FX rate 
changes. The results indicate that a 1% increase in FC derivatives use reduces the 
sensitivity of stock return volatility to time delayed weekly (monthly) exchange rate 
changes by 0.1061 (0.1881) units. Panel B of Table 6-5 uses FC derivatives dummy as a 
measure of firms derivatives use. As expected, the results show that the coefficients on FC 
derivatives dummy are negative and statistically significant for weekly and monthly return 
horizons. These suggest that FC derivative user firms have 0.0968 (0.2149) units lower 
sensitivity of stock return volatility to time delayed weekly (monthly) exchange rate 
changes. Together results in panel A and B of Table 6-5 indicates that the use of FC 
derivatives reduces the sensitivity of stock return to the lagged changes in the trade-
weighted Sterling exchange rate index. 
Table 6-5: The Effect of FC Derivatives Use on Absolute Value of Lagged FX Exposure 
This table provides summary statistics for 𝛃𝟑𝐢𝐒𝐓𝐑𝐭−𝟏 in Part A and regression results for equation [18]  
using 𝛃𝟑𝐢𝐒𝐓𝐑𝐭−𝟏 as dependent variable in Part B. In both panel A and B of Part B, we use absolute values of 
𝛃𝟐𝐢𝐒𝐓𝐑𝐭−𝟏, estimated using equation [19], as the dependent variable. In panel A, we Extent of FC 
Derivatives and in panel B, we use FC derivatives dummy as main explanatory variable. Extent of FC 
Derivatives is the notional value of FC derivatives scaled by firm’s total assets; FC derivatives dummy is a 
variable that is set to ‘1’ if a firm is FC derivatives users and ‘0’ otherwise; Foreign Sales is the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets; Liquidity is the ratio 
of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities; Firm Size is a 
natural logarithm of total assets; Market to Book is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of 
assets. In parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and clustering at 
the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions 
also include year and industry dummies. 
Part A Whole Sample  Positive Exposure 
Statistics Weekly Monthly  Weekly Monthly 
Observations 4464 4464  2059 2059 
Mean -0.1550 -0.0672  0.6771 0.9523 
Median -0.0792 -0.0880  0.5018 0.6928 
                                                 
152 The number of significant lagged FX exposures for negatively exposed firms are very few and hence we 
do not report the results. 
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Minimum -4.0802 -3.7525  0.0005 0.0011 
Maximum 2.6078 3.8093  2.6078 3.8093 
Standard Deviation 1.0872 1.2725  0.6076 0.8728 
Significant Expo -5% 84/1.88% 168/3.76%  83/4.03% 166/8.06% 
Significant Expo -10% 175/3.92% 301/6.74%  172/8.35% 298/14.47% 
Part B Panel A: Extent of FC Derivatives  Panel B: FC Derivatives Dummy 
Variables Weekly Monthly  Weekly Monthly 
FC Derivatives -0.1061* -0.1881**  -0.0968* -0.2149*** 
 (0.058) (0.087)  (0.054) (0.068) 
Foreign Sales -0.0190 0.0431  0.0139 -0.0081 
 (0.060) (0.091)  (0.038) (0.051) 
Leverage 0.9464*** 0.9847***  0.8012*** 0.8088*** 
 (0.145) (0.220)  (0.116) (0.156) 
Liquidity 0.0483** 0.0500  0.0257 0.0201 
 (0.020) (0.034)  (0.016) (0.021) 
Firm Size -0.0429*** -0.0542***  -0.0681*** -0.0576*** 
 (0.015) (0.016)  (0.013) (0.014) 
Market to Book 0.0139 -0.0605**  0.0017 0.0211* 
 (0.017) (0.029)  (0.009) (0.011) 
Constant 1.3838*** 1.3853***  1.2287*** 1.3652*** 
 (0.318) (0.363)  (0.217) (0.220) 
N 824 825  3,270 3,248 
Adj. R2 0.2748 0.1760  0.2493 0.1557 
F-Value 7.2979 6.9900  23.6251 14.8553 
6.4.4. The Effect of FC Derivatives use on Exposure to the Euro and the USD Exchange 
Rates 
We use two individual exchange rates Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD to test the 
robustness of our results, as these two currencies are the two most important currencies in 
which UK trade. A report from Office for National Statistics (2013) shows that UK exports 
50% of its services to EU, 28% services to US, 16% to Asia and rest to Australia, Oceania 
and Africa. The report also shows that UK imports 51% of services from EU, 26% of 
services from US, 19% services from Asia and rest from Australia, Oceania and Africa. 
These suggest that UK firms have twice as much export to EU than to US and three times 
to that of Asia. In respect to imports of UK, the data shows that import from EU is double 
to that of US and close to three times that of Asia. Overall, these suggest that UK firms are 
more exposed to Euro and USD and the exposure to Euro is double to that of USD. As EU 
and US play major role in export-import activity of UK, we calculate FX exposure of UK 
firms using Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD bilateral exchange rates. The shortcoming of 
using a trade-weighted index for all firms is that not all the firms in our sample have the 
similar type of trade with other countries as the weights applied in calculating trade-
weighted index and hence may not be relevant for such firms. Again, there would be firms 
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in the sample that would not be affected by Europe and US exchange rates.153 The results 
of this analysis are presented in Table 6-6. 
Part A of Table 6-6 reports the descriptive statistics for monthly Sterling/Euro and 
Sterling/USD FX exposures. It reports that 4.82% and 5.35% of the sample firms have 
significant exposure to Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD respectively.154 This suggests that 
even though UK firms have more import-export with EU, UK firms are more exposed to 
the changes in bilateral Sterling/USD exchange rate. The mean Sterling/Euro and 
Sterling/USD exposure values suggest that the average UK firm has negative exchange 
rate exposure. 
In panel A of Table 6-6 we present regression results where we use notional values of FC 
derivatives as an explanatory variable. We find negative but insignificant relationship 
between FC derivatives use and sensitivity of firms’ stock return volatility to changes in 
Sterling/Euro exchange rate whereas the relation between the FC derivatives use and the 
sensitivity of stock return volatility to FX rate movements in Sterling/USD is positive and 
insignificant. Muller and Verschoor (2008) calculate FX exposure for their European and 
UK firms using bilateral US exchange rate against Euro and Sterling. The authors also fail 
to find any significant relationship between FC derivatives use and USD FX exposure.155 
We find that firm’ real foreign operation, ratio of foreign sales to total sales, significantly 
increases firms’ stock return sensitivity to changes Sterling/Euro exchange rate. For other 
determinants of FX exposure, we find that leverage increases exposure whereas firm size is 
negatively associated with reduction in both Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD FX 
exposures. 
                                                 
153 Jong et al. (2006) show that the use of trade-weighted currency index and individual exchange rates 
works as compliments. 
154 Significant exposures at 10%. The percentages of observations that are significant at 5% level are 2.26% 
and 2.67% respectively for Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD exposures. 
155 Muller and Verschoor (2008) find significant results when they use WLS for firms with monthly negative 
USD FX exposures. They fail to find any significant effect of FC derivatives use on either weekly USD FX 
exposure or firms with positive USD FX exposures even when they use WLS.  
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Table 6-6: The Effects of FC Derivatives Use on Exposure to The Euro and USD Exchange Rates 
This table provides summary statistics for STREURO and STRUSD FX exposures in Part A and regression 
results for equation [18] in Part B. In both panel A and B of Part B, the dependent variable is absolute 
values of β̂2it estimated using following equation Rit =  β0i +  β1iRmt + β2iEXRt + εit where Rit is the rate 
of return on the ith firm’s common stock in period t; Rmt is the rate of return on the market portfolio in 
period t; EXRt is the rate of return on 1) Sterling/Euro exchange rate and 2) Sterling/USD exchange rate. In 
panel A, we use Extent of FC derivatives and in panel B, we use FC derivatives dummy. Extent of FC 
Derivatives is the notional values of FC derivatives scaled by a firm’s total assets; FC Derivatives dummy is 
a variable that is set to ‘1’ if a firm is FC derivatives users and ‘0’ otherwise; Foreign Sales is the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of assets; Liquidity is the ratio 
of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities; Firm Size is a 
natural logarithm of total assets; Market to Book is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of 
assets. In parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and clustering at 
the firm-level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions 
also include year and industry dummies. 
Part A Whole Sample 
Statistics STREURO  STRUSD 
Observations 4564  4562 
Mean -0.2736  -0.0320 
Median -0.1684  -0.0043 
Minimum -4.1266  -3.1584 
Maximum 2.3347  2.6847 
Standard Deviation 1.1035  0.9602 
Significant Expo -5% 103/2.26%  122/2.67% 
Significant Expo -10% 220/4.82%  244/5.35% 
Part B Panel A: FC Derivatives (Notional)  Panel B: FC Derivatives (Dummy) 
Variables STREURO (1) STRUSD (2)  STREURO (3) STRUSD (4) 
FC Derivatives  -0.1162 0.0262  -0.1773** -0.1514*** 
 (0.090) (0.053)  (0.079) (0.057) 
Foreign Sales 0.2701*** 0.0711  0.0439 0.0093 
 (0.085) (0.055)  (0.052) (0.041) 
Leverage 1.2430*** 0.5889***  0.9420*** 0.6032*** 
 (0.286) (0.177)  (0.153) (0.104) 
Liquidity 0.0671 0.0163  0.0404* 0.0089 
 (0.048) (0.021)  (0.021) (0.016) 
Firm Size -0.0774** -0.0535***  -0.0882*** -0.0645*** 
 (0.033) (0.017)  (0.021) (0.013) 
Market to Book 0.0085 -0.0328  0.0292** 0.0102 
 (0.043) (0.021)  (0.012) (0.010) 
Constant 1.1942** 1.6651***  1.8114*** 1.8912*** 
 (0.523) (0.377)  (0.290) (0.205) 
N 828 827  3,279 3,277 
Adj. R2 0.1714 0.1277  0.1490 0.1775 
F-Value 4.3813 2.6462  7.8189 14.2645 
In panel B of Table 6-6 we use FC derivatives dummy as the proxy for FC derivatives use. 
We find negative and statistically significant coefficient on FC derivatives dummy for both 
Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD FX exposure. These results indicate that FC derivative 
user firms have 0.1773 unit’s lower Sterling/Euro exposure and 0.1514 units lower 
Sterling/USD exposure than non-users. We find leverage has positive and significant 
Chapter 6: The Effects of FC Derivatives and FC Debt on FX Exposure 
Vikram Finavker 244 M00281338 
impact on both Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD FX exposure. Firm size has negative and 
significant impact on both FX exposures. As expected, we find that liquidity has positive 
coefficient for both FX exposure while significant for Sterling/USD FX exposure. 
6.4.5. The Effect of FC Derivatives and FC Debt on FX Exposure 
In this section, We estimate equation [20] and [21] using WLS. The regression results are 
provided in Table 6-7. In panel A of Table 6-7, we use absolute value of monthly β̂2i, which 
is calculated using Sterling broad effective exchange rate, as a dependent variable. Our 
regression results show risk reducing effect of FC derivatives and FC debt. In particular, 
the results show that the combined use of FC derivatives and FC debt, the use of FC 
derivatives only and the use of FC debt only have significant negative impact on weekly 
and monthly FX exposures. These suggest that users of either of the financial instruments 
have lower FX exposure than non-users. Allayannis, Ihrig, et al. (2001) also find negative 
relationship between combine use of FC derivatives & FX exposure and FC debt & FX 
exposure.156 Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) find negative and significant impact of the 
combined use of FC derivatives and FC debt, the use of FC derivatives only and the use of 
FC debt only on FX exposure. Chiang and Lin (2005) also examine the joint effect and 
find that FC derivatives have significant negative impact on FX exposure; whereas they 
find that the use FC debt increases FX exposure. Nguyen and Faff (2006) find negative but 
significant impact of FC debt on FX exposure for firms in industrial sector, positive but 
insignificant impact of FC debt on FX exposure for firms in resources sector and negative 
but insignificant impact for the combined sample. As expected and consistent with 
previous studies we find significant positive impact of ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
on FX exposure. These suggest that for a given FX exposure an increase in FX revenue 
increases FX exposure. This finding is consistent with Hagelin and Pramborg (2004)157 
who also find positive and significant coefficient on their proxy for foreign exposure and 
in contrast to Nguyen and Faff (2006) who find negative and significant impact of ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales on FX exposure for all firms and firms in resources sector. For 
firms in industrial sector they find positive but insignificant coefficient. In column 2, we 
                                                 
156 Allayannis, Ihrig, et al. (2001) use a use a dummy variable for either use of FC derivatives or FC debt 
and use it to examine the effect of risk management on FX exposure. 
157 Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) use NE, calculated as difference between percentage of foreign revenue 
and percentage of foreign cost, as a proxy for firms’ net foreign exposure.       
Chapter 6: The Effects of FC Derivatives and FC Debt on FX Exposure 
Vikram Finavker 245 M00281338 
use equation [21] where we control for determinants of FX exposures. We get similar 
results even after controlling for the determinants of FX exposures. Among other control 
variables, we find leverage has positive and significant impact on FX exposure. 
In panel B of Table 6-7, we use absolute value of monthly β̂2i calculated using 
Sterling/Euro bilateral exchange rate as a dependent variable. The results of equation [20] 
presented in column 3, show that the combined use of FC derivatives and Euro debt, the 
use of FC derivatives only and the use of Euro debt only has significant negative impact on 
Sterling/Euro FX exposure. We find significant positive coefficient on foreign sales 
suggesting foreign sales increases Sterling/Euro FX exposure. The regression results of 
equation [21] presented in column 4, show that results consistent with our previous results 
and suggest that the use of financial instruments is associated with a reduction in 
Sterling/Euro FX exposure for a user firm. 
In panel C of Table 6-7, we use absolute value of monthly β̂2i calculated using 
Sterling/USD bilateral exchange rate as a dependent variable. The results in column 5 
show significant negative impact of combined use of FC derivatives and US debt on 
Sterling/USD FX exposure. We also find significant negative impact of FC derivatives on 
Sterling/USD FX exposure. These results suggest that the use FC derivatives on its own 
and together with US debt is associated with a reduction in Sterling/USD FX exposure. 
However, we fail to find any significant association between Sterling/USD FX exposure 
and US debt. This suggests that the use of USD debt has no effect on Sterling/USD FX 
exposure. When we control for determinants of FX exposure, we find that use of USD debt 
on its own or together with FC derivatives has no significant effect on FX exposure arising 
from changes in Sterling/USD rates. 
Overall, the results of this section show that the use of FC debt is an important part of risk 
management for UK non-financial firms as the use of FC debt is associated with reduction 
in FX exposure. The results also suggest that for UK non-financial firms the debt 
denominated in Euro is more valuable as its use reduces FX exposure arising from 
unanticipated movement in Sterling/Euro; whereas USD debt has no significant effect on 
FX exposure arising from unanticipated movement in Sterling/USD exchange rate. 
 
Table 6-7: The Effect of FC Derivatives and FC Debt on FX Exposure (WLS) 
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This table provides WLS regression results. In columns 1, 3 and 5 we use equation [20] and in columns 2, 4 and 
6 we use equation [21]. In panel A, the dependent variable is absolute values of monthly β̂2it estimated using 
Sterling broad index using equation [7]; In panel B, the dependent variable is absolute values of monthly β̂2it 
estimated using Sterling/Euro bilateral exchange rate using equation [7]; In panel C, the dependent variable is 
absolute values of monthly β̂2it estimated using Sterling/USD bilateral exchange rate using equation [7]; FC 
Derivatives and FC Debt is dummy set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses both FC derivatives and FC debt and ‘0’  
otherwise; FC Derivatives only is a dummy set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives but not FC debt and ‘0’  
otherwise; FC Debt only is a dummy set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC debt but not FC derivatives and ‘0’  
otherwise; Foreign Sales is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market 
value of assets; Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total 
current liabilities; Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets; Market to Book is the ratio of market value 
of assets to book value of assets. In parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also include 
year and industry dummies. 
Variables 
Panel A: Broad Index  Panel B: Sterling/Euro  Panel C: Sterling/USD 
1 2  3 4  5 6 
FC Derivatives and FC Debt Dummy -1.5682*** -0.5879***       
 (0.143) (0.122)       
FC Derivatives Only Dummy -1.9330*** -1.0791***       
 (0.179) (0.148)       
FC Debt Only Dummy -1.6811*** -1.0173***       
 (0.279) (0.251)       
FC Derivatives and EU Debt Dummy    -0.4826** -0.2880*    
    (0.202) (0.153)    
FC Derivatives Only Dummy    -0.5764*** -0.4228***    
    (0.188) (0.140)    
EU Debt Only Dummy    -0.4330* -0.4380**    
    (0.232) (0.188)    
FC Derivatives and US Debt Dummy       -0.2608*** -0.1161 
       (0.076) (0.071) 
FC Derivatives Only Dummy       -0.2222*** -0.1293* 
       (0.078) (0.072) 
US Debt Only Dummy       -0.0393 -0.0224 
       (0.112) (0.106) 
Foreign Sales 1.0081*** 0.6534***  0.1775* 0.0840  0.0869* 0.0484 
 (0.122) (0.136)  (0.106) (0.081)  (0.045) (0.042) 
Leverage  2.7858***   1.6331***   0.6470*** 
  (0.266)   (0.236)   (0.103) 
Liquidity  -0.0625   0.0553**   0.0047 
  (0.051)   (0.026)   (0.015) 
Firm Size  -0.4266***   -0.1597***   -0.0983*** 
  (0.034)   (0.023)   (0.010) 
Market to Book  0.0566   0.0663***   0.0098 
  (0.039)   (0.016)   (0.013) 
Constant 1.6188*** 6.3101***  1.3296*** 2.8470***  1.2658*** 2.3619*** 
 (0.226) (0.518)  (0.228) (0.302)  (0.100) (0.171) 
N 2,536 2,414  2,537 2,414  2,535 2,412 
Adj. R2 0.7634 0.7828  0.1263 0.2417  0.1182 0.1809 
F-Value 293.6095 135.1687  6.9130 10.6988  11.8303 15.9477 
6.4.6. The Effect of Extent of FC Debt on FX Exposure 
We have also collected data on percentage of debt denominated in FC and use it to 
examine the effect of extent of FC debt use on FX exposure. In Table 6-8 we use equations 
[22] and [23] to investigate the impact of percentage of FC debt on exchange rate exposure. 
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We expect a negative relationship between FC debt and FX exposure. We use dummy 
variable for FC derivatives use to control for other interpretation of coefficient on FC debt. 
Table 6-8: The Effect of FC Debt on FX Exposure 
This table provides WLS regression results. In panel A we use equation [22] and in panel B we use equation 
[23]. In both models the dependent variable is absolute values of β̂2it estimated using equation [7]; FC 
Derivatives is a dummy set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses FC derivatives and ‘0’ otherwise; FC Debt is a ratio of 
foreign debt to total debt; Foreign Sales is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales; Leverage is the ratio of 
total debt to market value of assets; Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in 
progress over total current liabilities; Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets; Market to Book is the 
ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. In parentheses are standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The regressions also include year and industry dummies. 
Variables 
Panel A  Panel B 
Weekly Monthly  Weekly Monthly 
FC Derivatives  -0.1547*** -0.2667***  -0.1242** -0.2351** 
 (0.050) (0.075)  (0.053) (0.116) 
FC Debt (% of Total Debt) -0.0096 -0.0814*  0.0076 -0.1808** 
 (0.039) (0.048)  (0.040) (0.077) 
Foreign Sales 0.0268 0.1141**  0.0106 0.0138 
 (0.040) (0.052)  (0.041) (0.073) 
Leverage    0.6743*** 1.1414*** 
    (0.112) (0.202) 
Liquidity    0.0088 0.0743** 
    (0.018) (0.034) 
Firm Size    -0.0525*** -0.0222 
    (0.010) (0.020) 
Market to Book    0.0030 0.0342* 
    (0.012) (0.019) 
Constant 0.8483*** 1.2940***  1.3981*** 1.4417*** 
 (0.075) (0.110)  (0.156) (0.335) 
N 2,550 2,535  2,425 2,415 
Adj. R2 0.1498 0.0786  0.1893 0.2291 
F-Value 11.8692 9.2043  12.6780 10.1751 
The empirical results, presented in Table 6-8, show a significant negative relationship 
between firms’ use of FC debt and monthly FX exposure. The results are consistent with 
our expectation that FC debt acts as a hedging instrument, as we find that the use of FC 
debt significantly reduces the monthly FX exposure.158 We find mixed effect of FC debt 
use on weekly FX exposure. Our results are consistent with Elliott et al. (2003) who also 
find that firms use FC debt to hedge FX exposure. Doukas et al. (2003) also find that the 
FX exposure of Japanese firms declines as the firms engage in raising FC debt to manage 
                                                 
158 It is important to note that FC debt can work as hedging instrument only for those firms that have cash 
inflow from foreign operations and if firms can match cash inflow with cash outflow.   
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FX exposure. The authors use debt to assets ratio as a measure for FC debt. However, debt 
to assets ratio may not be good proxy for FC debt as it is a measure of leverage. On the 
other hand, our measure is more suitable to investigate the effect of FC debt, as it is an 
actual measure of firms’ use of FC debt. Our results are opposite to Chiang and Lin (2005) 
who find positive and significant coefficient on FC debt. Nguyen and Faff (2006) also 
investigate the effects of FC debt on FX exposure for Australian firms and fail to find any 
significant impact of either FC debt or FC derivatives on long-term FX exposure. 
We also find significant negative coefficient on FC dummy variable for both weekly and 
monthly FX exposure. Consistent with our earlier results, these results suggest that FC 
derivative user firms have lower FX exposure than non-user firms. We find positive and in 
some cases significant coefficient for foreign sales. Consistent with other studies we find 
FX exposure increases with leverage and reduces with firm size. Overall, the results 
suggest that FC debt is effective in lowering monthly FX exposure. 
Overall, our results from this section suggest that either the combined use of FC 
derivatives and FC debt or FC derivatives only or FC debt only has significant negative 
impact on both weekly and monthly FX exposure. These results are consistent with our 
expectations and suggest that these financial instruments are used for hedging purposes. 
Our results on FC debt support the intuition that FC debt can also work as risk 
management tool for firms to manage their FX exposure. We also provide anecdotal 
evidence from the annual reports of our sample firms where they mention that they use FC 
debt as a natural hedging tool.159 Collectively, we suggest that FC debt is also an integral 
part of risk management for non-financial firms that can be used to hedge FX exposure 
besides FC derivatives. 
6.4.7. The Effect of Foreign Debt on The Probability of Default 
In previous section, we show that the use of FC debt reduces FX exposure for the user 
firms and provide anecdotal evidence showing that firms use FC debt as a risk 
management instrument. Many previous studies also report that firms use FC debt for 
hedging (Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Keloharju and 
Niskanen, 2001; Elliott et al., 2003; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003; Hagelin and Pramborg, 
                                                 
159 See appendix for more details 
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2004; Aabo, 2006). As established above that FC debt is an instrument for hedging, in this 
section we investigate the impact of FC debt on probability of default along with FC 
derivatives. Probability of default is a measure of firms’ probability of encountering 
financial distress and it is estimated using Merton’s (1974) option pricing model.160 In 
simple terms the probability of default measures the likelihood that the market value of a 
firm’s assets will be less than the book value of its liabilities by the time the debt matures. 
Firms’ probability of default increases if a firm does not have sufficient capital resource to 
pay off its liabilities. Firms’ probability of default may also increase with volatile cash 
flow as it may reduce the value of firms’ assets. One of the reasons for cash flow volatility 
is FX exposure. If firms can manage their FX exposure with FC debt then firms can reduce 
its cash flow volatility and hence reduce probability of default. This suggests that FC debt 
can also be used to hedge probability of default. However, the use of FC debt may also 
result in higher probability of default. In unreported univariate results, we find that firms 
that use FC debt have significantly higher leverage than firms that do not use FC debt, 
which indicates that FC debt user firms should have higher probability of default due to 
more leverage than non-FC debt user firms should. It follows that there are two effects 
behind FC debt, leverage effect and hedging effect, pushing it into opposite direction. If 
the hedging effect of FC debt was larger, then we would expect negative relationship 
between FC debt and probability of default and if the leverage effect of FC debt was  
larger, then we would expect significant positive relationship between FC debt and 
probability of default. We use equation [24] to investigate the effects of FC debt on 
probability of default. 
The empirical results presented in column 1 of Table 6-9 show that the use of FC 
derivatives lowers (has a significant impact on the) the probability of default. In addition, 
the combined effect of FC derivatives and FC debt has a significant negative impact on the 
probability of default. Moreover, the impact of FC derivatives and FC debt on the 
probability of default (-0.9641) is not significantly different to that generated by FC 
derivatives only (-1.0826). However, we fail to find any significant impact of FC debt on 
the probability of default. Collectively, these results imply that FC debt is not having an 
adverse effect on firm default probabilities. Therefore, this suggests that the leverage 
                                                 
160 We source this data from Moody’s. 
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effect161 on default probabilities from the use of FC debt is neutralised by the hedging 
effect162 on default probabilities resulting in an overall insignificant effect. We get similar 
results in panel B when we use long-term default probabilities. When we use the amount of 
FC debt firms use (FC debt as a % of total debt) in our specification (models 2, 3, 5 and 6) 
we also find that FC debt use has no significant effect on default probabilities. These 
results support the notion that the two effects generated by the use of FC debt cancel each 
other out. 
In panel C, we examine the impact of FC derivatives and FC debt on Z-score, an 
accounting-based measure of distress risk. A higher Z-score implies a lower distress risk. 
In column 7 our results show that the combined use of FC derivatives and FC debt has no 
significant impact on Z-score, whereas for firms that use FC derivatives only, the impact 
on Z-score is positive, suggesting that derivatives use lowers the risk of default. For firms 
using FC debt the coefficient is negative but insignificant suggesting that the hedging and 
leverage effects (of FC debt) neutralise each other. The results in columns 8 and 9 suggest 
that firms using more FC debt have significantly lower Z-score, which implies that the 
leverage effect of FC debt outweighs the hedging effect. Our results suggest that the 
hedging effect of the use of derivatives is statistically weaker when we use Z-score; which 
may be because it is a pre-derivative use measure and it does not fully incorporate the 
effects of derivatives; whereas the leverage effect from FC debt use will be fully reflected 
in a firm’s balance sheet and is therefore more likely to be picked up by the Z-score 
measure. 
Overall, our results suggest that firms that use FC debt likely to have lower Z-score but not 
different probability of default. These results combined with our earlier results suggest that 
FC debt can be used to manage FX exposure without increasing overall probability of 
default due to increased leverage. This finding is important as the average firm in our 
sample has 46% of FC debt usage. Judge (2006a) and Bartram et al. (2009) show that large 
number of UK firms use FC debt. Bartram et al. (2009) show that 85.6% of their UK 
                                                 
161 Clark and Judge (2009) show firms use of FC debt for hedging also increases the possibility of increased 
leverage if the FC strengthens against home currency. They find that firms with high leverage use currency 
swap to match their foreign assets with foreign liabilities instead of issuing new debt. 
162 Many previous studies find that firms use FC debt for hedging and its use reduces FX exposure 
(Allayannis, Brown, et al., 2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001; Elliott et al., 
2003; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003; Hagelin and Pramborg, 2004; Bartram et al., 2009) 
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sample uses FC debt whereas Judge (2006a) finds that 65.8% of UK sample firms use FC 
debt. The advantage of using FC debt as opposed to domestic debt is that FC debt also 
works as hedge for FX exposure by matching foreign assets with foreign liabilities and FC 
debt is also cheaper to obtain than domestic debt (Keloharju and Niskanen, 2001). Our 
results suggest that the combined use of FC derivatives and FC debt and FC derivatives 
only is associated with reduction in probability of default. 
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Table 6-9: Effects of FC Derivatives and FC Debt on the Probability of Default and Z-score 
This table provides regression results of equation [24] using OLS model. EDF1YEAR is the probability of default in 1-year time; EDF5YEAR is the probability of default in 5-years time; Z-score is a Altman’s Z-
score calculated for UK firms; FC Derivatives and FC Debt is a dummy set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses both FC derivatives and FC debt and ‘0’ otherwise; FC Derivatives Only is a dummy set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses 
FC derivatives but not FC debt and ‘0’ otherwise; FC Debt Only is a dummy set equal to ‘1’ if a firm uses foreign debt but not FC derivatives and ‘0’ otherwise; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market value of 
assets. Profitability is measured as return on invested capital, which is calculated as the sum of pre-tax profits and total interest charges divided by invested capital. Excess Return is the annual return on the firm minus 
the value weighted FTSE all shares index annual return over the entire fiscal year. Equity Volatility is expressed as square root of number of trading days multiplied by standard deviation of natural log of the daily price 
growth rate. Firm Size is a natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of total current assets minus total stock and work in progress over total current liabilities. In parentheses are standard errors adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regressions also include year and industry dummies. 
Variables Panel A: EDF1YEAR  Panel B: EDF5YEAR  Panel C: Z-score 
1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9 
FC Derivatives and FC Debt Dummy (A) -0.9641**    -0.6074**    0.1064   
(0.408)    (0.247)    (1.092)   
FC Derivatives Only Dummy (B) -1.0826**    -0.7404***    2.5058*   
 (0.430)    (0.273)    (1.319)   
FC Debt Only Dummy (C) 0.1608    -0.0091    -1.8374   
 (0.701)    (0.426)    (1.919)   
FC Derivatives Dummy  -1.0968***    -0.6617***    1.8463*  
  (0.380)    (0.233)    (1.110)  
FC Debt (% of Total Debt)  0.1318 -0.0209   0.1346 0.0420   -1.5755* -1.8382** 
  (0.196) (0.174)   (0.129) (0.113)   (0.889) (0.840) 
Leverage 6.1364*** 6.1559*** 6.1206***  4.7645*** 4.7806*** 4.8439***  -2.8516 -3.3092* -2.1842 
 (1.187) (1.191) (1.063)  (0.690) (0.691) (0.616)  (1.906) (1.907) (1.795) 
Profitability -1.3167** -1.3273** -1.6033***  -0.9416** -0.9431** -1.0648***  21.9865*** 22.1690*** 22.3059*** 
 (0.628) (0.631) (0.613)  (0.415) (0.417) (0.404)  (2.460) (2.451) (2.380) 
Firm Size -0.3995*** -0.4015*** -0.4421***  -0.3291*** -0.3303*** -0.3557***  -0.1613 -0.1780 0.0155 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.082)  (0.046) (0.046) (0.051)  (0.237) (0.230) (0.235) 
Equity Volatility 6.1077*** 6.1029*** 6.1529***  4.4721*** 4.4662*** 4.5210***  -4.8281*** -4.7452** -4.4321*** 
 (0.748) (0.748) (0.690)  (0.464) (0.465) (0.432)  (1.855) (1.867) (1.686) 
Excess Return -1.9716*** -1.9747*** -2.0483***  -1.3303*** -1.3340*** -1.3680***  0.1162 0.1458 0.2649 
 (0.252) (0.252) (0.226)  (0.148) (0.149) (0.134)  (0.549) (0.553) (0.522) 
Liquidity -0.3360*** -0.3376*** -0.2949***  -0.1997*** -0.2032*** -0.1762***  2.6151*** 2.6294*** 2.7793*** 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.085)  (0.067) (0.067) (0.060)  (0.685) (0.691) (0.668) 
Constant 4.0141*** 4.0727*** 3.6989***  3.4778*** 3.4473*** 3.1945***  7.6019* 7.4529* 6.1425 
 (1.088) (1.099) (1.050)  (0.696) (0.698) (0.670)  (3.968) (3.930) (3.787) 
N 2,256 2,255 2,526  2,256 2,255 2,526  2,332 2,331 2,602 
Adj. R2 0.5402 0.5402 0.5439  0.6218 0.6218 0.6255  0.3468 0.3436 0.3400 
Equality Test:          A=B 0.5463    0.3251    0.0142   
                               A=C 0.0618    0.1033    0.2563  ` 
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                               B=C 0.0473    0.0594    0.0371   
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6.5. Summary of Research Findings 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of FC derivatives and FC debt on the exchange rate 
exposure of UK firms.  We also examine the impact of these instruments on the likelihood 
of default.  We first investigate the use of FC derivatives on FX exposure using models 
similar to Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Nguyen and Faff (2003). We use continuous 
and dummy measures as a proxy for firms’ use of FC derivatives. Consistent with previous 
studies and theories of hedging, we find that use of FC derivatives use is associated with 
reduction in FX exposure. Furthermore, our results show that the unexpected changes in 
FX rates significantly affect stock return of around 4% to 6% (8% to 15% for observations 
with positive exposures) of observations with time delay. However, FC derivatives are 
effective in reducing FX exposure arising from time delayed exchange rate changes. 
Additionally, we calculate Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD FX exposures, as Europe and 
US are major trading partners for UK firms and hence the stock return sensitivity of UK 
firms may have higher association with changes to Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD. We 
show that use of FC derivatives reduces FX exposure arising from both Sterling/Euro and 
Sterling/USD. However, the empirical results in relation to the effects of FC derivatives 
use with Sterling/USD are slightly weaker. 
Next, we investigate the role for FC debt, as a natural hedge, in reducing FX exposure. The 
extent of FC debt usage is associated with reduction in monthly FX exposure. In analysis 
where we use dummy variable for FC debt usage, the results show significant negative 
association between FC debt dummy and FX exposure. Our results also show that debt 
denominated in Euro is appear to be associated with reduction in FX exposure arising from 
changes in Sterling/Euro exchange rates. However, the debt denominated in USD does not 
appear to be associated with a reduction in FX exposure arising from changes in 
Sterling/USD exchange rate. Overall, the results suggest that firm’s use of FC debt 
supports hedging motives. 
After establishing that firms use FC debt for hedging, we investigate the effect of FC debt 
on the 1-year and 5-year probability of default and on Z-score. We show that there are 2 
effects behind the use of FC debt 1) leverage effect 2) hedging effect. We fail to find any 
significant effect of FC debt on either 1-year or 5-year probability of default suggesting 
that hedging effect neutralised the leverage effect of FC debt usage. When we use Z-score, 
which we argue is a pre-hedging measure of probability of default, we observe a 
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significant negative impact of FC debt on Z-score indicating a pre-hedging risk-increasing 
effect. Overall, our results suggest that firms that use FC debt are likely to have lower Z-
score implying greater pre-hedging default risk but not different probability of default 
which suggests similar post hedging default probabilities between FC debt users and non-
users. These results combined with our earlier results suggest that FC debt can be used to 
manage FX exposure without increasing overall probability of default. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1. Introduction 
This thesis examined the effects of derivatives use on measures of financial risk for UK 
non-financial firms using a large unbalanced panel data for the period 1999-2010. This 
research is important in light of the role played by derivatives during the recent financial 
crisis, the introduction of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation and more recently 
the prospect of the introduction of the FTT. The extant empirical literature on this subject 
and particularly in the context of the UK is inconclusive on several important questions. 
This thesis was undertaken to answer three research questions: 
 Does the use of derivatives reduce equity price risk? 
 Is the use of derivatives associated with a reduction in the probability of default? 
 Do the use of FC derivatives and FC debt lower the exchange rate exposure? 
An understanding of the effects of derivatives use on UK non-financial firms financial risk 
is an important area of investigation given that the use of financial derivatives by UK non 
financial firms is increasing and if the use is not associated with hedging, then it would 
increase the financial risk of user firms and could potentially have serious consequences 
for financial stability in the UK. It is also important to investigate this issue in the UK 
setting as the bankruptcy code in the UK is creditor friendly which makes financial distress 
potentially more costly in the UK, all else being equal. 
7.2. Empirical Findings 
The empirical work in this thesis was organized in three chapters the findings of which are 
briefly summarized below.   
7.2.1. Does the use of derivatives reduce equity price risk? 
Chapter 4 empirically investigated the effects of derivatives use on several measures of 
equity price risk for a large sample of UK non-financial firms. The impact of all 
derivatives, FC derivatives and IR derivatives use on total risk, market risk and 
idiosyncratic risk was examined for the period from 1999 to 2010. In this chapter both 
continuous and dummy measures of derivatives were employed unlike previous studies 
that relied on dummy indicators of derivative usage. The empirical results of Chapter 4 
showed that UK non-financial firms use of derivatives lowered equity price risk. The 
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results demonstrated that all derivative and IR derivative user firms have lower total risk 
and idiosyncratic risk than non-users. FC derivative users have lower total risk but not 
different market risk or idiosyncratic risk suggesting that IR derivatives have a greater risk 
reducing effect than FC derivatives. Moreover, the results of Chapter 4 suggested that the 
important issue is not just whether firms use derivatives or not, but also the extent of 
derivatives used. The results showed that the extent of all derivatives, FC derivatives and 
IR derivatives is associated with an economically significant reduction in total risk, market 
risk and idiosyncratic risk. These results are consistent with the results of Guay (1999) and 
Bartram (2006) but contradictory to that of Hentschel and Kothari (2001), Bartram (2006) 
(results with UK sample) and Nguyen and Faff (2010). 
Furthermore, the investigation of the nonlinear effect of derivatives demonstrated an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between derivatives and total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
This indicated that low extent of derivatives use as well as high extent of derivatives use is 
associated with a reduction in total and idiosyncratic risk; whereas medium extent of 
derivatives use has no effect on these risks. The extent of FC derivatives of more than 80% 
is associated with a reduction in total risk, market risk and idiosyncratic risk and indicates 
that the low extent of FC derivatives is not useful enough for implementing an effective 
risk reducing strategy. The extent of IR derivatives of < 40% is associated with a reduction 
in total and idiosyncratic risk. Consistent with Nguyen and Faff (2010), the results showed 
that not all the levels of derivatives use is associated with a reduction in the firm risk 
measures. These results are contrary to the results of Hentschel and Kothari (2001). 
An examination of the effect of derivatives over-time on total risk showed that derivatives 
were effective in reducing total risk during the period 2004 to 2009, but had no effect on 
total risk in the years 2001, 2003 and 2010 and increased total risk in year 2000. The 
highest negative effect of derivatives was in the years 2005 and 2006. The negative over-
time effect of derivatives on idiosyncratic risk was stronger and negative for year 2002 to 
2010. Contrary to our earlier results, the over-time effect of derivatives showed positive 
effect on market risk. The over-time effects of FC and IR derivatives on total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk produce qualitatively similar results. 
In this chapter the endogeneity problem, due to simultaneity bias, was controlled using the 
propensity score method (PSM) method. Derivative users and non-users firms were 
matched on their likelihood of using derivatives, propensity score. The simple mean and 
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median difference between matched derivative users and non-users reduce unbiased 
estimation effect of derivatives use on the firm risk and showed that compared to matched 
non-users, derivative users firms have lower total risk and idiosyncratic risk. The 
comparison of matched FC derivative users and non-users and matched IR derivative users 
and non-users reveal lower total and idiosyncratic risk for user firms. These results are 
consistent with those presented by Bartram et al. (2011). 
The combined results of Chapter 4 showed that UK non-financial firms use derivatives for 
risk reduction and that the important issue is not whether firms use derivatives or not, but 
the extent of derivatives that firms use. 
7.2.2. Is the use of derivatives associated with a reduction in the probability of default? 
Chapter 5 provided an examination of the effects of derivatives use on the 1-year (short-
term) and 5-year (long-term) probability of default. The probability of default was proxied 
by the expected default frequency (EDF), sourced from Moody's Analytics. The advantage 
of this measure of firm risk is that it uses volatility of a firm's assets and the possibility of a 
firm's value declining to the degree that the firm will not be able to service its debt, to 
calculate probability of default. Surprisingly, not all the studies that investigated the effects 
of derivatives on the probability of default examine the effects of IR derivatives on the 
probability of default. Chapter 5 extends the extant literature on the effects of derivatives 
on the probability of default by investigating the effects of all derivatives, FC derivatives 
and IR derivatives during the period when one would expect significant benefits from 
derivatives. 
The empirical analysis revealed that the use of all derivatives, FC derivatives and IR 
derivatives is associated with a reduction in both 1-year and 5-year probability of default. 
These results are consistent with findings of Boyer and Marin (2013) and Magee (2013). 
Moreover, the risk reduction effect of derivatives is greater for the short-term probability 
of default than the long-term probability of default, consistent with the notion that 
derivatives are better suited to manage short-term rather than long-term financial risk. The 
results also showed that the inclusion of “other” users in the sample of non-users 
underestimates the actual effect of derivatives on the probability of default. Consistent with 
hedging theories, the results showed that two types of derivatives use have higher risk 
reduction effect on the probability of default than one type of derivatives use. Further 
investigation revealed that in one type of derivatives use, FC and IR derivatives use is 
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associated with a reduction in the probability of default; whereas, the use of CP derivatives 
has no effect on the probability of default. The results also revealed that the combination of 
IR & FC and IR & CP is associated with a reduction in the probability of default and also 
highlight that IR derivatives have greater negative effect on the probability of default than 
FC derivatives. 
Chapter 5 also examined the importance of derivatives during a period of heightened credit 
risk, financial crisis and for firms with different levels of accounting-based risk. The 
interaction of derivatives with credit risk conditions showed that derivatives are most 
beneficial to the firms during periods of higher financial and credit risk measured by 
variables such as aggregate corporate capital gearing and the corporate default spread.  
When we interacted our derivatives dummy with year dummies we found that derivatives 
were highly beneficial during periods of economic slowdown such as the years 2000-2001 
and during the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009. Derivatives use was more beneficial 
during the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 than the economic crisis of 2000-2001. 
Derivatives use during the period of favourable economic conditions either increased or 
had no effect on the probability of default. The results indicated that the effect of 
derivatives on the probability of default is time varying. The interaction of derivatives with 
Z-score, accounting-based measure of risk, revealed that derivatives are more beneficial 
for firms with lower pre-derivatives Z-score, firms with greater risk of financial distress, 
than firms with higher pre-derivatives Z-score. The separate investigation of FC and IR 
derivatives use revealed similar benefits for user firms. 
The problem of simultaneity between the extent of derivatives use, probability of default 
and leverage was addressed using 2SLS and GMM-IV methods. The results of 
instrumental variable analysis supported the risk reducing effect of derivatives. Several 
tests of instruments validity suggested that the instruments used possessed properties 
required by valid instruments. Endogeneity and self-selection bias problems were also 
controlled using matching methods. In particular, propensity score (PSM) and coarsened 
exact matching (CEM) methods were used. In the PSM method derivatives users and non-
users are matched on a single score based on their likelihood of using derivatives and in 
CEM method covariates are first coarsened and then derivative users are exactly matched 
with non-users on the coarsened data. Several matching algorithms were used to match 
derivative users with non-users on the estimated propensity score. The results of PSM 
showed that derivative users had lower average probabilities of default than matched non-
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users across various matching algorithms for both short-term and long-term default 
probabilities. These results are similar to Bartram et al. (2011). The results were robust to 
hidden bias as suggested by sensitivity analysis. The CEM removes the imbalance from the 
data and makes the derivative users and non-users firms more comparable. The results of 
imbalance before and after matching showed a large reduction in imbalance improving the 
data for better estimation effect of derivatives use. The results showed significant negative 
effect of derivatives use on the probability of default after matching derivative users and 
non-users using CEM. Furthermore, the results of treatment effect, which is also used for 
controlling the self-selection bias, confirmed the negative effect of derivatives on the 
probability of default. 
The results in Chapter 5 provided strong evidence that the use of derivatives by UK non-
financial firms is associated with a reduction in the probability of default. The empirical 
analysis also showed that IR derivatives use had a greater risk reducing effect on the 
probability of default than FC derivatives use. The effect of derivatives use is also time 
varying with significant risk reduction during periods of economic and financial crisis. The 
results also showed that derivatives were more beneficial to firms that had higher pre-
derivative financial distress risk measured by Z-score and during periods of heightened 
credit risk conditions. 
7.2.3. Do the use of FC derivatives and FC debt lower the exchange rate exposure? 
Chapter 6 investigated the effects of FC derivatives on FX exposure for a large sample of 
UK non-financial firms for the period 1999-2010. This chapter also sought to investigate 
whether FC debt could be used as a hedging tool by examining the effects of FC debt on 
FX exposure, the probability of default and Z-score. The use of FC derivatives and FC debt 
was measured using both a continuous and a dummy measure. The analysis in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 showed that UK non-financial firms are largely exposed to foreign exchange 
exposure due to higher foreign sales, foreign income and foreign assets. Unlike previous 
studies FX exposure was calculated in several ways and the effects of FC derivatives was 
examined on each of them. Firm's FX exposures were calculated using a trade-weighted 
Sterling index, lagged trade-weighted Sterling index, bilateral Sterling/Euro exchange rates 
and bilateral Sterling/USD exchange rates.  
The analysis showed that a number of UK non-financial firms were significantly exposed 
to FX exposure.  The majority of firms had positive FX exposure which suggested that an 
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appreciation of the pound would unfavorably affect a firms cash flow than a depreciation 
of pound. The results showed a relatively weak effect of the extent of FC derivatives on 
contemporaneous FX exposure. When the examination was repeated with a decision to use 
FC derivatives, the results showed a strong negative effect of FC derivatives on 
contemporaneous FX exposure suggesting a reduction  in FX exposure consistent with 
findings of Allayannis and Ofek (2001). The examination of lagged FX exposure revealed 
that the stock returns of a small number of UK non-financial firms were sensitive to lagged 
changes in FX exposure. The stock return of these firms takes time to react to the changes 
in FX exposure. The analysis revealed that the use of FC derivatives lowers the sensitivity 
of stock return to lagged changes in FX rates. Stock return sensitivity to Sterling/Euro and 
Sterling/USD was calculated after looking at the UK export-import data. Few sample firms 
are significantly exposed to FX exposures arising from the unanticipated changes in 
Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD. However, the decision to use of FC derivatives lowers the 
stock return sensitivity of UK firms to unanticipated changes in Sterling/Euro and 
Sterling/USD. 
Evidence from annual reports suggested that many UK non-financial firms used FC debt as 
a risk management instrument. The role of FC debt as a risk management instrument was 
examined along with FC derivatives. The analysis revealed that firms that used FC 
derivatives and FC debt, FC derivatives only and FC debt only benefited from lower FX 
exposures arising from unanticipated changes in the Sterling trade-weighted index.  Also 
firms that used FC derivatives and EU debt, FC derivatives only and EU debt only 
benefitted from lower FX exposure arising from unanticipated changes in the Sterling/Euro 
bilateral exchange rate. Furthermore, the results showed that the use of US debt along with 
FC derivatives lowered FX exposure arising from unanticipated changes in the 
Sterling/USD bilateral exchange rate. However, the use of US debt only had no effect on 
FX exposure. Analysis that used a continuous measure of FC debt showed that FC debt is 
more effective in hedging long-term FX exposure than short-term FX exposure. 
After showing that FC debt lowered FX exposure and therefore was an effective risk 
management instrument, further investigation was carried out to examine the effects of FC 
debt on the probability of default and Z-score. We argued that there were two financial risk 
effects of using FC debt, these being a leverage effect which increased financial risk and a 
hedging effect which reduced financial risk. The empirical results showed that the use of 
FC debt had no effect on the probability of default on its own but if used with FC 
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derivatives then it lowered the probability of default. Combined, these results suggested 
that there is no adverse effect of FC debt on the probability of default and suggested that 
the leverage effect of FC debt is neutralised by the hedging effect. The effect of FC debt on 
Z-score, deemed to be a pre-derivative measure of distress risk, showed that FC debt users 
had lower Z-scores and hence increased firm distress risk suggesting that leverage effect of 
FC debt suppressed the hedging effect. Overall, the results highlighted the importance of 
FC debt in risk management and showed that FC debt can be used to manage FX exposure 
without increasing overall probability of default due to increased leverage. 
Overall, this thesis provided a comprehensive analysis of the effects of derivatives on 
financial risk measures for UK non-financial firms and showed that UK non-financial 
firms use of derivatives lowered firm financial risk which is consistent with UK firms 
using derivatives for hedging and not for speculation. 
7.3. Contribution of Thesis to Existing Knowledge 
The main contribution of this thesis to the existing body of knowledge is the new evidence 
on the effects of derivatives use on firm financial risk measures. This thesis not only 
showed the effects of derivatives on UK non-financial firms risks but also identified the 
type of instruments that reduced firms’ risk, the time period when derivatives are the most 
beneficial and firms to which derivatives will benefit the most. Various stakeholders such 
as employees, investors, creditors and regulators have become increasingly concerned 
about how UK non-financial firms use. The empirical analysis of this thesis provides 
comprehensive analysis of the effects of derivatives on UK non-financial firms' risks and 
fills an important gap in the literature. 
The wider empirical work on the effects of derivatives on firm risk is carried out mainly 
using samples of US firms (Guay, 1999; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Bartram, 2006; 
Nguyen and Faff, 2010; Bartram et al., 2011; Boyer and Marin, 2013; Magee, 2013). This 
shows that very little is known about the impact of derivatives usage on firm risk for UK 
non-financial firms. This thesis argues that UK firms have greater incentives to use 
derivatives for risk reduction than say US firms in part due the creditor friendly bankruptcy 
code in the UK and hence provides a good rationale for examining the effects of 
derivatives use. The results of this thesis show that UK non-financial firms’ use of 
derivatives lowers firm risk and suggests that UK firms use derivatives for hedging and not 
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for speculation. In this way the thesis makes a strong contribution to the existing corporate 
hedging literature. 
This thesis is the first to investigate the effects of derivatives on the firm risk during the 
period of economic and financial crisis and contributed to the body of knowledge. 
Understanding the effects of derivatives during the period of financial crisis is important, 
given the role played by derivatives during the recent financial crisis. This thesis also 
contributed to the hedging literature by showing that derivatives are the most beneficial 
during the period of heightened credit risk conditions and the most beneficial to firms that 
have higher pre-derivative distress risk. 
Moreover, this thesis contributed to the literature that examines the effects of FC 
derivatives on FX exposure. The thesis showed that FC debt is an important part of risk 
management for UK non-financial firms and the use of FC debt is associated with a 
reduction in FX exposure. The thesis was the first to show that there are two financial risk 
effects behind FC debt use, a leverage effect and a hedging effect. This thesis contributed 
to the hedging literature by examining the effects of EU debt and US debt on the FX 
exposure arising from Sterling/Euro and Sterling/USD exchange rates. Finally, the thesis 
also contributed to hedging literature by showing the effect of FC debt use on the 
probability of default and Z-score. 
This thesis also contributed to the current debate governing the introduction of European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation and the prospect of the introduction of the FTT. The 
results of this thesis showed that UK non-financial firms use of derivatives is consistent 
with hedging motives and hence UK non-financial firms should be exempted from the new 
regulations and permitted to use OTC derivatives without any impediments, as they do not 
pose any threat to financial stability. 
7.4. Limitations of the Study 
The main assumption of this thesis is that markets are rational and market prices reflect all 
the available public information. Although this study provides important findings with 
regards to firms’ use of derivatives, it also encountered some limitations that should be 
acknowledged. 
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It is important to remind that this thesis only investigated the effects of derivatives on the 
UK non-financial firms and with reference to other setting, it may produce different results 
and hence external validity is considered a limitation of this study. 
This thesis suffers from the data limitation with regards to derivatives. The data on firms’ 
use of derivatives is manually collected from annual reports and in the absence of uniform 
disclosure requirement different firms disclose the information on the derivatives use 
differently. This could have resulted in misclassification of some firms. However, this 
would not bias our results significantly as the misclassification of users and non-users 
would have similar occurrence. Due to unavailability of import data, this thesis could not 
investigate the effects of FC derivatives on the negative FX exposure without facing the 
omitted variable bias. 
This thesis uses two broad categories of derivatives, FC derivatives and IR derivatives, and 
based on that shows the effects of derivatives on the firm risk. This thesis assumes uniform 
effect for the instruments that are available under broad categories of FC and IR 
derivatives. However, the broad categories of derivative can be subcategories into the type 
of derivative instrument such as forwards, swaps, caps, collars and options for which 
separate effects are not examined. 
The problem of simultaneity bias and omitted variable bias are controlled with 
instrumental variables. The instruments are used based on the empirical literature and 
necessary tests are employed to check for the validity of the instruments. However, 
concerns remain over whether the instruments are uncorrelated with error term. 
7.5. Recommendation for Further Research 
Although this thesis provided a comprehensive examination of the effects of derivatives on 
the firm financial risks it can be extended for further research. The limitations of the study 
show that a further analysis could be conducted using detailed information on various 
types of derivative instruments under FC and IR derivatives. This will show what 
particular types of instruments are more effective in reducing risk. 
While examining the effects of FC derivatives on FX exposure, the thesis highlights the 
importance of operational hedging, which can also lower the FX exposure. However, data 
on operational hedging is not readily available and further research can be done by 
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collecting this data. Further research should also calculate FX exposure using different 
methods showed in empirical research. 
7.6. Conclusion 
In light of the recent financial crisis, derivatives market has come under greater regulatory 
scrutiny and new imposed and proposed regulations are likely to increase the cost of using 
derivatives for non-financial firms. The empirical examination presented in this thesis 
shows that use of derivatives by UK non-financial firms is associated with a reduction in 
firm risk. The risk reduction benefits of derivatives are shown to be higher during the 
recent financial crisis and heightened credit risk and also for firms with higher pre-
derivative distress risk. Due to the increased cost of using derivatives, non-financial firms 
may not be able to hedge their risk and hence would be more exposed to risk. This shows 
that any intervention in derivatives market that would result in non-financial firms using 
fewer derivatives due to increased cost may not be warranted. 
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Appendix 
“In order to minimize the Group’s exposure to exchange rate fluctuations, the currencies 
of its major income and expenditure flows are matched, where at all possible, thereby 
creating a natural hedge against such fluctuations.”(Abbot Group, Annual Report 2006, 
pg no. 23) 
“Where appropriate, borrowings are effectively arranged in currencies so as to provide a 
natural hedge against the investments in overseas net assets.” (Davis Service Group Plc, 
Annual Report 2009, pg no.81) 
“The group invests in property acquired in a currency other than pounds Sterling. In such 
situations, it is the group’s policy to take out loans in the same currency to act as a natural 
hedge against currency fluctuations.”(Grainger Plc, Annul report 2007, pg no. 111) 
“The Group’s objective in managing its structural currency exposures from its foreign 
currency expenditure is to maintain a low cost of borrowings, which provides a natural 
hedge against currency depreciation. “Genemedix Group, Annual Report 2005, pg no. 50) 
“Group policies on foreign currency risk affecting cash flow, profits and net assets are 
maintained to minimize exposures to the Group by using a combination of natural hedge 
positions and derivative instruments where appropriate”(First Group Plc, Annual Report 
2010, pg no. 26) 
“A small proportion of continuing revenues are denominated in Euros. A surplus of Euros 
has been generated over the last two financial years, however, a natural hedge is now in 
place with Euro sales matching Euro purchases” (Filtronic Plc, Annual Report 2010, pg 
no.63) 
“The group finances overseas company investments partly through the use of foreign 
currency borrowings in order to provide a natural hedge of foreign currency risk arising 
on translation of the group’s foreign currency subsidiaries.”(Spectris Plc, Annual Report 
2010, pg no 62) 
“The group does endeavor to match foreign currency borrowings to investments in order 
to provide a natural hedge for the translation of the net assets of overseas 
subsidiaries.”(Euromoney Plc, Annual Report 2010, pg no 17) 
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“The Group faces currency exposure from exchange rate fluctuations against Sterling. 
Balance sheet exposures are hedged to the extent that overseas liabilities, including 
borrowings, provide a natural hedge.”(EMI Group Plc, Annual Report, pg no 21) 
“The majority of Emap’s debt is in Euros due to the lower cost of borrowing. The interest 
arising on the Euro debt also acts as a natural hedge for the operating profits of our 
French business when these are translated into Sterling”(Emap Plc, Annual Report 2005, 
pg no. 12) 
“The Group’s policy is to use Euro-denominated debt as a natural hedge against the 
translation of Euro-denominated assets.”(Christian Salvation Plc, Annual Report 2007, pg 
no. 18) 
“The majority of the Group’s operating expenses are in Sterling along with smaller 
elements in US dollars and Australian dollars. Where possible, anticipated foreign 
currency operating expenses are matched to foreign currency revenues. The excess 
exposure over and above this natural hedge, to the extent that cash flows are predictable, 
is managed using forward contracts”(BTG Plc, Annual Report 2010, pg no. 100) 
“We are exposed to exchange rate transaction risk on foreign currency sales and 
purchases as we believe that active currency hedging does not provide long-term benefits 
to our shareholders. Because a majority of our sales are denominated in US dollars, and 
the US dollar plays a dominant role in our business, we borrow and hold surplus cash 
predominantly in US dollars to provide a natural hedge.”(BHP Billiton Plc, Annual 
Report 2010, pg no 105) 
“100% of our debt at 30 April 2010 was drawn in dollars providing a substantial but 
partial natural hedge against Sunbelt’s dollar-based net assets.”(Ahstead Group Plc, 
Annual Report 2010, pg no. 29) 
“The Group is subject to a cross-border transactional currency exposure in respect of 
trading outside each operating company’s functional currency. Where possible, currency 
receivables and payables are matched, creating a natural hedge. A proportion of any 
surplus cross-border transactional exposure is hedged using appropriate derivative 
instruments”(Anite Plc, Annual Report 2010, pg no. 29) 
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“The Group’s policy is to borrow locally wherever possible to act as a natural hedge 
against the translation risk arising from its net investments overseas.”(Aegis Group Plc, 
Annual Report 2009, pg no. 65) 
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